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  • Krauthammer on Scowcroft

    Wouldn't you just love to be at the cocktail party that these two guys showed up at?

    The Realist Who Got It Wrong

    By Charles Krauthammer
    Sunday, October 30, 2005; B07



    Now that Cindy Sheehan turns out to be a disaster for the antiwar movement -- most Americans are not about to follow a left-wing radical who insists that we are in Iraq for reasons of theft, oppression and empire -- a new spokesman is needed. If I were in the opposition camp, I would want a deeply patriotic, highly intelligent, distinguished establishment figure. I would want Brent Scowcroft.

    Scowcroft has been obliging. In the Oct. 31 New Yorker he came out strongly against the war and the neocon sorcerers who magically foisted it upon what must have been a hypnotized president and vice president.

    Of course, Scowcroft's opposition to toppling Saddam Hussein is neither surprising nor new. Indeed, we are now seeing its third iteration. He had two cracks at Hussein in 1991 and urged his President Bush to pass them both up -- first, after Hussein's defeat in the Persian Gulf War, when the road to Baghdad was open, and then, days later, during a massive U.S.-encouraged uprising of Kurds and Shiites, when America stood by and allowed Hussein to massacre his opponents by the tens of thousands. One of the reasons for Iraqi wariness during the U.S. liberation 12 years later was the memory of our past betrayal and suspicions about our current intentions in light of that betrayal.

    This coldbloodedness is a trademark of this nation's most doctrinaire foreign policy "realist." Realism is the billiard ball theory of foreign policy: The only thing that counts is how countries interact, not what's happening inside. You care not a whit about who is running a country. Whether it is Mother Teresa or the Assad family gangsters in Syria, you care only about their external actions, not how they treat their own people.

    Realists prize stability above all, and there is nothing more stable than a ruthlessly efficient dictatorship. Which is why Scowcroft is the man who six months after Tiananmen Square toasted those who ordered the massacre; who, as the world celebrates the Beirut Spring that evicted the Syrian occupation from Lebanon, sees not liberation but possible instability; who can barely conceal a preference for Syria's stabilizing iron rule.

    Even today Scowcroft says, "I didn't think that calling the Soviet Union the 'evil empire' got anybody anywhere." Tell that to Natan Sharansky and other Soviet dissidents for whom that declaration of moral -- beyond geopolitical -- purpose was electrifying and helped galvanize the movements that ultimately brought down the Soviet empire.

    It was not brought down by diplomacy and arms control, the preferred realist means for dealing with the Soviet Union. It was brought down by indigenous revolutionaries, encouraged and supported by Ronald Reagan, a president unabashedly dedicated not to detente with evil but to its destruction -- i.e., regime change.

    For realists such as Scowcroft, regime change is the ultimate taboo. Too risky, too dangerous, too unpredictable. "I'm a realist in the sense that I'm a cynic about human nature," he admits. Hence, writes Jeffrey Goldberg, his New Yorker chronicler, Scowcroft remains "unmoved by the stirrings of democracy movements in the Middle East."

    Particularly in Iraq. The difficulties there are indeed great. But those difficulties came about not because, as Scowcroft tells us, "some people don't really want to be free" and don't value freedom as we do. The insurgency in Iraq is not proof of an escape-from-freedom human nature that has little use for liberty and prefers other things. The insurgency is, on the contrary, evidence of a determined Sunni minority desperate to maintain not only its own freedom but its previous dominion over the other 80 percent of the population now struggling for theirs.

    These others -- the overwhelming majority of Iraq's people -- have repeatedly given every indication of valuing their newfound freedom: voting in two elections at the risk of their lives, preparing for a third, writing and ratifying a constitution granting more freedoms than exist in any country in the entire Arab Middle East. "The secret is out," says Fouad Ajami. "There is something decent unfolding in Iraq. It's unfolding in the shadow of a terrible insurgency, but a society is finding its way to constitutional politics."

    Ajami is no fool, no naif, no reckless idealist, as Scowcroft likes to caricature the neoconservatives he reviles. A renowned scholar on the Middle East, Ajami is a Shiite, fluent in Arabic, who has unsentimentally educated the world about the Arab predicament and Arab dream palaces. Yet. having returned from two visits to Iraq this year, he sports none of Scowcroft's easy, ostentatious cynicism about human nature, and Iraqi human nature in particular. Instead, Ajami celebrates the coming of decency in a place where decency was outlawed 30 years ago.

    It is not surprising that Scowcroft, who helped give indecency a 12-year extension in Iraq, should disdain decency's return. But we should not.

