Has the Nuke gone out of fashion?

[Inst]

OoE, can I ask three questions?

First, what is preventing a proportional response doctrine? Let us say that the Soviets cross the border sometime during the 1970s, and the United States responds with tactical nukes. Would it really make sense for the Soviets to escalate the engagement to a full-out nuclear war? I assert no; it would be satisfactory to pull back, to deescalate the engagement, and save face and pride by nuking a few Western targets. Or perhaps I just sound like an idiot.

Second, what is the difference between a tactical nuke and its successors? Are tactical nukes more expensive than cluster munitions? Are tactical nukes easier to deliver? Or are tactical nukes outclassed in every regard?

Third, I think you are the only person on the entire internet who mentions Chinese ballistic missile salvos used to approximate tactical nukes, cluster munitions, fuel air explosives, and earth penetrators. Where can I find more information on that?

[Officer of Engineers]

OoE, two things. One, let's say Putin gets pissed off and nukes an Anti-Ballistic Missile emplacement. Could you honestly say the rational thing to do for the United States would be to respond with its full nuclear arsenal? Of course, the United States might still do it, but I'd assert that the MAD doctrine is irrational as you would be throwing jade for bricks; it's possible to save your nuclear credibility while saving your ass.

This is not the case with the doctrines being presented by both sides. If you've read through the Cold War threads, we have documentation from both sides who think that a nuclear exchange will not be limited. We had thought that Moscow might have been thinking that but they had no illusions.

Second, I think you are the only person on the entire internet who discusses Chinese ballistic missile batteries.

Well, not just me. Andy and CDF gang have been discussing this very much in the past but you know, outside of CDF, I don't think anyone has put this together. In many ways, we are the leaders of extrapolating Chinese doctrines.

Where can I find more information on Chinese ballistic missile battery doctrine?

You won't find much. The data is gleamed from missile battery tests. The Chinese are the ONLY ones consistently doing missile salvo tests. I've only seen one other example and that was the Iranians but they've not done anything since.

Plus, you will find that the Career Path of most Second Artillery Corps Officers are no longer with the nuclear arms but through the conventional arms.

The rest is based upon the weapon's technical data and what they could achieve.

[Inst]

Is it on the old database or the new database, since CDF crashed?

[Officer of Engineers]

Alot of it should still be on the new but it is here also

http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/fie...pla-ssm-4.html

As to your revised second question, I would not classify the new systems as any cheaper than tac nukes since they usually require 2-3 strikes per package to replicate the "effect" of a tac nuke. But the main difference is the pyschological barrier that we do not have to cross.

[m1tch311]

To the question yes and no. Now ICBM and some missiles are increasingly easy to spot with satellites and would be a smoking gun to the nation that fired them (at least to the us). Dirty bombs in suitcases with a high radioactivity are increasing popular with nations who play underhanded..........

[Officer of Engineers]

We can trace any radioactive material back to the plant from which it came from.

[m1tch311]

Yeah i read about that.. And cant we use sat's to see launch or something in that nature?

[Officer of Engineers]

Only where we are looking. We are not watching Antarctica for example.

[zraver]

Originally Posted by Inst View Post
OoE, two things. One, let's say Putin gets pissed off and nukes an Anti-Ballistic Missile emplacement. Could you honestly say the rational thing to do for the United States would be to respond with its full nuclear arsenal?

Yes, without reservation. By making sure there is no nuclear slippery slope where one side it can "trade" damage for some sot of advantage from risking nuclear adventurism.

In 1967 and 73 the USSR loosened the nuclear saber in its scabbard vs Israel. The US in response dropped the clutch and accelerated towards World War 3. The USSR backed off and after 73 never again tried nuclear blackmail. In 91 (it may be apocryphal) the UK told Saddam that any use of gas vs UK troops would lead to an immediate nuclear strike, Israel made the same point and Saddam blinked. Because it can never profit from the use of WMD, nations never use them.

Of course, the United States might still do it, but I'd assert that the MAD doctrine is irrational as you would be throwing jade for bricks; it's possible to save your nuclear credibility while saving your ass.

