Announcement

**Gabru47** · 10 Sep 05,, 21:37

Air Marshall Nur Khan sings a different tune. It wasn't India who was the aggressor, as is "reported" in the tale you posted. Heres the truth.

http://www.dawn.com/2005/09/06/nat2.htm

ISLAMABAD, Sept 5: Air Marshal (retired) Nur Khan, the man who led the airforce achieve complete superiority over the three times bigger Indian airforce on the very first day of the 1965 war, had all but resigned the post the very day that he took command of Pakistan Air Force on July 23, 1965.

�Rumours about an impending operation were rife but the army had not shared the plans with other forces,� Air Marshal Nur Khan said. Sharing his memoirs with Dawn on the 40th anniversary of 1965 war, Air Marshal Khan said that he was the most disturbed man on the day, instead of feeling proud.

Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan while handing over the command to Nur Khan had not briefed him about any impending war because he was not aware of it himself. So, in order to double check, Nur Khan called on the then Commander-in-Chief, General Musa Khan.

Under his searching questions Gen Musa wilted and with a sheepish smile admitted that something was afoot. Nur Khan�s immediate reaction was that this would mean war. But, Gen Musa said you need not to worry as according to him Indians would not retaliate. Then he directed a still highly skeptical Nur Khan to Lt-Gen Akhtar Hasan Malik, GOC Kashmir, the man in-charge of �Operation Gibraltar� for further details. The long and short of his discussion with Gen Malik was, �don�t worry, because the plan to send in some 800,000 infiltrators inside the occupied territory to throw out the Indian troops with the help of the local population�, was so designed that the Indians would not be able retaliate and therefore the airforce need not get into war-time mode.

A still incredulous Nur Khan was shocked when on further inquiry he found that except for a small coterie of top generals, very few in the armed forces knew about �Operation Gibraltar�. He asked himself how good, intelligent and professional people like Musa and Malik could be so naive, so irresponsible.

For the air marshal, it was unbelievable. Even the then Lahore garrison commander had not been taken into confidence. And Governor of West Pakistan, Malik Amir Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh did not know what was afoot and had gone to Murree for vacations.

It was at this point that he felt like resigning and going home. But then he thought such a rash move would further undermine the country�s interests and, therefore, kept his cool and went about counting his chickens � the entire airforce was too young and too inexperienced to be called anything else then � and gearing up his service for the D-day.

The miracle that the PAF achieved on September 6, to a large extent, is attributed to Nur Khan�s leadership. He led his force from up front and set personal example by going on some highly risky sorties himself. But then no commander, no matter how daring and how professional, can win a battle if his troops are not fully geared to face such challenges and that too within 43 days of change in command.

The full credit for turning the PAF into a highly professional and dedicated fighting machine goes to Air Marshal Asghar Khan who was given charge of the service in 1957. Thank God, unlike the other service no darbari or sifarishi was given the job. And by the time he left on July 23, 1965, Asghar Khan had turned the PAF into a well-oiled, highly professional and dedicated fighting machine and had trained them on the then best US made fighters, bombers and transport planes. Those who flew those machines and those who maintained them on ground worked like a team, and each one of the PAF member performed beyond the call of duty to make a miracle.

The PAF performance had crucially allowed the Army to operate without interference from the Indian airforce.

�The performance of the Army did not match that of the PAF mainly because the leadership was not as professional. They had planned the �Operation Gibraltar� for self-glory rather than in the national interest. It was a wrong war. And they misled the nation with a big lie that India rather than Pakistan had provoked the war and that we were the victims of Indian aggression �, Air Marshal Khan said.

When on the second day of war President Gen Ayub wanted to know how we were faring, Musa informed him that the Army had run out of even ammunition. That was the extent of preparation in the Army. And the information had shocked Gen Ayub so much that it could have triggered his heart ailment, which overtook him a couple of years later.

This in short is Nur Khan�s version of 1965 war, which he calls an unnecessary war and says that President Ayub for whom he has the greatest regard should have held his senior generals accountable for the debacle and himself resigned.

This would have held the hands of the adventurers who followed Gen Ayub. Since the 1965 war was based on a big lie and was presented to the nation a great victory, the Army came to believe its own fiction and has used since, Ayub as its role model and therefore has continued to fight unwanted wars � the 1971 war and the Kargil fiasco in 1999, he said.

In each of the subsequent wars we have committed the same mistakes that we committed in 1965.

Air Marshal Khan demanded that a truth commission formed to find out why we failed in all our military adventures. It is not punishment of the failed leadership that should be the aim of the commission but sifting of facts from fiction and laying bare the follies and foibles of the irresponsible leaders in matters with grave implications for the nation. It should also point out the irregularities committed in training and promotions in the defence forces in the past so that it is not repeated in future.

Mr Khan believes that our soldiers when called upon have fought with their lives but because of bad leadership their supreme sacrifices went waste. And after every war that we began we ended up taking dictation from the enemy � at Tashkant, at Simla and lastly at Washington.

He said at present Pakistan is engaged in another war, this time in Waziristan. This war can also end up in a fiasco and politically disastrous for the federation if it is fought with the same nonchalance and unprofessionally as we did the last three wars.

