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CIA Director cites big gains against al-Qaida globally

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  • CIA Director cites big gains against al-Qaida globally

    I hope this is noticed by the public and factored into the election. It appears that the Bush administration's strategy has forced important portions of the Islamic world to confront the practical implications of Al-qaeda's ideology, resulting in its loss of popular support. These and other consequences of the Administration's actions in the WoT, planned or serendipitous, are finally creating strategic gains.

    CIA cites big gains against al-Qaida
    Al-Qaeda is facing setbacks globally, according to CIA chief
    By Joby Warrick
    The Washington Post
    updated 11:18 p.m. PT, Thurs., May. 29, 2008

    Less than a year after his agency warned of new threats from a resurgent al-Qaeda, CIA Director Michael V. Hayden now portrays the terrorist movement as essentially defeated in Iraq and Saudi Arabia and on the defensive throughout much of the rest of the world, including in its presumed haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
    In a strikingly upbeat assessment, the CIA chief cited major gains against al-Qaeda's allies in the Middle East and an increasingly successful campaign to destabilize the group's core leadership.

    While cautioning that al-Qaeda remains a serious threat, Hayden said Osama bin Laden is losing the battle for hearts and minds in the Islamic world and has largely forfeited his ability to exploit the Iraq war to recruit adherents. Two years ago, a CIA study concluded that the U.S.-led war had become a propaganda and marketing bonanza for al-Qaeda, generating cash donations and legions of volunteers.

    All that has changed, Hayden said in an interview with The Washington Post this week that coincided with the start of his third year at the helm of the CIA.

    "On balance, we are doing pretty well," he said, ticking down a list of accomplishments: "Near strategic defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Near strategic defeat for al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Significant setbacks for al-Qaeda globally — and here I'm going to use the word 'ideologically' — as a lot of the Islamic world pushes back on their form of Islam," he said.

    'Own worst enemy'
    The sense of shifting tides in the terrorism fight is shared by a number of terrorism experts, though some caution that it is too early to tell whether the gains are permanent. Some credit Hayden and other U.S. intelligence leaders for going on the offensive against al-Qaeda in the area along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, where the tempo of Predator strikes has dramatically increased from previous years. But analysts say the United States has caught some breaks in the past year, benefiting from improved conditions in Iraq, as well as strategic blunders by al-Qaeda that have cut into its support base.

    "One of the lessons we can draw from the past two years is that al-Qaeda is its own worst enemy," said Robert Grenier, a former top CIA counterterrorism official who is now managing director of Kroll, a risk consulting firm. "Where they have succeeded initially, they very quickly discredit themselves."

    Others warned that al-Qaeda remains capable of catastrophic attacks and may be even more determined to stage a major strike to prove its relevance. "Al-Qaeda's obituary has been written far too often in the past few years for anyone to declare victory," said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University. "I agree that there has been progress. But we're indisputably up against a very resilient and implacable enemy."

    A landmark study last August by the 16 U.S. intelligence agencies described the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area as a de facto al-Qaeda haven in which terrorist leaders were reorganizing for attacks against the West. But Hayden said counterterrorism successes extend even to that lawless region. Although he would not discuss CIA operations in the area, U.S. intelligence agencies have carried out several attacks there since January, using unmanned Predator aircraft for surgical strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban safe houses.

    "The ability to kill and capture key members of al-Qaeda continues, and keeps them off balance — even in their best safe haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border," Hayden said.

    But terrorism experts note the lack of success in the U.S. effort to capture bin Laden and his top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Intelligence officials say they think both are living in the Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal area in locations known only to a few top aides. Hayden said capturing or killing the pair remains a top priority, though he noted the difficulties in finding them in a rugged, remote region where the U.S. military is officially forbidden to operate.

    Apprehension
    The Bush administration has been watching political developments in Pakistan with apprehension, worried that the country's newly elected leadership will not be as tolerant of occasional unilateral U.S. strikes against al-Qaeda as was the government of President Pervez Musharraf, a close ally in the U.S. fight against terrorism.

    Hayden declined to discuss what agreements, if any, have been brokered with Pakistan's new leaders, but he said, "We're comfortable with the authorities we have."

    Since the start of the year, he said, al-Qaeda's global leadership has lost three senior officers, including two who succumbed "to violence," an apparent reference to Predator strikes that killed terrorist leaders Abu Laith al-Libi and Abu Sulayman al-Jazairi in Pakistan. He also cited a successful blow against "training activity" in the region but offered no details. "Those are the kinds of things that delay and disrupt al-Qaeda's planning," Hayden said.

