Articles and links for the Military Professional

[Jay]

Colonel,
I read the link about Soviets against
Afghanis. If USSR dint collapse prolly they wudve tamed Afghanis. The sheer amount of fire power they had would've brought the shit out off anybody! :dontcare

[Officer of Engineers]

They did tame Afghanistan. The Mujahadeen only had two strategic offensives against the Soviets. Three years into the Soviet occupation and when the Chinese and Americans introduced SA-7 and Stingers respectively. Both times, the Mujahadeen were beaten back and beaten back severely, though the response was several years in the making.

Even when the Soviets left, the Kabul government lasted another 10 years, controlling most of Afghanistan until the last 4. Even when the Taliban took over, they never were able to defeat the Russian supported Northern Alliance.

The very fact that the Russians were able to fight two Chechen Wars is leading me to believe that even with their economic collapse and the fall of the USSR, Moscow could have stayed in Afghanistan, which would have avoided the Chechen situation altogether.

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March-April 2002 English Edition
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Soviet Special Forces (Spetsnaz): Experience in Afghanistan
Timothy Gusinov

When I read in the newspapers that U.S. Special Forces units had deployed to Afghanistan in the full-scale antiterrorist operation after the Attack on America on 11 September 2001, I could not help but experience déjà vu; I had "been there, done that."

"They are ready to go," I said to myself. "Maybe at this exact moment they are jumping into a chopper to take them on their mission. Or possibly, they are already on the ground in Afghanistan."

I had lived through the dark nights in the mountains of Afghanistan. I had heard the angry roar of helicopter engines in thin air. And, I had experienced the deafening bursts of automatic gunfire and the blasts of hand grenades as they exploded in narrow canyons or among packed mud walls of Afghan villages. I lived again the exhausting dash back toward the pick-up area. I saw the faces of my comrades, dead and alive.

Soviet Spetsnaz

The involvement of the Soviet special forces—the Spetsnaz—in Afghanistan began in 1980. The Soviet command soon realized that mechanized infantry units were not effective against Mujahideen guerrilla tactics. The Spetsnaz were called in as the only forces capable of fighting the enemy on his own terms. Even these crack units initially lacked mountain-warfare training. Their mission in the event of a full-scale European theater of war was to hunt and destroy headquarters, command and communications centers, and mobile missile launchers. In Afghanistan they had to learn a lot fast to meet new and unique challenges.

In the paragraphs below, I list some of the challenges and solutions Soviet Spetsnaz teams faced and what they learned.

Deployment Lessons Learned

Helicopter assault tactics. When deploying a Spetsnaz team into enemy territory, helicopters should make several landings, leaving the team at one location only and under cover of darkness. Doing so complicates the enemy's search and pursuit because they will have to conduct searches in several places, thus dispersing their forces.

The helicopter drop should be from two to three miles behind the target, so that instead of going deeper into enemy territory for the attack, the group would be moving back toward its own base. If the enemy launches a search operation, chances are fewer that they will be searching in the back direction.

Helicopters should use different routes for returning to base after dropping the team. To conceal the team's deployment, there should be other air force activity in the area, including limited air strikes near but not too close to the team's objective.

Destroying enemy supply convoys. During the Soviet-Afghan war, the Mujahideen developed sophisticated and effective tactics of bringing weapons and ammunitions supply convoys into Afghanistan. The tactics the Spetsnaz most often used to destroy such convoys were helicopter assaults and ambushes en route.

The general rule for intercepting and destroying weapons and ammunition convoys is that the closer to the enemy's base or main camp the convoy is intercepted, the higher the chances the convoy will be in one piece and its security will not be on full alert. After a large convoy arrives at a distribution base or area, representatives of different field commanders and tribes meet it and divide it into smaller groups, which are much harder to detect.

When a long line of camels loaded with weapons and ammunition is attacked, the most depressing thing is the maddening shriek of wounded animals. The wounded from the convoy security detachment scream too, but they are the enemy; the animals are victims. The most unpleasant thing is when a camel loaded with mines or TNT explodes into bloody pieces, killing everyone nearby.

Local conditions. Even if soldiers speak the local language and dress like the locals, they should not count too much on their ability to pass as locals. The way they walk is different, and there are many tribal dialects. Dress-specific features, even in the way of wearing a headdress, carrying weapons, and so on, can betray someone as not being a native. Depending on the mission, however, it makes sense to dress as much like locals as possible for the particular area of the country in which the mission is to occur. Doing so could fool the enemy for some time and give soldiers a small advantage. Also, soldiers should collect and hide used toilet paper. Most Afghans in rural areas use small stones and pieces of dry clay for this purpose.

Tactics Lessons Learned

Air-fuel munitions. The Soviet air force used air-fuel bombs and unguided rockets with air-fuel warheads for the first time in Afghanistan. When used in populated areas, such munitions completely destroy buildings within a distance of 25 to 30 meters from the center of the explosion and partly destroying and damaging structures at a distance of up to 80 meters. The smashing and throwing effect of an air-fuel bomb's hot explosion wave is effective at a distance of up to 200 meters, especially in canyons and narrow valleys. However, thin air in the mountains and wind at ground level can quickly disperse the concentration of aerosol needed for explosion, thereby decreasing the power of such munitions.

These munitions should be used during cold season, at night, or during the early morning, when the air is still cool and thick. If dropped in thin air or during windy conditions, it is best to use a cocktail combination of aerosol munitions and smoke bombs dropped together. The smoke will keep the aerosol from dispersing too quickly.

The number of landing zones in Afghanistan near fortified enemy bases are limited and usually mined. During air-assault missions, air-fuel munitions are effective for cleaning mines from helicopter landing zones before troops land.

Soviet attack aircraft used the following tactics:

lAttacking the target from the sun.

lPerforming "star" air strikes, which consist of aircraft attacking a target continuously from different directions, thus preventing the enemy from accurate firing in one direction.

lUsing two aircraft or two pair of aircraft on parallel courses coming from opposite directions to attack the target.

lFinishing the attack by steady climbing, then performing a sharp hook turn to either left or right.

Often a flight of aircraft would launch a distracting attack by flying on afterburners to create noise, while the main striking force attacked a strongly fortified enemy base from another direction during a large-scale operation.

Air-strike diplomacy. If a particular tribe, field commander, or village was known to have taken prisoners of war (POWs) or possessed the remains of those killed in action, from two to four aircraft would deliver an impressive air strike as close as possible to the location using heavy bombs and incineration munitions. At the same time, leaflet bombs would be dropped that declared that unless there was immediate negotiation for POWs' release or for the return of bodies to a specified location, the next air strike would target the area itself.

Air Defenses Lessons Learned

During my service in Afghanistan, the enemy used a variety of portable, shoulder-launched missiles. They included the old (usually Egyptian-made) Strela-1, Strela-2, and Strela-2M (modernized) missiles; American Red Eye and Stinger missiles; and British Blowpipe missiles.

According to information gathered from POWs, Blowpipe performance was disappointing because of its low accuracy, heavy weight, and complicated guidance system. Blowpipes were used en mass during the 1986 assault on Javara south of Khost. I personally witnessed from two to three simultaneously launched Blowpipe missiles missing a single aircraft and exploding in the air.

Twelve 7-millimeter DShK (1, 2, or 4 barrels, mostly of Chinese or Egyptian manufacture) and fourteen, 5-millimeter Zenitnaya Gornaya Ustanovka (ZGU) antiaircraft mountain units, using Krupnokaliberniy Pulemet Vlavimirova Tankoviy tank-mounted, large-caliber machine guns of Vladimirov design (originally designed for tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs)), had effective ranges of fire up to 1,500 to 1,800 meters. Even after the introduction of SA missiles, the DshKs and ZGUs caused from 50 to 70 percent of helicopter losses and damage and from 40 to 50 percent of aircraft losses and damage. Also in limited use were Swedish 20-millimeter Eurlicon antiaircraft guns and the Soviet-made mobile 4-barrel automatic gun system known as Shilka, which was used by the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.

For better protection of their fortified bases and strongholds, enemy forces established a local early warning system that consisted of a net of observation posts. Small radio stations were located as far as from 5 to 15 kilometers from each post. This distance does not seem like much when flying in a jet, but it is enough to give advanced warning of approaching helicopters. Also, such posts kept air force bases under observation, reporting every group take off. To counter such a net, striking teams should take a deceptive course, then change it to the correct one once out of the observation area.

Enemy air defense of fortified bases began from distant approaches of from four to six kilometers out from the main base area. Air defenses included heavy antiaircraft machine guns and occasional SA missiles located on high mountain ridges. The concentration of air defenses gradually increased toward the center of main bases and fortified areas. The number of heavy machine guns defending a base varied depending on its size and importance but could range from 60 to 80 pieces in a particular area. Crews are tough. Often, when a gunner was killed or wounded, another trained crew-member immediately replaced him.

Soviet pilots nicknamed antiaircraft machine guns "welding machines," because from the air the flashes that occurred when they were fired reminded the pilots of welding works in progress. Fortified areas with large numbers of antiaircraft machine guns were called welding workshops.

Special "free-hunting" missile teams usually consisted of from 10 to 20 soldiers; one to two trained missile men; and two to three soldiers to carry additional tubes. Other team members carried infantry weapons for protection and cover. Hunting teams, operating near air bases, and missile teams defending enemy bases, included 4- to 10-member groups whose mission was to kill or capture downed pilots. Pilots' messes at airbases, such as at Bagram and Kabul, were specific targets for mortar or rocket barrages. Sometimes such teams would climb to incredible heights to attack or engage transportation aircraft that the Soviets thought were flying at safe altitudes.

In 1987, after recovering from being wounded for the second time, I returned to Afghanistan where I worked at the Military Intelligence Department in Kabul. I received information that a Spetsnaz team in the Panjshire area had intercepted and destroyed an enemy convoy carrying, in addition to the usual variety of weapons and munitions, small portable oxygen bottles and masks.

To counter such measures, humanitarian packages should be dropped from higher altitudes. Transportation aircraft should alternate approach directions as often as possible, and they should avoid permanent flight routes.

Mine Warfare Lessons Learned

On many occasions, enemy forces would lay mines in a way that they could be easily detected and disarmed. Other mines in the same area would be much better concealed and laid with much more resourcefulness. For example, a mine having an easily detectable metal casing might be surrounded by mines that had plastic casings, which are much harder to detect. Enemy forces would also combine pressure-detonated mines with remote radio or wire-detonated mines and charges whose power was often increased by putting pieces of cut thick metal around them or laying stones over them.

Despite the fact that many modern weapons, including modern land mines, are used in Afghanistan, many homemade devices are also used. A pile of empty artillery and tank shell cases, as well as cases from unexploded air bombs and other munitions, clearly indicates that the place is used for manufacturing explosive devices. Also, the enemy will collect empty artillery and tank shell cases, refill them with explosives, and use them as anti-vehicle mines. Such refuse should be collected and rendered unusable by running over it with a tank or other heavy-armor vehicle.

Finding large amounts of cheap soap and empty glass bottles indicates the production site of Molotov cocktails. Soap is grated, placed in a bottle, mixed with gasoline, and thrown on a vehicle. When the bottle breaks the burning mixture of soap and gasoline sticks to the surface and burns. MR

Editor's note: U.S. Armed Forces on the ground in Afghanistan have most likely already encountered all or most of the tactics discussed here. However, it is wise to listen to the voice of experience. The War on Terrorism could last much longer than anyone can predict.



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Timothy Gusinov served two tours of duty, totaling from 4 to 5 years, in Afghanistan. Because he speaks Farsi and Dari, his duties included facilitating coordination and liaison between Afghani governmental and Soviet troops as well as negotiations with local authorities, tribe leaders, and field commanders. Wounded twice, he received a number of orders and medals including the Order of Red Star. After the Persian Gulf war, he was the U.N. military observer during the Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission. He also served as an adviser to the former Yugoslavia. He now lives in the United States.


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Contact the Military Review Updated: 31 Jul 2002

[Blademaster]

They already blew the smithereens out of the Aghanis. The problem was that the Afghanis accepted the blood price and continued to fight. They were willing to sacrifice to the last man standing to fight against the Russians. Left with only one option to win the war, the Russians decided it was not worth it and thus began a phased pull out to avoid giving the picture of being defeated and the force collapsing and that was before the USSR showed real signs of collapsing.

[Officer of Engineers]

CANADIAN ARMY LAND FORCE TACTICAL DOCTRINE AND MANOEUVRE WARFARE - DO WE PRACTICE WHAT WE PREACH?



Introduction



To be an officer in the infantry is to attempt to be a master of many things. One of those things of great importance, although rarely if ever validated after basic training, is tactics. Tactics are defined, in the Oxford Concise Dictionary, as "the art of disposing forces in contact with the enemy." Doctrine, as defined in B-GL-300-000/FP-002 Interim 2, is stated simply as "that which is taught." Thus tactical doctrine is simply "what is taught about the disposing of forces in contact with the enemy." That is nice and short and for lack of a better argument or definition, suitably accurate. Doctrine and tactics, thus tactical doctrine, is based upon principles and fundamentals. B-GL-300-002/FP-000 states that "The Canadian Army, after almost a decade of debate, has adopted manoeuvre warfare as doctrine." This is a bold statement. Is it true in the sense that we practice it now, today? Do we practice it only at specific levels? To go further; are we even able to practice it at all? The focus of this paper will be to examine the nature of manoeuvre warfare and its true relation to Canadian Army doctrine and training. This paper will seek to answer three questions:



a. What is manoeuvre warfare?;

b. Does the Canadian Army practice manoeuvre warfare?; and

c. Is manoeuvre warfare relevant to the Canadian Army?



