Taliban bitten by a snake in the grass

[Agnostic Muslim]

Taliban bitten by a snake in the grass

By Syed Saleem Shahzad

KARACHI - The Taliban and their al-Qaeda associates, in what they considered a master stroke, this year started to target the Western alliance's supply lines that run through Pakistan into Afghanistan.

Their focal point was Khyber Agency, in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a key transit point for as much as 70% of the alliance's supplies needed to maintain its battle against the Afghan insurgency.

The spectacular blowing up on March 20 of 40 gas tankers at Torkham - the border crossing in Khyber Agency into Afghanistan's Nangarhar province - sent shock waves through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led (NATO) coalition. So much so that it made a deal for some supplies to transit through Russia, a much more arduous route.

The Torkham success was followed by a number of smaller attacks, and the Taliban's plan appeared to be going better than they could have expected.

Then came this week's incident in which the Taliban seized two members of the World Food Program (WFP) in Khyber Agency, and it became obvious the Taliban had been betrayed, and all for the princely sum of about US$150,000.

Their Khyber dreams are now in tatters.

With friends like this ...

When the Taliban's new tactic emerged, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - which Pakistan's intelligence community says maintains its biggest South Asian presence in Pakistan - sprung into action and staged a coup of its own.

But that's getting ahead of the story.

After coming under intense pressure in its traditional strongholds in the North and South Waziristan tribal areas, al-Qaeda and the Taliban staged a joint shura (council). This meeting concluded that they had to be especially careful of local political parties and tribals who were all too ready to sell themselves in the US's quest to find Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. The council pointed to the example of Iraq, where the US's policy of courting Sunni tribes to turn against al-Qaeda has had marked success.

At this point, the council hit on the idea of taking the initiative and turning Taliban and al-Qaeda attention on Khyber Agency with the aim of bleeding the Western coalition without having to launch major battles.

This was fine in theory, but there were practical difficulties: the agency is the most unlikely place for "Talibanization". The majority of the population is Brelvi-Sufi Muslim, traditionally opposed to the Taliban's Deobandi and al-Qaeda's Salafi ideology. Being an historic route for armies and traders, the population is politically liberal and pragmatist, not easily swayed by idealist and Utopian ideology such as the Taliban's and al-Qaeda's.

So the Taliban sent in its own fighting corps gathered from other tribal areas, and drafted in Ustad Yasir, a heavyweight Afghan commander, from Afghanistan. These predominantly Pashtun fighters consider the Afridi and Shinwari tribes, the natives of Khyber Agency, as materialist and non-ideological, but all the same a local host was essential for their operation.

The Taliban hit on one of the few Salafis in the area, Haji Namdar, as their point man. Namdar is not a traditional tribal, he's a trader who has worked in Saudi Arabia. His Salafi ideology and the fact that he is a practicing Muslim lent him credibility - and trustworthiness - in the eyes of the Taliban.

Namdar came on board, offering to provide the Taliban with sanctuary for their men, arms and supplies along the main road leading to the border area. He gave these assurances to Taliban leaders in his own home.

The Americans were fully aware of the Taliban's designs on Khyber Agency and invested a lot in the tribes to protect the route. In response, the Taliban threatened tribal chieftains, and launched a suicide attack on a jirga (meeting) convened to discuss eradicating the Taliban from the area. Over 40 tribals were killed.

US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte also visited Khyber Agency to meet with chiefs, but out of fear for the Taliban only six tribal elders showed up. It appeared the Americans had been outwitted, but their game was not over.

Anyway, with the Taliban's arrangement with Namdar, the stage was set and they steadily stepped up their attacks on convoys heading for Afghanistan, leading to the capture of the two WFP members and their vehicle on Monday.

Things start to go wrong

Unlike in previous Taliban attacks in the area, local paramilitary forces chased the Taliban after this incident. The Taliban retaliated and five soldiers were killed, but then their ammunition ran out and they surrendered the two workers and tried to flee, but they were blocked.

The Taliban called in reinforcements, but so did the paramilitary troops, and a stalemate was reached. Eventually, the Taliban managed to capture a local political agent (representing the central government) and they used him as a hostage to allow their escape.

They retreated to their various safe houses, but to their horror, paramilitary troops were waiting for them and scores were arrested, and their arms caches seized. A number of Taliban did, however, manage to escape once word got out of what was happening.