    Growing complacency?
    Despite the optimistic outlook, he said he is concerned that the progress against al-Qaeda could be halted or reversed because of what he considers growing complacency and a return to the mind-set that existed before the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

    "We remain worried, and frankly, I wonder why some other people aren't worried, too," he said. His concern stems in part from improved intelligence-gathering that has bolstered the CIA's understanding of al-Qaeda's intent, he said.

    "The fact that we have kept [Americans] safe for pushing seven years now has got them back into the state of mind where 'safe' is normal," he said. "Our view is: Safe is hard-won, every 24 hours."

    Hayden, who has previously highlighted a gulf between Washington and its European allies on how to battle terrorism, said he is troubled that Congress and many in the media are "focused less on the threat and more on the tactics the nation has chosen to deal with the threat" — a reference to controversial CIA interrogation techniques approved by Hayden's predecessors.

    "The center line of the national discussion has moved, and in our business, our center line is more shaped by the reality of the threat," Hayden said.

    On Iraq, he said he is encouraged not only by U.S. success against al-Qaeda's affiliates there, but also by what he described as the steadily rising competence of the Iraqi military and a growing popular antipathy toward jihadism.

    "Despite this 'cause célebrè' phenomenon, fundamentally no one really liked al-Qaeda's vision of the future," Hayden said. As a result, the insurgency is viewed locally as "more and more a war of al-Qaeda against Iraqis," he said. Hayden specifically cited the recent writings of prominent Sunni clerics — including some who used to support al-Qaeda — criticizing the group for its indiscriminant killing of Muslim civilians.

    Iranian interference
    While al-Qaeda misplayed its hand with gruesome attacks on Iraqi civilians, Hayden said, U.S. military commanders and intelligence officials deserve some of the credit for the shift, because they "created the circumstances" for it by building strategic alliances with Sunni and Shiite factions, he said.

    Hayden warned, however, that progress in Iraq is being undermined by increasing interference by Iran, which he accused of supplying weapons, training and financial assistance to anti-U.S. insurgents. While declining to endorse any particular strategy for dealing with Iran, he described the threat in stark terms.

    "It is the policy of the Iranian government, approved at the highest levels of that government, to facilitate the killing of American and other coalition forces in Iraq. Period," he said.

    © 2008 The Washington Post Company

    URL: CIA cites big gains against al-Qaida - Washington Post - MSNBC.com

  • #2
    Yes But There Is So Much They Are Not Telling You

    Comment


    • #3
      If you have nothing to contribute, kindly leave this forum.

      Comment


      • #4
        The CIA isint a source I would have faith in, remember WMD in Iraq?

        Comment


        • #5
          BudW Reply

          Well get your ass over there and send us the straight scoop. Read the Duelfer Report yet? Probably not. Worried about WMD? Why? It's not in Iraq's forseeable picture, is it? Why was the CIA's assessment reinforced by every conceivable intelligence apparatus in the world?

          Bottom line- He had it. Now he's dead and doesn't. Sounds real good to me.
          "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
          "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

          Comment


          • #6
            Originally posted by S-2 View Post
            Well get your ass over there and send us the straight scoop. Read the Duelfer Report yet? Probably not. Worried about WMD? Why? It's not in Iraq's forseeable picture, is it? Why was the CIA's assessment reinforced by every conceivable intelligence apparatus in the world?

            Bottom line- He had it. Now he's dead and doesn't. Sounds real good to me.
            Somewhat of a misnomer S-2, no intelligence agency had assets on the ground in Iraq, and none had the resources that the US had available: SIGINT, ELINT, HUMINT, the whole range. I still haven't seen a comprehensive list of worldwide intelligence services and their opinions on Iraqi WMD pre-OIF.

            The Duelfer Report says two things; one, that Saddam did not have stockpiles of WMD, and was primarily concerned with defensive balancing against Iran, and two that he retained the capability to restart WWI/WWII technology. Okay, it's not that difficult to create mustard gas or sarin, but chemical weapons warfare is impractical. Saddam was further away from nuclear/bio weapons, and had even discontinued the programs.

            Comment


            • #7
              Herodotus Reply

              What exists are the bare facts-

              Use against his own population and use against a neighboring state.

              Destroyed or otherwise, Saddam wasn't prepared to permit verification as that meant even the implied threat would be neutered. Thus, even in the absence of weapons or active and vibrant programs, Hussein intended to promulgate the belief that such capability AND weapons still resided within his means. It took a war to uncover that bit of subterfuge for which I won't blame neither the NCA nor our nat'l intelligence apparatus. Bluntly, better safe than sorry, especially when we possessed the means to rectify the manner largely on our terms.

              "...one, that Saddam did not have stockpiles of WMD, and was primarily concerned with defensive balancing against Iran, and two that he retained the capability to restart WWI/WWII technology."