He, therefore, called for an immediate change of command at the GHQ insisting that President Gen Pervez Musharraf should appoint a full-time Chief of Army Staff and restore full democracy in the country. He suggested appointment of an independent chief election commissioner in consultation with all the political parties.

�Look at India. There a religious party comes in power and nobody cries foul and it goes out of power and nobody alleges rigging. We can also do this,� he added.

And we must make unified efforts to restore the country in the vision of the Quaid-i-Azam. Turn it into a non-theocratic and truly democratic state. And all the three forces should model themselves on the lines set by Asghar Khan when he was commanding the PAF, he suggested.

It was a special moment in Pakistan's history. It was when we became a nation. A wave of emotion inundated Pakistanis from Karachi to Lahore to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). People came out in big numbers to participate in rallies in support of the army.

Don't you find this silly? The only reason for nationhood in Pakistan was because their citizens were lied to, told that India had invaded them. Don't you think thats a silly reason for nationhood? There is a perceived threat from India, so we must stick together. Wow.

**Asim Aquil** · 11 Sep 05,, 09:18

Thats the thing, Nur's got his own opinion, but most Pakistanis feel, no matter what happens in Kashmir, thats not a war. Its a disputed territory as per the claims of the UN. The war is technically still on, its been so since the 1st war.

India also said it would keep the conflict narrowed to Kashmir in several international forums.

Then it clearly tried to invade Lahore, through deception. But as fate would have it, the generals got spooked. And stopped right there, when they could've just walked into main shehr.

Lahore has that effect on its enemies.

**Samudra** · 11 Sep 05,, 10:13

**Ray** · 11 Sep 05,, 17:07

Operation Gibralter

General Mohammed Musa, who commanded the Army in the 65 War, gave his account of how the Indians surprised the GHQ, the C-in-C and the Supreme Commander Field Marshal Ayub Khan on September 6, 1965. Narrates Musa Khan in his book "My Version":

India launched her ignominious, undeclared and blatant aggression on our homeland at about 0330 hours on 6 September. The Supreme Commander was informed about the invasion by Air Commander Akhtar of the Pakistan Air Force, who was on duty at the Air Defence Headquarters at Rawalpindi on night of 5th-6th September. Indian troop movements across the frontier had been reported to him by the border posts of the PAF Wireless Observer wing. The President then rang me up to ascertain whether or not GHQ had received any information about the Indian attack and the whereabouts of the field army that morning.

Lt. General Musa describes the genesis of the surprise Indian attack on 6th September in his own words:

The then Foreign Minister Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and the Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed spurred on by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, who was commander of our troops in Azad Kashmir, pressed the Government to take advantage of the disturbed situation in the valley and direct the Army to send raiders into Indian held Kashmir for conducting guerrilla activities there and to help, on a long term basis, the locals in organising a movement with a view to eventually starting an uprising against the occupying power.

Continues the former C-in-C in his book, the sponsors and supporters of the raids had at last succeeded in persuading the President to take the plunge that led to an all-out armed conflict with India' .......

The concept of sending infiltrators in the Indian held Kashmir, code named Gibraltar was the brain-child of the ministry of Foreign Affairs but General Musa assumed full responsibility for the development of the concept, its planning and coordination of the entire operation. He says:

After the Government finally decided that deep raids should be launched in Indian-held Kashmir, I directed Commander 12 Division, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, to prepare a draft plan for the operation, code-named 'Gibraltar' in consultation with GHQ and within the broad concept we had specified. GHQ approved it after making certain changes in it. With the help of sand model, he went over the final plan in Murree before it was put into effect on 7 August, 1965 under our overall control. The Supreme Commander and his Military Secretary were present. He also agreed with it. I was accompanied by the CGS (Major General Sher Bahadur) and the Directors of Military Operations and Intelligence Brigadiers Gul Hasan and Irshad Ahmed Khan respectively. No civil official attended this briefing.

Broadly the plan envisaged, on a short-term basis, sabotage of military targets, disruptions of communications, etc. and, as a long-term measure, distribution of arms to the people of occupied Kashmir and initiation of a guerrilla movement there with a view to starting an uprising in the valley eventually. The push towards Akhnur was not part of it. However, it was considered as one of the likely operations that we might have to undertake, as we felt our activities would have an escalating effect.

Nevertheless, when the Indians started attacking and capturing Azad Kashmir territory in Tithwal and Haji Pir Pass areas, we decided to hold them in these places and retaliate by threatening Akhnur through the Chamb valley in order to release the pressure in the north.

The simple truth emerging from the preceding statement of General Musa is clear in that, while the concept of 'Gibraltar' did originate from the ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Musa, whatever he might say after the event, went along with it in a half heartedly and non serious manner leading to the downfall of President of Pakistan General Ayub Khan via Tashkent Agreement.

The loser in the final analysis was Pakistan, described so feelingly by General K.M. Arif in an analysis carried by "Daily Dawn", 6th September 1990.

