India in the red
Raghu Dayal / New Delhi June 15, 2008, 2:52 IST
China is creating a ring of anti-Indian influences in the South Asian neighbourhood that signifies strategic encirclement and containment of India.
The Rise of Great Nations, a documentary telecast recently in China elicited considerable interest among strategy thinkers across the world. Close on its heels, Chinese President Hu Jintao showed up in military fatigues to make an ominous advocacy of a powerful navy for "sound preparations for military struggles" and for the strategic objective of "comprehensive national power" extending and expanding its global presence. China's urge to fly the national flag ever farther afield is evident in its eagerness to demonstrate its rapid "remarkable leap", in the pace and fervour with which it amasses sophisticated weaponry, in the way it equips its 2.3 million strong PLA, and in extending its presence to the Malacca Straits and the Indian Ocean.
The Chinese juggernaut has rolled on for a quarter of a century with its incredible economic upsurge. With its GDP galloping to $1.7 trillion, it is already the world's sixth-largest economy and the world's third-largest exporting country after Germany and the US. Its foreign exchange reserves exceed $1 trillion. Its rapid economic growth has been largely concentrated in the coastal areas. Its long-range maritime interests have drawn it to look beyond being a continental land power to a sea power as well. In tune with its strategy of "oceanic offensive", its ambitions in the Indian Ocean are described in the Chinese circles as "China's next frontier".
China is busy creating a new dynamism all along an axis that spans the continent of Eurasia. The Dark Continent has been wooed with aid to African countries, where it is buying oil and gas, minerals and materials for its bourgeoning industry. It has been busy developing multimodal connectivity all along the borders and inside the neighbouring countries as a strategic measure and to facilitate trade flows. Thus, rail and road links have sprouted along and inside Pakistan, Myanmar, Vietnam and Nepal. Overtures have been made to extend the Golmud-Lhasa rail line, the world's highest railway, to Nepal. The Beijing-Lhasa rail link has serious strategic implications vis-à-vis India's sparse infrastructure in its mountainous territories all along the border in the North-East.
In some countries like Cambodia, China clearly aims to assure its access to natural resources. It has offered loans for a deep-sea port at Sihanoukville that would allow it a convenient delivery point for its West Asia oil imports. Cambodia has granted China the rights to one of its five offshore oilfields. China has also offered a $600 million credit to Cambodia for two major bridges near the capital Phnom Penh that will link it to a network of roads, besides a hydropower plant, and a fibre optic network to connect Cambodia's telecom with that of Vietnam and Thailand.
China has been willing to take on complicated infrastructure projects in distant areas. It has sunk more than a dozen concrete pylons across the tributary of the mighty Mekong river, which will help knit together a 2,000-km route from the southern Chinese city of Kunming through Laos to the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Thailand. China is linked to Vietnam by two rail lines north of Hanoi. Singapore or Indonesia would be linked to the main Chinese south-north trunk rail line, running from Shenzen to Erenhot on the border with Mongolia, or the main Chinese east-west trunk line stretching from the port of Lianyungang on China's coast to Druzhba on the border with Kazakhstan.
China is fast establishing its presence in resource-rich Central Asian Republics (CAR). With its border just 260 km from Kyrgyzstan by road, China's growing commercial force is penetrating the remote lands beyond its western border. The flow of Chinese goods here has increased eight fold in the last five years to over $900 million and continues to rise fast. Its strategic orientation is also reflected in its linking the Xianjiang province with CAR. China's trade with the eight-member Central Asia Regional Economic Co-operation (CAREC) — Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, besides China — has surged from $1 billion to $9.8 billion in the last decade.
China is developing an entire network of rail and highway infrastructure at a very rapid pace. The Korean Peninsula West Trade Corridor link already exists between the Busan port in South Korea and Shenyang in China via Seoul, Pyongyang and Sinuiju on the South Korean side and Dandong on the Chinese side. Some major projects have been envisaged for the proposed Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) corridor, in particular for a nearly 3,000-km standard (1,435 mm) gauge running along the Caspian Sea with a north-south branch of 700 km line across Turkmenistan to link up with the Iranian network. An important TAR component, the ASEAN-promoted Singapore–Kunming Rail Line project, is being avidly supported by China. It will provide China with a valuable pan-Asian rail linkage.