What is Manoeuvre Warfare?



The Official Definitions



Before one can adequately define manoeuvre warfare, one must define manoeuvre. Manoeuvre is defined in the Oxford Concise Dictionary as "a planned and controlled movement or series of moves." The military definition often relates manoeuvre to the employment of fires. The U.S. Army's publication, FM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Symbols, defines manoeuvre as "the movement of forces supported by fire to achieve a position of advantage from which to destroy or threaten destruction of the enemy." The Canadian Army defines the word manoeuvre similarly in B-GL-300-002/FP-000, Land Forces Tactical Doctrine, as the "employment of forces through movement in combination with speed, firepower or fire potential to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to achieve the mission." These definitions are adequate at all tactical levels of war from section fire and manoeuvre up to Brigade Group level. However, in his book, The Art of Maneuver, author Robert Leonhard explains the difficulty that these definitions encounter once they enter the arena of operational and strategic levels of war. Clearly at this level, manoeuvre cannot be associated with battlefield fires. This distinction is important because the purpose of manoeuvre is to gain a positional or psychological advantage over the enemy. Leonhard simply defines manoeuvre at this level as "movement". The author goes on to explain that this simple definition is the most accurate in attempting to understand manoeuvre warfare. Thus the word manoeuvre can be accurately defined as "movement."

Manoeuvre warfare is often described as a mind set or fighting philosophy that has nothing to do with the word manoeuvre at all. The word manoeuvre is important to the understanding of manoeuvre warfare, because of its definition of movement. The movement of forces is critical to the success of any mission. This movement could involve one machine gun moving to a position where effective fire can support a dismounted attack at platoon level or it can involve the movement of an entire armoured division. Without an emphasis, or at least an understanding, of how movement relates to manoeuvre warfare, there is the danger of confusing manoeuvre warfare with attrition warfare.



Attrition



The Canadian Army defines manoeuvre warfare, in CFP 300-1, Conduct of Land Operations, as "a war fighting philosophy that seeks to defeat the enemy by shattering his morale and physical cohesion, his ability to fight as an effective coordinated whole, rather than destroying him by incremental attrition." The term "physical cohesion", is dubious in this context as it leads to the belief that head-on confrontations, although sometimes unavoidable, are manoeuvre warfare. Manoeuvre warfare is often defined within the context of its comparison to attrition warfare. Attrition warfare seeks to defeat the enemy through head-on combat or what can be termed as strength versus strength or mass versus mass. Leonhard explains that the attritionist focuses upon the physical aspect of the enemy's army (tanks, guns, troops, etc.) and thus seeks to destroy them. Manoeuvre is looked upon in the attritionist view as a way to get to the fight, or as stated by Leonhard, "the attritionist moves in order to fight". An analogy of attrition warfare would be to stand face to face with your opponent and engage in a straight forward fist fight, all the time hoping that you are just that much faster or stronger or more precise with your blows than your opponent. The faster, stronger more precise blows can be analogous to faster engagement and response times, longer weapon ranges, more precise target acquisition systems and more powerful weapons. All of which, although very important factors, become outdated eventually and lead to the development and purchasing of costlier systems. A recent example of this, on albeit a large scale, would be the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The argument can be made that the Iraqi forces were not defeated due to superior tactics or manoeuvre on the part of the coalition forces at operational and strategic level but rather by attrition warfare; they were bombed and blasted out of existence.



Manoeuvre and Psychology



A manoeuvre warrior will seek to defeat the enemy through means other than simple destruction of his physical forces. In fact the manoeuvre advocate attempts to avoid strength and exploit weakness. Manoeuvre theory puts a great deal of emphasis upon the "intangibles" of war, such as morale, shock and initiative. Indeed these intangibles can be so diverse as to include religious beliefs or economic ideas. All Canadian Army officers are familiar with these intangibles, however few exercises are designed with these intangibles in mind. U.S. Army historian, Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall, discovered that in World War Two, only ten to fifteen percent of soldiers would fire their weapons at the enemy in combat. With these types of statistics in mind, it is difficult if not impossible to ignore the psychological "intangibles" of war. Imagine the tremendous psychological impact that the mere threat of enemy forces infiltrating deep into one's territory can have upon soldiers. Thus, it can be argued that enemy units can be neutralized physically or psychologically purely through movement of friendly forces. Leonhard also goes on to state that the majority of physical defeats (ie. destruction) of armies throughout history have taken place during the pursuit, once an army "breaks" (not to be confused with a disciplined withdrawal). Once an army and its soldiers realize their situation is lost or hopeless and flee from the battlefield are they at their most vulnerable. The key here is that the enemy must believe that their situation is hopeless and that they are lost. When this occurs they have lost their will to fight, and to quote a popular television show, resistance is futile. Indeed, if one is to accept Leonhard's conclusions, then it is safe to say that an army is defeated before it is destroyed.

Through these psychological "intangibles" and physical movement of forces, manoeuvre warfare seeks to preempt the enemy, in other words to disarm or neutralize him before the battle. If this is not possible, then manoeuvre warfare dictates dislocation, or the rendering irrelevant, of the enemy's forces. Just as the attritionist moves in order to fight, the manoeuverist fights in order to move. Returning to the analogy with our imaginary opponent, dislocation would dictate that we turn out the lights and attack him from behind with a baseball bat. Even better would be to preempt our opponent by poisoning his breakfast cereal hours before, or make him believe he is going to fight Mike Tyson. Using the Persian Gulf example for a moment longer, we can find evidence of manoeuvre warfare at the company or combat team level. The infamous stories of M1 tanks with dozer blades, filling in the Iraqi trench systems, are a perfect examples of manoeuvre warfare. Instead of the conventional, fair fight of dismounting the infantry to clear the trench system, simply make the trench system irrelevant (or in this case non-existent!). This last point is extremely important to an understanding of manoeuvre warfare as it relates to our society's traditional values of honor, courage and fair play. These values hold no place in manoeuvre warfare. In no way is this statement meant to condone war crimes, rather it is to underline what manoeuvre warfare is not. It is not meant to be glorious fair fight that many imagine. It is instead sneaky, underhanded and always on the lookout for some "unfair" advantage. The aim of manoeuvre warfare is to defeat the enemy, not necessarily destroy his physical mass.



Critical Vulnerability



However, before we can adequately define manoeuvre warfare, we must further our discussion to the topics of strengths and weaknesses. The United States Marine Corps in their publication, FMFM 1 Warfighting, compares source of strength to "center of gravity." If an enemy source of strength is removed from the battlefield (the means through which this is achieved are irrelevant), his warfighting capabilities are obviously greatly reduced. However, it is critical to understand that reduced does not mean non-existent. Leonhard uses the USMC argument to advance the chess analogy. If we compare an army to the pieces used in a chess game the idea of center of gravity becomes readily apparent. The most powerful piece on the board is the queen. It is the "source of strength", as it can in any direction for any distance. Indeed, if one loses one's queen, one's ability to win the game is significantly reduced. More often than not, loss of the queen leads to defeat, but (and it is an important but) not always. This is because the queen, although the source of strength, is not the center of gravity. If a player's queen is lost, his or her combat power is definitely reduced but that player is still able to play. The center of gravity is the king. The loss of one's king results in immediate defeat. Thus the king is the center of gravity and the "critical vulnerability" that must be the focus of the opponent's effort. Thus the first question of "What is manoeuvre warfare?" can now be answered. Manoeuvre warfare is the concept of defeating the enemy by neutralizing the enemy's center of gravity (critical vulnerability) through preemption, dislocation or destruction.



Does the Canadian Army Practice Manoeuvre Warfare or Just Talk About It?



The Alcyoneus Principle



The preemption or dislocation of forces may at first seem to be applicable only at operational and strategic level. One may ask, "What does this have to do with combat team or battle group level combat?" The answer lies in the idea discussed by Leonhard and what can be termed as the Alcyoneus Principle and how it relates to Combined Arms Warfare. If we look at the strengths and weaknesses of the traditional three combat arms; Infantry, Armour and Artillery (Engineers will be excluded, as they do not engage the enemy except when acting as infantry) and compare them with traditional tasks and doctrine, an interesting dilemma develops. The Alcyoneus Principle is based upon the idea of using unlike systems (ie. one Arm versus another Arm) to exploit the inherent weaknesses of each arm. It states that the enemy's systems (Arms) should have their strengths negated before being attacked.

Well known throughout the combat arms is the idea that the best weapon for killing a tank is another tank. However if we examine that idea for a moment, an interesting discrepancy develops. If the conditions are favourable to your tanks in terms of range, terrain, etc. then the enemy's tanks probably enjoy the same conditions. There is thus no strength versus weakness scenario, just strength versus strength. In the combined-arms world of the combat team/battle group, there is an overwhelming desire to attack like forces or mass on mass combat. That is to say, attack enemy infantry with infantry, enemy armour with armour and enemy artillery with artillery (otherwise known as counter battery). However, one of the fundamentals of manoeuver warfare is that of attacking weaknesses, or critical vulnerabilities and not sources of strength. The strengths of armour are long-range engagement, speed, manoeuverability, shock action and so on. In any estimate (FLOCARK, IPB, etc.), we are taught to concentrate upon the high-speed approaches because that is where the tanks want to be. However, manoeuver theory asks the question "where do the tanks not want to be?" The answer is obvious. They want to avoid areas where their strengths are removed or dislocated, and where they are extremely vulnerable. Where on the battlefield are tanks vulnerable? The answer to every infantryman is close country. It is in close country that tanks are most vulnerable, but more importantly where engagement distances for infantry are very short. Thus the best weapon for killing a tank is an infantryman with a hand-held anti-tank weapon capable of engagement ranges as small as a few meters.

The same occurs with employment of artillery. A great percentage of artillery assets are tasked in the counter-battery role. Once again it is clear that this is an attrition type of battle, strength versus strength. In a battle of attrition, the larger and more numerous the enemy guns are, the more of our guns will be tasked in the counter-battery role. In the extreme, the beginning of any conflict (and thus the loss of surprise) would be dominated almost entirely by huge artillery duels until one side is declared the winner. However, if one examines the vulnerabilities of artillery on the battlefield then one quickly realizes that the most effective weapon against artillery is a round from the main armament of a tank. Imagine a battery of artillery, with their guns elevated skyward, attempting to defend itself from high speed armour (or even a company of LAV 25's) penetrating deep into the enemy's rear area. The results of such an engagement would obviously be on the side of the tanks.

Unfortunately, there is also an ultimate weapon for destroying the infantry. Infantry is vulnerable in the open, dismounted and beginning the assault. Infantry become an opportune target for artillery in this situation. Infantry are also extremely vulnerable when travelling in armoured personnel carriers. In this situation, one round from a tank or an anti-armour weapon can destroy an entire section. Thus each element of the combat arms has its own vulnerabilities. It also has it's own unique strengths. Manoeuvre warfare seeks to exploit this natural paradox by using one arm's strengths against another's weaknesses.



Combined Arms Training Today



The concept of combined arms warfare at the Combat Team and Battle Group levels is well known throughout the Canadian Army. However, does the Canadian Army take full advantage of combined arms training? Do we fully gear our tactics toward enemy weaknesses and away from enemy strengths? The immediate answer would be no. Few if any exercises are planned around armored forces penetrating deep to eliminate enemy artillery and infantry are seldom deployed in ambush like positions to destroy enemy armor. This task is more likely to appear as a patrol task such as tank killing, relegated almost to a secondary duty rather than capitalizing upon the inherent vulnerabilities of armour. However, combined arms training should also focus upon combining forces to compensate for the weaknesses of other arms. Thus tanks are never without infantry to protect them in close country while simultaneously providing the infantry with the powerful anti-armour required. Both arms can move securely when the artillery are working to neutralize targets along the axis of advance and not removed for counter-battery tasks. Most exercises today are tailored toward mass on mass type of battles where a ratio of 3:1 is "required" to ensure victory. Manoeuvre warfare is not just about attacking weaknesses and avoiding strengths. Referring back to our original definition of manoeuvre, we realize that manoeuvre warfare is also about the movement of forces to dislocate or preempt the enemy. Thus, it can be said that training today touches on manoeuvre warfare with the combined arms approach to warfare. However, training does not fully exploit the inherent strengths and weaknesses of each arm in order to gain full advantage over the enemy.



Dichotomy



In discussing the movement of forces, Leonhard uses the term "force dichotomy" to describe what Chinese theorist Sun Tzu explained as "ordinary force" and "extraordinary force". This concept of Sun Tzu was that the ordinary force would "fix" the enemy in place while the extraordinary force would perform some manoeuvre such as a flanking or an envelopment. This theory is often put into practice during sub-unit training within the Canadian Army. Flankings performed at platoon and section level, using the heaviest firepower available (C9 or C6) as the ordinary force, while the extraordinary force performs the flanking, are common knowledge.

However, is this dichotomy seen at higher levels? If so how? The obvious answer is yes, flankings and envelopments are all part of Canadian tactics at all levels. However, does this mean we are exploiting the concept of force dichotomy to its fullest. Let us return to our concept of attacking critical vulnerabilities, this time at operational level. It can be generally accepted that the service support echelons of units and formations are an army's critical vulnerabilities. They are slow moving, lightly defended and if destroyed, render a unit incapable of fighting or moving due to the loss of fuel, food and ammunition. An army's strength is its heavy combat forces such as armour, infantry, anti-tank aviation and artillery. Thus the ordinary force, that is to say the force that would fix the enemy would be required to engage such sources of strength. The ordinary force would thus require a great deal of firepower, such as that offered by the Leopard, LAV 25 and the Eryx. The extraordinary force would require lighter equipment since its target, the enemy's critical vulnerability, is the rear echelon. Weapons such as the .50 Caliber Machine Gun, the C6, the 84mm SRAAW(H) and the 66mm SRAAW(L) would be more than adequate to destroy rear echelon targets. The current M113 would be a more than adequate vehicle for such an "extraordinary" force. Clearly this is a somewhat brazen concept, but one that offers the Canadian Army the opportunity to become true advocates of manoeuvre warfare by exploiting the concept of force dichotomy and critical vulnerability.