    [email protected]


    © 2005 The Washington Post Company

  • #2
    Here's a guy defending Scowcroft's point of view. From an article by Dick Cheney in 1991:


    Did We Go Far Enough?

    There have been significant discussions since the war ended about the proposition of whether or not we went far enough. Should we, perhaps, have gone in to Baghdad? Should we have gotten involved to a greater extent then we did? Did we leave the job in some respects unfinished? I think the answer is a resounding "no."

    One of the reasons we were successful from a military perspective was because we had very clear-cut military objectives. The President gave us an assignment that could be achieved by the application of military force. He said, "Liberate Kuwait." He said, "Destroy Saddam Hussein's offensive capability," his capacity to threaten his neighbors -- both definable military objectives. You give me that kind of an assignment, I can go put together, as the Chiefs, General Powell, and General Schwarzkopf masterfully did, a battle plan to do exactly that. And as soon as we had achieved those objectives, we stopped hostilities, on the grounds that we had in fact fulfilled our objective.

    Now, the notion that we should have somehow continued for another day to two is, I think, fallacious. At the time that we made the decision to stop hostilities, it was the unanimous recommendation of the President's military advisors, senior advisors, that we had indeed achieved our objectives, and therefore it was time to stop the killing and the destruction.

    Some have suggested that if we had spent another day in combat in the Kuwait theater, we would have changed the outcome of the subsequent conflict between the Shi'a, and the Kurds in the north, against Iraq. I do not believe that is the case. I think it is important to remember that Saddam had better than 60 divisions when the war started; that we destroyed or rendered combat ineffective in military terms about two-thirds of that force, roughly 40 divisions in the Kuwaiti theater. But he had some 20 divisions deployed in Iraq that never were engaged in the conflict. They were up along the border with Turkey, along the border with Iran, but they were never committed to the theater. And they were never there for the target of U.S. military operations. It is that residual force, plus what small force he was able to get out of the theater at the end of the war, that he ultimately used to deal with the Kurds and the Shi'a, but I do not believe one more day in Kuwait would have made that much difference.

    Some have suggested that if we had gotten involved just a little bit -- for example, if we had shot down a few helicopters -- it would have changed the outcome of the conflict. Again, I think that is a misguided notion. One of the lessons that comes out of all of this is we should not ask our military personnel to engage "a little bit" in a war. If you are going to go to war, let's send the whole group; let's make certain that we've got a force of sufficient size, as we did when we went into Kuwait, so that we do not suffer any more casualties than are absolutely necessary.

    Now, if you're going to deal with the effort to change the military balance inside Iraq, if you want to really neutralize the Iraqi Army, you have to deal not only with helicopters but also with artillery, with tanks and armored personnel carriers, and with the infantry units that clearly make the Iraqi government -- even today with a two-thirds smaller army than they had a few months ago -- significantly an overwhelming presence vis-a-vis the insurgents that exist inside the country.

    I think that the proposition of going to Baghdad is also fallacious. I think if we were going to remove Saddam Hussein we would have had to go all the way to Baghdad, we would have to commit a lot of force because I do not believe he would wait in the Presidential Palace for us to arrive. I think we'd have had to hunt him down. And once we'd done that and we'd gotten rid of Saddam Hussein and his government, then we'd have had to put another government in its place.

    What kind of government? Should it be a Sunni government or Shi'i government or a Kurdish government or Ba'athist regime? Or maybe we want to bring in some of the Islamic fundamentalists? How long would we have had to stay in Baghdad to keep that government in place? What would happen to the government once U.S. forces withdrew? How many casualties should the United States accept in that effort to try to create clarity and stability in a situation that is inherently unstable?

    I think it is vitally important for a President to know when to use military force. I think it is also very important for him to know when not to commit U.S. military force. And it's my view that the President got it right both times, that it would have been a mistake for us to get bogged down in the quagmire inside Iraq.

    Comment


    • #3
      Broken, do you really think that when you bring up 15 year old positions by people as some sort of "gotcha!" you are doing anything other than making yourself look silly?

      -dale

      Comment


      • #4
        For most people, everything changed Sept 11, 2001.

        He (Cheney) was probably right then and he is right now. Different times, different circumstances.

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by dalem
          Broken, do you really think that when you bring up 15 year old positions by people as some sort of "gotcha!" you are doing anything other than making yourself look silly?

          -dale
          You think it is silly to point out that Cheney used to be a realist of the sort Krauthammer is deriding?

          I liked the Cheney of Bush 41 and the realist views of that administration. God knows what happened to Cheney. Too many heart attacks or something.
          Last edited by Broken; 01 Nov 05,, 22:55.