The only person aware of the safe houses was Namdar, their supposed protector: they had been sold out.

Their worst suspicions were confirmed when Namdar broke his cover and announced on a local radio station that Taliban commanders, including Ustad Yasir, should surrender or face a "massacre", as happened when local tribes turned against Uzbek fighters in South Waziristan in January 2007.

Namdar said that he had the full weight of the security forces behind him, and he did not fear any suicide attack.

Al-Qaeda and the Taliban immediately called an emergency shura in North Waziristan to review the situation. Al-Qaeda's investigations revealed that the CIA and Pakistani intelligence had got to Namdar and paid him $150,000 in local currency.

The immediate result is that Taliban operations in Khyber Agency have been cut off. This in itself is a major setback, as the attacks on supply lines had hit a raw NATO nerve.

In the broader context, Namdar's betrayal vividly illustrates the dangers of traitors within the ranks of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The fear is that the various peace deals being signed now between the Islamabad government and selected tribal leaders could lead to a whole new batch of betrayals.

The conclusion, therefore, is to go all-out to stop the government's dialogue process with militants and tribals.

Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan

Well... I am not quite sure where to begin with this...

I'll just see what ya'll think.

[Parihaka]

As always, ideology's greatest enemy is pragmatism.

[Ray]

Taliban bitten by a snake in the grass

Taliban bitten by a snake in the grass

By Syed Saleem Shahzad

KARACHI - The Taliban and their al-Qaeda associates, in what they considered a master stroke, this year started to target the Western alliance's supply lines that run through Pakistan into Afghanistan.

Their focal point was Khyber Agency, in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a key transit point for as much as 70% of the alliance's supplies needed to maintain its battle against the Afghan insurgency.

The spectacular blowing up on March 20 of 40 gas tankers at Torkham - the border crossing in Khyber Agency into Afghanistan's Nangarhar province - sent shock waves through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led (NATO) coalition. So much so that it made a deal for some supplies to transit through Russia, a much more arduous route.

The Torkham success was followed by a number of smaller attacks, and the Taliban's plan appeared to be going better than they could have expected.

Then came this week's incident in which the Taliban seized two members of the World Food Program (WFP) in Khyber Agency, and it became obvious the Taliban had been betrayed, and all for the princely sum of about US$150,000.

Their Khyber dreams are now in tatters.

With friends like this ...

When the Taliban's new tactic emerged, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - which Pakistan's intelligence community says maintains its biggest South Asian presence in Pakistan - sprung into action and staged a coup of its own.

But that's getting ahead of the story.

After coming under intense pressure in its traditional strongholds in the North and South Waziristan tribal areas, al-Qaeda and the Taliban staged a joint shura (council). This meeting concluded that they had to be especially careful of local political parties and tribals who were all too ready to sell themselves in the US's quest to find Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. The council pointed to the example of Iraq, where the US's policy of courting Sunni tribes to turn against al-Qaeda has had marked success.

At this point, the council hit on the idea of taking the initiative and turning Taliban and al-Qaeda attention on Khyber Agency with the aim of bleeding the Western coalition without having to launch major battles.

This was fine in theory, but there were practical difficulties: the agency is the most unlikely place for "Talibanization". The majority of the population is Brelvi-Sufi Muslim, traditionally opposed to the Taliban's Deobandi and al-Qaeda's Salafi ideology. Being an historic route for armies and traders, the population is politically liberal and pragmatist, not easily swayed by idealist and Utopian ideology such as the Taliban's and al-Qaeda's.

So the Taliban sent in its own fighting corps gathered from other tribal areas, and drafted in Ustad Yasir, a heavyweight Afghan commander, from Afghanistan. These predominantly Pashtun fighters consider the Afridi and Shinwari tribes, the natives of Khyber Agency, as materialist and non-ideological, but all the same a local host was essential for their operation.

The Taliban hit on one of the few Salafis in the area, Haji Namdar, as their point man. Namdar is not a traditional tribal, he's a trader who has worked in Saudi Arabia. His Salafi ideology and the fact that he is a practicing Muslim lent him credibility - and trustworthiness - in the eyes of the Taliban.

Namdar came on board, offering to provide the Taliban with sanctuary for their men, arms and supplies along the main road leading to the border area. He gave these assurances to Taliban leaders in his own home.