              You grossly under-represent the findings. That's too bad as it distorts the report. If you really wish, we can cover Duelfer again. Anybody who reads it and finds the Iraqi government's intent innocuous and benign is delusional.

              No Saddam. No Baath party. No WMD. No threat of regional irredentism. No persecution of Shia and Kurds. All very good.

              Best of all, Iraqis now have the ability to screw themselves via democracy rather than be screwed by totalitarian authority. Ain't pluralistic democracy great?;)

              As to "national technical" means of intell collection, they can and were defeated. We partially premised our ops on the worst case intelligence scenario and best available info. So what's the problem? There's a real eagerness to turn all this into a Perry Mason court case. Bullsh!t. The baathist Iraqi gov't represented an unrepentant and persistent regional threat of the first order and that's no longer the case. I'm greatly pleased with the results.

              As to this article, nobody seemed prepared to question our intell when this fledgling democracy was on the cusp of a OIF Phase IV defeat. I'm not questioning this re-assessment now- good, bad, or indifferent. Not that it matters anyway. It's a snap-shot, and one that would seem to reflect ground truth.
              Last edited by S2; 01 Jun 08,, 02:54.
              "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
              "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by S-2 View Post
                Use against his own population and use against a neighboring state.
                His own people (allegedly) in rebellion and against a neighboring state that rejected his peace offering and sought the total subjugation of Iraq. The use of such weapons against civilians is reprehensible, but use against Iranian troops in the 1980s at the height of the Khomeini Revolution is perhaps a somewhat different scenario.


                Destroyed or otherwise, Saddam wasn't prepared to permit verification as that meant even the implied threat would be neutered. Thus, even in the absence of weapons or active and vibrant programs, Hussein intended to promulgate the belief that such capability AND weapons still resided within his means. It took a war to uncover that bit of subterfuge for which I won't blame neither the NCA nor our nat'l intelligence apparatus. Bluntly, better safe than sorry, especially when we possessed the means to rectify the manner largely on our terms.
                And why did he persist in this myth? Because he was scared witless of Iran and sought to balance against traditional Iranian hegemonic desires, and temper radical Shiite fundamentalism.

                You grossly under-represent the findings. That's too bad as it distorts the report. If you really wish, we can cover Duelfer again. Anybody who reads it and finds the Iraqi government's intent innocuous and benign is delusional.
                I've read the report, you've read the report yet we reach different conclusions about it. According to the report the US was perceived as less of a threat than Iran:

                The United States

                Saddam did not consider the United States a natural
                adversary, as he did Iran and Israel, and he hoped
                that Iraq might again enjoy improved relations with
                the United States, according to Tariq ‘Aziz and the
                presidential secretary. Tariq ‘Aziz pointed to a series
                of issues, which occurred between the end of the
                Iran-Iraq war and 1991, to explain why Saddam failed
                to improve relations with the United States: Irangate
                (the covert supplying of Iran with missiles, leaked in
                1986), a continuing US fl eet presence in the Gulf, suspected
                CIA links with Kurds and Iraqi dissidents and
                the withdrawal of agricultural export credits. After
                Irangate, Saddam believed that Washington could
                not be trusted and that it was out to get him personally.
                His outlook encouraged him to attack Kuwait,
                and helps explain his later half-hearted concessions
                to the West. These concerns collectively indicated to
                Saddam that there was no hope of a positive relationship
                with the United States in the period before the
                attack on Kuwait.
                Although the United States was not considered
                a natural adversary, some Iraqi decision-makers
                viewed it as Iraq’s most pressing concern, according
                to former Vice President Ramadan. Throughout
                the 1990s, Saddam and the Ba’th Regime considered
                full-scale invasion by US forces to be the most
                dangerous potential threat to unseating the Regime,
                although Saddam rated the probability of an invasion
                as very low. Throughout the UNSCOM period, Iraqi
                leaders extended a number of feelers to the United
                States through senior UNSCOM personnel offering
                strategic concessions in return for an end to sanctions.
                The stumbling block in these feelers was the apparent
                Iraqi priority on maintaining both the Saddam Regime
                and the option of Iraqi WMD.
                • In a custodial debriefi ng, Saddam said he wanted to
                develop better relations with the US over the latter
                part of the 1990s. He said, however, that he was not
                given a chance because the US refused to listen to
                anything Iraq had to say.
                • In 2004, Charles Duelfer of ISG said that between
                1994 and 1998, both he and UNSCOM Executive
                Chairman Rolf Ekeus were approached multiple
                times by senior Iraqis with the message that Bagh32
                dad wanted a dialogue with the United States, and
                that Iraq was in a position to be Washington’s “best
                friend in the region bar none.”
                No Saddam. No Baath party. No WMD. No threat of regional irredentism. No persecution of Shia and Kurds. All very good.
                I would say only the first two are assured. Iraq may still decide to develop WMD capability at some point in the future to counter Iran or Israel (imagine that), and the Iraq-Iran, Iraq-Kuwait border disputes pre-date Saddam and were never fully resolved by his removal. As for persecution of Shiites and Kurds, it was replaced by persecution of Christians, Turkmen, Sunnis, and sustained Sunni/Shiite violence, not to mention more repression against women.

