Mongol Empire vs. Roman Empire

[zraver]

Gods forbid.I'm a Dacian( probably a significant part ).Water causes rust,anyway.

15 millions?? I suppose you include women and children,but IIRC the number of citizens during Augustus was no more than 4-4.5 millions (men and women).The number of citizens during Augustus rose slowly,mainly due to auxiliaries ending their military service.Up until Caracalla the citizens number was never more than 10%.

Most Roman census counts went by male citizens. Augusutus counted 4 million or so in Italy alone. Then there are the minucipium where the males had the duty of military service in the legions but not the vote or right of appeal so where not counted as full citizens until retirement. 10-15 million first and second class citizens is plausible out of a population of 60 million or so.

[1979]

15 millions?? I suppose you include women and children,

more likely 11 millions depending on the distribution across age groups.
Population pyramid - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Generally a population pyramid that displays a population percentage of ages 1–14 over 30% and ages 75 and above under 6% is considered a "young population" (generally occurring in developing countries, with a high agricultural workforce). A population pyramid that displays a population percentage of ages 1–14 under 30% and ages 75 and above over 6% is considered an "aging population" (that of which generally occurs in developed countries with adequate health services, e.g. Australia).

but IIRC the number of citizens during Augustus was no more than 4-4.5 millions (men and women).

According to Julius Honorius, Cosmographia it was 4 millions in the year 28 BC across the entire roman empire without women or children.
Less than a quarter lived in Italy probably as a result of the extensive colonization policy.

The number of citizens during Augustus rose slowly,mainly due to auxiliaries ending their military service.Up until Caracalla the citizens number was never more than 10%.

Feasible if you count only the roman tax payers ( main reason censuses are conducted even today ). i.e. 6% in Augustus reign.
For the lack of a better word i would use the term " ruling class " ;)
referring to the 11 million figure.

[1979]

Increasing the service length to 25 years means that each year the roman citizens have to provide only ~ 3.000 replacements for the discharged veterans.

sloppy math on my part, it's actually 6160 replacements.
(I divided the number of legionary soldiers by average life expectancy ,instead of length of military service).

[Monash]

Rome has about 25 legions, most of them outside of Britain are near major waterborne highways and can move rapidly. From the defeat at Beth Horon in the 4-8 November 66, Rome had three legions and local allies and troops assembled by April of 67. The news made it to parts of the empire not affected by the rebellion and troops were assembled, shipped and arrived in 4-5 months. It turns out the troops sent were already in Alexandria as part of Nero's plan to invade Eithiopia.

Using rather rough time frames 30BC-70AD The area of the Levant and surronding areas had 11 legions. Thats somewhere between 90-160,000 Imperial troops. During the jewish Revolt Herod Agrippa and loyal towns added 40,000 troops not counting garrisons. Assuming similar numbers of local troops per region (Syria, Judea, Anatolia, Egypt). The maximum Roman force not counting bar eminimum garrisons is 160,000 Imperial troops and 200,000 locals.

Thoughts anyone?

Judea- X Fretensis, VI Ferrata, III Gallica
Armenia- I Parthica,
Anatolia- XVI Flavia Firma, IV Scythica
Egypt- III Cyrenica. XXII Deiotarina
Syria- XXIV Othion Rapax, III Galicia, and VI Ferata

Sorry been busy with work and family stuff. But to continue setting out basic "limits" for the scenario. I have seen the figures above for the number of Legions/Units but also others that place the number of Legions (post Augustus) at 30 Legions with which auxiliaries puts a maximum upper limit on the number of troops at about 300,000.

Looking at the scenario it is unlikely that Rome will be caught entirely by surprise with regards to the Mongol approach given it implies that the Mongols have encountered and defeated the Seleucids/Parthians (depending on period). They might not know the exact point of contact/line of attack adopted by the Mongols - especially if the Mongols use some degree of guile/caution in their approach but they will know they are coming and have some ideas of the size and general tactics /style of fighting of their opponents.

Research would be required to estimate the time required by the Mongols to conquer the "Parthians" but I suggest that historical examples of Mongol campaigns against similar sized Empires/regions could be used as a template. As a "guesstimate" however 1-2 years does not seem an unreasonable given the need to subdue/siege major cities and then restore some kind of order and regrouping before proceeding onwards on their next campaign.

For this reason I think Rome will almost certainly have time to receive word of first "contact" between the Mongols and their old foes to the East. Perhaps the Parthians would send requests for assistance, it might be via their spies and contacts in the Parthian capital or it might be from traders and/or refugees but the Romans will also get some ideas of how well the fight is going for the Parthians. So whatever the means I think Rome is likley to have at least 12 months to prepare. (I still think you have to detract a number of months for the inevitable bureaucratic wrangling and indecision. Again historical records from previous Roman crisis can be used to calculate an "average delay".

Next you need some accurate figure on how long it would take to recruit equip and train local militia and/or fresh auxiliaries. There may be examples from historic "national emergencies" in Rome's history but there must be literature by historians and/or reinactors that would help. And this figure has to be realistic (as do all the figures you use) you can't assume a "perfect" mobilisation across the entire Empire. For example mobilization across the Italian Peninsula would almost certainly go more smoothly than that in more restive/recently acquired provinces.

A key issue will in any case be how many units/types are stationed on the Eastern frontier to begin with. Since this was a “hot” border you can probably assume they were at full strength or in some cases over strength. (Apparently in some cases legions in key sectors could be doubled in size). But at the same time you might have to allow for the fact that some legions in quieter sectors were slightly under strength. Using Zravers figures as a guide can we assume perhaps 10 legions with their support units stationed in an arc from Egypt and through Syria and the Levant to Anatolia ad Constantinople. Say 100,000 men plus any local reserves (possibly another 30-40,000). This last figure needs to be carefully researched as well. To this however you can probably also add a significant number of refugees from the fallen “Parthian Empire”. There are historical precedents that again need to be researched but I believe the Romans could probably muster 20-30,000 Parthian refugees (and possibly as many as 50,000). Importantly most of these would be horsemen a resource the Romans were historically short of.

Rome then has to garrison strategic cities ports and/or lies of approach and still form a strategic reserve with which to fight the battle. So on this basis Rome still needs to transfer considerable resources to the East and as I’ve said previously it can’t afford to strip its borders bare doing so- the model has to allow for at the fact that significant numbers of legionares and auxiliaries would have to remain in place supported by local militia in their respective provinces. (I’m assuming the invasions occurs before the formation of the central reserve armies under the late emperors and the accompanying reduction in the size and importance of the old legionary formations on the Imperial border.)

