Could Germany have won WWII

[1979]

Stolfi indicates the German Army CONSTRUCTED 14,000 miles of normal guage and repaired another 10,000 miles of track during Barbarossa alone. ?

I wondering if Stolfi has any ideea what 14.000 miles of rail mean
the whole rail network of the SU in 1928 was 76.000 km or 47.500 miles
in 10 years another 18.000 km or 11.250 miles of track were added.
Westwood, J. N. A History of Russian Railways.
that's about 1125 miles per year or 3 miles per day.

here is another example
CHAPTER 9 — The Western Desert Railway | NZETC

Unless Germans have become Russian and 1944 has become 1941 I fail to see your point, especially in light of the evidence suggesting German acumen at constructing rail lines.

Do you mean surveying the land, bringing up gravel and balast , mounting ties and tracks and driling holes for the spikes or screws. ?
Only problem is that doing that you would not advance at a speed of 20 km per day but 1/10 of that.
Driling new holes in the existing ties and moving the tracks 8.9 cm togheder was the German acumen .
The point is that the soviets can slow the german advance to a crawl by simply
destroying the railways.

As Moscow lies roughly between those two cities it seems your concern may only be valid for 400 kilometers. My distance calculator suggests the distance from Smolensk to Nishny Novgorod (Gorki) is 760 km and 360 km from Smolensk to Moscow.

Too bad roads and rails do not folow a straight line. :)

Thank God there's little of that in August as compared to November..

Good luck defending Yelnia.

It's not as though Soviet armies in the south face no opposition from the 11th and 17th Armies and 1st Pz Group. Moreover, it's not as though armies subsequently raised by the Soviets were even as well-manned, equipped and trained as those which had already proven so inept against German arms.

Soviet armies on the northern and southern flanks of AGC had stark choices in the summer and very early fall of 1941. They could defend (barely) to their front or attack AGC in the flank. Doing one would expose themselves to the other. There's no evidence offered that they could withstand attacks by 11, 17, 16, 18 Armies along with 1 and 4 Panzer Groups while also attacking the flanks of AGC. Moreover, there's no evidence offered suggesting they weren't decisively engaged in late July-early August when such would have been necessary. As such those armies would have found it near impossible to disengage, reconstitute and rearm while repositioning themselves between AGC and Moscow.

I'm not talking about disengage, reconstitute and rearm but about those new 6 new armies that went into the rebuild of the soviet sothern wing after the kiew
batle.
Ignoring kiev in august means these reseves would be positioned in front of moskow not behind the donetz river.

The question which needs to be asked is whether the Soviet Union could have remained a viable threat to the German Army if Moscow-Gorki had been taken in early-mid September and successful operations subsequently conducted on reverse fronts to eliminate Soviet forces along the Leningrad axis and on the southern periphery?

Obviously Stolfi does not need to ask himself that .
I think the phrase he used was "
When the german army took Moskow in 31 august ..."

[S2]

Zraver Reply

"Maybe, but AGC after taking Moscow is in a pickle..."

As the Germans were in a pickle on December 6th in front of Moscow I'd prefer my chances in mid-September. Fair to say, though, that the Soviets are in a far worse "pickle" were that to happen.

"No they are not."

Zraver, it's irrelevant. Typhoon never happens under this premise. Soviet operational reserves for any counter-offensive are speculative under utterly changed conditions.

"Germany's ability to push east past Moscow is doubtful, by then the panzers would have completely outrun the supply lines and the wear on the truck fleet is mounting."

Logistical burdens didn't impede German advances in October nor November sufficient to prevent them ending on the doorstep of Moscow. How do you presume such in better weather without the wear and tear associated with diversions both north and, then, south? Did you miss the part about German railway troops and the Todt organization constructing 14,000 miles of track during Barbarossa? The German Army had STAFFED prior to the initiation of Barbarossa for a logistical plan supporting such an advance.

"...In the historical time line by the time of Operation Typhoon the invaders had suffered about 20% losses in men and 50% or more in tanks and planes and even higher in truck transport..."