The Americans were fully aware of the Taliban's designs on Khyber Agency and invested a lot in the tribes to protect the route. In response, the Taliban threatened tribal chieftains, and launched a suicide attack on a jirga (meeting) convened to discuss eradicating the Taliban from the area. Over 40 tribals were killed.

US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte also visited Khyber Agency to meet with chiefs, but out of fear for the Taliban only six tribal elders showed up. It appeared the Americans had been outwitted, but their game was not over.

Anyway, with the Taliban's arrangement with Namdar, the stage was set and they steadily stepped up their attacks on convoys heading for Afghanistan, leading to the capture of the two WFP members and their vehicle on Monday.

Things start to go wrong

Unlike in previous Taliban attacks in the area, local paramilitary forces chased the Taliban after this incident. The Taliban retaliated and five soldiers were killed, but then their ammunition ran out and they surrendered the two workers and tried to flee, but they were blocked.

The Taliban called in reinforcements, but so did the paramilitary troops, and a stalemate was reached. Eventually, the Taliban managed to capture a local political agent (representing the central government) and they used him as a hostage to allow their escape.

They retreated to their various safe houses, but to their horror, paramilitary troops were waiting for them and scores were arrested, and their arms caches seized. A number of Taliban did, however, manage to escape once word got out of what was happening.

The only person aware of the safe houses was Namdar, their supposed protector: they had been sold out.

Their worst suspicions were confirmed when Namdar broke his cover and announced on a local radio station that Taliban commanders, including Ustad Yasir, should surrender or face a "massacre", as happened when local tribes turned against Uzbek fighters in South Waziristan in January 2007.

Namdar said that he had the full weight of the security forces behind him, and he did not fear any suicide attack.

Al-Qaeda and the Taliban immediately called an emergency shura in North Waziristan to review the situation. Al-Qaeda's investigations revealed that the CIA and Pakistani intelligence had got to Namdar and paid him $150,000 in local currency.

The immediate result is that Taliban operations in Khyber Agency have been cut off. This in itself is a major setback, as the attacks on supply lines had hit a raw NATO nerve.

In the broader context, Namdar's betrayal vividly illustrates the dangers of traitors within the ranks of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The fear is that the various peace deals being signed now between the Islamabad government and selected tribal leaders could lead to a whole new batch of betrayals.

The conclusion, therefore, is to go all-out to stop the government's dialogue process with militants and tribals.

Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan

A new twist.

How does this pan out in view of what is going on in the badlands of Pakistan?

[Agnostic Muslim]

Posted in South Asian affairs section already Ray. Someone could merge the two...

Here is an interesting commentary on the Pakistani efforts:

INSIGHT: FATA is not about eating muesli

—Ejaz Haider

Counter-insurgency is murky business; very murky in fact. It needs those who can get their hands dirty so the rest of us, the liberals, can eat muesli, show good manners and talk about probity

If it is accepted, as it should be, that effective media usage in today’s world is essential for winning public acceptance of a policy, especially one which relies on use of force or the threat of its use, then the government, in its current effort in Khyber Agency, has failed — again. Consider.

Knives are out and questions being asked: who is responsible for this operation; what and who is being targeted; how would this be effective in putting down the militants; who are these militants — Taliban or local, religio-sectarian groups; is it a charade played out for the benefit of Washington in the backdrop of increasing pressure on Pakistan to do something and the visit here of Richard Boucher, assistant secretary of state for south and central Asia?

Stories from the ground and analyses make various allegations: Frontier Corps and army troops have gone in after an understanding with the local groups; they have gone into an area which was quiet anyway; leaders of lashkars in Khyber are agencies’ boys; once troops pull out, the groups will rebuild their assets; the buildings destroyed by the troops were empty; et cetera.

These allegations do not add up to any coherent criticism and, in most cases, are at odds with each other. But that does not take away from the fact that they are lethal for whatever policy is being pursued.

Here’s an example: one major criticism against the previous government has been that it was fighting America’s war and it used force instead of dialoguing with the tribesmen (let’s not quibble about dialogue with whom, how and through what medium). Let’s now suppose that the current government decided, on the basis of this criticism, to do the following: select an area with the least degree of difficulty; talk to local lashkar commanders and organise an operation; time it to sync with the visit here of Mr Boucher.