In summary then the Romans could theoretically muster enough troops to meet the threat of an invasion by 200,000 plus Mongols but it would in the first instance be something of a polygot force, not 200,000 plus professional legionare. The whole process of assembling this force would need to be carefully thought out and modelled.

Finally I have rethought my position on the stationing of armies along the passes into Anatolia to the north of the Mongols initial line of advance. I would be concerned about the possibility of the Mongols achieving a breakthrough at one particular point (be it via tactics, treachery or sheer luck.) While I believe the area would favour the Romans defensively if a breakthrough occurs at one points Roman units stationed in other passes/districts as blocking forces run the risk of being “trapped” in the passes by swift moving Mongol formations that sweep in behind them before they can unite.

Another option would be for the Romans to fall back to the Bosporus/Black Sea Coast and concentrate opposite Constantinople. The Romans would have the advantage of secure supply and communication line with one of the largest cities in the Empire a few hours sail away at best. They couldn’t be outflanked and have the option of moving forces along the Black Sea and Aegean coasts at will. Fresh troops and militias can also be trained in or transferred to Constantinople at will. If the Mongols advance to the coast they face poor choices, either doing battle on the enemy’s terms on terrain where they cant outflank the enemy or standing off and watching the enemy grow stronger every month. (Trying to backtrack and go around the Black Sea to the Danube front doesn’t help much in this case either because the Romans can transfer the bulk of their forces to that border long before the Mongols could arrive and would be in position ready to meet them.) So the key then become the Egyptian front.

Even allowing for the above however I believe that at least initially the Mongols would have the Romans on the back foot and would force them to either concede much of the east or risk destruction of their forces in a massive one off counter offensive, and the Romans simply wouldn’t have the time to muster a second force of suitable size if the first is decisively defeated. So in the first instance the Romans would seem to have no choice but to fall back, hold at strong defensive positions and then plan a series of carefully staged counter attacks once they have mobilised the full resources of the Empire. But then we a talking about not a one off invasion but generational conflict.

Modelling the above conflict and gaming out the variable/options would be a challenge.

[1979]

Finally I have rethought my position on the stationing of armies along the passes into Anatolia to the north of the Mongols initial line of advance. I would be concerned about the possibility of the Mongols achieving a breakthrough at one particular point (be it via tactics, treachery or sheer luck.) While I believe the area would favour the Romans defensively if a breakthrough occurs at one points Roman units stationed in other passes/districts as blocking forces run the risk of being “trapped” in the passes by swift moving Mongol formations that sweep in behind them before they can unite.
Another option would be for the Romans to fall back to the Bosporus/Black Sea Coast and concentrate opposite Constantinople. The Romans would have the advantage of secure supply and communication line with one of the largest cities in the Empire a few hours sail away at best. They couldn’t be outflanked and have the option of moving forces along the Black Sea and Aegean coasts at will. Fresh troops and militias can also be trained in or transferred to Constantinople at will. If the Mongols advance to the coast they face poor choices, either doing battle on the enemy’s terms on terrain where they cant outflank the enemy or standing off and watching the enemy grow stronger every month. (Trying to backtrack and go around the Black Sea to the Danube front doesn’t help much in this case either because the Romans can transfer the bulk of their forces to that border long before the Mongols could arrive and would be in position ready to meet them.) So the key then become the Egyptian front.

That was the deployment during M.Aurelius/L.Verus time, Augustus border regions were Cilicia and Galatia .
http://www.thejournal.org/studylibra...st-century.jpg
I'm not sure if the romans had a Black Sea fleet in 30BC-14 Ad time frame and constantinople belonged to Thrace. (roman client state)

Much more challenging scenario from a defensive pov.

[Mongol]

Mongolian historical epic movie from 1945

This film revolves around Tsogt Taij, a 17th century Mongolian prince who waged a campaign against Manchu and Tibetan force. Much like Michael the Brave, the film depicts a mediaeval hero fighting against foreign invaders, with a nationalist vision, in this case the vision of a 'united and sovereign' Mongolia. Both in theme and stylistically, it also shares some characteristics with Alexander Nevsky, but it has a distinctive feeling which sets it apart from these films.

All Mongolian people know this movie and they like this movie. Even this movie might had some communist propaganda against religion, people enjoy this movie because many great actors and actresses played in this movie and it is of one of earliest movies had been made in Mongolia. Costumes and weapons were used in this movie were genuine and original things which had been collected from public and private collections which might be dated back to 17-18th century.
It has english subtitle. So if you wann see some Mongolian epic movie, watch this. Quality is not so good. But it is one of Mongolian best historical movies.

Part 1
YouTube - Tsogt Taij [1/15] English Subtitle

Part 2
YouTube - Tsogt Taij [2/15] English Subtitle

Part 3
YouTube - Tsogt Taij [3/15] English Subtitle

You will see other parts easily on your right hand menu on Youtube.

[troung]

thanks for posting that.

[zraver]

Sorry been busy with work and family stuff. But to continue setting out basic "limits" for the scenario. I have seen the figures above for the number of Legions/Units but also others that place the number of Legions (post Augustus) at 30 Legions with which auxiliaries puts a maximum upper limit on the number of troops at about 300,000.

Assuming 30 legions +auxilla with a average strength of each legion and supporting auxilla of 12000, thats 360,000 Imperial troops of which about half are legionaries. The Roman Army would need 6000 new legionaries a year on 25 year enlistments, so thats another legion's worth of troops if untrained and spread out. Also how long will the retirees retain enough skill to be quickly pulled back into uniform? If we say 5 years thats an additional 30,000 troops most of whom likely retired in the East in colonies. That puts an upper limit on Imperial troops at around 399,000. I don't think retired auxilla will want back in uniform.

To this must be added local allies and mercs. During the Great Jewish revolt Harold Agrippa II provided 40,000 troops from Judean Hellenes and Syrians. It is likely that each province in the East from Egypt up to Anatolia and across Thrace can add the same- some less but others more. Thats 14 or so regions either provinces, vassal states or allied kingdoms including Armenia. That number likely is not all those provicnes can produce, just all the surplus once essential garrisons and policing forces are subtracted. Thats a maximum force of another 560,000 local troops of varying quality from city garrisons and caravan guards to highly effective mounted troops. Total Roman field strength in the East full surge height of the empire's total ability is 959,000 or about 2.4% max of the empires total eastern population.