How and why Pakistan blundered into war .......... At that time, the policy making in the country was highly personalised. The institutions were weak and by-passed. Pakistan's Foreign Office with Mr. Aziz Ahmed as the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto as the Foreign Minister called the martial tunes. It had miscalculated that despite operation Gibraltar, the fighting was likely to remain confined inside the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Foreign Office is on record to have assessed that India was not in a position to risk a general war with Pakistan......for inexplicable reasons the General Headquarters based its operational plan in Kashmir on a wishful logic. The misplaced ego, the high ambition and the naive approach of a selected few , plunged Pakistan into an armed conflict. The outcome of the war, or the lack of it, eclipsed Ayub Khan's position.

At a briefing arranged at SSG Parachute Training School at Peshawar in the presence of two senior officers, Lt. Col. Abdul Matin, the Commander of No. 1 Commando Battalion, now retired and the brilliant Operations Staff Officer Maj. E. H. Dar, (Late Major General E. H. Dar) the Air Force Chief was told that only a pre-emptive operation like the Israeli crippling raids against the front line Arab State's air bases as in 1956 Arab-Israel War, could have probability of success. To this, the Air Chief observed that a decision to carry out pre-emptive operation as suggested could only be taken by the Government (meaning President Ayub Khan). Technically the observation made was correct but in that case the operation should have been based on the hypothesis of pre-emptive alone. There was also objection by the Military Operations Experts to the dropping of Para commandoes in Kashmir with no equivalent of French Maquis to hide, feed and organise their escape and was tantamount to suicide.

General Musa Khan, Field Marshal Ayub Khan's C-in-C, was the archetype of the loyal commander. But after him Ayub appointed another favorite, Yahya Khan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto set up a ' Liberation Cell ', which included people like:

* Mr Aziz Ahmed
* Mr Nazir Ahmed
* Mr Ayub Buksh Awan
* Mr NA Farooqi
* Mr Ahmed
* Mr Altaf Goher (although the latter did not attend any of the meetings)

General Musa, Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army at that time, confirms the existence of this 'Cell', which was set up in August of 1964. The majority of the members of this 'Cell' were from the 'Qadiani sect�, he pointed out.

When this ambitious plan was first sent to the GHQ, General Musa opposed it and wrote the following points to the President Ayub Khan:

* Guerrilla war in Kashmir can only be successful if the people of Kashmir take part in it, and in my opinion we need more time to prepare people for this.
* During the guerrilla war if India realized that it is losing the war in Kashmir, she will attack Pakistan.
* As long as Pakistan is not in a position to defeat India militarily, we should not venture such operation in Kashmir.
* In order to defeat India we need more army, better arms and better training.

General Musa asked for money to set up two more army divisions to face the challenge. General Ayub in principle agreed with this idea, but the Finance Minister Mr Shoaib persuaded him against this by saying that the Pakistan economy cannot afford it. And this idea was dropped. It is ironic that no such army was raised before the start of the �Operation Gibraltar� or during its operations, but after the war, in the same month, two divisions were set up.

According to Brigadier (R) Farooq, General Musa was a simple man. He gave his opinion about the 'Operation' and then did not make it a matter of pride and remained quiet. if he and General Sher Bahadur who also opposed the idea, had resigned then there would have been no 'Operation Gibraltar'.

A top level meeting was held at the Headquarters of the 12th Division in May 1965. Once again, General Musa opposed the plan, and to this President Ayub Khan said: "Musa I have been assured by the Foreign Office that India would not be involved in a full scale war". When both General Musa and General Sher Bahadur said that if we are to start a guerrilla war at that level, it is very likely that India would react and attack Pakistan. President Ayub Khan reacted by saying: "We will have to take heart sometime".

Apart from the assurance to which President Ayub Khan made reference that India would not attack Pakistan, Pakistani planners of this �Operation� were led to believe that India is not in a position to launch attack against Pakistan until 1966 or 1967. It was emphasized that we do not waste any more time, and start our action as soon as possible.

Musa Says in his book, 'My Version' that the Kashmiris of the Valley were not taken into confidence about the �Operation� that was to be started to liberate them. He wrote:

We had not even consulted the public leaders across the cease fire line about our aims and intentions, let alone associating them with our planning for the clandestine war...

The people of the area to be 'liberated' must have to be taken into confidence, if the people organizing this gigantic task really meant business. Without the help of the local people outside army cannot win a war or even survive. Not only the people of Kashmir living on the other side of the cease fire line were not taken into confidence, also the people of Azad Kashmir, even the Azad Kashmir Government was not taken into confidence. When the �Operation� was put into practice then the planners realized the need to have some Kashmiri support. They already had set up a Liberation Council, and compelled by circumstances they announced that Choudhry Ghullam Abbass was leading this Liberation Council.

Choudhry Ghulam Abbass was already very annoyed with this, he immediately rejected that in a news statement in the Daily Nawa E Waqat the following day:

I have nothing to do with all this, and I did not know anything about an �Operation�.

General Musa confirms the above position, he said:

Because of the haste with which the �Operation� was launched, even Azad Kashmir leaders were not taken into confidence by the advocates of Guerrilla raids. Helplessly they remained in the background. Their co - operation was also very necessary and would have been very helpful. They could have assisted the mujahideen in various ways by themselves.