A ring of anti-Indian influence in the South Asian neighbourhood that China has been creating through military and economic assistance signifies strategic encirclement and containment of India. A steady erosion of India's presence in Southeast Asia with China's ascent largely by dint of "hard power" is visible in Myanmar more than in any other country in the region. The ongoing "Yunnanisation" of northern Myanmar is evidence of it. China is busy building the Irrawady Corridor, involving road, rail, river and energy transport links between the Yunnan and Myanmar ports. In resource-rich Myanmar, China is connecting the country's interior to its southern flank. Beijing is currently working on a deep-water port on Myanmar's west coast and has completed the site investigation for a 232-km Lashik-Muse/Rueli rail line in Myanmar. It is busy promoting the construction of the 120-km Kra Isthmus canal in Thailand that would reduce the sea leg of oil tankers from the Middle East by about 1,000 km and avoid the hazardous
Straits of Malacca. Likewise, China is busy completing another strategic corridor on India's western flank. Pakistan has access to Kashgar in China's Zianjiang province. It may have further linkage through Khunjerab Pass and Karakoram Highway to Kashgar.
It appears a clear promoter-catalyst for an important rail project to link the strategic Gwadar port promoted and aided by China and built by Pakistan on its south-west coast as well as an 800-km railway line proposed to connect Dalbandin on the Koh-i-Taftan (on Iranian border)-Spezand-Quetta-Chaman (on Afghanistan border) rail line. The proposal is to extend this rail link to Kashi in China, providing China and Pakistan a direct connection with Central Asian Republics. The rail link built on standard gauge will apparently suit China, while India's broad gauge (1,676 mm) will no longer be compatible with Pakistan's. It will thus isolate the Indian rail link.
These are developments of great significance for India. This is an obvious Chinese infrastructure overload around India – the great feat of a railway in Tibet in the north with the intention to link Nepal as well, a huge build-up of ports, roads and railways on India's eastern and western flanks, and, of course, China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean.
Raghu Dayal / New Delhi June 15, 2008, 2:52 IST
China is creating a ring of anti-Indian influences in the South Asian neighbourhood that signifies strategic encirclement and containment of India.
The Rise of Great Nations, a documentary telecast recently in China elicited considerable interest among strategy thinkers across the world. Close on its heels, Chinese President Hu Jintao showed up in military fatigues to make an ominous advocacy of a powerful navy for "sound preparations for military struggles" and for the strategic objective of "comprehensive national power" extending and expanding its global presence. China's urge to fly the national flag ever farther afield is evident in its eagerness to demonstrate its rapid "remarkable leap", in the pace and fervour with which it amasses sophisticated weaponry, in the way it equips its 2.3 million strong PLA, and in extending its presence to the Malacca Straits and the Indian Ocean.
The Chinese juggernaut has rolled on for a quarter of a century with its incredible economic upsurge. With its GDP galloping to $1.7 trillion, it is already the world's sixth-largest economy and the world's third-largest exporting country after Germany and the US. Its foreign exchange reserves exceed $1 trillion. Its rapid economic growth has been largely concentrated in the coastal areas. Its long-range maritime interests have drawn it to look beyond being a continental land power to a sea power as well. In tune with its strategy of "oceanic offensive", its ambitions in the Indian Ocean are described in the Chinese circles as "China's next frontier".
China is busy creating a new dynamism all along an axis that spans the continent of Eurasia. The Dark Continent has been wooed with aid to African countries, where it is buying oil and gas, minerals and materials for its bourgeoning industry. It has been busy developing multimodal connectivity all along the borders and inside the neighbouring countries as a strategic measure and to facilitate trade flows. Thus, rail and road links have sprouted along and inside Pakistan, Myanmar, Vietnam and Nepal. Overtures have been made to extend the Golmud-Lhasa rail line, the world's highest railway, to Nepal. The Beijing-Lhasa rail link has serious strategic implications vis-à-vis India's sparse infrastructure in its mountainous territories all along the border in the North-East.