Directive or Detailed Control



The Canadian Army's publication, Land Forces Tactical Doctrine, lists ten fundamentals of manoeuvre warfare. The key words that can be pulled from this list are agility, imagination, direction and control, focus, main effort, initiative and risk. Such words are important to understanding the philosophy of manoeuvre warfare theory. Leonhard discusses two schools of manoeuvre theory. The first is German and the second is Russian.

Author William S. Lind described the German theory in his book, Manoeuvre Warfare Handbook. According to Lind the German theory has three principles. The first is "directive control" (Auftragstaktik). This theory is related to the term "recce pull". Directive control makes use of what is termed as "mission-type" orders. Such orders provide the subordinate with the mission and the commander's intent and only as much information required in order to coordinate with other units. How the mission is to be accomplished is left up to the subordinate, thus emphasizing initiative and encouraging the seizing of opportunities. The second principle is that of a main effort or focus, more popularly known by its German name Schwerpunkt. This focus comes from the commander's intent and thus, despite the enormous freedom given to subordinates to accomplish their mission, ensures all are working toward a common goal. The final principle is that of attacking weakness or gaps as opposed to attacking strengths or surfaces.

This type of manoeuvre theory depends upon the initiative of one's subordinates. Hand in hand with that initiative is the extraordinary trust that must exist between superior and subordinate. The trust must work both ways. The superior must be able to trust that the subordinate will respect the commander's intent. Similarly, the subordinate must trust that the commander will accept mistakes and failure from time to time. This extraordinary trust and acceptance of initiative is rarely accepted in the Canadian Army today. Indeed, a senior officer recently, in the Canadian Forces publication, The Maple Leaf, criticized officers for "cooking" plans, that is, acting without the authority to do so. Such criticism destroys initiative and thus the foundations of this school of manoeuvre theory. Even daily routine in the army, at least at Battalion level, does not do a great deal to promote initiative.

The second theory is "detailed control" (Befehlstaktik). This is related to the term "command push". Unlike directive control, detailed control, as the name implies, relies upon detailed orders. Reconnaissance assets are used not to find gaps, but to identify units and obstacles along the selected route. Thus assets are not "pulled" along behind reconnaissance elements, but rather reconnaissance elements are "pushed" ahead. Subordinates are allowed no freedom of manoeuvre and no initiative is permitted. Although on the surface this theory does not appear to be manoeuvre warfare, it does follow the principles of focus and main effort. The most important aspects of Befehlstaktik are preparation, momentum and depth. The initiative that is absent after the line of departure is crossed is shown during the preparations. Momentum and depth are emphasized once H hour arrives. Depth is achieved by sacrificing the "fleeting" tactical opportunities during the close fight, for the deep penetration into the rear of the theatre of operations. Thus, Befehlstaktik seeks to avoid the attrition fight at the tactical level and achieve a decisive victory at the operational or even strategic level through preemption, dislocation or destruction. The formation of operational manoeuvre groups by the Russians, is a result of Befehlstaktik. All units are used to create the gap and then exploit it as deeply as possible. Detailed control relies upon momentum and depth, not upon seizing an opportunity. The enemy is not defeated through seizing an opportunity but rather by imposing the commander's will upon the enemy.

Although not as well known as directive control, detailed control is more appropriate to our conventional way of thinking. Where directive control emphasizes initiative, the acceptance of mistakes and the reliance of higher headquarters upon the information provided by line units, our daily method of operation as well as our values, both military and those of society, are closer to detailed control. Our units are told what to do, how many people are required, what equipment is needed, etc. Few units are permitted the flexibility to decide how they are going to complete taskings. Indeed, many taskings are so simple that no thought is required in order to complete them. Acceptance of mistakes is not a daily practice in units and few higher headquarters rely upon unit input for planning of exercises or operations. Thus there would be no continuity if we were to change the way we do business daily to the way we would do business in war. Although not in line with doctrine, directive control is manoeuvre warfare because it seeks to defeat the enemy by neutralizing his critical vulnerability through dislocation, preemption or destruction.

Thus, one can then answer to the second question; does the Canadian Army practice manoeuvre warfare? The answer is yes but not the type it believes and not to the full extent possible.



Is Manoeuvre Warfare Appropriate to the Canadian Army?



Complexity of Modern Ops



Manoeuvre warfare seeks to defeat the enemy by neutralizing his critical vulnerability through preemption, dislocation or destruction. However, is defeat of the enemy the mission of every unit today? The Canadian Army is becoming increasingly aware of the complexity of modern day operations. United Nations, Joint Force and Coalition Operations involve delicate political overtones, sensitivity toward collateral damage and restrictive rules of engagement. Few, if any, operations that the CF are or possibly can be involved in are "total war", with complete disregard for political consequences. In these highly sensitive climates, initiative and directive control are not appropriate. A young platoon commander at a check point in Bosnia may well be aware of the Commander's intent, however he does not have enormous flexibility with respect to his actions. Problems can escalate to the highest levels quickly thus mistakes attributed to initiative and latitude at sub-unit level and lower cannot be tolerated. Each action is verified and authorized by higher headquarters before it can be carried out. Due to the complexity of rules of engagement and the political distaste for collateral damage, rarely is there a case of "shoot first and ask questions later". Even our nation's laws and beliefs place the emphasis upon "minimum force required". The responsibility quickly falls to commanders, as seen by the Somalia Inquiry, to ensure that all rules of engagement are understood and followed. A mistake can result in court martial and thus the perceived lack of political support can result in stifled initiative. Directive control and the initiative and latitude that accompany it, are founded upon trust between commanders and their subordinates. The fears of the extreme political consequences that can result from mistakes in modern operations erode this trust. This is not the climate for directive control but rather detailed control.



The Impact of Modern Technology



With the advent of modern intelligence gathering systems, information on the enemy can be attained faster than any time in history. Due to the range and area of influence of these systems, they are normally controlled at the highest levels. Thus, higher headquarters often know more about what is going on in front of the lead combat teams than the combat teams themselves. The better the intelligence gathering or surveillance system, the quicker and more accurately higher headquarters are aware of the situation. This would logically place higher headquarters in a position to "call the shots" and direct units more accurately, rather than relying upon units for information to develop an accurate picture of the situation. This is an ideal situation for detailed control. Of course there are always limitations to technology due to weather, mechanical malfunctions, etc. It is precisely these limitations than can be overcome through initiative and directive control. Thus the exponential improvement of modern information gathering systems creates a complex problem. The power of these systems lends itself to detailed control but reliance upon the same systems yearns for directive control.



Conclusion



The ever-diminishing size of our forces, along with our outdated equipment, creates challenges for today's commanders. Through imagination and a use of the concepts of manoeuvre warfare these challenges can be overcome. Force dichotomy and critical vulnerability are just as important to an understanding of manoeuvre warfare as is Schwerpunkt. An accurate analysis of strengths and weaknesses leads to a more intelligent understanding of the enemy. This understanding in turn leads to ideas of how to defeat even a superior enemy. In a climate of budgetary restriction, we must use the resources available to there utmost potential. Manoeuvre warfare seeks to defeat the enemy by neutralizing his critical vulnerability through preemption, dislocation or destruction. It is true that not all missions that the Canadian Army will be involved in will require defeat of an enemy. However if we state that manoeuvre warfare is our doctrine we must understand what manoeuvre warfare is and how it can be or cannot be used if we are to be successful in future operations.





References :



Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, Novato CA, Presidio Press 1991.
2. LCol Dave Grossman, On Killing, Boston MA, Little Brown and Company, 1995.

B-GL-300-002/FP-000, Land Force Tactical Doctrine, Volume 2.
William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Boulder CO, Westview Press 1985.

[Officer of Engineers]

To the Brigadier,

Sir, I ran across your post at the Bharat Rakshak Forum: Indian Army - Revolution in Military Affairs

I liked to answer your questions in this forum which is somewhat more technically oriented.

Originally posted by Ray at BRF: InA - RMA
While the Indian Army is operational competent, yet the scientific and technological march the world over apparently the Revolution in Military Affairs {RMA} has outpaced the jack of all trades approach towards warfare.

Apparently, specialisation is the need of the hour especially in the field of:

1. Information Technology and Information Warfare,
2. Human Resource Development/ Management.
3. Weapon Technologies.
4. Communications.

Sir, it's actually much simpler than that. It all falls back to the two axiom of warfare.

1) To find the enemy.
2) To kill the enemy.

And its collary - And do it to the enemy before the enemy can do it to us.

Everything that we're currently doing is geared towards these axioms and the collary. If the specialization fits, we used. If it doesn't, we discard. Note how we no longer use spears.

Originally posted by Ray at BRF: InA - RMA
Thus, the questions that come to mind are:

1. Is there a requirement to organising structural changes?

As noted in the above article

The Alcyoneus Principle



The preemption or dislocation of forces may at first seem to be applicable only at operational and strategic level. One may ask, "What does this have to do with combat team or battle group level combat?" The answer lies in the idea discussed by Leonhard and what can be termed as the Alcyoneus Principle and how it relates to Combined Arms Warfare. If we look at the strengths and weaknesses of the traditional three combat arms; Infantry, Armour and Artillery (Engineers will be excluded, as they do not engage the enemy except when acting as infantry) and compare them with traditional tasks and doctrine, an interesting dilemma develops. The Alcyoneus Principle is based upon the idea of using unlike systems (ie. one Arm versus another Arm) to exploit the inherent weaknesses of each arm. It states that the enemy's systems (Arms) should have their strengths negated before being attacked.

Well known throughout the combat arms is the idea that the best weapon for killing a tank is another tank. However if we examine that idea for a moment, an interesting discrepancy develops. If the conditions are favourable to your tanks in terms of range, terrain, etc. then the enemy's tanks probably enjoy the same conditions. There is thus no strength versus weakness scenario, just strength versus strength. In the combined-arms world of the combat team/battle group, there is an overwhelming desire to attack like forces or mass on mass combat. That is to say, attack enemy infantry with infantry, enemy armour with armour and enemy artillery with artillery (otherwise known as counter battery). However, one of the fundamentals of manoeuver warfare is that of attacking weaknesses, or critical vulnerabilities and not sources of strength. The strengths of armour are long-range engagement, speed, manoeuverability, shock action and so on. In any estimate (FLOCARK, IPB, etc.), we are taught to concentrate upon the high-speed approaches because that is where the tanks want to be. However, manoeuver theory asks the question "where do the tanks not want to be?" The answer is obvious. They want to avoid areas where their strengths are removed or dislocated, and where they are extremely vulnerable. Where on the battlefield are tanks vulnerable? The answer to every infantryman is close country. It is in close country that tanks are most vulnerable, but more importantly where engagement distances for infantry are very short. Thus the best weapon for killing a tank is an infantryman with a hand-held anti-tank weapon capable of engagement ranges as small as a few meters.

The same occurs with employment of artillery. A great percentage of artillery assets are tasked in the counter-battery role. Once again it is clear that this is an attrition type of battle, strength versus strength. In a battle of attrition, the larger and more numerous the enemy guns are, the more of our guns will be tasked in the counter-battery role. In the extreme, the beginning of any conflict (and thus the loss of surprise) would be dominated almost entirely by huge artillery duels until one side is declared the winner. However, if one examines the vulnerabilities of artillery on the battlefield then one quickly realizes that the most effective weapon against artillery is a round from the main armament of a tank. Imagine a battery of artillery, with their guns elevated skyward, attempting to defend itself from high speed armour (or even a company of LAV 25's) penetrating deep into the enemy's rear area. The results of such an engagement would obviously be on the side of the tanks.

Unfortunately, there is also an ultimate weapon for destroying the infantry. Infantry is vulnerable in the open, dismounted and beginning the assault. Infantry become an opportune target for artillery in this situation. Infantry are also extremely vulnerable when travelling in armoured personnel carriers. In this situation, one round from a tank or an anti-armour weapon can destroy an entire section. Thus each element of the combat arms has its own vulnerabilities. It also has it's own unique strengths. Manoeuvre warfare seeks to exploit this natural paradox by using one arm's strengths against another's weaknesses.

The obvious conclusion is to be able to field infantry in close quarters against armour; artillery to pound entrenched infantry; and armour to race under artillery's ballastic arcs. So, the question is not only about re-organizing but also re-orienteering.

Originally posted by Ray at BRF: InA - RMA
2. What are the spheres where specialisation is essential?

Information and the ability to act on that information. And the solution may not be just technology but also technique and maybe just pure technique. The Soviets/Russian/Chinese technique is to plan for all possible contigencies. The American/Western technique is to be able to react to all possible contigencies. The former is just pure technique and having the resources available (ie 6-10 to 1 numeric superiority, even if it's just local superiority) and the latter is mainly technological (C4ISR).

It is no coincidence that the "Eastern" Forces view the Meeting Engagement as the most dominant form of combat while "Western" forces specializes in Hasty combat. Well rehersed drills against best available informed decisive actions.

Currently, the Western way is superior at the battalion to brigade/regiment level where orders take hours to pass down to the platoon level. Up to the company level where real-time execution of orders take place, there is very little difference between the two systems. There is only so many TACSITS a company and below is expected to encounter.

