Tweet
Makes you wonder how the hell did Iraq lost the war. The Maj is currently working on FCS.
Originally posted by Redleg01 at CDF
Excerpts from the NOV-DEC 2003 edition of the FA Journal. Makes my blood friggin boil. "Higher headquarters" and "officials" leads me to believe that the rumors are true...that civilian pukes (you can guess who) insisted that the leave the howitzers behind. Note the chart that indicates the lift difference between a 120-mm mortar platton and a six-gun howitzer battery. Somebody ought to be flayed for this. Talk about a congressional investigation. Hell, the DIVARY had to sell the idea of even taking mortars!!!!!!!
We have become so twisted that some very senior decision maker decided to LEAVE BEHIND COMBAT POWER BECAUSE IT TOOK TOO MUCH LIFT!!!! Crimeny, talk about the damned tail wagging the dog.
The young captain that wrote this deserves to be commended, not for his articulateness, but for standing up against "the man" when he knows he's right. We can only hope that he stays in and that he, or someone like him, eventually becomes COSA. Note that he's now on his (at least) second combat tour, in Iraq.
Excerpts from the NOV-DEC 2003 edition of the FA Journal. Makes my blood friggin boil. "Higher headquarters" and "officials" leads me to believe that the rumors are true...that civilian pukes (you can guess who) insisted that the leave the howitzers behind. Note the chart that indicates the lift difference between a 120-mm mortar platton and a six-gun howitzer battery. Somebody ought to be flayed for this. Talk about a congressional investigation. Hell, the DIVARY had to sell the idea of even taking mortars!!!!!!!
We have become so twisted that some very senior decision maker decided to LEAVE BEHIND COMBAT POWER BECAUSE IT TOOK TOO MUCH LIFT!!!! Crimeny, talk about the damned tail wagging the dog.
The young captain that wrote this deserves to be commended, not for his articulateness, but for standing up against "the man" when he knows he's right. We can only hope that he stays in and that he, or someone like him, eventually becomes COSA. Note that he's now on his (at least) second combat tour, in Iraq.
"But we must learn from our mistakes.
Not taking howitzers into Afghanistan
from the beginning was a mistake. A
small amount of additional airlift would
have brought in howitzers that had twice
the indirect firepower, were more accurate
and had three times the range—a
decided advantage for our infantry
forces in Afghanistan, especially during
Operation Anaconda."
"...it is
fortunate the division persisted in requesting
a 105-mm howitzer battery to
deploy as well.
Although the M120 does not require a
trailer and is, therefore, more easily
transported, the 105-mm howitzer
shoots nearly three times the distance of
the 120-mm mortar and can hit targets
closer to friendly forces with risk estimate
distances (REDs) nearly half that
of the 120-mm mortar. In addition, a
mortar platoon only has four tubes while
the howitzer battery has six."
"Interestingly, the M120’s maneuverability
advantage was never significant
in Afghanistan. During Task Force (TF)
Panther’s combat operations in OEF,
the combat mortar platoon arrived at
the battlefield in the same manner as the
howitzers, usually in the same convoy.
The mortars missed IPRTF (Note: In
Position Ready To Fire) times because
they had to continue on after the
howitzers emplaced in order to get
within range of the target."
"Charlie Battery was practicing
hipshoots when it realized it could
not support a target that was well within
the mortars’ maximum range. Unlike a
howitzer that can shoot any target within
its maximum range immediately upon
emplacement, a mortar can’t reach certain
ranges until the baseplate is seated
firmly into the ground—either by shooting
rounds or digging it in with a shovel.
Until then, the mortar tube cannot reach
its maximum elevations and, therefore,
cannot reach the targets associated with
those elevations."
"Initially, the artillery howitzers weren’t
allowed to deploy in order to save airspace.
With the support of the division, the 82d Div
Arty “sold” higher headquarters on the
concept of deploying the smaller 120-
mm mortar platoon that would not take
much additional airlift room to give the
division more indirect firepower.Once the Div Arty sold the idea of the
120-mm mortar platoons, it then argued
that taking a minimally manned and
equipped 105-mm artillery battery only
would require slightly more airlift."