K. H Khurshid, who was the secretary to Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and also Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir Government commented:

I firmly believe that Ayub Khan was not fully aware of the reasons for the war of 1965. Foreign Office, Home Ministry and some senior officers from the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs which included A. B Awan, Nazir Ahmed, Aziz Ahmed and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, prevailed on him and assured him that it is only a small programme which would not lead to a war with India. Ayub Khan who offered India �joint defence� would not have agreed to a full scale war with India.... These men wanted to weaken Ayub�s hold on the government, and this is the real reason why he was so angry with them after the war.

Ayub Khan was assured by his advisors and the Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, that India would not cross the international boundary to attack Pakistan. The Indian leaders and ministers were clearly saying that if Pakistan did not stop its adventure in Kashmir, then the conflict could spread to other areas. But Pakistani leaders did not take these threats seriously until the direct Indian attack on the Pakistani cities of Lahore and Sialkot in order to release the pressure on the retreating Indian forces in Kashmir.

Some critics say that the operation was "deliberately mis-planned to topple or weaken Ayub Khan". This has been very controversial, but whatever its real motives, it resulted in a full scale war between India and Pakistan. The Security Council arranged a cease fire on 23 September 1965.

General Musa Khan is the author of his autobiography, Jawan to General and "My Version". He died in 1991.

**Ray** · 11 Sep 05,, 17:09

Pakistan Army Committed Kargil Like Disaster in 1965 War As Well

Special SAT Report

WASHINGTON, Sept 6: A new book on Pakistan, scheduled to be released worldwide on Sept 11, gives out a detailed account of how the Pakistan Army planned a military operation to capture Akhnur in August 1965 which ultimately led to the India-Pakistan war and how mysterious decisions led to its failure, a la the Kargil fiasco of 1999.

The book Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War On Terror, written by Hassan Abbas, a former police officer from Pakistan and currently a Research fellow at the Harvard Law School and a PhD. candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, provides a befitting backdrop to the 1965 war, the 39th anniversary of which is being observed in Pakistan today.

The book, already among the top 100 bestsellers at Barnes and Nobles, also examines the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan and analyzes its connections to Pakistan Army's policies and the fluctuating US-Pakistan relations. It includes profiles of leading Pakistani Jihadi groups and gives details of the conspiracy behind General Zia-ul-Haq�s plane crash in 1988, a botched military coup by fundamentalists in army in 1993-94 and lastly about how General Musharraf handled the volatile situation after the 9/11 attacks.

Leading writers and intellectuals including Stephen P Cohen of the Brookings Institution, Harvard University Professor Jessica Stern, Peter Bergen, Terrorism Analyst, CNN and author of The Holy War Inc and Arnaud de Borchgrave, Editor-at-Large of The Washington Times and UPI, have praised the book in glowing terms.

It raises an oft repeated but a pertinent question about the conduct of the top Pakistan Army brass in 1965 when Pakistani troops were just three miles from Akhnur and its capture was imminent, the military commander was changed and so much time was deliberately wasted that a successful war was turned into a defeat.

Following excerpt of the book throws more light on how, on this day, the Pakistan Army wrote an inglorious epitaph to a glorious plan which it failed to execute:

�When the Pakistan Army inflicted a short, sharp reverse on the Indians in the Rann of Kutch in mid-1965, Ayub�s spirits got a boost. More important, the international arbitration that followed the Kutch dispute (resulting in favor of Pakistan) put Pakistan under the assumption that if the Kashmir problem was to be solved, the Rann of Kutch route would have to be replicated - a limited clash in Kashmir leading to a threat of all-out war, and then an intervention and arbitration by the great powers.

Hence at this point there was considerable confidence among the Pakistanis about the strength of their own arms, which was bolstered by their newfound friendship with China. Utter frustration over Indian intransigence on Kashmir coupled with sympathy for the gathering hopelessness of the Kashmiris and concern over the rapid rearmament of the Indian armed forces on account of Western military aid, were factors that played a crucial role in Pakistan�s drift toward considering a military solution of the Kashmir issue.

Bhutto, in his letter to Ayub of May 12, 1965, drew his attention to increasing Western military aid to India and how fast the balance of power in the region was shifting in India�s favor as a result. He expanded on this theme and recommended that �a bold and courageous stand� would �open up greater possibility for a negotiated settlement.�

Ayub Khan was won over by the force of this logic, and he tasked the Kashmir Cell under Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed, to draw up plans to stir up some trouble in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir, which could then be exploited in Pakistan�s favor by limited military involvement.

The Kashmir Cell was a nondescript body working without direction and producing no results. It laid the broad concept of Operation Gibraltar, but did not get very far beyond this in terms of coming up with anything concrete. When Ayub saw that the Kashmir Cell was making painfully little headway in translating his directions into a plan of action, he personally handed responsibility for the operation over to Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, commander of the 12th Division of the Pakistan Army. This division was responsible for the defense of the entire length of the Cease-fire Line (CFL) in the Kashmir region.