Looking at the scenario it is unlikely that Rome will be caught entirely by surprise with regards to the Mongol approach given it implies that the Mongols have encountered and defeated the Seleucids/Parthians (depending on period). They might not know the exact point of contact/line of attack adopted by the Mongols - especially if the Mongols use some degree of guile/caution in their approach but they will know they are coming and have some ideas of the size and general tactics /style of fighting of their opponents.

Don't forget the Georgians and Armenians.

Research would be required to estimate the time required by the Mongols to conquer the "Parthians" but I suggest that historical examples of Mongol campaigns against similar sized Empires/regions could be used as a template. As a "guesstimate" however 1-2 years does not seem an unreasonable given the need to subdue/siege major cities and then restore some kind of order and regrouping before proceeding onwards on their next campaign.

1-2 years fits with what they did in history in the area called Persia.

For this reason I think Rome will almost certainly have time to receive word of first "contact" between the Mongols and their old foes to the East. Perhaps the Parthians would send requests for assistance, it might be via their spies and contacts in the Parthian capital or it might be from traders and/or refugees but the Romans will also get some ideas of how well the fight is going for the Parthians. So whatever the means I think Rome is likley to have at least 12 months to prepare. (I still think you have to detract a number of months for the inevitable bureaucratic wrangling and indecision. Again historical records from previous Roman crisis can be used to calculate an "average delay".

I think more like 6 months unless what ever Caesar/Augustus on the throne is a military man.

Next you need some accurate figure on how long it would take to recruit equip and train local militia and/or fresh auxiliaries. There may be examples from historic "national emergencies" in Rome's history but there must be literature by historians and/or reinactors that would help. And this figure has to be realistic (as do all the figures you use) you can't assume a "perfect" mobilisation across the entire Empire. For example mobilization across the Italian Peninsula would almost certainly go more smoothly than that in more restive/recently acquired provinces.

see above.

A key issue will in any case be how many units/types are stationed on the Eastern frontier to begin with. Since this was a “hot” border you can probably assume they were at full strength or in some cases over strength. (Apparently in some cases legions in key sectors could be doubled in size). But at the same time you might have to allow for the fact that some legions in quieter sectors were slightly under strength. Using Zravers figures as a guide can we assume perhaps 10 legions with their support units stationed in an arc from Egypt and through Syria and the Levant to Anatolia ad Constantinople. Say 100,000 men plus any local reserves (possibly another 30-40,000). This last figure needs to be carefully researched as well. To this however you can probably also add a significant number of refugees from the fallen “Parthian Empire”. There are historical precedents that again need to be researched but I believe the Romans could probably muster 20-30,000 Parthian refugees (and possibly as many as 50,000). Importantly most of these would be horsemen a resource the Romans were historically short of.

In cases of national emergency Rome would strip other regions of garrisons and use gold in place of spears to secure the border in the short term. 15-20 legions in the area is not unreasonable if the man on the throne is a former military man.

Rome then has to garrison strategic cities ports and/or lies of approach and still form a strategic reserve with which to fight the battle. So on this basis Rome still needs to transfer considerable resources to the East and as I’ve said previously it can’t afford to strip its borders bare doing so- the model has to allow for at the fact that significant numbers of legionares and auxiliaries would have to remain in place supported by local militia in their respective provinces. (I’m assuming the invasions occurs before the formation of the central reserve armies under the late emperors and the accompanying reduction in the size and importance of the old legionary formations on the Imperial border.)

The important cities and military colonies can garrison themselves for the most part.

In summary then the Romans could theoretically muster enough troops to meet the threat of an invasion by 200,000 plus Mongols but it would in the first instance be something of a polygot force, not 200,000 plus professional legionare. The whole process of assembling this force would need to be carefully thought out and modelled.

Almost every Roman army was a polygot force. The legions where the anvil or the hammer of the force depending on circumstance.

Finally I have rethought my position on the stationing of armies along the passes into Anatolia to the north of the Mongols initial line of advance. I would be concerned about the possibility of the Mongols achieving a breakthrough at one particular point (be it via tactics, treachery or sheer luck.) While I believe the area would favour the Romans defensively if a breakthrough occurs at one points Roman units stationed in other passes/districts as blocking forces run the risk of being “trapped” in the passes by swift moving Mongol formations that sweep in behind them before they can unite.

Blocking the passes won't cost Rome much in the way of troops if the goal is to in fact block the passes, not keep the regions on the other side.

Another option would be for the Romans to fall back to the Bosporus/Black Sea Coast and concentrate opposite Constantinople.

It will depend on who is in charge. Rome has done both- falling back and fighting forward. Both have their own set of issues. Fighting forward risks the destruction of the army, and falling back risks the cities of the Levant and Anatolian interior surrendering without a fight.

The Romans would have the advantage of secure supply and communication line with one of the largest cities in the Empire a few hours sail away at best. They couldn’t be outflanked and have the option of moving forces along the Black Sea and Aegean coasts at will. Fresh troops and militias can also be trained in or transferred to Constantinople at will. If the Mongols advance to the coast they face poor choices, either doing battle on the enemy’s terms on terrain where they cant outflank the enemy or standing off and watching the enemy grow stronger every month.

Don't forget if the Roman's fight forward, every major city in the Levant has to be taken. Jerusalem held out for 7 months as an example. Jerusalem, Damascus, Caesaria, Tyre etc. Smaller medium sized cities would not last as long but still have to be taken or isolated. All those cities act as roadblocks for the Mongols and highways for the Romans.

(Trying to backtrack and go around the Black Sea to the Danube front doesn’t help much in this case either because the Romans can transfer the bulk of their forces to that border long before the Mongols could arrive and would be in position ready to meet them.) So the key then become the Egyptian front.

Agree in part, disagree in part. The Mongols are not going to get 200,000 men and 1,000,000 men across the Sinai in good order and then force a crossing of the Nile against the Roman navy.

Even allowing for the above however I believe that at least initially the Mongols would have the Romans on the back foot and would force them to either concede much of the east or risk destruction of their forces in a massive one off counter offensive, and the Romans simply wouldn’t have the time to muster a second force of suitable size if the first is decisively defeated. So in the first instance the Romans would seem to have no choice but to fall back, hold at strong defensive positions and then plan a series of carefully staged counter attacks once they have mobilised the full resources of the Empire. But then we a talking about not a one off invasion but generational conflict.

Disagree, your ignoring Rome's ability to create army after army when needed until fairly late into the imperial period. Your also ignoring the obstacles fortified cities place in front of the Mongols and the logistics burden that places on them.

]

[Monash]

Disagree, your ignoring Rome's ability to create army after army when needed until fairly late into the imperial period. Your also ignoring the obstacles fortified cities place in front of the Mongols and the logistics burden that places on them.]