          Comment


          • #6
            Originally posted by Broken
            You think it is silly to point out that Cheney used to be a realist of the sort Krauthammer is deriding?

            I liked the Cheney of Bush 41 and the realist views of that administration. God knows what happened to Cheney. Too many heart attacks or something.
            Yes, I do think it is silly. As has been said above, 9/11 changed a lot of peoples' opinions on realpolitik.

            -dale

            Comment


            • #7
              HAH! Broken really said he LIKED Cheney? He LIKED 'the realist views of that administration'? HAH!

              Dude's a scream. A dumbass, too, but he's a laugh-riot, just the same.

              So, if Broken was all in favor of Bush 41, I suppose the same Krauthammer critique of Scowcroft applies to Broken's version of foreign policy, too. The same one that left all that Saddam business undone for the next decade, throughout two entire terms of that shrewd statesman Clinton, and basically kicked the can down the road to dealt with NOW. The one that saw the US encourage an uprising, then abandoned the rebels to be slaughtered, thus setting the stage for what we're dealing with NOW.

              With a backwards look at history and the perspective that ten years' worth of awful history affords us, this moron thinks Scowcroft and the OLD Cheney were correct. What a nugget. Usually, hindsight is 20/20. But Broken's hindsight really IS hindsight: out his own ass. How can any one single human being be so dam' WRONG about virtually everything he believes? Even with the benefit of knowing now how badly that 'realist' policy would turn out?

              Brilliant man, that Krauthammer.

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by dalem
                "Originally Posted by Broken
                You think it is silly to point out that Cheney used to be a realist of the sort Krauthammer is deriding?

                I liked the Cheney of Bush 41 and the realist views of that administration. God knows what happened to Cheney. Too many heart attacks or something."


                Yes, I do think it is silly. As has been said above, 9/11 changed a lot of peoples' opinions on realpolitik.

                -dale
                It didn't change Krauthammer's. He claimed before 9/11 that Bush 41 (and Cheney, his Sec Def) were wrong not to invade Iraq in 1991. I think Cheney's argument above is an effective rebutal.

                9/11 did not change neo-con thinking on invading Iraq, it gave the neocons an opportunity to "correct" the mistakes of Bush 41's policy.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by Broken
                  It didn't change Krauthammer's. He claimed before 9/11 that Bush 41 (and Cheney, his Sec Def) were wrong not to invade Iraq in 1991. I think Cheney's argument above is an effective rebutal.

                  9/11 did not change neo-con thinking on invading Iraq, it gave the neocons an opportunity to "correct" the mistakes of Bush 41's policy.
                  I said it changed a lot of people's opinions, not everyone's. Clearly those already on the new side of the paradigm would be excluded from the trigger event in that context.

                  Come on Broken, you're not thinking very clearly right now.

                  -dale

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by dalem
                    9/11 changed a lot of peoples' opinions on realpolitik.
                    That's good...
                    No man is free until all men are free - John Hossack
                    I agree completely with this Administration’s goal of a regime change in Iraq-John Kerry
                    even if that enforcement is mostly at the hands of the United States, a right we retain even if the Security Council fails to act-John Kerry
                    He may even miscalculate and slide these weapons off to terrorist groups to invite them to be a surrogate to use them against the United States. It’s the miscalculation that poses the greatest threat-John Kerry

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by dalem
                      I said it changed a lot of people's opinions, not everyone's. Clearly those already on the new side of the paradigm would be excluded from the trigger event in that context.

                      Come on Broken, you're not thinking very clearly right now.

                      -dale
                      Really? Are you one of those people who believe 9/11 was caused by an over-reliance on realist thinking in our foreign policy? Was your view of realism somehow altered by 9/11?

                      Krauthammer is just b*tching because Scowcroft is kicking the neocons (including Krauthammer) while they are down. To give Scowcroft credit, he also kicked the neocons when they were up.

                      So Krauthammer's answer is to award himself victory over Scowcroft, as if the last 2 1/2 years were positive credit to the neocons. Apparently, the fact escapes Mr Krauthammer that most Americans do not consider the credit to be positive. Perhaps he could use a little realism himself.