General Akhtar Malik was a man of towering presence and was known for his acuteness of mind and boldness of spirit. He was loved and admired by his subordinates, but was far too outspoken to be of any comfort to most of his superiors. His professional excellence, however, was acknowledged both in military and civilian circles.

The plan of this operation (Gibraltar) as finalized by General Malik and approved by Ayub Khan was to infiltrate a sizable armed force across the CFL into Indian Kashmir to carry out acts of sabotage in order to destabilize the government of the state and encourage the local population to rise up against Indian occupation.

In order to be able to retrieve the situation in case this operation got into trouble, to give it a new lease on life, or to fully exploit the advantage gained in the event of its success, Operation Grand Slam was planned.

This was to be a quick strike by armored and infantry forces from the southern tip of the CFL to Akhnur, a town astride the Jammu-Srinagar Road. This would cut the main Indian artery into the Kashmir valley, bottle up the Indian forces there, and so open up a number of options that could then be exploited as the situation demanded. According to some Pakistani Army officers, it was foreseen then that the value of Operation Gibraltar would be fully enchased after Grand Slam succeeded in wresting control of Akhnur.

There was not enough time to fully prepare and train the men who were to infiltrate, and the three-month deadline given was considered to be not nearly enough for this, but the 12th Division was told that, because of certain considerations, no further time could be given.

Most of the men to be trained belonged to the Azad Kashmir Regular Forces, which meant that they would have to be withdrawn from the defensive positions along the CFL. The denuded front lines therefore had to be beefed up by other elements. Having no reserves for this purpose, General Malik decided that the only option for him was to simultaneously train a force of Azad Kashmiri irregulars (mujahids) for this purpose.

But when he called the C-in-C, General Musa, to ask for weapons to equip this force, the latter refused. General Malik then made a call to Ayub, apprised him of the difficulty he was having with the C-in-C, and concluded that if the Kashmiris were not to be trusted, they were not worth fighting for. Ayub then called Musa, told him why the new Mujahid Companies needed to be armed and equipped, and ended with the same note, that is, people who cannot be trusted were not worth fighting for. Soon General Malik got a call from Musa: �Malik, people who cannot be trusted are not worth fighting for - go ahead, arm them.�

Operation Gibraltar was launched in the first week of August 1965, and all the infiltrators made it across the CFL without a single case of detection by the Indians. This was possible only because of the high standards of Pakistan�s security measures, as acknowledged by a senior Indian Army general. The pro-Pakistan elements in Kashmir had not been taken into confidence prior to this operation, and there was no help forthcoming for the infiltrators in most areas.

Overall, despite lack of support from the local population, the operation managed to cause anxiety to the Indians, at times verging on panic. On August 8 the Kashmir government recommended that martial law be imposed in Kashmir. It seemed that the right time to launch operation Grand Slam was when such anxiety was at its height. But it was General Malik�s opinion that this be delayed till the Indians had committed their reserves to seal off the infiltration routes, which he felt was certain to happen eventually.

On August 24, India concentrated its forces to launch its operations in order to seal off Haji Pir Pass, through which lay the main infiltration routes. That same day General Malik asked General Headquarters (GHQ) permission to launch Operation Grand Slam. The director of military operations, Brigadier Gul Hassan, passed on the request to General Musa, and when he failed to respond, reminded him again the following day.

But Musa could not manage to gather the confidence to give the decision himself and sent ZA Bhutto to obtain the approval from Ayub Khan, who was relaxing in Swat, 200 miles away - strange way to fight a war with the C-in-C unwilling to give decisions and the supreme commander unable to do so.

The decision finally arrived on August 29, by which time the Indians had bolstered their defenses in the sector where the operation was to be launched with the induction of three infantry units and an artillery regiment. Still a few more precious hours were wasted by the GHQ, and the operation went to the early morning of September 1, more than a week after the commander in the field had first asked for the go-ahead.

By early afternoon of the first day all the objectives were taken, the Indian forces were on the run, and Akhnur lay tantalizingly close and inadequately defended. �At this point, someone�s prayers worked� says Indian journalist, MJ Akbar: �An inexplicable change of command took place.�

What happened was that, in a surprising turn of events, General Musa landed in the theater of operations and handed the command of the 12th Division over to General Yahya Khan, whom he had brought along. General Malik was asked to get into the helicopter and was flown away by Musa.

For nearly 39 years now the Pakistan Army has been trying to cover up this untimely and fateful change of command by suppression and falsification of history.

Loss of time is inherent in any such change, but for reasons that cannot be explained but by citing the intrusion of ego, Yahya insisted on changing Malik�s plan and therefore lost even more time. Whereas Malik had basically planned to invest and bypass the strongly defended localities, subordinating everything to reaching and capturing Akhnur with the least delay, Yahya took a different route - he crossed river Tawi and went straight into Troti, in which crucial time was lost. And this was enough for the Indians to bolster the defenses of Akhnur and launch their strike against Lahore across the international frontier between the two countries.

This came on September 6 while the Pakistani forces were still three miles short of Akhnur. This was the contrived end of an operation, which had been meticulously planned and had promised a lot.