Zraver,
I'm not actually ignoring the ability of Rome to raise fresh armies in the face of military defeats, after all they did this on a number of occasions. The reason I favoured a defensive posture on Rome's part at the start of our hypothetical campain v's an all or nothing head to head clash is purely based on the time required to raise a fresh army in the event Rome looses. If Rome lost "the grand battle" no matter how deep its pockets and extensive its resources it would still take time to raise and train the additional 1-200,000 men required to replace those lost in the first battle and then transfer them to the East. In the 3-6 months it took to get ready the Mongols would have a free hand to move and could seize Egypt, and/or Anatolia. (And that's possibly optimistic since we don't know what the political and economic ramifications of such a defeat would be in Rome once it became common knowledge that the army of the east was gone.)

Playing a delaying game gives the Empire time to prepare and mobilise its full resources and the longer it takes for the Mongols to force a confrontation the more the odds swing towards Rome - the Mongols are a long way from reinforcements.

As for the Anatolian border regions as noted earlier they are good defensive territory but I beleive (more research required) that there are numerous passes/routes of advance through them so blocking them completly would require a large number of troops spread accross a broad front in "pockets". All very good if you can be absolutley sure of holding but dangerous if you can't - especially when facing a mobile and well commanded force like the Mongols. All it would take is bribary or some other varient of the demon Murphy and you defensive line is breached. Hence my Bosporus solution. An orderly fall back taking as much resources as you can with you.

Finally as far as the Eastern cities are concerned I would reinforce the local garrisons somewhat, raise their militias and provide as much supplies as is practicable in the event of a seige. (As noted previously most of my forces would still be concentrated into 1 or 2 field forces.) Taking cities would cost the Mongols time and troops. But again in many cases they can bi-pass the cities if necessary and some would almost certainly surrender when faced with the example of what happened to cities which resited the Mongols - lets face it they didn't exactly hand out free icecreams to anyone who put up a fight. So in gaming this scenario you would also have to come up with some kind of statisitic on the probability of a particular city fighting or folding.

Finally in the medium term any city lost to the Mongols is much more likely to welcome Rome back (assuming its been part of the Roman Empire for more than a generation or so) than ally itself with "barbarian foreigners". So if Rome can survive the first impact of the invasion they should be able to retake lost cities with relative ease. I can't seen a Mongol garrison commander willingly letting himself be trapped in a city far from home unless it is;
a) a trap; or b) he is confident relief will arrive before his supplies run short - they were cavalrymen first and foremost.

Finally I think the biggest advantage the Mongols have over Rome in the scenario we are looking at is that a lot has to go right for the Romans to win, the Empire was a complex machine and allowing for human nature and chance lots could go wrong for them whereas if things go wrong for the Mongols they can just leave - and perhaps come back again later.

Cheers

PS I don't neccessary think they would try to get all 200k of troops/1 mil horses accross the Sinai. 50-70K of troops would do depending on how many soldiers Rome had deployed. If they can't cross the Nile delta they can always fall back and do the "blocking thing" themselves.

[1979]

A key issue will in any case be how many units/types are stationed on the Eastern frontier to begin with.

legionary deployment 29 BC- 19 BC time frame
Syria

III Galica
VI Ferata
X Fretensis
XII Fulminata

Egypt

III Cyrenaica
XXII Deotariana

Tunisia

III Augusta
VIII Augusta

Spain ( Cantabrian war )

I Germanica
II Augusta
IV Macedonica
V Alaudae
VI Victrix
IX Hispana
X Gemina
XX Valeria Victrix

Balkans

IV Scythica
V Macedonica
VII Claudia
XI Claudia
XIII Gemina
XV Apollinaris

Switzerland ( Raetia )

XXI Rapax

Germania

XIV Gemina
XVI Galica
XVII
XVIII
XIX

After the Cantabrian war
I Germanica , II Augusta, V Alaudae, IX Hispana, XX Valeria Victrix were transfered to the northern frontier .

[1979]

As for the Anatolian border regions as noted earlier they are good defensive territory but I beleive (more research required) that there are numerous passes/routes of advance through them so blocking them completly would require a large number of troops spread accross a broad front in "pockets". All very good if you can be absolutley sure of holding but dangerous if you can't - especially when facing a mobile and well commanded force like the Mongols. All it would take is bribary or some other varient of the demon Murphy and you defensive line is breached. Hence my Bosporus solution. An orderly fall back taking as much resources as you can with you.

FYI ( the mountain passes are the marked with the purple >< sign )
http://mappery.com/maps/Turkey-Road-Map.jpg

There are numerous passes echeloned in depth. And generally you do not put all your eggs in one basket. You have maybe two auxiliary battalions guarding each pass , falling back successively as pressure increases. The legion acts as a tactical reserve ,which is committed only for counterattacks. ( they do not reinforce failure so to speak )
If the conditions for successful counterattack do not exist , the legion would redeploy in depth. ( similar to the half-backs in a rugby team ).

The only problem is that during Agrippa time, the legions did not occupy the mountain pases.
That ocured after Nero became emperor, but with a larger force commitment to the eastern frontier .

[Mongolwarrior]

By studying and comparing both the Mongolian Empire and the Roman Empire, it will be discovered that the Mongols would have won a war against the Roman Empire.