                      If he would open his eyes, Krauthammer might note that realism is back in US foreign policy with Sec State Rice and the departure of Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and Douglas Feith.
                      Last edited by Broken; 02 Nov 05,, 07:01.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Broken
                        God knows what happened to Cheney. Too many heart attacks or something.
                        God knows what happened to you over the last 15 years. Too much pot or something.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by Broken
                          Really? Are you one of those people who believe 9/11 was caused by an over-reliance on realist thinking in our foreign policy? Was your view of realism somehow altered by 9/11?
                          I do think one of the root causes of 9/11 was the decision to let the M.E. fester during the Cold War. I'm not saying there was a better choice, but I think it's pretty obvious that the "he's a bastard but he's OUR bastard" mantra, which I see as an integral part of realpolitik, gave us a nasty slew of dictators with oppressed and hostile populations.

                          Krauthammer is just b*tching because Scowcroft is kicking the neocons (including Krauthammer) while they are down. To give Scowcroft credit, he also kicked the neocons when they were up.
                          I think Krauthammer is b*tching because he believes that once you've banged your pecker between two cinder blocks once, there's no real up side to doing it again.

                          So Krauthammer's answer is to award himself victory over Scowcroft, as if the last 2 1/2 years were positive credit to the neocons. Apparently, the fact escapes Mr Krauthammer that most Americans do not consider the credit to be positive. Perhaps he could use a little realism himself.
                          Is the M.E. more free today than it was on 9/10/2001? Are there more voters with actual power at their polls? Are there fewer sponsors of State Terrorism now? If the answer to these questions is "Yes", and I think it's clear that it is, then that's deserving of some positive credit.

                          If he would open his eyes, Krauthammer might note that realism is back in US foreign policy with Sec State Rice and the departure of Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and Douglas Feith.
                          How has Sec. Rice changed the direction of Wolfowitzian-based policy?

                          -dale

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            weird. seems like digging a shiv into scowcraft is the "in" thing to do these days.

                            ----
                            http://www.slate.com/id/2129221/

                            Mr. Stability
                            The wrongness of Brent Scowcroft's realism.
                            By Christopher Hitchens
                            Posted Tuesday, Nov. 1, 2005, at 1:47 PM ET

                            Scowcroft longs for the "peace" of Saddam's regime
                            The sole point of the non-findings of the Fitzgerald non-investigation, into the non-commission of non-crimes and the non-outing of a non-covert CIA bureaucrat, is (as Messrs. Kerry, Krugman, Rich, and others keep reminding us) that it might even yet trigger the long-awaited inquest into the Iraq intervention. I very strongly hope that there is a full-dress postmortem into this country's Iraq policy, though I am not ready to assume that "inquest" or "postmortem" are the correct terms for it. Let's just say a serious blue-ribbon, bipartisan, full-out inquiry. This inquiry, however, could hardly be confined—as Kerry, Krugman, and Rich so obviously hope—to the years 2001-05.

                            At the very minimum, the starting point of such a retrospective should be the decision, in 1991, to confirm Saddam Hussein in power after his expulsion from Kuwait and to keep his population under international sanctions. Another place to begin might be the apparent "green light," given by the Carter administration, for Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran. Real specialists and buffs might wish to start with the role of the CIA in the 1960s military coup—or coups—that brought the Baath Party to power in Baghdad in the first place.

                            Jeffrey Goldberg's widely discussed essay on Brent Scowcroft's politics, published in The New Yorker of Oct. 31, makes an ideal starting point. It reminds us, for one thing, that the root-and-branch opposition to regime change in 2003 came not from the left, but from the right. There were many vocal leftists on the streets at that moment, as we all remember, but their slogans were so puerile (a war for Halliburton and all that) as to make them ignorable. Far more to the point were the arguments made by conservatives and "realists" to the effect that the status quo in the Middle East was preferable to any likely alternative. My impression is that Mr. Goldberg paid out enough rope to Gen. Scowcroft to allow him to hang himself, most especially at the critical stage where the old reactionary proudly announced that the pre-existing status quo had meant: "Fifty years of peace."

                            Continue Article

                            I had not known until I read this article that Scowcroft was a Mormon, and this may have no importance. His willingness to believe anything could well stem from another source. He takes the view that the status quo is preferable to any forcible change, and also preferable to any change at all. For example, he warns that if Mubarak leaves or loses power in Egypt, he will be replaced by "bad guys" and sectarians. If this is true, then it must surely mean that the current "stability" of Egypt is illusory as well as undemocratic. He says that the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon is the prelude to civil war, not independence: "[T]he sectarian emotions that were there when the Syrians went in aren't gone." Hardly a persuasive argument, then, for the healing effect of a Syrian presence that lasted 29 years. (One should not forget that Lebanon's current phase of crisis began when Bashar al-Assad tried illegally to extend the term of a minority Christian president.) Meanwhile, in Damascus, the lovely status quo appears, by some alchemy unknown to Scowcroft, to be engaged in destabilizing itself. Death-squad regimes, it might be argued, have a tendency to do this.