On September 6, after the Indian attack across the international border, Ayub and Bhutto tried to invoke the 1959 US-Pakistan bilateral agreement, to ask for American help against Indian aggression, but to no avail.

Instead, President Johnson suspended military aid to both India and Pakistan. Pakistan immediately turned to China for help. These efforts brought about a strong Chinese condemnation of India�s aggression against Pakistan, and this was followed by a Chinese warning against Indian intrusions into Chinese territory.

And then on September 16 they sent a note to India to say that as long as Indian aggression against Pakistan continued, it would not stop supporting Pakistan in its just struggle. On September 19, Ayub and Bhutto flew to Beijing for a top secret meeting with the Chinese leadership. China promised Pakistan all the help, but told Ayub that he should be quite prepared to withdraw his army to the hills and fight a long guerrilla war against India.

For this neither the Sandhurst-trained Ayub nor the Berkeley-educated Bhutto was quite prepared. On the international scene there was already considerable concern that any direct Chinese involvement in the conflict may escalate and broaden the war involving other countries. Pakistan was pressed by the Western ambassadors to not encourage the Chinese to step up their engagement any further.

Pakistan knew it did not have the wherewithal to break through the stalemate on the battlefront. Thus it knew this was the end. Now Pakistan was prepared to accept a cease-fire. The guns fell silent on the afternoon of September 23. As to the final outcome of the war, Dennis Kux aptly says that India �won simply by not losing.�

Immediately after the war, on the Pakistan side the major controversy that occupied the minds of many was the change in command of Operation Grand Slam. The �view both in India and even amongst �sensible army officers� in Pakistan was that Malik�s sudden replacement led to the failure of Grand Slam.�

But the �sensible� Pakistani Army officers were restrained from discussing this subject. It was taboo to do so in the army messes and officers� gatherings, though in private this was most passionately debated. It was only after General Malik�s death in 1969 that GHQ gingerly started putting together a theory to justify this change and to propagate it.

It was now claimed that the change was preplanned and that this plan laid down that General Malik would command the first phase of the operation up to the river Tawi, and thereafter the command would be assumed by General Yahya Khan. However, there is not a shred of evidence to support this. The operation itself was a set-piece attack for which the operation orders are a part of the historical record, and there is no such mention in these.

And any doubts there might have been on the issue were laid to rest by General Gul Hassan, who was Director of Military Operations during the war and the one person who would have known of such a change. He has specifically denied having any knowledge of the same.

Indeed, not a single army officer except Musa and General Yahya seem to have known about this change, which shifted the initiative from Pakistan to the Indian Army. It now seems fair to speculate that the change in command was preplanned only in the sense that it was a conspiracy between Ayub, Musa, and Yahya; that if the operation got into trouble, Malik could keep the command and also the blame that would accrue as a result, but that if it held promise of success, Yahya would be moved in to harvest it.

Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, one of the very respected senior Indian military commanders, was one of the few to have appreciated the full military value of Operation Gibraltar as a part of Grand Slam rather than seeing the two in isolation. According to him, �The plan of infiltration was brilliant in conception,� and as for Grand Slam, he thought it was �aptly named Grand Slam for had it succeeded, a trail of dazzling results would have followed in its wake, and the infiltration campaign would have had a fresh lease of life,� and that �it was only the last minute frantic rush of reinforcements into the sector . . . that prevented this debacle from deteriorating into major catastrophe.�

It seems therefore that but for the change of command at a critical time during Operation Grand Slam, the aim of Gibraltar was well within realization, that is, to �de freeze the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring India to the conference table without provoking general war.�

It would be highly educative to read General Akhtar Malik�s views on the subject. This unpublished letter from General Malik to his younger brother, Lieutenant General Abdul Ali Malik, is a new source of information on the subject, and for this purpose is quoted here in full:

Pakistan�s Permanent Military Deputy
Embassy of Pakistan
Ankara
23-11-67

My Dear brother,

I hope you and the family are very well. Thank you for your letter of 14 Oct. 67. The answers to your questions are as follows:

a. The de facto command changed the very first day of the ops [operations] after the fall of Chamb when Azmat Hayat broke off wireless communications with me. I personally tried to find his HQ [headquarters] by chopper and failed. In late afternoon I sent Gulzar and Vahid, my MP [military police] officers, to try and locate him, but they too failed. The next day I tore into him and he sheepishly and nervously informed me that he was �Yahya�s brigadier�. I had no doubt left that Yahya had reached him the previous day and instructed him not to take further orders from me, while the formal change in command had yet to take place. This was a betrayal of many dimensions.

b. I reasoned and then pleaded with Yahya that if it was credit he was looking for, he should take the overall command but let me go up to Akhnur as his subordinate, but he refused. He went a step further and even changed the plan. He kept banging his head against Troti, letting the Indian fall back to Akhnur. We lost the initiative on the very first day of the war and never recovered it. Eventually it was the desperate stand at Chawinda that prevented the Indians from cutting through.

c. At no time was I assigned any reason for being removed from command by Ayub, Musa or Yahya. They were all sheepish at best. I think the reasons will be given when I am no more.