At the bn to bde/regt lvl where orders require execution time in the hours, the unit that receive their orders first has the upper hand and Western C4ISR dominates over even the most brilliant pre-planning. Regt would still require time to determine which units are to good-to-go and then pass those orders down.

Originally posted by Ray at BRF: InA - RMA
3. What does it involve to usher in specialisation down to the unit level?

Simplification and divesification. Both the Western and the Eastern models have clear distinctions between simple riflemen, assault pioneers, pathfinders, combat support (ie special weapons), and combat service. The roles and equipments for each is different and deserve specialized training to increase their effectiveness.

There's also the need to reduce and eliminate taskings which both models do aspire to. The Eastern model of centralized strong planning reduces the need for a strong reserve (7 up, 1 back) as compared to the Western model (2-3 up, 1 back).

In the Western model, cameras replace patrols. Though a lense at 2000 metres will never replace a pair of eyes 100 metres away, they do reduce the need to search everywhere.

Originally posted by Ray at BRF: InA - RMA
4. What will be the gains?

Increased effectiveness in certain areas. I'll use GPS as the example. GPS gives the soldier the ability to see terrain correctly and accurately much faster than map and compass.

Originally posted by Ray at BRF: InA - RMA
5. What are the impediments?

Lost of abilities in others. Giving troops GPS over map and compass gives them the ability to cover a MUCH larger area over map and compass. Being denied GPS and revert back to map and compass even in an emergency would limit area coverage, most likely to the detriement of mission success. If your troops need to cover X kms with GPS but only X-Y kms with map and compass, you're in trouble if your OPOBJ requires your troops to cover X kms.

Originally posted by Ray at BRF: InA - RMA
What do you feel will the modern battlefield be like?

CONFUSING.

Originally posted by Ray at BRF: InA - RMA
Has the Generalised soldier become redundant?

In a war, lasting six months or less, yes, he is. In a war lasting longer than six months, he's the master. Attrition will sooner or later start experiencing shortages. Good luck to the soldier with GPS when his batteries run out.

[Officer of Engineers]

Also, Sir, the Americans and the West have stopped using the term RMA. It is hard to put projects to that name. It is currently divided into two fields - the Future Combat System (aka Funny Concept Silliness to its detractors) for the hardware requirements and the OBJECTIVE FORCE for the doctrinal development.

[Officer of Engineers]

Canadian Forces College

Spotlight on Military News

Daily article links concerning military matters from around the globe.

[Officer of Engineers]

Command And Control Complexity Squared: Operating In The Future Battlespace
by Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn


We have to put aside the comfortable ways of thinking and planning, take risks and try new things so that we can prepare our forces to deter and defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged to challenge us.1

Donald Rumsfeld,
US Secretary of Defense

The military institution has been criticized continually for preparing to fight the last war, and, in many ways, this is understandable because of its conservative nature and abhorrence of change. There is, after all, a certain degree of comfort, if not logic, in maintaining doctrine, equipment, tactics and procedures that have proven successful in combat operations. To change, whether by evolution or by leaping to new concepts, methods or technologies, involves an enormous degree of risk, particularly in a field where failure carries such cataclysmic consequences.2 “If the vision and the concepts are wrong,” warned Major-General Robert Scales, “adding resources simply compounds the error.”3

However, few competent military or political decision-makers would argue that the status quo is acceptable. The vacuum created in the wake of the Cold War has been filled with instability, conflict and seemingly continual change. The Canadian Army, like its allied counterparts throughout the world, must evolve if it is to remain a relevant institution.

But, to what end? What will the future battlespace be? To say that armed forces must be prepared for full spectrum conflict may be sound in principle, but it is hardly helpful. Yet, to attempt a definitive response would also be foolhardy. “Today’s world is without precedent,” cautioned French military analyst Phillippe Delmas, “It is as different from the Cold War as it is from the Middle Ages so the past offers no basis for comparison.”4 Clearly, there is no crystal ball. As quickly as a determinate method of fighting is developed by one belligerent, a counter is created by their opponents. It is important for commanders and strategists always to remember that potential antagonists are equally clever, and constantly striving to find a weakness to exploit. And, as the terrorist attack in New York on 11 September 2001 so clearly indicated, the attack that will be successful is the one that was not thought possible.

Therefore, although it is impractical to paint a future scenario with any degree of precision, it is possible to describe characteristics that are likely to shape the future battlefield and our ability to operate on it.5 By understanding current trends and the possibilities that the future might hold, political and military decision-makers should be able to choose the path that will allow desired outcomes to be realized, and, conversely, prevent undesired possibilities from affecting our national security. Moreover, an understanding of the likely attributes of the future battlespace will allow commanders, planners and defence scientists to develop the necessary doctrine, training regimes and equipment to assist the Army in preparing itself for the challenges of the new millennium.


Figure 1 – Spectrum of Conflict & Continuum of Operations

Increased Complexity
To state that the battlespace of the future – the land, air, sea, space and electromagnetic realm where armed conflict will be conducted within its cultural, economic, ecological, environmental, political, social and technological contexts – will be dramatically different from that of today is to repeat the strikingly obvious. “Future war,” predicts the former US Marine Corps Commandant, General Charles Krulak, “is most likely not the son of Desert Storm; rather it will be the stepchild of Somalia and Chechnya.”6

Certainly it will be increasingly complex. Gone is the reassurance and safety of a well-known, predictable and easily-templated enemy. The elaborate contingency plans once so important for the defence of Europe and the Western world are now irrelevant. So too are the doctrines and training programmes designed to prepare for combat against the former Warsaw Pact forces. Canada and its allies have been plunged into a chaotic and turbulent new era that is likely to become even more ambiguous, uncertain and volatile.

The battlespace is similarly predisposed. Its complexity will increase exponentially because of factors such as the asymmetric nature of the threat, the antagonists’ choice of urban terrain, blurred operations, expansion of the battlespace, the technological/human interface, and the challenge of real-time media coverage.

The Asymmetric Threat
The asymmetric nature of future conflict will have a dramatic effect on how we fight. “Asymmetry,” according to American strategist Steven Metz, “is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action.” He adds: “It can entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives, or some combination of these ... [and it] can have both psychological and physical dimensions.”7 Doctrinally, an asymmetric threat is a concept “used to describe attempts to circumvent or undermine an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses, [and] using methods that differ significantly from the opponent’s usual mode of operations.”8

At its core, asymmetry is not designed to win battlefield victory. Rather, its aim is to disrupt, distract and disconnect, or in short, to wear down a normally superior opponent. “Difficult to respond to in a discriminate and proportionate manner,” explained strategist Colin Gray, “it is of the nature of asymmetric threats that they are apt to pose a level-of-response dilemma to the victim. The military response readily available tends to be unduly heavy-handed, if not plainly irrelevant, while the policy hunt for the carefully measured and precisely targeted reply all too easily can be ensnared in a lengthy political process which inhibits any real action.”9

Gray also points out that the asymmetric threat makes coercive threats less credible, and even poses difficulties in going to war, as was recently demonstrated in the war against terrorism, and by the lack of international support for the American war against Iraq in 2003. Moreover, the asymmetric threat makes the achievement of operational and tactical goals increasingly difficult. As Gray pondered, “What defines success?” Displacing Osama Bin Laden? Ousting Saddam Hussein? Furthermore, it is not enough for responses “to asymmetric threats to be effective; in addition, they must be politically and morally tolerable.”10

Herein lies the difficulty for the practitioner. Commanders will be required to operate in, and be comfortable with, ambiguous and uncertain surroundings. Their options for using force will often be restricted. In addition, of necessity, they will require the capability of adapting physically and theoretically to changes in the immediate operational area as well as in the larger international security environment. These sorts of uncertain situations will also demand that individuals, units and formations be agile, flexible and capable of responding to the unforeseen and unexpected.

Complexity will also derive from the nature of the enemy that has been spawned by asymmetric warfare, and from the evolving Western way of war. As military superiority increases, so too will the resiliency of the opponents. The enemy is likely to work increasingly in complex networks of small organizations, each with a small number of dispersed individuals that communicate, coordinate and conduct campaigns in an inter-netted manner. These associations will be diverse, robust and redundant, thus making it difficult to bring superior force to bear. There will be multiple nodes, and most likely no centralized command structure to target. Therefore, the question arises, “How do you defeat it?”11

In addition, both state and non-state actors will increasingly have access to advanced communications and weapons technology that will make them more effective by giving them global reach for planning, staging and striking. This will also provide opponents with the means of interfering with friendly communications, command and control networks. Central to future operations will be the threat of “cyber-shock” that can paralyze or destroy a belligerent’s network, with the result being total destruction of an adversary’s ability to maintain a coherent command and control ability.12 The Assistant Deputy Minister, Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness for DND, reported that malicious attacks on systems and networks increased by 430 percent from 1999 to 2000, and by another 525 percent in 2001.13 In 1995, the US Department of Defense experienced approximately 250,000 attacks.14 During the crisis in Kosovo, in 1999, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic organized a systematic “ping bombardment” of the NATO server that went on for ten days and totally incapacitated it with a virus.15 Finally, during the first week of conflict in Iraq in 2003, over 20,000 web site attacks were recorded on pro- and anti-Iraqi war sites alone, in many cases making it impossible for sites to re-establish themselves because of repeated attacks.16

Complex Terrain
Complexity will also derive from the terrain on which an opponent will choose to do battle.17 Once again, the element of asymmetry and the enemy’s desire to avoid the superior firepower, organizational and technological advantages of the United States and its allies will drive them to seek means of levelling the playing field. One obvious method will be to operate in an environment that negates Western technological advantages – namely urban centres.

Throughout history, cities have always posed an enormous challenge for armies. The compression of space and the proximity of belligerents shape the environment. Small targets, primarily people, are densely distributed in a high-clutter, masked environment. The design of cities, with their abundance of infrastructure of every nature, tends to limit many current military capabilities such as stealth, mobility, communications, surveillance and reconnaissance, and GPS navigation and target designation. Moreover, fighting in built-up areas is not a core competency in most armies. The difficulties are further exacerbated by the inability of soldiers and commanders to think in a three-dimensional manner because of failure to train and practice.

These challenges and limitations provide a levelling effect. In addition, cities also provide physical cover for the enemy. As noted, an urban centre by its very nature tends to neutralize technology, especially long-range weapons. As a result, it relegates action to close combat – normally a very slow, resource- and casualty-intensive process. Moreover, the clutter and dense nature of cities make them ideal for concealment, deception and surprise strikes. The 2003 conflict in Iraq demonstrated that an opponent will hide troops, equipment and weapons in churches, community centres, hospitals and schools, and he will deploy soldiers in civilian dress mixed in with the population. One unofficial after-action report revealed the enemy to be:

Smart, flexible. Utilizing all means at their disposal. They have moved ammo in civilian trucks, held weapons to their own people’s heads, and pretended to be doctors with asthmatic children. Pretend to surrender – then open fire.18

Not surprisingly, in a recent study on unrestricted warfare, two Chinese strategists have warned: “There is no means which cannot be used in war [in the future] and there is no territory or method which cannot be used in combination.”19

The adoption of ‘unrestricted warfare’ on the part of some antagonists severely increases complexity for commanders and their soldiers. Regardless of the heinous nature of the circumstances that may have caused the conflict, or the moral bankruptcy of the organizations fighting it, the military forces of Western industrialized democracies will be expected to uphold principles and values that are fundamental to their societies. Future pressures resulting from the political context, along with constraints such as societal intolerance to friendly casualties and collateral damage, and demands for increasing precision engagements will make fighting exponentially more complex in the future.20 When military force is authorized, the resulting action will have to be at as low a risk threshold as possible, ensuring a minimum of casualties and collateral damage, and yet it will have to be brought to a conclusion in the quickest possible time.

The result is an inherent paradox. Commanders are often left with the quandary of using enough force to win, but thereby risking criticism of causing excessive death and destruction (such as in the 2003 war against Iraq, when the media routinely aired photos of wounded Iraqi civilians despite American restraint); or criticism of using too little force with the concomitant risk of losing the fight, or being criticized for a stalled, ineffectual campaign (such as in the initial stages of the Kosovo, Afghan and Iraqi campaigns in 1999, 2001, 2003 respectively).

This realization, provides opponents with another valuable reason to use urban settings: political cover. The risk of heavy civilian casualties, the danger of collateral damage, and the likelihood of a subsequent humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of a prolonged struggle in an urban area, compounded by the scrutiny of the media, provide not only a levelling of the battlefield but in some ways an advantage to the enemy. The resulting political constraints (i.e. restrictive Rules of Engagement), along with the necessity of having to invest heavily in humanitarian and public affairs efforts to counterbalance negative press coverage, can distract from the primary mission and sap momentum. This may also have the effect of prolonging the conflict, which to an impatient public is likely to be unacceptable.