Zraver, why the preoccupation with Typhoon? I'm at a loss to explain under this alternative scenario losses associated with diversions of German armor north and, then, south don't occur. Nor the attendant consumption of logistics. Add that back into your calculus.

"...By about 13 August 1941 the Germans had suffered Soviet combat action losses of approximately 12 percent of their original tanks. For Army Group Center, with 1780 battle tanks in its divisions when it attacked earlier in June, this translates into 214 German battle tanks "knocked out" by Soviet combat action on the eve of the hypothetical German advance on Moscow..." (Stolfi, pg. 164)

"...The German reserve army was depleted..."

The German reserve army had estimated 275,000 casualties through August, 1941. Those forces were available in the field replacement battalions and Field Replacement Army. In fact, German casualties through this period were 257,000. It would appear, therefore, that adequate personnel preparations had been made.

"...On 23 August, approximately when it would have been closing in on Moscow under the hypothetical direct advance, and after fighting a series of [actual]hard battles (Roslavl, Rogachev, and Gomel) to open the way south, Panzer Group Guderian controlled eight divisions averaging 12,543 men, each at "engagement strength". The divisions had additional men in unevacuated, lightly wounded, and temporarily sick. The German divisions of Panzer Group Guderian were operating at 80 percent personnel strength compared with their numbers at the beginning of the war..."

"...and logistical failures meant the troops were short on everything, not just winter clothes..."

Winter clothes aren't the problem in early August 1941, nor was anything else in the supply chain sufficient to prevent an advance on Moscow that was in any case made under far more arduous conditions two months later. Unlike late October through mid November, however, weather in mid August would not have caused an operational pause because of mud. This discontinuous advance associated with Typhoon consumed vast quanities of supplies while troops were mired in a standstill. Vehicles worn down by low-gear driving in late October through mid November don't incur that wear in mid August.

"...Being poised to make an advance on the city and actually taking it are different things. Moscow had a sizable garrison recently bolstered by the arrival of the 200,000 escapees from the Smolensk Pocket..."

Stolfi suggests approx 20 panzer and motorized divisions along with 25 infantry divisions available for AGC's attack on Moscow. They'd be opposed by a force of about 16 Soviet divisions far weaker than faced at Minsk or before Smolensk.

"...While short on weapons these were trained troops..."

Without weapons and time available to reconstitute a coherent command structure they are individual replacements and otherwise largely useless. An advance on Moscow beginning in early/mid August following a brief operational pause dramatically diminishes that available time. Stronger Soviet forces better trained had already been repeatedly defeated. Nothing heretofore suggests more of the same wouldn't happen.

"...Moscow was also much bigger than any of the other cities so a protracted street battle is not out of the question- a problem for the panzers who need those rifle divisions slowly slogging east..."

No Soviet city save Leningrad proved capable of resisting German forces in the summer and early fall of 1941. Very large cities like Kiev, Kharkov, Minsk and Smolensk had (or would) fallen. None save Kiev possessed a water barrier remotely like Leningrad. Neither would Moscow. While a protracted street battle is possible there is far more evidence to suggest such was unlikely especially since it can be presumed that Moscow would be fully enveloped.

German infantry were slow only relative to the German army. Depending on their engaged status those forces were entirely capable of executing sustained marches of 20km per day. Not all of AGC's infantry divisions would have been continuously engaged.

Remember this-the German Army had PLANNED for such an advance upon Moscow. Nothing in their execution of those plans that summer of 1941 had suggested their logistical or operational planning was flawed. They had properly assessed both the Red Army's ability to resist and the toll which the Soviet road and rail network would impose on a summer campaign's logistical plan. What followed Hitler's intervention and diversion of forces was operational improvisation, namely TYPHOON. Even then, despite the attendant impediments imposed by shorter days, worsening operational weather for both air and ground forces, additional troops and further incurred losses, they nearly achieved their objective by December 6, 1941.

None of those impediments existed in mid August.

What might have followed would determine Germany's success in the east. Had matters unfolded as they hoped the strategic dimensions of W.W. II are altered immeasurably. Hindsight affords us to view matters only as they occurred. All alternatives (such as mine) are fully speculative.