"Even with the
difficulties the howitzers encountered
after deploying, it was worth sending
them. The six M119A2 howitzers from
C/1-319 AFAR saw 13 months of combat
operations while sustaining more
than 95 percent operational readiness in
extremely harsh terrain. They would
have been valuable indirect fire assets
for Operation Anaconda, had they been
in country.
On 1 March 2002, Operation Anaconda
began as elements of C/1-87 IN
exited from the back of their CH-47 as
it touched down in the Shah-e-Kot Valley
and started looking for places to set
up planned blocking positions. Almost
immediately, small-arms fire started
coming from al Qaeda fighting positions
dug into the mountainsides around
the landing zone. A 120-mm mortar
section on the valley floor was only able
to shoot 16 rounds before it started
receiving small-arms fire. Soon after,
mortar rounds came in as well, sending
the mortar team running.
Without an artillery battery to support
them, the infantry was left without an
effective indirect fire support asset.
When the Army first tested its air
assault procedures in the jungles and
mountains of Vietnam, it quickly learned
to prep landing zones with artillery fire
before bringing in infantry by air—a
tactic that applied to forces in Operation
Anaconda. At the very least, a battery
should have been in place before H-Hour
in the Shah-e-Kot Valley to support
on-call targets that might arise in
the fluid environment of an air-assault
mission. Just like the maneuver units in
Vietnam, C/1-87 IN could have used
the howitzer’s firepower as it took small
arms and mortar fire on the landing
zone. Unfortunately, higher headquarters
required the 101st and 10th Mountain
Divisions to leave their howitzers
back in the states."
"While it is impossible to go back
and replay the battle during Operation
Anaconda, it is reasonable
to assume that supporting artillery
would have saved infantry lives.
Senior officials were willing to
leave artillery out of OEF initially
because they thought the artillery
took up too much airlift space—
that they could replace the
artillery’s firepower with mortars
and air support. Operation Anaconda
proved otherwise.
These officials thought howitzers
couldn’t perform in the rugged,
mountainous terrain. C/1-319
AFAR’s operational record as well
as the records of the batteries that
followed Charlie Battery have
shown otherwise."
Captain Joshua D. Mitchell was the Fire
Direction Officer (FDO) for C Battery, 1st
Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery
Regiment (C/1-319 AFAR), 82d Airborne
Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and
deployed to Afghanistan for Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) II. Currently, he is
deployed to Iraq as the Battalion FDO for 1-
319 AFAR in Operation Iraqi Freedom II. In
other positions with 1-319 AFAR, he was
the Executive Officer for C Battery and the
Fire Support Officer for B Company, 2d
Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment.
He holds bachelor’s degrees in
Biomedical Engineering and Mathematical
Sciences from Johns Hopkins University.
He was a Distinguished Graduate of his
Field Artillery Officer Basic Course and the
recipient of the Gunnery Award at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma.
Not taking howitzers into Afghanistan
from the beginning was a mistake. A
small amount of additional airlift would
have brought in howitzers that had twice
the indirect firepower, were more accurate
and had three times the range—a
decided advantage for our infantry
forces in Afghanistan, especially during
Operation Anaconda."
"...it is
fortunate the division persisted in requesting
a 105-mm howitzer battery to
deploy as well.
Although the M120 does not require a
trailer and is, therefore, more easily
transported, the 105-mm howitzer
shoots nearly three times the distance of
the 120-mm mortar and can hit targets
closer to friendly forces with risk estimate
distances (REDs) nearly half that
of the 120-mm mortar. In addition, a
mortar platoon only has four tubes while
the howitzer battery has six."
"Interestingly, the M120’s maneuverability
advantage was never significant
in Afghanistan. During Task Force (TF)
Panther’s combat operations in OEF,
the combat mortar platoon arrived at
the battlefield in the same manner as the
howitzers, usually in the same convoy.