Let’s start of by looking at the Roman Empire. It was one of the biggest empires of all time. The first thing that comes to mind while thinking about what made the Romans great is their weapons. Out of the weapons, the first thing to do is take a look at the gladius. Originally it had a short, 50 cm two-edged blade, with a longish point. It normally had a scabbard made of wood, leather, and tin that hung from the right side of the soldier, however, as early soldiers bought their own weapons and armor, it varied. Later short swords used by the Roman Empire were still referred to as the Gladius Hispanica, but only superficially resembled the originals. These newer swords, just like most worthwhile weapons, were improved over the years. They had a shorter point than the original, and were more uniform, as they were mass-produced instead of bought individually and made custom for each soldier. (Hollis)
The Gladius probably weighed around a kilogram. They had a wooden handle that was wrapped with leather, and were very evenly weighted. While the swords were designed for use as a stabbing weapon, they could still be used as a slashing weapon because of their sharp sides. In training, the stabbing approach was stressed, because a slashing blow had much less chance of fatally wounding an opponent. Since enemies had armor and bone to protect them, the slash, or chop was much easier to block, but a stabbing thrust could punch through armor and kill. (Hollis)
Secondly, we see the pila (pl. pilum). There were two types of pila: thick and thin. Thin pilum had a long, skinny, iron head, which fit to the long handle by way of a socket. Thin pilum was about 2 m long, and it was a light, throwing weapon, used in mass showers meant to shock and cause chaos, and it had a barbed point. Thick pilum were of similar length, and was attached to the wooden shaft with a 5 cm wide tang, or block. A pyramid-shaped barb was normally the tip of both of these weapons. The iron point of both was about 7.5 mm in diameter (or about the diameter of a pencil). On the thick pila, the block also protected the hand in melee fighting. The thick pila was used most often in hand to hand fighting. (Hollis)
Soldiers carried both types of spear, in addition to the gladius. Later versions of the pilum in the first century were made quite similarly, but the thick pila were much lighter than the original, weighing in at about 2kg. The point of the thin pila was made of as soft of an iron as the blacksmith could make so that the point would bend upon impact, preventing the enemy from throwing the spear back. This did make it a one-use weapon though. The pilum could either be thrown, as in the case of the thin one, or, like the heavy pila, used in hand-to-hand combat.
Thirdly, we can look at some of the siege weapons used by the Romans. The Onager was very much like a catapult, but it used twined hair or sinew instead of rope, because they resisted expansion and so they would be stronger than just rope. They also had a sling at the end to carry the payload instead of a scooped out part on the end of the arm. This added just a little bit of extra power that was not evident in most catapults. Most of the time, a large stone or boulder was used, but on occasion, the Romans would throw skulls, rotting carcasses, captured prisoners’ body parts, and anything else that was suitable. “Onager means "donkey," and the weapon was so named because of its incredible kickback. One tale features an engineer who was too close to an Onager when it fired, and was reduced to a pulp.”(Hollis)
The scorpio, a big crossbow type weapon that was used to hurl javelins was famous for its accuracy. It was used mainly in a siege setting to pick defenders off of the walls, but a large number of them could be used on a battlefield, to get at the enemy before they could get to the Romans. “However, its more famous relative is the ballista, which was a large crossbow-type weapon that could hurl a 50-pound stone over 500 meters. A large ballista could be over 6 meters tall.”(Hollis)
The ballista was the forerunner of the trebuchet. It hurled stones, NOT darts, javelins, or arrows, like most people think. The scorpio was the large sniper crossbow, and the ballista was an accurate stone-hurler. It is one of the most famous siege weapons ever for a good reason; it was powerful, accurate to very small targets, and easily portable.
The siege tower was a tall, mobile tower type structure that was mounted on wheels. It could be rolled up to the enemy's walls, and a drawbridge type ramp could be lowered from the top, allowing archers and infantry access to the top of the walls of the besieged fortress. These towers were covered in boiled rawhide or armor, and had a full complement of archers, normally stationed on the top level to pick defenders off the ramparts. If the siege tower could not access the enemy because of adverse terrain, (not flat ground) the Romans would simply build a very strong ramp, or fill in a valley. Time was of no consequence during a siege to the Roman Empire. The siege tower basically removed the problem of high walls, but it was very flammable. (Hollis)
A battering ram was used to exploit the weakest point in a city’s defenses: the gate. It was normally used in the bottom level of a siege tower or in a special covering that was almost like an armored tent with wheels. The ram was suspended by leather straps from a beam running down the middle of the structure, and swung forward by two teams of men. (Hollis)
Now, we can look at the Roman armor, and we see that the scutum was originally a slightly curved oval shield made from two sheets of wood glued together and covered with canvas and boiled leather, usually with a spindle shaped iron boss along the vertical length of the shield. It was a full body shield, and was extremely heavy (weighing in at around 10kg). When a legionary charged an enemy with the shield, (a tactic often used), he would hold it with a straight arm and rest it on his left shoulder, then run towards the enemy with full force in an attempt to knock his foe over. He would then kneel behind the shield and fight from behind it using stabbing techniques with the gladius. (Hollis) The early scutum (shield) was said to have “the convex surface of which measures two and a half feet in width and four feet in length, the thickness at the rim being a palm's breadth. It is made of two planks glued together, the outer surface being then covered first with canvas and then with calfskin. Its upper and lower rims are strengthened by an iron edging which protects it from descending blows and from injury when rested on the ground. It also has an iron boss called the umbo fixed to it which turns aside the most formidable blows of stones, pikes, and heavy missiles in general.”(Polybius)
An example of this type of scutum was found at Kasr El Harit in the Fayum in Egypt. It is 1.28m long and 63.5cm wide, and was constructed of laminated birch wood. Nine or ten strips of birch from 6-10cm wide were fish-glued in-between two layers of thinner strips laid out perpendicular to the middle layer. The shield was thickest in the center (1.2cm), and was slightly less than a centimeter thick at the edges. The shield was covered with hard felt, used to stop arrows, which was stitched through the wood. The strap to grip it with was horizontal, and was held from the top. “The shields of the legionary had to be of regulation size, and a soldier could be severely reprimanded if his shield was too large.”(Hollis) Because of the rectangular shape of the scutum, formations of legionaries could overlap their shields to make formations like the testudo, or tortoise, which copied the tortoiseshell’s design by having the legionaries hold up their shields as a protection from enemy missiles.
The standard armor of the Roman Empire was the lorica segmentata, which was a segmented armor. It was constructed of strips of iron and leather that was joined together with hooks or straps. It covered the chest and shoulders, providing good protection from any enemy spears, missiles, and swords. “It had decorative hinges which served no purpose. (Hollis) The lorica segmentata weighed about 9kg.
A greave (derived from the Old French/English “greve” was a piece of armor that protected the shin. (Merriam-Webster) Greaves have been seen most often among the armor of most pre-gunpowder heavy infantry. Roman soldiers wore only one greave. The one greave was worn on the left leg, the leg that was exposed during battle. (Hollis)