If we suppose all this — and this is hypothetical — and juxtapose it with the criticism with which we began this exercise, should the critics not applaud the government for being very smart on the following counts: it has adopted a policy which has brought into harmony two conflicting requirements — making the US, international community and Afghanistan happy without having to kill its own people and getting own troops killed.

No. It is still being criticised.

If it acts in ‘reality’, it is criticised for killing its own people and getting its troops killed; if it plays out a charade, it is pooh-poohed and critics smirk because not a bullet is being fired, no soldiers have fallen, and no real culprits are being arrested (leave aside the fact that in this conflict critics upon critics have tried to tell us that there is only one culprit — the USA — while the Pashtun are reacting to its presence).

Note: This argument itself would necessitate, given international pressure on Pakistan to fight its own people and the presumed injustice of that demand, to play this game and far from faulting the government for doing so, critics should absolutely hail it.

That the government is getting the short end of the stick no matter what it does shows it needs to get its act together.

Let’s now move from suppositions to some facts.

Khyber Agency, far from being a quiet place, has been posing much trouble to Islamabad.

This is what Kathy Gannon of AP reported on May 20 under the caption, “Attacks on Khyber trucking threaten US supply line”:

“Thieves, feuding tribesmen and Taliban militants are creating chaos along the main Pakistan-Afghanistan highway, threatening a vital supply line for US and NATO forces.

“Abductions and arson attacks on the hundreds of cargo trucks plying the switchback road through the Khyber Pass have become commonplace this year. Many of the trucks carry fuel and other material for foreign troops based in Afghanistan.

“US and NATO officials play down their losses in these arid mountains of north-western Pakistan — even though the local arms bazaar offers US-made assault rifles and Beretta pistols, and the alliance is negotiating to open routes through other countries.”

Tankers were being blown up and Pakistan’s envoy to Kabul was kidnapped by criminal gangs in the Agency who then sold him to the Taliban. The situation was exacerbated by sectarian feuding between Lashkar-e Islami of Mangal Bagh Afridi and Pir Saifur Rehman’s Ansar-ul Islam which is many years old but has flared up again in the Tirah Valley. Bagh’s men recently kidnapped several Christians from Peshawar and also tried to kidnap the son of Amir Muqam, a PMLQ leader.

If this is not reason enough to move in and show force I don’t know what is. Equally, to expect that some of these characters will not return to their bad habits or that if they do the operation would have been a failure betrays little knowledge of the area and how tribes and groups operate.

Khyber Agency is bounded in the north and north-west by Mohmand Agency, in the south and south-east by Orakzai Agency and in the west by Afghanistan. Taliban groups have been infiltrating into the Agency to temporarily link up with criminal and other gangs there. Indeed, in a joint effort US-Pakistan intelligence operatives paid Haji Namdar to lure in Taliban groups which he did and then betrayed them. Namdar is salafi and heads an organisation called Amr bil Ma’roof wa nahi Anil Munkar. He makes the usual rhetoric but can be relied upon to deliver if paid well (Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Taliban bitten by a snake in the grass”; Asia Times Online, April 26).

Now we have Maulvi Nazir and Gul Bahadur, two Wazirs from South and North Waziristan Agencies, being put up against Baitullah Mehsud. This is a legitimate counter-insurgency effort and is far more effective than employing troops to attack insurgents from outside. The efficacy of this can be judged from Mehsud’s reported initiative to distribute pamphlets in Miranshah pledging never to fight against Gul Bahadur (see Daily Times, “Mehsud challenged by new militant bloc”; July 2). Earlier, Nazir was used to throw out Uzbeks from the area.

The point is that counter-insurgency operations, which rely heavily on effective intelligence, are not about dealing with angels. One rogue is used to put down another and some concessions are given for controlled activity to one in order to take out the other. This is not the stuff a squeamish liberal stomach can take (Ejaz Haider, “Eroding insurgency from the inside”, Daily Times, June 28).

There is always a downside to this approach; sometimes the rogue one is relying on and playing against another gets out of control. That’s a risk one has to take. When CIA was dealing with Manuel Noriega, the latter was also linked to Cuba and running drugs. But Noriega was useful because he was prepared to provide Contra training facilities to CIA. Examples abound.

Counter-insurgency is murky business; very murky in fact. The situation in FATA requires multiple approaches and tactics even as there is only one strategic objective: bringing the area under control. This will require a running effort, not a one-off operation that can provide us the final solution.

