Maybe the world is just tired of useless people making kids, committing horrible acts and then expecting a handout. A think a movie was made about the last time the civilized world tried to help them out.
I love the HR math - the number goes from as many as 50-100k to as many as 100k and soon it will be 100k people died - utter BS.
I love the HR math - the number goes from as many as 50-100k to as many as 100k and soon it will be 100k people died - utter BS.
Why east Africa's famine warning was not heeded
Psychological and organisational reasons lay behind the poor response to this famine – not the hoary old 'lack of political will'
Why east Africa's famine warning was not heeded | Hugo Slim | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 18 January 2012 12.14 EST
Article history
Displaced Somali's who fled the famine
Displaced Somali's who fled the famine in the south of the Horn of Africa. Photograph: Mohamed Abdiwahab/AFP/Getty Images
Natural sciences can predict certain things quite well once they have established particular natural laws. But political and social sciences are notoriously bad at it. This is not surprising. Human events are deeply unpredictable, so we tend not to be too hard on ourselves when we miss things like the Arab spring.
But should we be much harder on ourselves when we miss a famine? Surely, there is quite a lot of hard science in a famine – indicators of drought, rising food prices, distressed asset sales, malnutrition and migration flows. Presumably, by now, we can predict a famine, especially in the Horn of Africa that has been saturated by government, UN and NGO "famine early warning systems" since the horrendous famine of 1984.
According to the Department for International Development, the current famine in east Africa may have killed up to 100,000 people. A new report by Save the Children and Oxfam says they saw this coming, but politicians did not take their warnings seriously enough and acted too late.
The British government has made a quite exceptional commitment to foreign aid at a time of extreme cuts in public spending and in Andrew Mitchell, the Department for International Development has a minister with a deep personal commitment to humanitarian action. Why famine early warning is not heeded is a complex human problem, perhaps even a so-called "wicked problem". It is certainly not one that can be easily answered by that lazy refrain – "a lack of political will". Few governments have shown as much political will on aid as this one.
So, why was international action late? Save the Children and Oxfam give a number of reasons; some of these are psychological and some are organisational. Psychologically, they suggest that government officials were reluctant to call a crisis until there was a crisis. This reluctance had three main drivers: a fear of getting it wrong; a fear of being too interventionist and undermining community coping; and "fatigue" and "resignation" in the face of so many droughts in such ecologically fragile parts of the world. I imagine these psychological reasons are pretty accurate. When I was a UN early-warning monitor in Ethiopia in 1987, I was always worried that I might call it wrong and look very stupid if food aid was piling up in the road as Ethiopians were bringing in a massive harvest. This report's suggestion of agreeing a "no-regrets" culture if you overreact seems psychologically sensible.
There are budgeting and organisational problems, too. Corralling hundreds of NGOs and UN agencies to agree the scale of a problem and then to act in concert is always going to be difficult. More importantly, budgets are still divided too strictly between emergency and development funds. You can't start doing emergency work from a development budget and vice versa. Quite rightly, Save the Children and Oxfam are asking for more flexible funding that moves between the two on a basis of agreed "trigger" points. Only by treating famine and development within a single mindset will we end the damaging split thinking that requires aid either to be laidback and long term, or hyperactive and hectic.
Britain is a thought leader in this area of global policy and needs to encourage others to follow suit, but international politics is only one part of the complex problem of famine prevention. The other is national politics. Millions of poor people who are vulnerable to famine live in fragile ecological areas that need peace, public investment, access to credit and governments that are focused on their needs.
It is politicians in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia who bear primary responsibility for preventing famine among their citizens. They need to be alert to early-warning systems, and make the most of international aid and economic growth for the poorest in their countries. But their hesitations, conflicts and power plays are just as much to blame for the late response to this famine. As warnings were raised about this crisis, the Kenyan political elite was obsessed with itself in its endless power-sharing wrangle. The Somali elites were at war. And, as usual in Ethiopia, everyone in the aid world was far too frightened to criticise prime minister Meles Zenawi's judgment of the crisis in case they got thrown out.