Lorica Hamata is the Roman adaptation of mail, which is a type of linked armor consisting of small metal rings in a dense pattern to form mesh-type armor. The word mail itself, actually refers to the material, not the garment made from it. Being one of the most highly successful types of armors ever, mail was used by nearly every ancient to medieval metalworking civilization in history. “The Roman legionnaire was equipped with a lorica hamata, a mail shirt, from a very early date. Mail was extremely flexible and provided good protection against cutting and piercing weapons.” (Encyclopedia Britannica) It is commonly believed that the Roman Republic first came into contact with mail while fighting the Gauls in Cisalpine Gaul, which is now Northern Italy.
Mail was an extremely prized commodity, as it was expensive and time consuming to produce, and could mean the difference between life and death in a battle. Thus, it was usually only worn by nobility, wealthy soldiers, or mercenaries. The Royal Armory at Leeds concluded that "... it (mail) is almost impossible to penetrate using any conventional medieval weapon...” Mail's resistance to weapons is determined by four factors: the linkage type (riveted, butted, or welded), the type of material used (iron versus bronze or steel), the weave density (a tighter weave needs a thinner weapon to puncture), and the thickness of the individual rings. Mail, when a warrior could afford it, provided a significant advantage to a warrior’s armor. Its one weakness is that of high velocity, sharp, projectiles, such as arrows and darts. (mailleartisans.com)
Roman helmets had several variations. The older Montefortino helmet was bowl shaped, with a topknot that was filled with lead, and a hole for insertion of a feather. The Coolus type helmet was a round bronze helmet that had a small neck guard, and the Port type, which was an iron helmet with a long neck guard. The Port type had a topknot that was adapted to hold the crest, and this port type helmet later evolved into what is known as the Imperial Gallic type. (Hollis)
The Gallic type much enlarged the neck guard further, and included metal cheek-guards, which protected the face. It also featured a reinforced arch along the forehead to protect against downward slashes. Ancient military equipment was not produced in assembly lines, but made by hand, so it is not certain to what degree there was any standardization even under the Roman Empire. Originally, the neighboring Etruscans, people who utilized the “Nasua” type helmets, influenced Roman helmets. The Gauls, however, were the peoples who most impacted the design of the Roman helmet hence the popular "Imperial Gallic" type helmets as mentioned above. (Hollis)
The Roman military was a very organized system. There was a very clear system of rank, and several different divisions of the basic military unit, called the legion. There was on average, 30 battle ready legions. “The legions were numbered, but the numbers tended to repeat themselves. At one point, there were 5 legions numbered III. If a legion was destroyed, its number could not be used again, such as the case of the massacre of legions XVII, XVIII, and XIX.”(Hollis) Each legion had about 5,500 men. The legion was subdivided into ten units called cohorts. Nine of the cohorts had 480 soldiers. The cohorts were subdivided into six centuries, of about 80 men each. The first cohort had about 800 men, and only five centuries. Most of the extra men in the first cohort were specialists, such as blacksmiths, builders, or cooks. The legion also had around 120 cavalrymen, who were used mainly as scouts but also to protect the flank if needed.
A centurion commanded each century. Each century also had a tesserarius, a signifer, a cornicen, and an optio. The tesserarius was mainly in control of guard duties. The signifer was the standard-bearer, who also kept track of pay and expenses, and he received double pay. The cornicen was the horn blower, similar to buglers of today. The optio was the second in command, and helped with the training of the century.
The centurion of the first cohort's first century was the primus pilus, or "first spear," and was the highest-ranking centurion in the legion. Each legion also had an aquilifer and several ranking officers, as well as a legatus. The aquilifer carried the eagle, the standard of the entire legion. Much superstition was attached to the eagle, and if it was lost, the entire legion would be disbanded. The legion carried other standards as well, such as the imago, an image of the emperor, the legionary symbol, and special flags called vexilla, which were used when detachments of the legion were sent away. For this reason the detachments were referred to as vexillations.
The legatus was an officer appointed by the emperor, and commanded the legion with a great deal of help from his centurions and the camp prefect, who had been promoted from primus pilus, and could be compared to a quartermaster. “The entire foundation of Roman infantry tactics was the idea that by keeping troops in order, one could fight more effectively. Most military commanders of the day simply had their troops rush wildly at the enemy, relying on superior numbers, better soldiers, or luck to carry the day. The Romans realized that they could not always rely on these, so they turned to strategy. Each situation was handled differently, taking into account terrain, the type and strength of the opponent's troops, and the type and strength of the Roman's troops.”(Hollis)
The default arrangement for a full legion in battle was as follows. The cavalry rode up towards the front, on the sides where they could protect the flanks. In between them were two rows of five cohorts. The rightmost cohort consisted of 1100 infantry and 30 mounted troops, while the others contained 550 infantry and 65 cavalry. Behind the main group were seven units of light troops, followed by seven units of reserves. (Hollis)
When the legion was in transit, a different arrangement was required. The main part of the cavalry rode up front as a vanguard, followed by the infantry, in a long column of cohorts. Behind them came the army's baggage, servants, and vehicles, guarded by several units of cavalry. At the end came the best units of both infantry and cavalry, to defend against attacks from the rear. The lighter units such as the auxiliaries were arranged around the edges to act as scouts.
When the Romans were outnumbered or had inferior troops, the tactic of using a natural barrier to protect one flank, and their cavalry to protect another was most often the only hope for victory. The left flank was kept guarded by whatever protection was available. The light troops and cavalry protected the right flank. With both sides well covered, the army normally had little to fear from an attack. (Hollis)
Roman commanders had several options when the enemy was facing defeat. Did they press the attack, and try to cut them down, or did they allow them to retreat? While some might try and make an end once and for all, right there, the more frequent approach was to allow them to run. When cornered, soldiers would often try to make a stand, and fight with the strength brought on by desperation, often taking a heavy toll before they were overwhelmed. If they were given an avenue of escape, they would most often think only of running, dropping all equipment in an attempt to go faster. The Romans would then be dealing with a disarmed, panicked, and demoralized rabble, not a force that had nothing to lose, and was determined to fight to the last man. (Hollis) This was really one of the most brilliant tactics used by the Roman Empire, and showed the brilliance of the Roman generals.
Because they were only useful on flat ground, the Romans did not like to use chariots. When the Romans faced enemies that used chariots, every man would set his thick pila into the ground in front of the army tilted in a 30 to 45 degree angle to impale any horse and/or rider foolish enough to try and cross it. The Roman army had several ways of dealing with mounted elephants. They usually carried several riders, most of the time, archers, with the idea being that the riders could pick off any attackers before they had enough time to kill the elephant. “The first method was to pick off the riders with archers, then attack or coral the elephant, which could be difficult if the riders themselves were archers, because they had a height advantage, which affected the trajectory. The second was to have the cavalry ride in circles around it and throw javelins. Another tactic was to part ranks in front of the elephant, and then rush in and attack its flanks. (Hollis) However they did NOT have a winning record against the mounded archer type armies and that is a very important thing to realize when you are considering who would win. Another thing that is important to note is that the Roman Empire’s normal army size was from 2 to 3 legions or from 11,000 to 16,000 men.