Media Scrutiny And The Reality Of The Strategic Corporal
As a result of the issues discussed above, in any future conflict leaders and their subordinates will operate in a politically sensitive environment where the actions of a single soldier at a roadblock or in a tactical setting can have strategic ramifications. Operating under the constant glare of the television camera will multiply the degree of complexity faced by leaders and their subordinates. “The Power of CNN” is no longer an idle network boast.21 The ‘CNN effect’ has greatly magnified the notion of the “strategic corporal”, where a low-level tactical decision or error can become a strategic issue as it is beamed across the globe in real time. In fact, it adds to the volatility of the political security environment. The media’s global connectivity and instantaneous reporting can create highly-charged political problems simply because of viewers’ reactions to news reports (such as collateral damage or perceptions of unjust military action). A recent example of this phenomenon was the US Marine Corps soldier who, upon clearing a stronghold in Iraq, raised the American flag. Although the flag was lowered almost immediately, the fleeting image of that action unleashed a barrage of controversy as it carried implications of the Americans being an occupying power instead of a liberating force. “A wrong decision in the glare of the media,” warns Colonel Paul Maillet, a former DND Director of Defence Ethics, “can have far-reaching consequences that can affect peacekeeping mandates and strategic and national policies and aims.”22

The CNN effect also feeds what has become an unrealistic impatience by both the public and the media. War, even when conducted in some of the most distant and hostile environments known, is now expected by a restless media and their audience to be over within days or, at best, weeks. In a medium where only 90 to 100 seconds are allocated to any single issue in the average news story, and where the dominant principle seems to be “if it bleeds it leads”, there is a need for news to be dramatic if not sensational. This will cause great problems for the military. News reports can be expected to be fleeting and without context. “Television as a medium has no past and no future,” explained NATO spokesman Jamie Shea, “It is always the eternal present. What BBC’s Nik Gowing has called the “tyranny of real time,” with no causality, and no connection to what came before or what goes next. So everything is immediately important and a few moments later completely unimportant, contrary to our experience of real life.”23

A single act can become the defining image of a battle, campaign or operation. Failure or errors of any scale carry the potential of being catastrophic. Recent examples have shown that shocking images of combat can sway public opinion in an open, democratic society and create intense political pressure to cease hostilities.24

And, there will be no respite. In Bosnia there were 3,000 journalists on the ground throughout the NATO air campaign of 1995. “They were faster than NATO soldiers or NATO satellites,” conceded Shea. “Certainly faster than our intelligence community.”25 The infamous tractor bombing incident caused NATO to lose 20 percentage points of public support after images were beamed all over the world.26 In the recent 2003 war against Iraq, there were approximately 810 embedded reporters with the Coalition forces, in excess of 3,000 war correspondents in total, and a multitude of others covering the conflict from locations throughout the globe.27 This has led to a universally accepted populist notion that ‘it isn’t real unless it’s on television.’ To conduct operations in such an environment magnifies the complexity of an already complicated profession.

Information Operations
Operations in the future battlespace, at all levels, will be highly dependent on information operations (IO). These will include activities such as computer network attacks, efforts to counter enemy propaganda, deception operations, electronic warfare (EW), destruction of enemy IO targets, ensuring the security of friendly information and infrastructure, as well as related activities such as civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and public affairs. One immediate requirement will be the need to get information disseminated quickly to military personnel and civilians in the area of operations, as well as to the domestic and international audience. This will necessitate the swift passage of information from the lowest levels involved, i.e. having events explained at the scene by the soldiers on the ground. This carries a degree of risk and adds to the complexity of the task. However, a RAND study concluded: “The marginal return from leveraging an information factor – such as the media – may be greater than the marginal return of applying more firepower.”28 In the end, time becomes the critical factor – often the centre of gravity.

This will have dramatic implications for those conducting operations. First, it will require a greater concentration on information operations and a comprehension of the peoples and cultures of the area of operations. It will also require significant effort devoted to countering propaganda and informing the media, the affected population, the domestic audience and the international community about the “proper and righteous” manner in which operations are being conducted.

Blurred Operations
The constant media scrutiny – instantaneous global coverage of events as they happen in real time – will further add complexity to operations in the battlespace by what might be termed the ‘blurring’ of operations. Public indignation and the political pressure resulting from negative images portraying humanitarian crises will necessitate concurrent and parallel operations, rather than sequential operations according to a carefully laid out schedule. Best described by former US Marine Corps Commandant, General Charles Krulak as the “three block war,” soldiers will be expected to provide humanitarian assistance in one part of the city, conduct peacekeeping operations in another part, and at the same time fight a lethal mid-intensity battle in a third sector.29 During Operation “Iraqi Freedom”, Lieutenant-Colonel William Wallace revealed that “One day our troops are kicking down doors, and the next they’re passing out band-aids.” He added, “In some cases, they’re kicking down doors without really knowing if they are going to have to pull a trigger or pass out a band-aid on the other side.”30 In the end, victory will not be assured just because the shooting stops. “Winning the peace”, as it has been popularly expressed, will become essential.

This reality, coupled with the tendency of opponents to use civilian infrastructure and populations to shield their actions, will almost certainly result in greater reliance on non-lethal weapons if friendly forces are to conduct missions safely without inflicting large numbers of civilian casualties or excessive collateral damage. By incapacitating crowds or even entire localities, soldiers can attempt to identify potential foes from ‘friendlies’ or neutrals without putting themselves or others at great risk. Although increasingly complex, the alternatives become untenable.

As a result, commanders and soldiers will be expected to transition quickly from fighting to humanitarian activities and aid to the civil power operations, and vice versa. They will be expected to conduct complex and dangerous combat in urban settings against a wily, elusive enemy. This will require finely-honed tactical skills at one moment – among them marksmanship, house clearing and demolitions – and then softer expertise such as negotiation, mediation and assistance to civilian authorities the next. These demand a totally different suite of skills and ability. In essence, the complex new battlespace will require that soldiers be warrior diplomats.

The implication for the warrior of the future battlespace is simple. To be a highly trained combat soldier will not be enough; this multifaceted environment will require soldiers to be highly educated. The traditional emphasis on training – “a predictable response to a predictable situation” – will have to be better balanced with education, defined by Professor Ron Haycock as the “reasoned response to an unpredictable situation – critical thinking in the face of the unknown.”31 In this vein, “time dedicated to understanding the higher orders of conflict inculcates mental agility and the ability to be creative as well as technically competent,” explains Major-General Scales. “A well-read and educated leader,” he adds, “will be better prepared to deal with the uncertainty and chaos of combat.”32 Decentralized decision-making power, and enlightened low-level leaders capable of making reasoned, timely decisions under pressure are what will determine success or failure.

Expanded Battlespace
Increased complexity in the battlespace will also derive from the expanded nature of operations, which will be conducted simultaneously on land and sea, in the air and in space, as well as in the electromagnetic domain. Moreover, operations will be non-contiguous and non-linear. That is to say, operations will take place throughout the entire battlespace without the historical linear approach, where the frontages and flanks of opposing forces delineated the actual battlefield, and where boundaries, report lines and axes of advance defined the scope of manoeuvre of a commander, unit or formation.

Continual technological advancements will enable land forces to manoeuvre while acquiring and engaging targets more rapidly, at greater ranges, and with more precise effects, and greater lethality than ever before. The greatly improved ability to locate and identify targets, accurately assess their capabilities, and engage them in a timely manner will enable the employment of much smaller, more agile, networked units that can be dispersed over greater distances and still have greatly reduced logistics support needs. This diffusion of force, protected through access to real-time information and precision weapons rather than on mass and firepower as in the past, will allow for simultaneous operations throughout the battlespace. This will deprive an opponent of any respite as their fighting forces, infrastructure, command and control systems, and indeed their psychological resiliency (i.e. morale and will), are disrupted, displaced and destroyed.


Figure 2 – The Expanding Battlespace

This will lead to a battlespace with many parallel and simultaneous operations being conducted by diverse yet interconnected and interdependent forces that are dispersed throughout a battlespace that is less dense and with no defined boundaries. Manoeuvre, tied to situational awareness and access to lethal weapons effects, will become dominant. The size of forces will become less relevant; forces will disperse and come back together as the operational situation dictates. Their ability to call on precision weapons, and provide accurate target designation at all times, will be the key to operational and strategic success.

Commanders at higher levels will be required to deal with wide-scale dispersion of their subordinate units and thus the challenge of a span of control that greatly exceeds what is now considered acceptable. Real-time threat assessments, the assignment of realistic tasks, and the proper allocation of munitions delivery systems and logistics sustainment will require careful management and control. Lower-level commanders will increasingly find themselves with near-independent commands at great distances from friendly forces. They will rely on agility, speed, accurate and timely information, and massed precision weapons effects coordinated through inter-netted command and control systems to achieve success.


Figure 3 – Non-Contiguous Battlespace

Continual High Tempo Of Operations
Another characteristic of the future battlespace will be continuous battle. Technological advancements such as all-condition, all-weather, day/night vision enhancement will permit non-stop operations. This will allow the concept of tempo to be used as a deliberate tactic, i.e. the sustaining of an intensity of operations with which the enemy cannot cope. The will of an opponent is rarely broken by a single spike in intensity. Rather, a consistent, concentrated, simultaneous effort will be required over an extended period of time. By continually overwhelming the enemy’s decision cycle, their ability to react and offer coherent resistance will be diminished.

Tempo will also increase as a result of the compression of time from ‘sensor to shooter’ and the ability to influence the entire battlespace. Technology will enable advances in early and distant detection of enemy forces. The ability to destroy those forces before they disperse, disappear or engage friendly forces, as well as the need to maintain unrelenting pressure on the enemy to ensure a quick and successful outcome, will drive belligerents to conduct non-stop operations until one side is exhausted or destroyed.

In addition, the political pressure for rapid resolution of a conflict will also drive a relentless tempo. The cost of war to modern societies is such that leaders will hesitate to engage in military campaigns unless the result is likely to be quick and decisive. Furthermore, as already discussed, the public, fed by an insatiable media, will also compel decision-makers as well as military commanders to push for instant results.

Enhanced Lethality
Yet another characteristic of the future battlespace will be its increased lethality. Technological advances will continue to enhance the range and precision of weapons and target acquisition systems. As the ‘sense and act’ operational functions become more advanced, survival on the battlefield will become progressively more difficult. Dispersion, rapid mobility, stealth, quick response and force protection will be essential as long-range precision engagements by a myriad of weapon systems – kinetic energy, laser, sound, light and pulse – become the norm. The future battlespace will focus on simultaneous attack by interdependent air-ground-sea-space forces that are situationally aware and have a current and accurate view of the battlespace via computer and satellite. These forces will be networked from ‘sensor to shooter’ (i.e., surveillance systems will be electronically connected to all weapons platforms), which will ensure the capability for swift, massed effects.

Clearly, the key to success will be timely intelligence coupled with flexible, swift, lethal military response, and the technology is already proving to be both capable and lethal. For example, During Operation “Enduring Freedom” in 2001, senior Al Qaeda terrorist commanders travelling in a remote area of Afghanistan were killed by a missile fired from an unmanned, remotely-controlled Predator drone. Less than two years later, within 45 minutes of the information being passed, an American B2 Bomber struck a building believed to house Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Increasingly, the dictum: ‘If you can be seen, you are dead’ will prevail.

However, the proliferation of inexpensive weapons and information technology will also allow antagonists to acquire a lethal capability relatively easily. Therefore, although small, agile, dispersed units will indeed be capable of dominating large areas because of access to accurate targeting data and precision-effects weaponry, they will need to remain dispersed, highly mobile and robust just to avoid the effects of the enemy’s precision weapons.

WAR
TARGET RANGE
(enemy tank)
Number of Rounds
for a Kill

Second World War
800 yards
18

1973 Arab-Israeli War
1,200 yards
2

War Against Iraq, 2003
2,400 yards
1


Figure 4 – The Growing Precision of Direct Fire Weapons33



WAR
No. of 2000 lb. bombs/
missiles to hit 60’ by 100’ tgt
No. of Aircraft
(from medium height)
Circular Error
of Probability

Second World War
9,070
3,024
3,300 ft

Korea
1,100
550
1,000

Vietnam
176
44
400

1991 Gulf War
30
8
200

War Against Iraq, 2003
(1)
1 (B2)
10


Figure 5 – The Growing Precision of Aerial Weapons34

The Technologically-dependent Battle
The need for accurate, instantaneous situational awareness, intelligence and target acquisition, coupled with long-range precision effects, will make the battlespace of the future technology-dependent. “Our goal,” explained Pennsylvania Representative Curt Weldon of the House Subcommittee on Procurement when speaking on the issue of the unmanned bomber/unmanned combat aerial vehicle, “[is to ensure that] within 10 years, one-third of our tactical strike aircraft will be unmanned.”35 US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel David Branham concurred. “Its possible,” he commented, “that in our lifetime we will be able to run a conflict without ever leaving the United States.”36 Strategist and futurist, retired US Army Major General Robert Scales, has noted that “the task of destroying the enemy now [and in the future] belongs to firepower, not maneuver systems.”37

In the near term, the conundrum will be the balance between technology and manpower. How much redundancy back-up from conventional ‘legacy’ formations and weapons will have to be retained, and for how long? The interface and integration of technology (i.e. equipment, surveillance systems, robotics and weapons) and humans will, of course, provide an exponential increase in capability and a more technologically proficient and aware military. However, it will also create technological dependencies and increased training requirements (whether practical or by means of simulation). In addition, the new information technology and sensor capability and output, coupled with full-spectrum connectivity, will provide an abundance (perhaps even an overload) of information that will need to be filtered and processed in a timely manner. This may well become the most daunting challenge for commanders of the future: to cull the important bits of information from the massive waves of clutter that will continually flood recipients.

It should be noted, however, that the rise of technology will not displace human ingenuity. It would be foolhardy to assume that an enemy that lacks similar technology or weapons systems will be incapable of causing destruction or mayhem. The threat of asymmetric attack will always be present, and commanders must never underestimate an opponent merely because of his limited technology.


Figure 6 – Interdependent Operations

Interdependent Operations
The expanded, more lethal, technologically-dependent battlespace creates the final characteristic of the future realm of conflict – interdependent operations. At this time, the ability to conduct effective joint operations – those involving two or more environments (services) of a single country – has been the immediate goal. This entails the ability to plan and conduct operations in a seamless manner, with integrated command structures, interoperable communications and information systems, along with common doctrine and procedures.38

In the future battlespace, however, military forces will have to move beyond joint to interdependent operations. The need for swift responses to fleeting opportunities on the battlefield will require adaptability and flexibility. It will require the ability to designate weapons platforms, regardless of which service owns them, to react instantly in support of another element anywhere in the battlespace. In essence, capability and effects must be completely embedded in one command. The continued existence of ponderous chains-of-command and unwieldy targeting protocols will be tantamount to failure. Equally, any inability to ensure connectivity and accurate situational awareness of all friendly forces will be deadly.