Managing food crises will be a continuing global challenge as prices rise and environments change. In many ways, the international aid system is now functioning as a nascent global safety net. This is real progress and means that hungry people can now be reached and helped in any part of the globe. All of us should expect our politicians and civil servants to pay special attention to the early-warning systems that guide this safety net. And, as Save the Children and Oxfam point out, we need to make it clear that we would rather politicians acted too early than too late.
Psychological and organisational reasons lay behind the poor response to this famine – not the hoary old 'lack of political will'
Why east Africa's famine warning was not heeded | Hugo Slim | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 18 January 2012 12.14 EST
Article history
Displaced Somali's who fled the famine
Displaced Somali's who fled the famine in the south of the Horn of Africa. Photograph: Mohamed Abdiwahab/AFP/Getty Images
Natural sciences can predict certain things quite well once they have established particular natural laws. But political and social sciences are notoriously bad at it. This is not surprising. Human events are deeply unpredictable, so we tend not to be too hard on ourselves when we miss things like the Arab spring.
But should we be much harder on ourselves when we miss a famine? Surely, there is quite a lot of hard science in a famine – indicators of drought, rising food prices, distressed asset sales, malnutrition and migration flows. Presumably, by now, we can predict a famine, especially in the Horn of Africa that has been saturated by government, UN and NGO "famine early warning systems" since the horrendous famine of 1984.
According to the Department for International Development, the current famine in east Africa may have killed up to 100,000 people. A new report by Save the Children and Oxfam says they saw this coming, but politicians did not take their warnings seriously enough and acted too late.
The British government has made a quite exceptional commitment to foreign aid at a time of extreme cuts in public spending and in Andrew Mitchell, the Department for International Development has a minister with a deep personal commitment to humanitarian action. Why famine early warning is not heeded is a complex human problem, perhaps even a so-called "wicked problem". It is certainly not one that can be easily answered by that lazy refrain – "a lack of political will". Few governments have shown as much political will on aid as this one.
So, why was international action late? Save the Children and Oxfam give a number of reasons; some of these are psychological and some are organisational. Psychologically, they suggest that government officials were reluctant to call a crisis until there was a crisis. This reluctance had three main drivers: a fear of getting it wrong; a fear of being too interventionist and undermining community coping; and "fatigue" and "resignation" in the face of so many droughts in such ecologically fragile parts of the world. I imagine these psychological reasons are pretty accurate. When I was a UN early-warning monitor in Ethiopia in 1987, I was always worried that I might call it wrong and look very stupid if food aid was piling up in the road as Ethiopians were bringing in a massive harvest. This report's suggestion of agreeing a "no-regrets" culture if you overreact seems psychologically sensible.
There are budgeting and organisational problems, too. Corralling hundreds of NGOs and UN agencies to agree the scale of a problem and then to act in concert is always going to be difficult. More importantly, budgets are still divided too strictly between emergency and development funds. You can't start doing emergency work from a development budget and vice versa. Quite rightly, Save the Children and Oxfam are asking for more flexible funding that moves between the two on a basis of agreed "trigger" points. Only by treating famine and development within a single mindset will we end the damaging split thinking that requires aid either to be laidback and long term, or hyperactive and hectic.
Britain is a thought leader in this area of global policy and needs to encourage others to follow suit, but international politics is only one part of the complex problem of famine prevention. The other is national politics. Millions of poor people who are vulnerable to famine live in fragile ecological areas that need peace, public investment, access to credit and governments that are focused on their needs.
It is politicians in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia who bear primary responsibility for preventing famine among their citizens. They need to be alert to early-warning systems, and make the most of international aid and economic growth for the poorest in their countries. But their hesitations, conflicts and power plays are just as much to blame for the late response to this famine. As warnings were raised about this crisis, the Kenyan political elite was obsessed with itself in its endless power-sharing wrangle. The Somali elites were at war. And, as usual in Ethiopia, everyone in the aid world was far too frightened to criticise prime minister Meles Zenawi's judgment of the crisis in case they got thrown out.
Managing food crises will be a continuing global challenge as prices rise and environments change. In many ways, the international aid system is now functioning as a nascent global safety net. This is real progress and means that hungry people can now be reached and helped in any part of the globe. All of us should expect our politicians and civil servants to pay special attention to the early-warning systems that guide this safety net. And, as Save the Children and Oxfam point out, we need to make it clear that we would rather politicians acted too early than too late.
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