[Mihais]

[
What might have followed would determine Germany's success in the east. Had matters unfolded as they hoped the strategic dimensions of W.W. II are altered immeasurably. Hindsight affords us to view matters only as they occurred. All alternatives (such as mine) are fully speculative.

But for that reason they are so much more interesting.

There's more.Even if the Soviets keep Leningrad and Kiev until winter,they'd be hard pressed to attack.Right into prepared(although extended) German positions,with rebuild mobile divisions in reserve(the Germans have probably 2 months to do that after Moscow falls).Meaning another disaster is waiting them.

[zraver]

[B]

As the Germans were in a pickle on December 6th in front of Moscow I'd prefer my chances in mid-September. Fair to say, though, that the Soviets are in a far worse "pickle" were that to happen.

The problem is Moscow is a tigers, tail, what do you don once you have it? Without 3PG aiding AGN leningrad is likely to avoid the closing of the land route between the city and Lake Lagoda. This gives the Soviets the city as an operational base to attack down the rail line into the shoulder of the AGC Salient so AGC must defend this.

Zraver, it's irrelevant. Typhoon never happens under this premise. Soviet operational reserves for any counter-offensive are speculative under utterly changed conditions

Their employment might be changed, but the units themselves are real enough.

Logistical burdens didn't impede German advances in October nor November sufficient to prevent them ending on the doorstep of Moscow. How do you presume such in better weather without the wear and tear associated with diversions both north and, then, south? Did you miss the part about German railway troops and the Todt organization constructing 14,000 miles of track during Barbarossa? The German Army had STAFFED prior to the initiation of Barbarossa for a logistical plan supporting such an advance.

Under ideal conditions the Germans were able to advance the railroad 20km on pace with the infantry. However the panzer's outdistanced this and relied on trucks to move supplies from the rail head to the group then corps and division areas. Your now askin that truck fleet to be divided into quarters 1. battle for Moscow and the push east, 2. the northern shoulder, 3 the southern shoulder, movement of infantry to Moscow.

Zraver, why the preoccupation with Typhoon? I'm at a loss to explain under this alternative scenario losses associated with diversions of German armor north and, then, south don't occur. Nor the attendant consumption of logistics. Add that back into your calculus.

I was pointing out that losses were high. Denied the support of 3PG AGC might take fewer losses, but AGN and AGS would take more so the end result in lost blood and treasure is about the same.

"...By about 13 August 1941 the Germans had suffered Soviet combat action losses of approximately 12 percent of their original tanks. For Army Group Center, with 1780 battle tanks in its divisions when it attacked earlier in June, this translates into 214 German battle tanks "knocked out" by Soviet combat action on the eve of the hypothetical German advance on Moscow..." (Stolfi, pg. 164)

basically the loss of an entire Panzer division whose establishment strength was only 228 panzers of all types in two regiments. This is roughly a fifth of AGC's massed panzer units the remainder being assault guns or smaller armored units attached to mobile and panzer grenadier units.

The German reserve army had estimated 275,000 casualties through August, 1941. Those forces were available in the field replacement battalions and Field Replacement Army. In fact, German casualties through this period were 257,000. It would appear, therefore, that adequate personnel preparations had been made.

But after that the pool dries up. IIRC by December the replacement army was down to 50,000 men.

"...On 23 August, approximately when it would have been closing in on Moscow under the hypothetical direct advance, and after fighting a series of [actual]hard battles (Roslavl, Rogachev, and Gomel) to open the way south, Panzer Group Guderian controlled eight divisions averaging 12,543 men, each at "engagement strength". The divisions had additional men in unevacuated, lightly wounded, and temporarily sick. The German divisions of Panzer Group Guderian were operating at 80 percent personnel strength compared with their numbers at the beginning of the war..."