In addition, blurred operations, media scrutiny and political pressure will create a multi-dimensional battlespace that necessitates the cooperation and interaction of not only all three environments (services), but also governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations. Increasingly, interdependent operations encompassing a myriad of military and non-military forces working together will be the key to achieving the desired outcomes.

Conclusions
The future battlespace will be volatile, uncertain, constantly changing, and ambiguous. There will be an increased emphasis on information operations and small, agile, dispersed, situationally-aware units operating in a non-linear environment supported by instantaneously-delivered precision-effects weaponry. Operations will be conducted simultaneously on land, sea, air and space, as well as in the electromagnetic spectrum. Conflict will become increasingly complex because of the asymmetric nature of the threat, the use of urban terrain, blurred operations, and the expansion of the battlefield. Technological advances will ensure that the battlefield becomes even more lethal: ‘If you are seen, you are dead.’ Furthermore, operations will be multi-dimensional, requiring not only the close integration of all three environments, but also that of governmental and non-governmental agencies to achieve desired outcomes. Finally, all activity will be conducted under the unrelenting scrutiny of international media that will beam events across the world in real-time as they occur.

To function in this daunting environment will require a reorientation of how we think and operate on the battlefield. The American concept expressed as “See First – Understand First – Act First – Finish Decisively” would seem to provide the right guidance. This will be achieved by enhanced situational awareness made possible by global command and control and ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) capabilities. It will also be the result of networked interdependent environments (services) capable of conducting simultaneous operations in a non-contiguous battlespace, as well as responding instantly to calls for massed precision weapons effects.

The American solution, according to the White Paper Concept for the future “Objective Force” issued by the US Army Chief of Staff, is defined as operations “characterized by developing situations out of contact; manoeuvring to positions of advantage; engaging enemy forces beyond the range of their weapons; destroying them with precision fires and when necessary, by tactical assault at times and places of our choosing.”39 In essence, what will be needed are adaptable (highly trained and educated), highly mobile, well-equipped forces capable of rapid deployment on complex multi-dimensional coalition operations, and able to conduct missions across the entire spectrum of conflict.


Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn, PhD, is Deputy Director of Land Strategic Concepts and Adjunct Professor of History at Royal Military College.

Notes
Speech given at the National Defense University, Washington D.C. 31 January 2002, <http://defenselink.mil/speeches/2002...31-secdef.html>.
This is why the American military maintains a ratio of 15 percent of its forces in a state of change, while the other 85 percent remain constant and form the baseline combat capability. David Hughes, “The Future of Joint Warfighting,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 26 May 2003, p. 76.
Major-General Robert h . Scales, Jr., Yellow Smoke. The Future of Land Warfare for America’s Military (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Pubishers, Inc., 2003), p. 19.
Phillippe Delmas, The Rosy Future of War (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 213.
This projection is based on trends analysis which is based on the systematic collection of data on what is actually occurring in the world at present in regards to such things as technology, economic performance, military spending, environmental degradation, etc.... The analysis of this data normally indicates a specific direction, or trend for a given area. From this, a rough order of magnitude forecast can be made.
Robert Holzer, “Krulak Warns of Over-Reliance on Technology,” Defence News, 7-13 October 1996, p. 4.
Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, “Asymmetry and US Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts,” US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001, pp. 5-6.
Colonel W.J. Fulton, DNBCD, “Capabilities Required of DND, Asymmetric Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Fourth Draft, 18 March 01, p. 2/22.
Colin Gray, “Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror,” Parameters, Vol 32, No. 1, Spring 2002, p. 6.
Ibid., p. 9.
Mohammed Aideed in Somalia is one example. He used runners, burning tires and other primitive means of communication and was able to elude capture and destruction of his power base.
See James J. Schnieder, “Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity and the Promise of Information Warfare,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1997, pp. 21-28.
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, Part I, Item 15.
Edmund M. Glabus, “Metaphors and Modern Threats: Biological, Computer and Cognitive Viruses,” in Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America be Defeated? (Carlisle: US Army War College, 1998), p. 203.
Dr. Jamie Shea, “Modern Conflicts, the media and public opinion. The Kosovo Example,” Militaire Spectator, JRG 169, 8-2000, p. 411.
Reuters, “War Hack Attacks Tit For Tat,” <http://www.wired.com/news/conflict/0...ml?tw=wn_ascii>, accessed 1 April 2003.
The term ‘complex terrain’ in the context of this chapter refers to terrain features that impact on line-of-sight, restrict manoeuvre and separate the soldier from his vehicle (e.g. jungle, mountain or urban environments).
“3-7 CAV Lessons Learned,” posted on Companycommand.com, 1 April 2003.
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999), p. 199.
See Jeffrey Record, “Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War,” Parameters, Vol 32, No. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 4-23.
It is estimated that a minimum of 100 million people had access to satellite networks carrying reports on the War in Iraq during the American-led invasion. International Press Institute (IPI), “Caught in the Crossfire: The Iraq War and the Media,” <http://www.freemedia.at/IraqReport2003.htm>, accessed 6 June 2003.
Colonel J.P.M. Maillet, “Defence Ethics, Program Ethics and Operations Project,” memorandum, 20 June 2000.
Shea, p. 409.
See Sean J. A. Edwards, Mars Unmasked (Santa Monica: RAND Arroyo Center, 2000), p. 67.
Shea, p. 410. The US Army 7th Cavalry learned of the start of the war in Iraq not from their chain of command but from their embedded CNN reporter, Walter Rodgers. He told the soldiers that the Americans had launched air strikes at Baghdad, marking the beginning of the war. Jacqueline E. Sharkey, “The Television War,” American Journalism Review, May 2003, <http://www.ajr.org>, accessed 6 June 2003.
Ibid., p. 411.
IPI, “Caught in the Crossfire,” and CNN televised report, 9 April 2003.
Sean J. A. Edwards, Mars Unmasked (Santa Monica: RAND Arroyo Center, 2000), p. xiv.
Robert Leitch, “The Three Block War: Urban Conflict,” US Medicine Information Central, <http://www.usmedicine.com/column.cfm...D=37&isseID=23>, accessed 27 March 2003.
Michael Noonan, “The Military Lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) E-Notes, 1 May 2003.
Dr. Ron Haycock, “Clio and Mars in Canada: The Need for Military Education,” presentation to the Canadian Club, Kingston, Ontario, 11 November 1999.
Scales, p. 13.
Ibid., p. 65.
Source: George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1996), p. 262; Roger W. Barnett, Asymmetric Warfare (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s Inc, 2003), pp. 43-44; CNN televised report, 10 April 2003.
Matthew Brzezinski, New York Times Magazine – Online edition, 20 April 2003.
Ibid.
Scales, p. 157.
Canada. Joint Doctrine for Canadian Forces. Joint and Combined Operations B-GG-005-004/AF-000 (Ottawa: DND, 1995), pp. 1-11.
Steven Metz, Director of Research and Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department at the Strategic Studies Institute, has articulated six decisive characteristics for the future battlespace: strategic speed; full scale decisiveness; broad band precision; success in protracted, asymmetric, ambiguous, and complex conflicts; ability to operate in coalition; and rapid conceptual and organizational adaptation.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Conference Of Defence Associations Institute
20th Annual Seminar

Thursday, February 26, 2004

Château Laurier Hotel, Ottawa

Theme: “The Way Ahead for Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy”
For further information and to register,
please view our website at: www.cda-cdai.ca
or contact the CDAI at 359 Kent Street, Suite 502
Ottawa, Ontario, K2P 0R7
Tel (613) 236-1252, Fax (613) 236-8191
or E-mail [email protected]


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Photo by Silvia Pecota

A convoy of LAV IIIs moving along a road at dusk in Wainwright, Alberta, April 2003.


Last Modified: 2004-01-05 Important Notices

[Officer of Engineers]

A question has been asked how are combined arms are actually formed to support the various combat arms, ie how are the various trades formed and attached to the various formations.

To start off, the brigade/regiment is the smallest combined arms unit. Using the Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group as an example

CMBG

2 Mech Inf Bn
1 Light Inf Bn(-)
1 Arm'd Regt
1 Arty Regt
1 Engr Regt
1 Svc Bn
1 Amb Bn
1 Sigs Sqn
1 HQ & Sigs Sqn
1 Tac Hel Sqn

Mech Inf Bn

3 Mech Inf Coys
1 Cbt Supt Coy (1 Mortar bty, 1 TUA Pl, 1 Pioneer Pl, 1 Recee Tp)
1 Svc Coy

Light Inf Bn(-)

1 Parachute Coy
1 Rifle Coy
1 Svc Coy

Arm'd Regt

1 Tk Sqn
1-2 Direct Fire Support Sqn (Coyotes without sensors)
1 Recee Sqn
1 Svc Coy

Arty Regt

1 SP Arty Bty
2 Towed Arty Bty
1 SHORAD Bty
1 Svc Bty

Engr Regt

1 Fd Engr Sqn
1 Construction Sqn
1 Bridging Sqn
1 Svc Coy

To have sufficent robustness at any given situation, a bn is the smallest unit you need to maintain effectiveness. Thus, going smaller would deny multiple support points.

From a bde, you can ad-hoc form battle groups (Americans call these Task Forces) and company groups/combat teams by selectively assigning support elements to the bns that would need it. For example, have the bridging sqn support the only coy that actually is doing the crossing.

Typically, a battle group is a mixture of 3-5 of both inf coys and arm'd sqns. Depending on the support needed, SP btys may follow while covering fire is offerred by the towed btys.

A coy grp/cbt tm is the immediate cbt rqmnt that actually needs to do direct fire against the enemy. It is formed usually at the bn lvl but may be tasked with supporting elements not organic to the bn.

[Officer of Engineers]

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/engl...4/indxjf04.asp

Military Review
Command & General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Mil Review Home English Edition Spanish Edition Portuguese Edition



January-February 2004 English Edition
Return to the Military Review Homepage

Cover

Index

2 Deconstructing Army Leadership
Colonel Christoper R. Paparone, U.S. Army

A deconstruction of the Army's theory of leadership, with its emphasis on hierarchy and management, reveals that the Army has based its theory on circular logic, unprovable assumptions, and romantic myths, and it fails to understand the real nature of leadership—its inspirational and sensemaking function.

11 Targeting in Postconflict Operations in Iraq
Lieutenant Colonel Dominic J. Caraccilo, U.S. Army, and
Major Andrew M. Rohling, U.S. Army

The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry Regiment, parachuted into northern Iraq, seized Kirkuk, conducted raids, and after Baghdad fell, set up an independent Kirkuk police force and public service system. They used the methodology of the targeting process to focus on nontraditional targets, such as the city's infrastructure, and developed effective ROE for postconflict operations.

20 Effects-Based Operations and the Exercise of National Power
Major David W. Pendall, U.S. Army

As the United States faces 21st-century adversaries and national security challenges, we must acknowledge the threats as being different from threats faced in the 20th century and develop new strategies. Effects-based operations, as a core competency of future warfare, will leverage allies' kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities with global reaching effects.

32 Field Artillery at the Crossroads of Transformation
Lieutenant Colonel Tommy James Tracy, U.S. Army

The Crusader cannon artillery acquisition project has been cancelled, which lends credence to the thought that a mechanized army equipped with heavy weaponry is no longer needed. The question is whether the Army should continue to place importance on such legacy items as heavy tanks and cannon. This article joins the debate.

45 Information Operations in Support of Special Operations
Lieutenant Colonel Bradley Bloom, U.S. Army

To meet the challenges the Army faces in the post-11 September 2001 operating environment, the Special Operations Forces community must develop flexible, durable staff organizations to deliver focused, coordinated information operations products to enhance mission accomplishment.

50 Joint Fires Evolution
Major Eric C. Braganca, U.S. Air Force

During Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, special operations forces made great progress in integrating joint fires. With the Air Force, they came up with innovative joint fires solutions to capture oil fields, prevent SCUD attacks, and secure military objectives in Iraq before conventional forces arrived.

54 Implementing a Unit Manning System
Colonel Eli T.S. Alford, U.S. Army

Twenty years ago, Military Review published an article by General Donn A. Starry in which he proposed a framework for implementing effective change in the Army. Today the Army is again examining unit manning to determine what the Army needs for the future, even if it means looking toward the past instead of to the future.

61 The Army Profession—Ostrich or Phoenix?
Major Sean Herron, U.S. Army

Army officers routinely engage in robust discussions about what it means to be a professional soldier, but the Army as an institution might be losing its professional status. Herron, the 2003 winner of the MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, sees the Army as being regarded increasingly as just another government agency.

67 China's Cruise Missile Program
Colonel Geoffrey T. Lum, U.S. Air Force

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles hit 80 percent of their targets. China noted this magnificent performance and began developing and acquiring cruise missiles for possible use against Taiwan, to bridge the technology gap between China and America, and to deter any U.S. intervention in East Asia. The military must prepare now to face this new threat.


Review Essays
74 Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq
George Ridge, Professor, University of Arizona, Tucson

The Pentagon, seeking a way to satisfy editors pushing to cover the war from the front alongside troops in "real time," came up with a solution—resurrect embedding for independent, uncensored reporters. "There is no way to back out of the embedding process. It's here to stay."