Now that we have briefly studied the Romans; let’s look at the Mongolian empire. Again, the first thing that comes to mind is the weapons used. The Mongol bow was known for its effectiveness. “The composite bow was a weapon of stunning efficiency, unsurpassed until the evolution of effective firearms.” (O’Connell 47) It was made out of wood, sinew, and horn, which was all held together by animal glue, normally fish. It was called the compound bow. They drew it with just the thumb finger because it was the strongest finger, as opposed to the popular European draw style of using three fingers. The reason why they did that was that if you used a multi-finger grip, and if they do not leave contact with the bowstring at the exact same time, the way the arrow left the string was messed up, and the Mongols didn’t want to have to worry about that.
Mongolian composite bows were smaller, faster, and more powerful than all other bows of a relative size. It was usually stored in a leather case or sheath when it was not being used. The armament of the Mongols focused on the bow. Each warrior had two, attached in a special quiver to their saddles on each horse in addition to multiple quivers filled with sixty arrows each. They had two bows, one smaller, for on horseback, and one larger bow that was used from a standing position in the ground. The larger bow itself possessed an incredible amount of penetrating power, often consisting of pull weights of over one hundred fifty pounds (the English longbow’s draw was around 120 or so). The Mongols used a wide variety of arrows, many with specialized purposes, such as armor piercing arrows, blunt stun arrows, and even whistling arrows for signaling purposes. (May)
Mongolian lancers wore heavier armor than the horse archers. Lance is a term for a variety of different pole weapons based on the spear. The lance was normally used from horseback. The name is derived from the term “lancea,” Roman auxiliaries' javelin. Also compare longche, the Greek term for lance. A lance in the original sense of the word is a light throwing spear, or javelin, but it later turned into a longer, thin, spear that was held under the arm. The English verb to launch "fling, hurl, throw" is derived from the term in the Old French “lancier,” as well as the rarer or poetic “to lance.” There is some disagreement on how many lancers there were; compared to bowmen, but actually, there was a random number of them; sometimes they had lancers, and sometimes they didn’t. They were adaptations from the Parthinian cataphracts, which were the precursors to European knights. The Mongolian lancers, in all actuality were Asian mounted knights.
The ild was a variation on the scimitar that was slightly more elongated and less curved than the popular Islamic scimitars. The scimitar was used mainly by cavalry because of its lighter weight and its curved blade, perfect for slashing enemies from the horse. Most Islamic countries used the scimitar widely because they favored the cavalry. “The earliest known use of scimitars is from the 9th century, when they were used among soldiers in the Khurasan region of Persia.”(Wikipedia)
The Mongols adapted, improved, and used almost any siege weapons they came across in battle. This last sentence is perhaps one of the most important of the whole paper. It means that, after at least 800 years, and after all of the improvements that were made to siege weapons in general, Including Roman Siege Weapons, the Mongols still improved upon them even further. They also used them quite frequently, as in the siege of Aleppo; when Hulegu Khan used 20 catapults against the Bab al Iraq (Gate of Iraq). (May)
“Mongolian warriors themselves, in order to maintain their mobility, were lightly armored compared to many of the armies they faced. Their armor, for the most part, consisted of lacquered or boiled leather, which mainly covered the upper body. A helmet was also part of their accoutrement. Other types of armor, such as chain mail, did appear, but it was not as widespread among the Mongols due to the weight.”(May)
Traditionally, Mongolian warriors during the earlier days of the Mongol Empire would have probably used round shields constructed out of mostly wicker, most likely using willow or rattan which was wound into a slightly domed spiral. This would then have been covered with a layer of boiled leather. Similar designs were used all across much of Asia. Existing examples include almost flat and deeply domed shapes. When resources permitted, these shields would be reinforced and augmented by iron reinforcements and, in later periods, might have been entirely constructed of iron. The straps used to hold the shield were made of rawhide leather, tied or stapled onto the wicker directly, and it was positioned so that both straps would fit in the fist snugly, but be taught enough to offer fine control just by turning the wrist. The Chinese were often known to equip their cavalry in the Mongolian fashion, even keeping a separate form of shields for the cavalry than what was used for the foot soldiers. (Kapaj)
The Mongols normally invaded with a set plan of attack that was used everywhere and was fine-tuned or the particular invasion, but gave the generals flexibility to do what they needed to do. First the Mongol army would invade in several different columns. Often it was three-pronged attack that was used, consisting of the main army in the center (half of the attacking force) and then two flanking forces that were one fourth of the attacking force each. Flanking forces in some cases went into neighboring territories or around key areas before rendezvousing with the army at the center. All of these columns were protected by a screen of scouts who would constantly relay information back to their mother column. In addition, because of their pre-planned schedule as well as the scouts, and the freedom the generals had to make their own choice, the Mongols not only marched divided (which covered more land), but also were also able to fight united. Moreover, because of the fact that the Mongol forces marched in smaller units, the Mongols were not impeded with columns stretching for miles, like the Romans and other medieval nations were. (May)
Their mobility was very useful when fighting a large force because the Mongols were hardly ever located where the enemy thought they were, and this gave the Mongols the element of surprise. Their use of a many-pronged invasion also helped their preferred method of attacking the enemy. Mongols liked to deal with all field armies before attacking enemy fortresses because if they were attacking a fortress, they did not want to be attacked from the rear and the castle at once. This was very good because it also added to the fear factor if a battered and bloody soldier got to the city, and started telling people that his army was massacred.
Reaching this goal was rarely difficult, as the enemy (except in the case of the Khwarazmians during the invasion of central Asia) usually sought to stop the Mongols before they destroyed an entire province. Furthermore, the use of columns with its outlying screen of scouts gathering intelligence enabled the Mongols to locate, encircle and destroy the enemy armies much more rapidly than one army simply wandering around. (May) “This also meant that an embattled force could receive reinforcements or, in the advent of defeat, they could be avenged. By concentrating on the field armies, the strongholds had to wait. Of course, smaller fortresses, or ones easily surprised, were taken as they came along.
This had two effects. First, it cut off the principle city from communicating with other cities where they might expect aid. Secondly, refugees from these smaller cities would flee to the last stronghold.”(May) The reports from streaming hordes of refugees not only reduced the moral of the inhabitants and army garrison of the principle cities; it also strained their resources to the limit. The sudden flood of refugees heavily taxed food and water reserves. Soon, what was once a formidable undertaking became easy through the fear gaining and the food waning.
The tactics used, whether in battle on the field or during a siege, focused on two primary aspects: firepower and mobility combined. “Military historians often speak of the great success of the English with their longbows at Agincourt or Crecy, but almost a century before Crecy, the Mongols had demonstrated on several occasions the advantages of concentrated firepower over any opponent. Not only did a withering hail of arrows break a charge of armored knights, but it also could pin units to a particular location.”(May)
During sieges, the Mongols relied even more than normal on concentrated firepower. At the siege of Aleppo, Hulegu Khan used twenty large catapults against the Bab al-Iraq (Gate of Iraq) alone. In the invasion of the Khwarezmian Empire, as recorded by Jűzjânî, there were several episodes in which the Mongols constructed not just some, but hundreds of siege machines simply in order to surpass the number that a defending city possessed. Extreme discipline set the Mongol armies apart from their contemporaries of the day. Without discipline, the Mongols could never have practically perfected the system of horse archer warfare, which had in fact, existed for centuries. (May)
Another tactic used was the feigned retreat, or caracole. It would sometimes go on for as much as a day or two; while the Mongols were preparing to strike. They would wait for the moment the enemy dropped his guard, and when the time was right, the Mongols would attack and invariably win.
In some cases, as during the invasion of Hungary in early 1241, they covered up to 100 miles per day, which was unheard of by other armies of the time. Something else that we need to look at is the fact that the Mongols, with the exception of Kublai Khan invading Japan, NEVER lost a war. They did lose ONE MAJOR BATTLE however; the battle of Ain Jalut, against the Mamluks. It is important to note that the Mongols were led not by the Khan, but by Ket Buqa Noyan, (a general who was not prepared to be attacked), and were lured into an ambush. (deremilitari.org)
In 1227, at the time of Genghis Khan’s death, the Mongolian Empire was almost four times as big as the Roman Empire’s at its biggest time. It is also important to note that the Mongol’s normal army size was at least two tumen, or 20,000 men but most of the time, it was bigger. Had the Mongols not given up their nomadic, conquering, ways; I believe they could have conquered the world as they knew it.
The Romans heavily depended on armored infantry, which were very slow, did not have a winning record against horsemen, let alone at least 15,000 mounted bowmen and 5,000 lancers. The vast amount of food needed (over 13 tons per month, per legion) would hurt the Romans in a fight against the Mongols.
The main argument that Roman supporters have is that the Roman Empire at its greatest time, and the Mongol empire’s greatest time, were nearly 1000 years apart, but the question is not, who would have won if they were in power at the same time, but who would of won. Their legions were famed and feared, but would never be able to face up against the hordes of the Mongols. The armor of the Romans might have proved to be a problem, some people claim, but the power of the Mongol bows, if shot in the right place, could, and would wreak havoc against the Roman lines steadily trudging forward, trying to reach them. (For was not the armor of the Knights better than the Roman’s, and did the Mongolian bows not pierce the Knights’ armor?)
The Mongolian Hordes were arguably the most feared fighting force ever in history for a reason. The combination of absolute mobility and withering firepower in such a way was not seen before and has not been since, until the invention of the jet airplane. The Mongol armies traveled very light, and were able to live largely off the land. The Mongols equipment included fishhooks and other tools that were meant to make each warrior independent of any slow fixed supply source. To ensure they would always have fresh horses, each trooper usually had 3 or 4 mounts. Since most of the Mongols' mounts were mares, they could live off their horses' milk or milk products when need arose. In dire straits, the Mongol warrior could even open one of his horse’s jugular veins, and drink some of the blood!
Just the fact that a VERY small Mongolian army was 20,000 men as seen in the battle of Ain Jalut, yet at times was as many as 125,000 men, and the normal Roman army size was 2 to 3 legions, (around 11,000 men to 16,000 men) should help the reader realize that the Romans wouldn’t stand a chance.
The amazing tactics (that military experts still study today), the extreme skill and discipline that no nomad archer type army ever had before, and the organization that no other army as large has ever had, all lead me to believe that the Mongols would have won a war against the Roman Empire.