d. Not informing pro-Pak Kashmiri elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the op was to de freeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribund state, and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the op was vital, that is, to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL [cease-fire line]. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole op could be made stillborn by just one double agent.

e. Haji Pir [Pass] did not cause me much anxiety. Because [the] impending Grand Slam Indian concentration in Haji Pir could only help us after Akhnur, and they would have to pull out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender their gains, and maybe more, in the process. Actually it was only after the fall of Akhnur that we would have encashed the full value of Gibraltar, but that was not to be!

f. Bhutto kept insisting that his sources had assured him that India would not attack if we did not violate the international border. I however was certain that Gibraltar would lead to war and told GHQ so. I needed no op intelligence to come to this conclusion. It was simple common sense. If I got you by the throat, it would be silly for me to expect that you will kiss me for it. Because I was certain that war would follow, my first choice as objective for Grand Slam was Jammu. From there we could have exploited our success either toward Samba or Kashmir proper as the situation demanded. In any case whether it was Jammu or Akhnur, if we had taken the objective, I do not see how the Indians could have attacked Sialkot before clearing out either of these towns.

g. I have given serious consideration to writing a book, but given up the idea. The book would be the truth. And truth and the popular reaction to it would be good for my ego. But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pak [East Pakistan] and we will need all we have to save the situation. The first day of Grand Slam will be fateful in many ways. The worst has still to come and we have to prepare for it. The book is therefore out.

I hope this gives you the gist of what you needed to know. And yes, Ayub was fully involved in the enterprise. As a matter of fact it was his idea. And it was he who ordered me to by-pass Musa while Gibraltar etc. was being planned. I was dealing more with him and Sher Bahadur than with the C-in-C. It is tragic that despite having a good military mind, the FM�s [Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto�s] heart was prone to give way. The biggest tragedy is that in this instance it gave way before the eruption of a crisis. Or were they already celebrating a final victory!!

In case you need a more exact description of events, I will need war diaries and maps, which you could send me through the diplomatic bag.

Please remember me to all the family.

Yours,
Akhtar Hussain Malik

It is quite obvious what had happened. In the words of Justice Muhammad Saraf: �Had Akhtar been continued in his duty... he would have been the only General in Pakistan with a spectacular victory to his credit and it would then have been very difficult for President Ayub to ignore his claim to the office of the Commander-in-Chief, after the retirement of Musa, which was quite near.�

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, one of the main players of this game, also later argued that, �Had General Akhtar Malik not been stopped in the Chamb-Jaurian Sector, the Indian forces in Kashmir would have suffered serious reverses, but Ayub Khan wanted to make his favorite, General Yahya Khan, a hero.�

However, the very idea of Operation Gibraltar was controversial in itself. The military initiative robbed Pakistan of its moral high ground vis-�-vis the Kashmir conflict. In retrospect, it would have been better if Pakistan had focused more on continuing its efforts toward the resolution of the dispute through UN or third-party mediation. Ayub and his top generals also misread how far Kashmiris (in India) were willing to cooperate with Pakistan in this kind of adventure.

(After the war) the army also underwent major though subtle changes in personnel. Musa retired soon after the war, to be replaced by General Yahya Khan as C-in-C of the army. This was not a popular choice, but as Yahya settled in, he subtly started to gather power by promoting and placing his own loyalists in critical spots. A sick and disheartened Ayub was too careworn to notice this. And besides, he had implicit faith in Yahya�s loyalty.

He may also have been quite certain that his new choice of army chief came with the kind of baggage that would foreclose the possibility of his gaining the sort of following that could eventually threaten Ayub�s position. Ayub was wrong. He could not see that Yahya could collect any number of equally discredited officers around him. Among the first to be swept off the stage was General Akhtar Malik. He was posted out to CENTO in Ankara, Turkey.

Yahya told him that Pakistan needed a sensible and mature officer there, and Malik had replied: �Being a sensible and mature officer, I quite realize why I am needed there.� Concurrently with this, all officers considered to be Malik loyalists were sidelined. This was a major step along the road inaugurated by Ayub himself, of promoting the interests of personal loyalty over those of competence and professionalism. Professional pride progressively gave way to servile behavior.

Already the army had embarked on a crash program of making up shortages in the ranks of the officer class. To meet the target, standards were consciously and conspicuously lowered, thus making it a self-defeating exercise.

Also, in the aftermath of the war, one would have expected the army to analyze its performance. Not only was such an appraisal not carried out beyond the merest whitewash, the attempt deliberately falsified the record to save reputations, because after the war many of those were promoted whose reputations needed to be saved.

But the formality of a war analysis had to be fulfilled, and most ironically the task was entrusted to General Akhtar Malik. He did this in two parts; one dealt with the performance of junior leadership, and the other with that of the higher command.

Brigadier Mohammad Afzal Khan, who read the latter in manuscript form, and Major Qayyum, under whose supervision it was typed, both commented upon the scathing criticism to which this document subjected the prosecution of the war at higher levels. After the death of the general, no one has seen the record of this document in the army GHQ."

http://www.satribune.com/archives/sept04/P1_habook1.htm

**indianguy4u** · 11 Sep 05,, 17:12

When it comes to facts ppl from pureland choose to ignore or even better reinvent it

**Ray** · 11 Sep 05,, 17:39

India having captured Haji Pir was to push forth and link up at Pooch and thereby eliminate the Hajir Pir Punch Bulge.