75 A Short History of the Moroccan Armed Forces
Lieutenant Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

Morocco, the first country to recognize the United States as a nation, has long been a Middle East ally to the United States. Assessing the relationship between Moroccans and Americans could further the understanding between the two countries, helping to capitalize on Arab and Muslim military potential.

79 Book Reviews contemporary readings for the professional

[Ray]

Colonel,

Thanks.

Very intersting articles indeed!

[Jay]

Colonel,
I was looking for tthis kinda info.

Thanks

[Officer of Engineers]

Originally posted by Ray
Colonel,

Thanks.

Very intersting articles indeed!

Sir,

Please maintain a critical eye when reading these articles, even if I posted them. I don't necessarily agree with all of them, especially with the promise of future toys. However, they do address the problems that I think that we've both had faced and problems to come.

I don't expect, Sir, that you to agree with everything I say or post. I do not even agree with my past assumptions either. Just that it is important to keep both an openned mind and also a critical mind.

[Officer of Engineers]

Sir,

May I ask just how much computer wargaming is going on within the InA? Even for recreational purposes? This is one of the cheapest ways to instill new thinking into any army - to find what works and what doesn't work on a terrain based system.

And then, a new shock waiting for the computer wargaming expert when he ventures out into the real world and try a real live exercise to learn that real life ain't a computer game.

However, these tools are extremely valuable. What may work in a computer wargame may not work in real life. However, what does not work in a computer wargame will also not work in real life.

In any case, I'm presenting this a food for thought. Incidently, the Canadian Forces College has recently replaced JANUS (the one I used during my tenor) with TacOps. Last thing, these games' graphics are extremely poor, not the usual shoot-them-till-they bleed the Red Sea type. They're more remenince of our paper based map games. The goal is to train, not to nuke them till they glow.











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TACOPS and Brigade Combat Team
TACOPS and BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
Review by Michael K. Robel




TITLE: TACOPS
PUBLISHER: www.battlefront.com
DESIGNER: Major I.L. Holdridge, USMC (Ret)
MINIMUM SPECIFICATIONS: Mac: MacOS 7.6 or higher, 68K Mac or PowerMac, 256 Colors,
800x600 resolution, CD-ROM drive.
PC: Windows 95/98/NT4, PC 486 class or better CPU, 256 Colors,
800x600 resolution, CD-ROM drive.
# OF PLAYERS: 1-multi
MACHINE USED FOR REVIEW: Acer Aspire, AMD K6 3D Processor, and 48 MB of RAM
TITLE: BCT: BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
PUBLISHER: www.shrapnelgames.com
DESIGNER: Captain Patrick Proctor, USA
MINIMUM SPECIFICATIONS: Windows 3.1/95/98, 133MHz Pentium or higher, 32MB of RAM
# OF PLAYERS: 1-2
MACHINE USED FOR REVIEW: Acer Aspire, AMD K6 3D Processor, and 48 MB of RAM

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTION
DOCUMENTATION
SOUND AND GRAPHICS
GAME MECHANICS AND/OR GAMEPLAY
GAME AS HISTORY/DOCTRINE
EDITABILITY
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
CONCLUSION
RATING
BIBLIOGRAPHY
SIMILAR GAMES
WEB LINKS
BIOGRAPHY OF REVIEWER

INTRODUCTION

TACOPS and BCT: Brigade Combat Team are modern tactical combat simulators that portray the battalion and brigade commander's fight at the platoon and section level from the late 1970’s to c. 2010. Other games (e.g., most recently, STEEL PANTHERS II {1996} and III {1997}) have attempted to simulate this before, but these two releases stand apart. They both deliver performances that rank with Department of the Army tactical simulations such as Brigade Battalion Battle Simulation (BBS) and JANUS.

TACOPS 3.0 is the continuation of a classic game that was initially published by Arsenal (1994). Avalon Hill was due to release an upgraded version which was cancelled (1998) and the designer reworked the program and has now released it through www.Battlefront.com. The game has been well maintained and delivers a superior performance. BCT is newer, gaining support and is constantly being refined. Both games should benefit from the Internet distribution and this method of distribution may indeed be critical to the survival of detailed wargames as a genre.

These two games have approached their objectives from two very different paths, but both deliver an exceptionally enjoyable, playable, and bug-free gaming experience.

DOCUMENTATION

The documentation is excellent. Detailed documentation in pdf format is provided on the TACOPS CD, together with a library of twenty US Army field manuals. BCT has less documentation included because it is a downloaded game, but there is additional and extensive documentation at the company website. Both Major Holdridge and Captain Proctor have active mailing lists and respond quickly to observations, questions, and suggestions. Both their distribution companies host forums as well.

TACOPS is also available in French as a result of its sale to the Canadian Army on the same disk as the basic game.

SOUND AND GRAPHICS

The two games differ considerably in appearance. TACOPS has a rather stylized map that uses only three elevation levels while BCT uses a contour map with detailed terrain resolution. The horizontal scale of both games deliver the look and feel of a 1:50,000 scale tactical map in general use in the Army. TACOPS' multi-color map is somewhat easier on the eyes than the basically black BCT map (N.B.: a color patch is available for BCT). TACOPS uses two kinds of maps: isomorphic like maps that represent various kinds of terrain and “overprinted” maps that overlay TACOPS terrain over paper maps from the NTC, Germany, Canada, Australia, and Jamaica. BCT uses its detailed terrain system to provide maps of the JRTC (FT Polk, LA), the National Training Center, FT Irwin, California, Eastern Kansas, Cuba, Bosnia, the Ukraine, and others. TACOPS has appropriate vegetation in each scenario, while BCT is only beginning to implement vegetation in some scenarios; yet, the detailed terrain in BCT offsets this shortcoming.

A critical element for both games is the Line of Sight Tool that enables the player to choose a point or unit and see where the dead space is (dead space is a term for terrain where units can neither see nor direct fire into; a civilian co-worker termed this "live space" when I explained it to her). TACOPS uses a line that the user can drag around to examine the LOS while BCT uses a fan. Both are effective and critical to battlefield success.

Unit appearances are handled differently -- TACOPS uses wargame-like counters with either NATO symbols or vehicle icons on a blue or red base while BCT uses blue or red icons (each icon represents anywhere from one to as many as 15 vehicles). For TACOPS, the standard icon contains four vehicles, representing a platoon, while BCT contains two, or a section.

BCT displays a movement vector that shows how fast and what direction the unit is moving and if it is entrenched. It also will display a series of status codes next to the icons showing what special orders the unit may have. TACOPS has a series of icon symbols that show unit facing, defilade or entrenched status, issuance of orders, etc.

The graphics in both games are defiantly low-key and not up to current “standards”: no 3D, animated, rendered eye-candy here. Instead, the effort is made to ensure that the game has a solid AI, good speed, and is bug-free. These games do not need the luxury of "good graphics" when they have "good game" instead. Selected sound effects enhance the gaming experience although the user can turn them off to speed game play.

GAME MECHANICS AND/OR GAMEPLAY

Each game models much the same equipment: the M1, M2, and M3 are prominent in both games for the US side, as is the T-72, T-80, T-90, and various BMP versions for the Opposing Force (OPFOR). Many other pieces of equipment are represented; the edge goes to TACOPS because it provides a wider range of vehicles that equip the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and United States Armies as well as the USMC. BCT concentrates on the US Army and to a lesser extent, the Marine Corps.

Both games are primarily solitaire games, but have excellent multi-player capabilities. TACOPS allows play via E-mail or as a Command Post Exercise in which the players send their orders to an umpire who reports engagement results, spot reports, and so forth. Printable maps and an overlay tool that allow the umpire to tailor the map for the players' use support this feature. BCT allows two players to connect and engage in simultaneous combat via the Internet. In solitaire mode, the AI for each game does not always deliver the same fight and can change the results radically.

TACOPS in solitaire scenarios only allows you to play BLUFOR against the OPFOR, while BCT has scenarios for both sides.

The two games run in different modes. TACOPS has an order phase during which the two players enter their orders. After both sides are finished, the game executes these orders for one minute, in four 15-second pulses. The player is limited to watching the map and biting his fingernails during the combat phase when he has no power to correct mistakes or take advantage of opportunities until the next orders phase. BCT plays in real-time, but can be paused to enter new orders; it also can be accelerated up to eight times normal speed. A given scenario for either game can usually be played to completion in about an hour.

Both games allow the player to order units through a combination of menu items, keyboard entries, and mouse clicks. As might be expected, their order’s menus are very similar, allowing for tactical movement, call for artillery fire, airlift, mounting and dismounting infantry, setting SOP behaviors (like dismount on contact, hold fire, and so on.). Movement orders are both issued via a series of waypoints, much like HARPOON. Several reports that can be used to assist the player in determining his courses of action are available, although neither game saves engagement results to a printable text file. Table 1 shows the reports available to the player:

TACOPS
BCT

Game Status
Game status (only at end)

Order of Battle
Fire Mission Log

Unit Database
Spot Report Log

Weapon Database
Unit Info

Photo Database
Vehicle Specifications

Unit Info
Operations Order

Situation Report Blue
Mission Objectives

Situation Report Red
Red Situation Template

Spot Report Blue
Blue Maneuver Graphics

Sport Report Red


Support Report Blue


Support Report Red


Logistics Report Blue


Logistics Report Red


TRP Report Blue


TRP Report Red


CPX Overlay Map


Operations Order



Table 1 Tactical Reports

Perhaps the most important report is vehicle specifications. Here the player can learn the strengths and weaknesses of his force. It also provides a glimpse into the algorithms used by the two designers to adjudicate combat. The games both determine probability of hit on a number of factors (weapon effectiveness at different ranges, suppression, number of rounds fired at the same target, armor penetration effectiveness, projectile velocity, armor protection, terrain, visibility, exposure and size, sight magnification, surprise, unit strength, moving or stationary, and other values).

The two games have very different methods in determining kills given a hit. BCT relies on a percentage value based on published Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) values that vary by aspect (front, flank, or rear) while TACOPS compares the penetrating power of a given round at each range with the armor presented (again, front, flank, rear). This is a simplification of what are very complicated procedures.

In the end, these two systems deliver comparable results, although the results do not always seem consistent with this reviewer's military experience. They sometimes deliver questionable kills, shorten visibility limits, and tweak engagement ranges so that the player cannot take full advantage of weapon systems characteristics. These are generally minimal distractions to the average player, but may be of more important to the military gamer or grognard.

Detailed examination of the BCT database reveals that some of the weapon systems attributes vary from scenario to scenario. This is due to BCT's modeling of a separate small database for every scenario reflect various “soft” factors like morale and training for various opponents. However, it is somewhat distressing to see very different performances delivered by the same system in two different scenarios.

Another interesting characteristic of the games is that the basic branch affiliation of the designers comes through. TACOPS provides a plethora of methods to fight the direct fire battle by using Target Reference Points and engagement priorities and abstracts the indirect fire fight a little bit (by only using three types of rounds) while BCT provides fewer controls for the direct fire fight, but offers many methods to control indirect fires. Sadly, neither game allows the user to set up an artillery program to be fired on order. In both games, indirect fires are delayed a realistic amount of time and inflict realistic casualties on the enemy.

Neither game specifically models the intangibles of war, e.g., morale, training, etc. BCT attempts to provide for this by adjusting weapon rates of fire and accuracy to reflect different force levels as well as having three levels of force quality: green, veteran, and elite.

Victory conditions for both games are similar, usually based on inflicting a certain percentage of casualties on the enemy, exiting a number of troops off the game board or onto an objective, and/or denying exit or entry onto an objective to a certain number of troops.

GAME AS HISTORY/DOCTRINE

Both games accurately portray contemporary military doctrine. The correct application of the principles of war will reward the player with greater combat success. Assisting the user in learning and applying doctrine is the reason TACOPS has a library of manuals included and why BCT has extensive help files available on the website.

EDITABILITY

TACOPS includes a scenario editor that allows the user to choose any available map and force structure. Unfortunately, the game does not allow you to access the AI for the OPFOR side in order to do create solitaire scenarios. On the other hand, the player can perform some modifications to the included scenarios that do use the AI to provide some variety. Weapons values and such are not adjustable by the user.

BCT does not yet offer a scenario editor, but one is in development, and it will allow adjustment of some weapon attributes in order to deliver a more standard performance and tweak the values. It will also allow access to the AI.

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

Both games have been adopted by various military organizations for use as a training vehicle. Conversations on both mailing lists reveal a high proportion of active duty and reserve armed forces members playing the game and undoubtedly using them for training. BCT is remarkably like JANUS in its presentation and menus; a fact that probably influenced the JRTC to buy it. However, the current lack of a scenario editor makes BCT slightly less useful for training, but when it is issued, BCT may very well be able to be used for aspects of mission planning and rehearsal.