                As to "national technical" means of intell collection, they can and were defeated. We partially premised our ops on the worst case intelligence scenario and best available info. So what's the problem? There's a real eagerness to turn all this into a Perry Mason court case. Bullsh!t. The baathist Iraqi gov't represented an unrepentant and persistent regional threat of the first order and that's no longer the case. I'm greatly pleased with the results.
                I think you overstate the threat Iraq represented, and I think the intelligence did so likewise, which is why I have problems with it. Iraq post-Gulf War and even post-Iran/Iraq war was severely weakened, half the armed forces capability it had earlier in the decade.

                Another country, two decades before OIF had sought and even gained WMD capability (specifically nuclear), was in violation of UN chapter seven security council resolutions, brutally suppressed a majority of its citizenry, and invaded one and had previously illegally annexed another of its neighbors, but South Africa altered its state behavior in part due to international pressure.

                As to this article, nobody seemed prepared to question our intell when this fledgling democracy was on the cusp of a OIF Phase IV defeat. I'm not questioning this re-assessment now- good, bad, or indifferent. Not that it matters anyway. It's a snap-shot, and one that would seem to reflect ground truth.

                What do you mean? Are you talking about no one questioning intel stating how FUBAR Iraq was, well it was sort of self-evident at the time. What is a little harder to ascertain is how a decentralized, religiously driven, non-state supported and non-region specific terrorist organization can be defeated.

                If four guys in Algiers, who never met bin Laden, set off a car bomb and call themselves al Qaeda in Algiers, can we say al Qaeda is defeated? Such a scenario may be unlikely but it is still possible. Qaeda isn't likely to go the Sinn Fien, Hamas, Hezbollah route and go "legit", it just exists to create mayhem. As long as there are young men in the Middle East willing to blow stuff up al Qaeda or al Qaeda-inspired copycats may still persist.

                Comment


                • #9
                  A trillion dollars later 4000 dead, 10s of thousands troops maimed in Iraq for what? because he had chemical weapons in the 80's? where did he get those weapons?

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Herodotus View Post
                    I've read the report, you've read the report yet we reach different conclusions about it. According to the report the US was perceived as less of a threat than Iran:
                    Explain to me why he went after Bush Sr?

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                      Explain to me why he went after Bush Sr?
                      Well no post-war documentation has ever been brought forward to confirm that the IIS was behind this attack. What convinced Clinton of Saddam's complicity was a bomb design similar to other known Iraqi bomb designs, and the testimony of one or two of the fourteen people indicted in the plot that an IIS agent approached them with the bomb. Seymour Hersh did an investigation into it, and found the evidence less than compelling.

                      Plot by Baghdad to Assassinate Bush Is Questioned - New York Times

                      Yes he is biased, but some of the government reports now coming out seem to back up his initial claim. Saddam was trying to remove sanctions, trying to stay under the radar, his support for terrorist groups was muted, he was convinced the CIA had penetrated his regime, etc. However he also wanted to assassinate the former president of the United States as he visited the country Saddam had just invaded, and been forced out of two years earlier, using Iraqi citizens and Iraqi bombs? That doesn't make sense, there's a disconnect somewhere.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by BudW View Post
                        The CIA isint a source I would have faith in, remember WMD in Iraq?
                        No doubt the CIA screwed up irt the WMD's. Althought technically the head of the CIA screwed up. No one knows for certain what most of the analyst really thought. But in their defense, they are right far more often than they are wrong. But mistakes stay with them a lot longer than successes do.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by Johnny W View Post
                          No doubt the CIA screwed up irt the WMD's. Althought technically the head of the CIA screwed up. No one knows for certain what most of the analyst really thought.
                          I do.


                          But in their defense, they are right far more often than they are wrong. But mistakes stay with them a lot longer than successes do.
                          CIA's track record from their inception has been dreadful.

                          Crush it and start over.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            bluesman,

                            what with all the new hires over there, you gonna be crushing down america's newest college campus, you savage
                            There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Bluesman View Post
                              I do.



                              CIA's track record from their inception has been dreadful.

                              Crush it and start over.
                              I disagree. My own experience with the CIA was that they were right 90% of the time.

                              Comment

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