The ceasefire intervened.

**Ray** · 11 Sep 05,, 17:42

The official history from the Indian side is available at www.bharat-rakshak.com
and

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-F...War/index.html

It has been updated.

Worth a read.

**lemontree** · 12 Sep 05,, 06:05

"We won the 1965 war, not India"

I am sure they also won maximum gold medals in the last Olympics.

This Jung journalist is sure doing a good job of licking the right (army) a$$es. A vain attempt to fool the public again.

I saw a similar article in the Jung with the similing face of Mahmood Shaam the editors shaking hands with Musharraf (congratulation for descovery that Pak won the 1965 war

), while the Dawn editor is the Musharraf's black sheep.

**Ray** · 12 Sep 05,, 06:22

An analysis of the 1965 War, indicates that Pakistan's future actions were highly based on the outcome of Akhnur action.

This over optimistic approach and "putting all the eggs in one basket" is too much of a gamble for planning a campaign!

No wonder India recovered and went on the counter offensice in Sialkot and also to Lahore and crossed the formidable defence oriented Ichhogil Canal.

**Ray** · 12 Sep 05,, 06:27

One of the interesting psychological issue I have noticed is that Pakistanis are very enthused by a single success or bank everything on one issue and are oblivious of the other issues that aggregates the complete issue.

**Ray** · 12 Sep 05,, 07:01

Then it clearly tried to invade Lahore, through deception. But as fate would have it, the generals got spooked.

War is conducted on some Basic "Principles of War".

Most of the "Principles of War" are common for all countries.

Surprise and Deception is one of them. Therefore, it is as per the Principles of War if India applied Deception and Surprised Pakistan.

Similarly, Pakistan used "Surprise and Deception" rather well in the 1965 and Kargil Wars. In war, whoever has the initiative has a greater chance of success.

In so far as the "spooked" issue is concerned, this is an ideal example to show that "Mathematical" application to success in War is not how war is fought! Nor is the mathematical application of forces on either side the panacea for success.

Space and time prevents a lesson on the subject, but suffice it to say, capture of a town or even a village, is one of the most difficult task for any army to accomplish. WWII is replete with examples and even the current ongoing Iraq War proves the point.

Lahore was not a hamlet. It was a city. The Indian Army reached the BATA factory and while the fighting was on, the ceasefire intervened.

In this context, it would also be prudent to add that a Canal which has a "Bund" and defences on either side and with minefields is also not a cakewalk!

**~~Harris Neutral~~** · 18 Oct 05,, 07:33

It is pretty much clear to the world that Indians are big losers. Like always like losers they invaded Pakistan's Lahore at night without warning. which shows there cowardness. WEll a small army pulled back a huge indian army, not only that Indians got heavt damage. Even if India would have brign 10 divisions, i am sure only a single brigade of Pakistan could hold it back, bcoz Pakistanis hav AMERICAN weopons and Indians have half malfunctioning tanks and weopons of Russia.
INDIA PAKISTAN
Casualties 10,000+ 800
Tanks lost 400+ 25
Aircrats lost 119 25
Ships lost 3 0
Submarines lost 0 1

Result:- Pakistan easily defended its land against coward invaders. Indians who know the reality still cry of their defeat when they r alone.

Harris Martyn_ Military Observer, Massachussetts University,USA

**lemontree** · 18 Oct 05,, 07:59

Originally posted by Harris Neutral

It is pretty much clear to the world that Indians are big losers. Like always like losers they invaded Pakistan's Lahore at night without warning. which shows there cowardness. WEll a small army pulled back a huge indian army, not only that Indians got heavt damage. Even if India would have brign 10 divisions, i am sure only a single brigade of Pakistan could hold it back, bcoz Pakistanis hav AMERICAN weopons and Indians have half malfunctioning tanks and weopons of Russia.
INDIA PAKISTAN
Casualties 10,000+ 800
Tanks lost 400+ 25
Aircrats lost 119 25
Ships lost 3 0
Submarines lost 0 1

.....
Harris Martyn_ Military Observer, Massachussetts University,USA

Harris you really are an idiot and know sweet f_all about Indo-Pak wars. Your casulties and equipment loss figures show your utter ignorance. Pak army lost 97 M-47/48 Pattons tanks in just one battle at Assal Uttar, the losses for PA in the total war were 300+ out of which 150 are with IA as war trophies. Indian armour lost 128 tanks including 40 which were captured by PA. Both India and Pak navies lost no ships/subs during 1965.

Result:- Pakistan easily defended its land against coward invaders. Indians who know the reality still cry of their defeat when they r alone.

The 1965 war was imposed on us and we hit back. PA failed in all its objectives and IA achieved what it wanted to. The IA never aimed at destroying Pakistan by to neutralize the PA attack in J&K.
No go and study this all over again.
Would you mind locating East Pakistan on a map post 1971.

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'We won the 1965 war, not India'

'We won the 1965 war, not India'

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