Stephen Smith, 9th grade, Michigan Virtual Charter Academy

Citations/Bibliography:

1. The Roman Military

2. The Silver Horde

3. Mongol Arms

4. lorica hamata (armour) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia

5. M.A.I.L. - Maille Artisans International League - History and Methodology of European Mail - Submitted by AMA Cobra

6. The Battle of Ayn' Jalut (1260)

6. Spielvogel, Jackson. World History Modern Times. Columbus, Ohio: Glencoe, 2005. Print.

7. O'Connell, Robert L. Soul of the Sword, an illustrated history of weapons from prehistory to the present. New York: The Free Press, 2002. Print.

8. Polybius, The Histories. Unknown date. Handwritten script.

[troung]

Something else that we need to look at is the fact that the Mongols, with the exception of Kublai Khan invading Japan, NEVER lost a war. They did lose ONE MAJOR BATTLE however; the battle of Ain Jalut, against the Mamluks. It is important to note that the Mongols were led not by the Khan, but by Ket Buqa Noyan, (a general who was not prepared to be attacked), and were lured into an ambush. (deremilitari.org)

The Mamlukes won repeatedly against Mongol cavalry. Ain Jalut was just the first of many Ws.

The Mongolian Hordes were arguably the most feared fighting force ever in history for a reason. The combination of absolute mobility and withering firepower in such a way was not seen before and has not been since, until the invention of the jet airplane.

Wouldn't go that far, they weren't all that different in mobility and firepower then the various Turkic Hordes that rampaged around. They came up short in archery against the Mamluks as well.

The vast amount of food needed (over 13 tons per month, per legion) would hurt the Romans in a fight against the Mongols.

Mongols had fodder and water needs.

The Romans heavily depended on armored infantry, which were very slow,

Tamerlane found infantry of enough use to bring units on campaign. In fact one of his earliest commands contained infantry. He also took infantry out against the Golden Horde and the Sultanate of Delhi. Not talking about "arrow fodder" either.

did not have a winning record against horsemen,

Depends on the time and opponent. Rome did score plenty of wins against cavalry.

You totally left off Roman cavalry.

[Officer of Engineers]

By studying and comparing both the Mongolian Empire and the Roman Empire, it will be discovered that the Mongols would have won a war against the Roman Empire.

Stephen Smith, 9th grade, Michigan Virtual Charter Academy

Yes, a real authority.

[Blademaster]

Yes, a real authority.

I'm sorry, was that sarcarsm. Sometimes I can't tell. <insert your obligatory picture of parody. I am just too ****ing lazy to do a google search and search among the pictures and select a worthy picture, then save it to my hard drive, rename it, and then upload it. I think I'd rather type my reason out than do all that shit. Oh wait. I just realized by typing all of that shit, I would have posted a picture. Ah goddamn goes my reason. Ah well.>