No its not, the credibility relies in the nuclear weapons state possessing 4 things. A MAD doctrine, launch on warning, a suicidal commitment to it, and the means to act on it. As long as potential nuclear foe believes those three things exist then nuclear war is not profitable. With MAD and LAW there is no way to even bargain away the destruction that will follow. Following your example of Putin nuking central Poland. Before he could even call the President or the Russian missile had even impacted our missiles would already be leaving the silos.

[Officer of Engineers]

Z,

I was corrected on this too. Launch on Warning is not policy. The policy is Launch on Confirmed Nuclear event. I cannot find the thread here but Launch on Warning has been studied by both sides and found to be too destabilizing and not workable. Both sides would take the hit and find out if it was a nuclear event or not before letting lose their missiles.

It was judged that mistakes in detection are too great and far too common to rely on Launch-On-Warning.

[zraver]

Z,

I was corrected on this too. Launch on Warning is not policy. The policy is Launch on Confirmed Nuclear event. I cannot find the thread here but Launch on Warning has been studied by both sides and found to be too destabilizing and not workable. Both sides would take the hit and find out if it was a nuclear event or not before letting lose their missiles.

It was judged that mistakes in detection are too great and far too common to rely on Launch-On-Warning.

Is that across the board, I can't imagine sitting still and not LoW when multiple sats and OHR show multiple inbounds on ballistic headings for military targets or population centers.

[Blademaster]

Is that across the board, I can't imagine sitting still and not LoW when multiple sats and OHR show multiple inbounds on ballistic headings for military targets or population centers.

That would be different but if it was just one launch but not a preclude to a massive strike, then US policymakers would wait till confirmation of a nuclear explosion.

But if you see massive number of incoming bogeys fitting the profile of nuclear tipped ICBMs, then I guess there is no need for Launch on Impact policy.

[Officer of Engineers]

Z,

I tried to find that thread but with no luck but just going by memory, it is across the board. During Carter's Presidency, the SecState received a wake up call in the middle of the night stating that they have positive launch detection of 2200 Soviet ICBMs. He spent 5 minutes trying to confirm with an anticipation of waking up Carter. Carter would be allowed only 7 minutes to make a decision.

As events have it, no other system detected the launch and the decision was to wait for impact. It turns out that someone left an exercise tape in the system. I can imagine a lot of nervous people waiting for Time impact. There was always the slightest chance that the detection was correct.

However, be advised. I am not a nuclear weapons strategist. I read things from others more knowledgeable than me.

[Gun Grape]

Launch on Impact is what made the Nuclear triad so important.

On detection of launch the bombers already in the air start heading for their targets, the alert bombers are launched and do the same. These can be called back, and in the time it takes for impact they would not yet penetrated soviet airspace if it was a false alarm.

The missile farms are waiting for the President to authorize a strike. They are sitting fat/Dumb/Happy. They have woke their partners up in the control rooms and waiting for a message. If its a real attack most of them would be gone, those that aren't shoot the response.

The Subs, some will shoot to make up for the destroyed land based missiles in the first strike. The others are the follow on waves. If they don't get the word to launch, or to stand down, due to a massive strike that wipes all the comm systems out, than at a certain time they follow the plan and launch at their designated targets. Just like in "Crimson Tide"

At least that was the plan in the mid to late 1980s.

Both the Soviets and the US had tales to tell like the Carter one that OoE mentions. I have heard that at one time one side called the other with a "Do you have missiles coming my way? Because I think you do and I'm about to send mine your way. But I would hate to destroy the world on a mistake."

[zraver]

Z,

I tried to find that thread but with no luck but just going by memory, it is across the board. During Carter's Presidency, the SecState received a wake up call in the middle of the night stating that they have positive launch detection of 2200 Soviet ICBMs. He spent 5 minutes trying to confirm with an anticipation of waking up Carter. Carter would be allowed only 7 minutes to make a decision.

As events have it, no other system detected the launch and the decision was to wait for impact. It turns out that someone left an exercise tape in the system. I can imagine a lot of nervous people waiting for Time impact. There was always the slightest chance that the detection was correct.

However, be advised. I am not a nuclear weapons strategist. I read things from others more knowledgeable than me.

Thats why I would want multi-system ID. Thermal blooms of multiple bogies from multiple sats with OHR verification.