PGG had 3,4,10, 17 and 18th pz plus SS Das Reich (mot), 10th inf (mot), 29th div (mot) and infantry regiment Gross Duetchsland for the rapid drive east. Of thes eunits the panzers are down 20%. Infantry support is light as is artillery. Moscow in late August and early September is defended by the Western Front which had just been rebuilt by the release of the reserve front. In addition there are a couple of Soviet armies from the old Western front hnaging tough. 16th Army (Rokossovksy) is blockin the Volokolmask Highway and 5th army (Govorov) holding Mohzaisk. Plus there are those 200,000 escappees and the citizen's militias.

Winter clothes aren't the problem in early August 1941, nor was anything else in the supply chain sufficient to prevent an advance on Moscow that was in any case made under far more arduous conditions two months later. Unlike late October through mid November, however, weather in mid August would not have caused an operational pause because of mud. This discontinuous advance associated with Typhoon consumed vast quanities of supplies while troops were mired in a standstill. Vehicles worn down by low-gear driving in late October through mid November don't incur that wear in mid August.

But they have much farther to go. They have the drive on Moscow, the taking of the city, then the push east plus the shoulders.

Stolfi suggests approx 20 panzer and motorized divisions along with 25 infantry divisions available for AGC's attack on Moscow. They'd be opposed by a force of about 16 Soviet divisions far weaker than faced at Minsk or before Smolensk.

And he is wrong under your operational timetable. Those infantry divisions are still reaching the area of the Smolensk battlefeild when your wanting to start your drive on Moscow. He also includes the panzer groups pulled in from AGN. Under your time table AGC has 4 panzer divisions worth of tanks (in 5 divisions) 3 motorized divsions and an infantry regiment. The Luftwaffe is not going to be able to add much, as it is down to about 600 servicable aircraft. meanwhile the defense of Moscow has 1000 tanks and 900 aircraft in those 16 divisions plus ample reserves of manpower. While I don't doubt the ability to reach the city quickly, espaically given the lack of multiple lines of defense in depth, taking it is another thing, then you have to hold it and push east. A tall order for a single panzer group, or even two.

Without weapons and time available to reconstitute a coherent command structure they are individual replacements and otherwise largely useless.

Didn't the German's say that about the BEF evacuees?

An advance on Moscow beginning in early/mid August following a brief operational pause dramatically diminishes that available time. Stronger Soviet forces better trained had already been repeatedly defeated. Nothing heretofore suggests more of the same wouldn't happen.

But they hadn't all been defeated... Kiev proved a tough nut, Leningrad did as well and in the fall Stevastopol would pose another problem.

No Soviet city save Leningrad proved capable of resisting German forces in the summer and early fall of 1941. Very large cities like Kiev, Kharkov, Minsk and Smolensk had (or would) fallen. None save Kiev possessed a water barrier remotely like Leningrad. Neither would Moscow. While a protracted street battle is possible there is far more evidence to suggest such was unlikely especially since it can be presumed that Moscow would be fully enveloped.

Except that the failure of the infantry light panzer groups to fully trap the Soviet's at Smolensk had already lead to a German abandonement of encirclement battles.

German infantry were slow only relative to the German army. Depending on their engaged status those forces were entirely capable of executing sustained marches of 20km per day. Not all of AGC's infantry divisions would have been continuously engaged.

Not dissagreeing, but that is not fast enough to keep pace with the panzers if they don't take a pause.

Remember this-the German Army had PLANNED for such an advance upon Moscow. Nothing in their execution of those plans that summer of 1941 had suggested their logistical or operational planning was flawed. They had properly assessed both the Red Army's ability to resist and the toll which the Soviet road and rail network would impose on a summer campaign's logistical plan. What followed Hitler's intervention and diversion of forces was operational improvisation, namely TYPHOON. Even then, despite the attendant impediments imposed by shorter days, worsening operational weather for both air and ground forces, additional troops and further incurred losses, they nearly achieved their objective by December 6, 1941.

They failed to understand that tanks alone cannot enforce an encirclement. They also failed to learn the true size of the red army and I am guessing the logisitics were alloted to fight a 200 divisions enemy not a 400 division enemy.

None of those impediments existed in mid August.

But other impediaments do exist.

What might have followed would determine Germany's success in the east. Had matters unfolded as they hoped the strategic dimensions of W.W. II are altered immeasurably. Hindsight affords us to view matters only as they occurred. All alternatives (such as mine) are fully speculative.

ditto.