The following UNIFORM JOINT TASK LIST items are supported:


UJTL Item
TACOPS BCT

TA.1--CONDUCT MANEUVER
TA.1.1--Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Systems)
X
X

TA.1.1.2--Move On Or Under Surface
X
X

TA.1.1.3--Move Through Air
X
X

TA.1.1.4--Close Into Tactical Combat
X
X

TA.1.2--Negotiate Air, Sea Or Terrain
X
X

TA.1.4--Control Combat Area
X
X

TA.1.4.1--Control Combat Area Through Firepower Or Firepower Potential
X
X

TA.1.4.2--Occupy Combat Area
X
X

TA.1.5--Integrate Firepower With Maneuver
X
X

TA.2--EMPLOY FIREPOWER
TA.2.1--Process Targets
X
X

TA.2.1.1--Select Targets To Attack
X
X

TA.2.1.2--Select Fire Attack System
X
X

TA.2.1.3--Develop Order To Fire
X
X

TA.2.2--Engage Targets
X
X

TA.2.2.1--Conduct Lethal Engagement, Conduct Strike, Surface, Subsurface, Air Defense/Antiair Attack, Adjust Illumination Targets, Request Attack
X
X

TA.3--EXERCISE COMMAND AND CONTROL
TA.3.1--Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status
X
X

TA.3.1.1--Communicate Information
X (CPX PLAY)
-

TA.3.1.3--Maintain Information and Force Status
X
X

TA.3.2--Assess Situation
X
X

TA.3.2.1--Review Current Situation
X
X

TA.3.2.2--Project Future Requirements
X
X

TA.3.2.3--Decide On Need For Action Or Change
X
X

TA.3.3--Determine Actions
X
X

TA.3.3.1--Issue Planning Guidance
X (CPX PLAY)
-

TA.3.3.2--Develop Courses Of Action
X
X

TA.3.3.3--Analyze Courses Of Action
X
X

TA.3.3.4--Compare Courses Of Action
X
X

TA.3.3.5--Select Or Modify Course Of Action
X
X

TA.3.4--Direct and Lead Subordinate Units
X (CPX PLAY)
-

TA.3.4.1--Prepare Plans Or Orders
X
X

TA.3.4.5--Synchronize Tactical Operations
X
X

TA.4--DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE
TA.4.1--Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements
X
X

TA.4.2--Collect Information
X
X

TA.4.2.1--Collect Information On Situation
X
X

TA.4.2.2--Collect Target Information
X
X

TA.4.3--Process Information
X
X

TA.4.3.1--Evaluate Threat Information
X
X

TA.4.3.2--Evaluate Physical Environment Information
X
X

TA.5--PROVIDE MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY
TA.5.1--Provide Mobility
X
X

TA.5.1.1--Overcome Obstacles
X
X

TA.5.1.2--Enhance Movement X
X

TA.5.2--Provide Countermobility
X
X

TA.5.2.1--Secure/Select Locations Of Obstacles
X
X

TA.5.2.2--Emplace Obstacles
X (Limited)
X (Limited)

TA.5.3--Enhance Survivability X
X

TA.5.3.3--Conduct Deception In Support Of Tactical Operations
X (Multiplayer)
X (Multiplayer)

TA.5.3.4--Provide Counter-Reconnaissance, Security and Readiness
X
X

TA.6--PROVIDE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
TA.6.1—Arm X (Limited)
X (Limited)

TA.6.4.5--Train Tactical Units and Personnel
X
X


Table 2 Uniform Joint Task List Supported Items

CONCLUSION
Both games sell for roughly >$20.00, so there is no reason not to buy them both, particularly if you are used to buying games in the retail channel. If you are new to wargaming, TACOPS is easier to learn and master. If you are a military officer or experienced with other wargames, particular HARPOON II, then BCT is a good choice.


Feature
TACOPS
BCT

Media
CD
Internet Download

Scale
Tactical
Tactical

Multi-player
E-mail, CPX
Internet

Terrain Representation
Stylized, 3 levels
Realistic Digital Terrain

Map Zoom
No
Yes (3 Levels)

Preview Map
Yes
Yes

Printable Maps
Yes
No

Scenario Editor
Yes
No (Forthcoming)

Database (Equipment) Editor
No
No (Forthcoming)

User Support
Excellent
Excellent

Adopted By Military Yes
Yes

Play Style
One-minute planning – simultaneous execution
Real-Time

Documentation
On the CD
Help File/Internet download


Table 3 Feature Comparisons




Figures (click on hyperlinks below for screenshots):

Figure 1 and Figure 2: TACOPS and BCT at the National Training Center. Notice the difference in icons (TACOPS has layered its terrain over a scanned map of the NTC, while BCT has digitized the terrain).

Figure 3and Figure 4: TACOPS, and BCT in more wooded terrain. It is here that the difference in elevation shows up with TACOPS' stylized terrain.

Figure 5 and Figure 6: TACOPS and BCT database screens. It is apparent how casualties and battle damage are calculated by the two games -- TACOPS uses armor thickness and penetration while BCT uses percentages.

Figure 7: The TACOPS unit orders dialog box. Most game features can be accessed from this box while BCT has more buttons to push in the basic game interface (See Figure 2).

Figure 8 and Figure 9: Calling for Fire. BCT has more munitions available, but TACOPS produces a more noticeable splash.

Figure 10: Up close and personal, the BCT Zoom function, which TACOPS lacks.



RATING

TACOPS ****

BCT ****

TARGET AUDIENCE: While both products share the same target audience (i.e., those personnel interested in contemporary tactical combat operations), TACOPS is the best entry point for the novice but is also sophisticated enough to appeal to grognards. BCT, because of its detailed terrain resolution, is recommended for the intermediate-level gamer and up.

TACOPS is like the Chinese game of GO -- a few minutes to learn a lifetime to master. BCT is more difficult to learn; after playing it for almost a year, this reviewer is still learning its nuances, and of course, it also takes a lifetime to master.

Overall, BCT is to TACOPS as HARPOON II is to HARPOON CLASSIC. In terms of learning difficulty, on a scale of 1 (Novice) to 10 (Wargaming Troglodyte), TACOPS rates a 5 and BCT rates a 9.

SIMILAR GAMES

COMPUTER:
STEEL PANTHERS III (SSI; 1997)
WARGAME CONSTRUCTION SET II: TANKS! (SSI; 1994)

BOARD:
ASSAULT (GDW; 1983)
SANDS OF WAR (GDW; 1992)
MBT (Avalon Hill; 1989)
IDF (Avalon Hill; 1993)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Armor Attacks: The Tank Platoon: An Interactive Exercise in Small Unit Tactics and Leadership, John F. Anatal, Presidio Press, 1992.
Defense of Hill 781: An Allegory of Modern Combat, James R. McDonough, Presidio Press, 1993.
FM 17-15: The Tank Platoon, Department of the Army.
FM 71-1: The Tank-Mechanized Infantry Company TeamFM 71-1: The Tank-Mechanized Infantry Company Team, Department of the Army.
FM 71-2: The Tank-Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, Department of the Army.
FM 71-3: The Armor and Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Department of the Army.
FM 71-123: Combined Arms Heavy Forces, Company, Battalion, and Brigade FM 71-123: Combined Arms Heavy Forces, Company, Battalion, and Brigade, Department of the Army.
First Clash: Combat Close-up In World War III, Kenneth Macksey, Arms and Armor Press, 1985.
Infantry Combat: The Rifle Platoon: An Interactive Exercise in Small Unit Tactics and Leadership, John F. Anatal, Presidio Press,1995.
Team Yankee, Harold Coyle, Berkley, 1994 (reissue).

WEB LINKS

www.army.mil The Army web site.
www.armytechnology.com Weapons information and specification on many different platforms.
www.battlefront.com The place to buy TACOPS. Has maps, After Action Reviews, and instructions for
multi-player CPXs.
www.shrapnelgames.com The place to buy BCT; on-line help for BCT.
www.prosimco.com Pat Proctor’s home page; has some data not found on the Shrapnel Games page.

BIOGRAPHY OF REVIEWER

Mike Robel is a lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve, with 16 years of active duty as an Armor Officer. He served in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment as a tank and cavalry platoon leader and a cavalry troop executive officer patrolling the very edge of the Free World along the border between East and West Germany. His other service was in the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) {The Big Red One} in Fort Riley, Stuttgart, Germany, and the Persian Gulf, where he commanded companies in all three brigades of the division and served as a battalion maintenance officer, battalion supply officer, battalion assistant operations officer, division armor training officer, division assistant operations officer, and as a brigade supply officer.

After leaving active duty, he worked for Logicon Advanced Technology as a database manager for the 87th Exercise Division in Birmingham, AL, managed the 2nd ACR’s simulation center in Fort Polk, LA, where he used the Army’s Corps Battle Simulation, Battalion-Brigade Battle Simulation, and JANUS. He is now a Knowledge Acquisition and System Test Engineer working on WARSIM 2000, which is the Army’s next generation battle simulation.

He has played board wargames since he was 8 years old (Avalon Hill’s U-Boat), and computer wargames since Avalon Hill’s MIDWAY for the TRS-80 Computer. He worked for Intracorp/360 for a year as the 360 Product Manager and was involved in the final production of HARPOON 2 (ADMIRAL'S EDITION). He has play-tested and developed scenarios for a plethora of wargames including HARPOON CLASSIC, HARPOON II, V FOR VICTORY, STEEL PANTHERS, GREAT NAVAL BATTLES, ULTIMATE MILITARY SIMULATOR II, PATRIOT, TANKS, and HIGH COMMAND as well as Army simulations.

He has been published in a variety of publications including STRATEGY PLUS, www.cdmag.com, COMMAND Magazine, Armor, Infantry, Military Review, and Army Times on a variety of computer games and various historical and contemporary military and historical topics as well as a strategy guide for TANKS!

He now lives on Merritt Island, Florida where he has a front row seat for space shuttle launches and the beach.




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[Officer of Engineers]

Sir,

Regarding a question you've posted in another thread about letting a man out of the army for being afraid of heights. I believe my own MGen (Ret'd) Lewis Makenzie answer your question

Responsibility -- A new Canadian definition
by Lewis MacKenzie


Responsibility: Authority; the ability to act independently and make decisions; the person or thing for which one is responsible.
-- Concise Oxford Dictory

Eleven years ago, I took an early retirement from the Canadian Armed Forces. I was making my superiors, including the Minister of Defence, the closet-separatist Marcel Masse, uncomfortable with some of my public pronouncements regarding the inability of the United Nations to adequately command, 24 hours a day, large scale military operations necessitating the use of force.

At 53 years of age, it was necessary to find another line of work to maintain the standard of living, which my working wife and I had provided for our family during my military career. Fortunately, the phone started ringing, and I found myself on the international speaking circuit addressing the security issues of the day: Bosnia, Somalia, Macedonia, Iraq, et al. A year later, I had put the scheduling of my speaking engagements in the hands of a Toronto/Boston-based agency. Shortly thereafter, I received a call asking me if I would be prepared to address the executives of a large corporation on the subject of leadership.

My initial inclination was to turn the request down. Leadership is a very personal thing, and I felt that if you stood in front of 500 people and spoke to them about the subject, at least half of them, if not more, would be thinking, "Who the Hell does he think he is talking to us about leadership!". Let's face it, they had probably already proven themselves as leaders just by being there. Admittedly, the proposed fee was pretty attractive; so, I decided to take on the task and wrap my presentation in the context of "I'm going to offer you 10 practical tips based on my experiences. Unfortunately, I didn't always apply them myself, so don't assume that I have all the answers, as some of the soldiers who worked with me would probably confirm. However, in hindsight, I wish I had of followed the advice I'll share with you today -- all the time -- so hopefully, some of my tips might just be of use to you."

Within my 10 practical tips was "Taking responsibility - even when you weren't responsible!" Now obviously, that takes some explanation, so let me try. Within a large organization, it's important for the person in charge to preempt the damage to that very organization posed by scandal, real or imaginary, by taking responsibility. That done, the problem, in the vast majority of cases, disappears from the public's mind, leaving the boss -- that is to say the person responsible -- to get on with corrective action to make sure it never happens again.

In order to make my point in anecdotal terms that the audience would recognize, I frequently refer to the infamous 1996/97 Somalia Inquiry. Senior leaders of the Canadian Armed Forces were called upon to testify regarding their responsibility for some of the failures within the military's chain of command, while dealing with the murder of a young Somali thief by a Canadian soldier during a peace enforcement mission in that country in 1993.

Numerous general officers started their testimony with -- to paraphrase -- "Yes, I was responsible, but ....". The irritating "but" was then followed by a drawn-out rationalization, culminated with the blame being dumped on the shoulders of their subordinates, or to use Conrad Black's insulting term, "underlings". In the most flagrant example, the Chief of Defence Staff of the day, General Jean Boyle, offered a Mea Culpa, immediately followed by blaming his staff for their incompetence. Compare that universally-condemned response to what might have been said, "Look, I'm a senior officer in the Canadian Armed Forces, things went wrong, don't blame the soldiers. If you need to blame someone, blame me, I'm responsible!". Case closed. The problem is dealt with, the public loses interest and the institution so important to our country is spared the humility of being raked over the coals until the heat got too much for the government and the commission was shut down.

Enter from stage left, the government's current sponsorship scandal. Last week, during the parliamentary committee's investigation of what went wrong, the new Canadian definition of responsibility was front and centre. The minister responsible for the sponsorship program, Alfonso Gagliano, explained that while he was responsible, he shouldn't be held accountable because his subordinates had clearly done bad things that they had not told him about. He went on to explain that he didn't have the authority to remove or hire bureaucrats who worked in his Ministry. If this fact were true, it might just lessen the weight of blame on Mr Gagliano's shoulders. Unfortunately for him, it is entirely untrue and misleading, as a minister of the crown can, as a minimum, have a civil servant in his department transferred to another ministry.

For the past ten years, I have asked the same question of some 300-plus audiences totalling at least a million attendees, "May I have a show of hands please -- in your entire life can you recall one instance where you thought less of a person, no matter what the circumstances, when that individual said, 'I'm responsible'?". I'm still waiting for the first hand to go up. I dare say that would still be the case if Mr Gagliano would utter those two same words. In the meantime, the new Canadian definition of responsibility stands:

Responsibility: That which justifies all the perks and prestige associated with the position until problems are discovered that threaten the reputation of the person responsible, at which time it is considered appropriate and proper to blame the underlings reporting to the person responsible. (sic)
-- Dictionary of Unique Canadian Definitions
(not to be confused with Concise Oxford)