The mortars missed IPRTF (Note: In
Position Ready To Fire) times because
they had to continue on after the
howitzers emplaced in order to get
within range of the target."
"Charlie Battery was practicing
hipshoots when it realized it could
not support a target that was well within
the mortars’ maximum range. Unlike a
howitzer that can shoot any target within
its maximum range immediately upon
emplacement, a mortar can’t reach certain
ranges until the baseplate is seated
firmly into the ground—either by shooting
rounds or digging it in with a shovel.
Until then, the mortar tube cannot reach
its maximum elevations and, therefore,
cannot reach the targets associated with
those elevations."
"Initially, the artillery howitzers weren’t
allowed to deploy in order to save airspace.
With the support of the division, the 82d Div
Arty “sold” higher headquarters on the
concept of deploying the smaller 120-
mm mortar platoon that would not take
much additional airlift room to give the
division more indirect firepower.Once the Div Arty sold the idea of the
120-mm mortar platoons, it then argued
that taking a minimally manned and
equipped 105-mm artillery battery only
would require slightly more airlift."
"Even with the
difficulties the howitzers encountered
after deploying, it was worth sending
them. The six M119A2 howitzers from
C/1-319 AFAR saw 13 months of combat
operations while sustaining more
than 95 percent operational readiness in
extremely harsh terrain. They would
have been valuable indirect fire assets
for Operation Anaconda, had they been
in country.
On 1 March 2002, Operation Anaconda
began as elements of C/1-87 IN
exited from the back of their CH-47 as
it touched down in the Shah-e-Kot Valley
and started looking for places to set
up planned blocking positions. Almost
immediately, small-arms fire started
coming from al Qaeda fighting positions
dug into the mountainsides around
the landing zone. A 120-mm mortar
section on the valley floor was only able
to shoot 16 rounds before it started
receiving small-arms fire. Soon after,
mortar rounds came in as well, sending
the mortar team running.
Without an artillery battery to support
them, the infantry was left without an
effective indirect fire support asset.
When the Army first tested its air
assault procedures in the jungles and
mountains of Vietnam, it quickly learned
to prep landing zones with artillery fire
before bringing in infantry by air—a
tactic that applied to forces in Operation
Anaconda. At the very least, a battery
should have been in place before H-Hour
in the Shah-e-Kot Valley to support
on-call targets that might arise in
the fluid environment of an air-assault
mission. Just like the maneuver units in
Vietnam, C/1-87 IN could have used
the howitzer’s firepower as it took small
arms and mortar fire on the landing
zone. Unfortunately, higher headquarters
required the 101st and 10th Mountain
Divisions to leave their howitzers
back in the states."
"While it is impossible to go back
and replay the battle during Operation
Anaconda, it is reasonable
to assume that supporting artillery
would have saved infantry lives.
Senior officials were willing to
leave artillery out of OEF initially
because they thought the artillery
took up too much airlift space—
that they could replace the
artillery’s firepower with mortars
and air support. Operation Anaconda
proved otherwise.
These officials thought howitzers
couldn’t perform in the rugged,
mountainous terrain. C/1-319
AFAR’s operational record as well
as the records of the batteries that
followed Charlie Battery have
shown otherwise."
Captain Joshua D. Mitchell was the Fire
Direction Officer (FDO) for C Battery, 1st
Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery
Regiment (C/1-319 AFAR), 82d Airborne
Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and
deployed to Afghanistan for Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) II. Currently, he is
deployed to Iraq as the Battalion FDO for 1-
319 AFAR in Operation Iraqi Freedom II. In
other positions with 1-319 AFAR, he was
the Executive Officer for C Battery and the
Fire Support Officer for B Company, 2d
Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment.
He holds bachelor’s degrees in
Biomedical Engineering and Mathematical
Sciences from Johns Hopkins University.
He was a Distinguished Graduate of his
Field Artillery Officer Basic Course and the
recipient of the Gunnery Award at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma.
Attached Files
Comment