[1979]

"...By about 13 August 1941 the Germans had suffered Soviet combat action losses of approximately 12 percent of their original tanks. For Army Group Center, with 1780 battle tanks in its divisions when it attacked earlier in June, this translates into 214 German battle tanks "knocked out" by Soviet combat action on the eve of the hypothetical German advance on Moscow..." (Stolfi, pg. 164)

No need to speculate over precentages.
The number of "knocked out" tanks in the german army was 127 in june, 736 in july, 582 in august per Mulller Hillerbrand.
the losses in sep. and oct. were moderate 229 and 234 respectivly however they would total 2758 by the end of the year.

[zraver]

"...By about 13 August 1941 the Germans had suffered Soviet combat action losses of approximately 12 percent of their original tanks. For Army Group Center, with 1780 battle tanks in its divisions when it attacked earlier in June, this translates into 214 German battle tanks "knocked out" by Soviet combat action on the eve of the hypothetical German advance on Moscow..." (Stolfi, pg. 164)

No need to speculate over precentages.
The number of "knocked out" tanks in the german army was 127 in june, 736 in july, 582 in august per Mulller Hillerbrand.
the losses in sep. and oct. were moderate 229 and 234 respectivly however they would total 2758 by the end of the year.

I think S-2 was specific to AGC and your numbers reflect the entire invasion. If so the losses of 863 tanks in June/July across the entire invasion force would put S-2's numbers about right for AGC. Soviet losses wer emuch higher but a critical weakness develops when considering the replacements. The Soviets were trading T-60, BT series, T-26, T-28 etc for T-34's with 76mm guns and the Germans were trading Pz II, Pz 38t and Pz III 37mm for pz III 50mm. Soviet technical domiance actually increases as their tank fleet shrinks.

Thanks to the real German mastery of planning resulting in the rapid fall of France and the early stages of Barbarossa plus the utterly stupid British decision to hang on to the 40mm 2 pounder long past its usefulness German tanks developed a reputation for technical dominace they did not deserve (outside of radios and three man turret sin the Pz III and IV). The Pz III was never modern as far as armament goes and the Pz IV only got modern in late 42 and the bulk of the fleet remained obsolete through 43. Had the Germans gone with the long barreled 50mm in 38-39 then the results of the war might be far different. But as it is for most of the war German tanks were substandard in armament and lagging in development. The later panther being the obvious exception. IIRC Poland was working on a tank using an adapted 75mm AA gun when the war broke out, the Russians had begun development of the T-34 and had already introduced the KV series. France had an excellent 47mm AT gun used on both the Char B1 Bis and Souma S-35 as well as much better armored protection. The 47mm SA35 had a muzzel velocity of 660m/s 110m/s better than early rounds for the German pak 38 50mm. Even the US was working on a 75mm medium velocity design in 39 (M2 600m/s).

[1979]

.
There's more.Even if the Soviets keep Leningrad and Kiev until winter,they'd be hard pressed to attack.Right into prepared(although extended) German positions,with rebuild mobile divisions in reserve(the Germans have probably 2 months to do that after Moscow falls).Meaning another disaster is waiting them.

the bigest problem with a drive east in august is the fact that the oposition in front of AGC consists of 16 armies not 16 div worth of troops.
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[S2]

1979 Reply

Your contention of 16 armies is closer to the truth if Glantz is to be believed.

Barbarossa Derailed-Glantz Google Books

Note the respective order of battle listed in the appendices for 31 July along the western front. The condition of those nine Soviet Armies (16/19, 30, 22, 24, 28, 29, 30, Group Iartsevo, and a Cavalry Group) varied dramatically although bolstered by 250,000 replacements in late July. Those replacements, too, would uniformly be of marginal quality.

German forces also were dramatically attrited. First, the armored infantry elements were particularly impacted during July while holding the outer ring of the Smolensk encirclement. Infantry divisions would see large casualties resisting Soviet counterattacks in August while holding the eastern front of AGC during a period when Pz Gruppe 3 and 2 were sent to the northern and southern wings of AGC.