In some countries like Cambodia, China clearly aims to assure its access to natural resources. It has offered loans for a deep-sea port at Sihanoukville that would allow it a convenient delivery point for its West Asia oil imports. Cambodia has granted China the rights to one of its five offshore oilfields. China has also offered a $600 million credit to Cambodia for two major bridges near the capital Phnom Penh that will link it to a network of roads, besides a hydropower plant, and a fibre optic network to connect Cambodia's telecom with that of Vietnam and Thailand.
China has been willing to take on complicated infrastructure projects in distant areas. It has sunk more than a dozen concrete pylons across the tributary of the mighty Mekong river, which will help knit together a 2,000-km route from the southern Chinese city of Kunming through Laos to the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Thailand. China is linked to Vietnam by two rail lines north of Hanoi. Singapore or Indonesia would be linked to the main Chinese south-north trunk rail line, running from Shenzen to Erenhot on the border with Mongolia, or the main Chinese east-west trunk line stretching from the port of Lianyungang on China's coast to Druzhba on the border with Kazakhstan.
China is fast establishing its presence in resource-rich Central Asian Republics (CAR). With its border just 260 km from Kyrgyzstan by road, China's growing commercial force is penetrating the remote lands beyond its western border. The flow of Chinese goods here has increased eight fold in the last five years to over $900 million and continues to rise fast. Its strategic orientation is also reflected in its linking the Xianjiang province with CAR. China's trade with the eight-member Central Asia Regional Economic Co-operation (CAREC) — Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, besides China — has surged from $1 billion to $9.8 billion in the last decade.
China is developing an entire network of rail and highway infrastructure at a very rapid pace. The Korean Peninsula West Trade Corridor link already exists between the Busan port in South Korea and Shenyang in China via Seoul, Pyongyang and Sinuiju on the South Korean side and Dandong on the Chinese side. Some major projects have been envisaged for the proposed Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) corridor, in particular for a nearly 3,000-km standard (1,435 mm) gauge running along the Caspian Sea with a north-south branch of 700 km line across Turkmenistan to link up with the Iranian network. An important TAR component, the ASEAN-promoted Singapore–Kunming Rail Line project, is being avidly supported by China. It will provide China with a valuable pan-Asian rail linkage.
A ring of anti-Indian influence in the South Asian neighbourhood that China has been creating through military and economic assistance signifies strategic encirclement and containment of India. A steady erosion of India's presence in Southeast Asia with China's ascent largely by dint of "hard power" is visible in Myanmar more than in any other country in the region. The ongoing "Yunnanisation" of northern Myanmar is evidence of it. China is busy building the Irrawady Corridor, involving road, rail, river and energy transport links between the Yunnan and Myanmar ports. In resource-rich Myanmar, China is connecting the country's interior to its southern flank. Beijing is currently working on a deep-water port on Myanmar's west coast and has completed the site investigation for a 232-km Lashik-Muse/Rueli rail line in Myanmar. It is busy promoting the construction of the 120-km Kra Isthmus canal in Thailand that would reduce the sea leg of oil tankers from the Middle East by about 1,000 km and avoid the hazardous
Straits of Malacca. Likewise, China is busy completing another strategic corridor on India's western flank. Pakistan has access to Kashgar in China's Zianjiang province. It may have further linkage through Khunjerab Pass and Karakoram Highway to Kashgar.
It appears a clear promoter-catalyst for an important rail project to link the strategic Gwadar port promoted and aided by China and built by Pakistan on its south-west coast as well as an 800-km railway line proposed to connect Dalbandin on the Koh-i-Taftan (on Iranian border)-Spezand-Quetta-Chaman (on Afghanistan border) rail line. The proposal is to extend this rail link to Kashi in China, providing China and Pakistan a direct connection with Central Asian Republics. The rail link built on standard gauge will apparently suit China, while India's broad gauge (1,676 mm) will no longer be compatible with Pakistan's. It will thus isolate the Indian rail link.
These are developments of great significance for India. This is an obvious Chinese infrastructure overload around India – the great feat of a railway in Tibet in the north with the intention to link Nepal as well, a huge build-up of ports, roads and railways on India's eastern and western flanks, and, of course, China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean.
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