FATA needs those who can get their hands dirty so the rest of us, the liberals, can eat muesli, show good manners and talk about probity.

Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He can be reached at [email protected]

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

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The problem is that these groups on the ISI/CIA? payroll while being pro-Government and anti-AQ are not averse to fighting NATO in Afghanistan.

Pro-Government Taliban leadership at the expense of maverick Taliban/militant/AQ groups - positioning for an eventual Taliban role in the Afghan government perhaps.

[S2]

A.M. Reply

This alleged $150,000 payoff is quite low, wouldn't you agree? Is it possible that for $165,000 we might find others to do the same. And on. And on. Net expense? Sounds far less, even factoring an escalating market for tribals willing to whack tribals, than reimbursing your army for COIN-related expense. Does last tribe standing receive the P.A.'s coup de grace? That may be when we'd ACTUALLY get to see the P.A.

If I understand the author, he's summarized the COIN experience into a few greasy payoffs. I honestly think it's a bit more complex if less murky and clandestine. You know...hearts and minds with a healthy mix of professionally applied kinetics, PRTs, brilliant ethno-anthropologists like David Kilcullen slaving away to decipher the intricacies of inter-tribal relations ad infinitum.

Somebody needs to do some fighting there and, so far, it hasn't been the P.A. I guess we can stop all that "reimbursement" and instead carry over a few suitcases of cash.

[Agnostic Muslim]

This alleged $150,000 payoff is quite low, wouldn't you agree? Is it possible that for $165,000 we might find others to do the same. And on. And on. Net expense? Sounds far less, even factoring an escalating market for tribals willing to whack tribals, than reimbursing your army for COIN-related expense. Does last tribe standing receive the P.A.'s coup de grace? That may be when we'd ACTUALLY get to see the P.A.

If I understand the author, he's summarized the COIN experience into a few greasy payoffs. I honestly think it's a bit more complex if less murky and clandestine. You know...hearts and minds with a healthy mix of professionally applied kinetics, PRTs, brilliant ethno-anthropologists like David Kilcullen slaving away to decipher the intricacies of inter-tribal relations ad infinitum.

Somebody needs to do some fighting there and, so far, it hasn't been the P.A. I guess we can stop all that "reimbursement" and instead carry over a few suitcases of cash.

:) As Parihaka said, the "pragmatists" would definitely be preferable over the "ideologues".

If the accounts are true, then to me this suggests that a CIA-ISI Afghan Jihad style relationship is being reestablished - hence my musing about a possible role for the more "pragmatic" among the Taliban to join the Afghan Government and share power being devised, after the "ideologues" have been routed.

Not that it equals the total amount spent by the US on Pakistan, but the local law enforcement and FC seem extremely happy with how their requests for equipment and weapons have been catered to by the GoP in the run up to this operation.

Ballistic helmets, body armor, APC's, heavy and light weaponry and even some tanks.

A slight aside - the amount of analysis the situation in FATA is getting in the light of this operation (in Pakistan) is quite welcome. The op-ed pages and input from readers sections are full of FATA/Taliban/Operation analysis, and for the most part they conclude that talks alone have failed.

This realization is important, and hopefully will permeate into a larger section of the Pakistani populace.

[S2]

Sharing W/ The Taliban

"...hence my musing about a possible role for the more "pragmatic" among the Taliban to join the Afghan Government and share power being devised..."

Z,

A pragmatic taliban is an oxymoron. These envisioned "roles" are no different than the flawed and continuing accomodation shown by provincial negotiators in NWFP. The taliban will use them to temporal advantage and giggle along the way- as usual. It's like asking a scorpion not to sting.

[Ray]

I. too. don't think that the Taliban can do any constructive governance. They are too gone into religious blackmailing and creating fear that they can have any credible presence in any govt.

If one reads the report of the Taliban having surrounded Peshawar, they say that the citizens are full of fear. Governance by fear is not good governance.

It is better to buy off people within these thugs so that they can turn against their mentors and in the bargain save lives.

[Agnostic Muslim]

Ray, S-2 :

When I referred to the "pragmatic Taliban", I was talking about the groups who, while religious, are not hell bent upon taking on the state when the state is present. The primary motivation of these groups in fighting NATO would be the perceived "occupation" of Afghanistan/Pashtuns, rather than the desire to establish an oppressive caliphate.