While Smolensk was encircled by 16 July, the cauldron wasn't collapsed until late July. Bock on 12 August seemed prepared to accept a less-than-fully secured rear to maintain forward momentum. Hitler wasn't-

"...It [my eastern front] can't hold much longer the way things look now. I am being forced [by Hitler] to spread the reserves which I've so laboriously scraped together for the hoped-for attack behind my front just to have some degree of security that it will not be breeched.

If, after all the successes, the campaign now trickles away in dismal defensive fighting for my army group, it is not my fault..." (Glantz, pg. 580).

The Soviet mobilization system was, indeed, at full steam. Approximately 1.4 to 2.2 million men were mobilized between June and the end of August. Nearly half were allocated to the western, central and reserve fronts as either replacements or members of newly-formed divisions. The quality of those formations could only have been marginal at best. Still, from Glantz' perspective, this typlified and reinforced the old adage that "quantity holds a quality all its own". Perhaps.

The AGC order of battle on 10 July shows 47 divisions (16 Pz/Motorized equivalent and 31 infantry divisions) grouped in 16 corps formations along with another 12 infantry divisions as reserves but enroute to AGC. This would exceed Stolfi's assessment of available forces when factoring in divisions enroute to AGC. Halder indicates that Stolfi's assessment, however, of the German reserve army's replacement system might have been accurate in the most general assessment but, down at the divisions, the replacements were barely trickling through-

"...For example, on 2 August Halder informed his diary that Army Group Center had lost 74,500 men and received only 23,000 replacements since the first day of Barbarossa..."

[1979]

No coNtest with regard to casulties and replacements received by AGC up to this point.
however the situation on 26 august 1941 showed 66.000 replacements received by AGC with another 25.000 schedueld to arive before the end of the month .
coupled with the reinforcements receied by other army groups ,the german replacement army by yearly september had bean used up , if the germans were to replicate their succes from octomber, everything they had would be allready on the table while STAVKA would be hoarding reserves to pinch AGC flanks .
The diversion of armor both north and south in august had secured a broad front
with safe flanks wich AGC would use durring their historical advance.
Without it ,we would be looking at a pencil style thrust towards moskow with counterattacks flaring up along both flanks.

[S2]

1979 Reply

Barbarossa wasn't intended to be fought in October.

"The diversion of armor both north and south in august had secured a broad front with safe flanks wich AGC would use durring their historical advance."

The diversion of armor signals Hitler's unpreparedness to accept the risks necessary for a strategic victory. Half-measures mean a Soviet flag flying over Berlin in late April 1945. Losing tenaciously wasn't the objective. The war was lost before the first leaf of fall fell from the trees.

[astralis]

i wonder if there was any point where hitler could have credibly offered (and stalin accepted) terms to the soviets.

[1979]

Half-measures mean a Soviet flag flying over Berlin in late April 1945. Losing tenaciously wasn't the objective. The war was lost before the first leaf of fall fell from the trees.

I'm going to embrace the siege mentality and say that octomber is not to late to win the war, the teritorial gains up to this point had eliminated the soviet manpower advange, from now on it's atrition warfare on industrial scale, perhaps the thing that the German army was design to avoid but it is not unreasonoble to belive that the Axis could train and equip as much soldiers as the soviets.
Nobody forced Hitler to declare war on America and I have a hard time beliving the UK would have
bean able to liberate western europe without it.

[Red Team]

If Hitler hadn't ordered Goering to divert bombing away from Fighter command bases when the RAF were on their knees...I shudder to think how close the Germans were to a real shot at Britain.

[zraver]

If Hitler hadn't ordered Goering to divert bombing away from Fighter command bases when the RAF were on their knees...I shudder to think how close the Germans were to a real shot at Britain.

Not very, the uftwaffe couldn't kill the fighters and pilots fast enough, and couldn't keep the runways closed.

[Red Team]

Not very, the uftwaffe couldn't kill the fighters and pilots fast enough, and couldn't keep the runways closed.

Yep Fighter Command just happened to have the balls, the luck and the equipment.