                            Scowcroft, sounding "realist" enough, announces to Goldberg that he is "a cynic about human nature." Well, so would I be, if I were a former partner in the firm of Kissinger Associates who now runs his own consultancy, introducing unpleasant regimes to the corporations that love them. But "cynicism" of this kind often masks a certain naiveté. Those who elected to keep Saddam in power in 1991—Scowcroft prominent among them—imagined that they would keep him in a "box." Instead, Saddam turned the sanctions regime into a racket that hugely augmented his own power and wealth, while the sanctions themselves killed innumerable people and created an immiserated underclass in Iraq that is the source of many of our present woes. And, perhaps more important, would have become the source of many woes. Like all of his co-thinkers, Scowcroft appears to imagine that the Saddam regime would just have continued, in its cynical way, providing some version of predictability and stability. Whereas it is as clear as day that the regime was crumbling and would have imploded with ghastly results that would have given many openings to "bad guys." You can say that this has happened anyway, as it has, but realist statecraft often involves the realization that there are no good options. That realization ought to prompt, surely, some reflection on the policy that led to an option-free outcome. That was exactly the mistake that the "realists" made with the Iran of the shah, whose implosion came to them as if out of a clear blue sky.

                            The other great foreign policy blemish on the first Bush administration was its fatal indifference to events in former Yugoslavia. Here again, Scowcroft flatly contradicts himself without appearing to notice. He tells Goldberg that he was stationed at the embassy in Belgrade in 1959 and noticed that nobody referred to themselves as Yugoslav. "They always called themselves Serbs, Croats, Slovenians." Well, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia were all semiautonomous parts of Tito's state, so there is no necessary contradiction there, but let's agree that even if he exaggerates Scowcroft is onto something. Several paragraphs later, however, he is quoted saying, "I didn't think it would break up." And—mark this—he is now speaking of 1991, when it actually was, quite visibly, "breaking up." So, all he is telling us is that he was badly wrong, twice. On the other hand, he thought it was a brilliant idea to intervene in Somalia just as the Bush administration was leaving office. Both of these messes were bequeathed to the Clinton administration, which scuttled from Somalia but belatedly proved Scowcroft wrong (again!) in the Balkans by showing that American force could end the bloodshed produced by tribalist fascism.

                            Realism of the Scowcroft sort presided over the Iran-Iraq war with its horrific casualties and watched indifferently as genocide was enacted in northern Iraq. It allowed despots free rein from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan, and then goggled when this gave birth to the Taliban and al-Qaida. If this was "fifty years of peace," then it really was time to give war a chance.
                            There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by astralis
                              weird. seems like digging a shiv into scowcraft is the "in" thing to do these days.
                              Not too surprising, considering Hitchens has backed the neo-con position all the way.

                              By the way the Scowcroft article Krauthammer and Hitchens are so upset about is here: New Yorker :

                              BREAKING RANKS
                              What turned Brent Scowcroft against the Bush Administration?
                              by JEFFREY GOLDBERG
                              Issue of 2005-10-31
                              Posted 2005-10-24


                              At eight o’clock on the morning of August 2, 1990, President George H. W. Bush assembled his National Security Council in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Thirteen hours earlier, Saddam Hussein had sent his Army into Kuwait, and the Administration was searching for a response. Brent Scowcroft, the President’s national-security adviser, has an unhappy memory of that first meeting. The tone, he says, was defeatist: “Much of the conversation in those early moments concerned the stability of the oil market. There was an air of resignation about the invasion.”

                              Shortly before the National Security Council meeting began, General Colin Powell, who was then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told General Norman Schwarzkopf, “I think we’d go to war over Saudi Arabia, but I doubt we’d go to war over Kuwait.” For the moment, at least, Powell’s assessment reflected the President’s mood. Minutes before the meeting, Bush had told reporters that he was not contemplating an armed response. Scowcroft had been listening to the President as he spoke to the press, and the comment immediately struck him as unwise. “Right at the beginning, I believed that it”—the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait—“was intolerable to the interests of the U.S.,” he told me recently.

                              At the time, Scowcroft, a retired Air Force general, was notably hawkish on the Iraq question, more so than the Secretary of State, James A. Baker III, and perhaps even more so than Dick Cheney, who was Bush’s Secretary of Defense. Scowcroft believed that if Saddam’s aggression was left unanswered it would undermine the international rule of law; it would also, he thought, compromise America’s standing in the world at a moment—the end of the Cold War—that was otherwise filled with promise....



                              The rest of the article Here

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