The above mentioned primary motivation is something that can be "negotiated" with, whereas the typical AQ/Taliban POV is one that leaves no room for compromise.

If they can sell out fellow "Pashtun religious extremists" for a few hundred thousand dollars, it is not entirely improbable that stability and a cessation of hostilities could be bought in exchange for representation in government.

I am not suggesting any of the Taliban actors on view right now could be the ones to try such an approach with, but the fact that they are susceptible to "worldly rewards" is encouraging.

At the least, as Ray said, the approach may result in gains in terms of fracturing and dismantling some of the groups (especially the more anti-state ones).

[Agnostic Muslim]

A pragmatic taliban is an oxymoron. These envisioned "roles" are no different than the flawed and continuing accomodation shown by provincial negotiators in NWFP. The taliban will use them to temporal advantage and giggle along the way- as usual. It's like asking a scorpion not to sting.

S2:

I was thinking, you guys have your own "scorpions/snakes" accommodated in the Afghan Government.

I am referring to the Panjsheri mafia and the rest of the Drug/war lords making up the Mayor of Kabul's adminsitration.

Intense hostility to Pakistan to boot (I suspect the repeated over the top accusations directed at Pakistan by the GoA officials is their attempt to deflect attention from the myriad domestic problems and ethnic tensions in order to come up with some sort of Afghan unity, by creating the big bad interfering Pakistani bogeyman).

A few more "snakes" in the administration to achieve a balance of power will not hurt, after all Pakistan has to live next to them, and their actions will have repercussions for Pakistan.

On that note however, what is it that NATO plans to do with stabilizing the country and combating the narcotics and weapons smuggling industry if and when the Taliban are subdued?

What future will Afghanistan's nascent democracy have if it is primarily in the hands of drug/war lords?

How long before the next Taliban movement arises to combat the injustices, corruption and chaos that will be the result of perpetuating the rule of the people in power currently?

[S2]

A.M. Reply

That's a rather self-righteous diatribe, coming from a guy who declared that Britain's recent and very generous social aid package, to be directed through the auspices of YOUR gov't, can only lead to the further self-enrichment of those Pakistani administrators. Are those Pakistani "corruptors" Tajik or part of the N.A.? If not, then one might think that you've unfairly singled a group at the expense of others whose hands are no less dirty.

The notion that a Panjashiri criminal cabal is at loose in Afghanistan rather blightly ignores the taliban's (and other Pashtu's) own long association with opium/heroin and the corruption behind which it operates. Further, it's only with great cynical irony that these "cleansers" of man are knee-deep in dope that often travels no further than Iran, Uzbekistan/Tajikistan, or Karachi to find it's end-user among fellow muslims.

"How long before the next Taliban movement arises to combat the injustices, corruption and chaos that will be the result of perpetuating the rule of the people in power currently?"

Your pleas for patience with Pakistan's evolving democratic process is incongruous with your demands regarding Afghanistan and assumptions about "perpetuat"ion. I'm dismayed by your short memory. Do you look to these same taliban for salvation in your own unjust, corrupt, and chaotic nation?

Good luck.

[Agnostic Muslim]

That's a rather self-righteous diatribe, coming from a guy who declared that Britain's recent and very generous social aid package, to be directed through the auspices of YOUR gov't, can only lead to the further self-enrichment of those Pakistani administrators. Are those Pakistani "corruptors" Tajik or part of the N.A.? If not, then one might think that you've unfairly singled a group at the expense of others whose hands are no less dirty.

The notion that a Panjashiri criminal cabal is at loose in Afghanistan rather blightly ignores the taliban's (and other Pashtu's) own long association with opium/heroin and the corruption behind which it operates. Further, it's only with great cynical irony that these "cleansers" of man are knee-deep in dope that often travels no further than Iran, Uzbekistan/Tajikistan, or Karachi to find it's end-user among fellow muslims.

"How long before the next Taliban movement arises to combat the injustices, corruption and chaos that will be the result of perpetuating the rule of the people in power currently?"

Your pleas for patience with Pakistan's evolving democratic process is incongruous with your demands regarding Afghanistan and assumptions about "perpetuat"ion. I'm dismayed by your short memory. Do you look to these same taliban for salvation in your own unjust, corrupt, and chaotic nation?

Good luck.

Nothing self righteous here at all. You have either chosen to deliberately ignore the questions I asked and deflect onto Pakistan, or missed the point I was making completely.

The fact that I lumped the Taliban into "snakes/scorpions" indicates what I think of them, and I do not consider them by any means the "preferred option".

However, the issue I see with your argument is in fact one of "hypocrisy", where Pakistan is continuously berated and criticized for "making deals with the devil", when NATO has done even worse by actually accommodating drug/war lords into the Mayor of Kabul's adminsitration.

I fail to see why such animosity to the idea of accommodating Taliban "scum", that is possibly willing to compromise and cease hostilities in exchange for representation in the government, when you are already accommodating and propping up NA and assorted drug/war lord scum in the GoA.

This isn't about the Taliban being better than the Panjsheri mafia, but that they are just as bad, and therefore the self-righteous histrionics from your side about "not negotiating with so and so" come across as quite hollow.

Yes, yes I know the Taliban and 911 and what not, but that does not take away from the fact that you are supporting thugs, murderers and criminals whose actions contributed to the mess that is Afghanistan and the rise of the Taliban and the support they enjoyed in the first place.

Which brings me to my second point - if and when the Taliban is subdued then what? The leadership in place currently is similar to the leadership that made a mess of things before, and in fact there is plenty of evidence that they are continuing to make a hash of governing Afghanistan.

The future of a stable and democratic Afghanistan lies in a strong ANA that is under the control of and loyal to a central government. However, the ethnic and tribal tensions in Afghanistan preclude any sort of strong central government - a high degree of autonomy and self governance for the provinces is essential.

But if that is the structure that NATO leaves Afghanistan with after defeating the Taliban, why will the drug/war lord provincial leadership allow any central control over and curtailment of the lucrative drugs and weapons business?

Please understand, I am not suggesting that if the Taliban were part of this government that they would be any better, but if the end result is going to be criminals in charge, why not save everyone the pain of drawing this war out an inflicting endless misery on people in the region and just accommodate the "scum" from both sides (Taliban and the 'lords) now?

So what is NATO's plan to avoid the above scenario from becoming reality?

Will it take on the Drug/war lords and fight to destroy their businesses?

Will it spend decades policing and funding Afghanistan's development after the Taliban are gone?

Or will it turn into a "its time for the Iraqis to figure out and resolve their problems themselves - we did our part and got rid of Saddam (Taliban)" campaign, with certain American politicians falling over themselves to prove who is really sincere about "bringing the troops home" and not pouring billions into a hole?

[S2]

A.M. Reply

"You have either chosen to deliberately ignore the questions I asked and deflect onto Pakistan, or missed the point I was making completely."

Not at all. No avoidance. Simply amazed that you resort to the obvious, and to what effect? Corruption, injustice, and chaos? No kidding. Why do you think we're there? Sadly, that's the GOOD story. Here's the bad-

"This isn't about the Taliban being better than the Panjsheri mafia, but that they are just as bad...Yes, yes I know the Taliban and 911 and what not..."

Yeah...and "what not". In the estimation of most Americans there actually is a rather distinct comparison. Here's how I see it. These N.A. guys who you so vehemently complain about are no worse than your own government. You called it- injustice, chaos, and corruption. It couldn't be more apt...or more of the usual that passes for governance in your part of the world.

OTOH, the GoA is also, accurately described by you, "nascent". That gives me hope, unlike Pakistan, which suffers a now long-engrained legacy of corruption, chaos, and injustice. What hope have I there?

Meanwhile, those protege whackos in the Kandahar School of Divinity are an altogether different, mean-spirited and twisted ilk-

[Vinod2070]

Why is there so much love for Taliban in Pakistan? Haven't they tasted enough Talibani medicine in their own nation?

Why is it good for Afghanistan and not good for Pakistan? Isn't it assuming that Afghanistanis are savages who don't deserve are or incapable of democracy and have to choose between the NA warlords and the Taliban?

Why would they be any different now than in the past? If only, they will want to avenge their defeat and support more terror in the region and beyond.

[Vinod2070]

And isn't it disgusting/condescending to refer to Karzai as the Mayor of Kabul? The writ of Pakistan government also doesn't run in many areas of Pakistan after 60 years.

What does that make of whoever happens to be the current in charge of Pakistan?