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  • Understanding Pakistan's Military

    This thread is devoted to the Pakistani military. I'd like to encourage members to feel free posting articles of a professional/scholastic nature that provide detailed information about the Pakistani Army's order of battle (itemized listings of units from Corps down to battalions along with special operations or army-level forces) and organization for combat (internal structure of specific unit-types).

    Further, I'd be interested to learn about the Pakistani military education system. Who becomes an officer? From what social stratas are they likely to be obtained? What is their background(s)? Are there special incentive programs to attract certain officer candidates (medical/nursing, engineer, business) and what of women?

    How does the ISI tie to the military? How is the ISI structured internally? Are they deeply compartmentalized internally?

    Who forms policy? On what basis and with what objectives?

    To the latter two points I'd refer readers to this excellent primer by Anatol Lieven as provided in another thread by Kasrkin-

    Understanding Pakistan's Military-ISN March/April 2008

    "...What follows is informed guess-work based on numerous discussions with experts and off-the-record talks with Pakistani officers including retired ISI officers.

    Concerning the ISI, the consensus of my informants is as follows: There is considerable resentment of the ISI in the rest of the military, due to their perceived arrogance and suspected corruption. However, when it comes to overall strategy, the ISI follows the line of the high command. It is after all always headed by a senior regular general, not a professional intelligence officer, and a majority of its officers are also seconded regulars. The present Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, was director of the ISI from 2004-2007, and ordered a limited crackdown on jihadi groups that the ISI had previously supported.

    Concerning the Afghan Taleban, the military and the ISI are at one, and the evidence is unequivocal: The military and ISI continue to give them shelter, and there is deep unwillingness to take serious action against them on America’s behalf, both because it is feared that this would increase Pathan insurgency in Pakistan, and because they are seen as the only assets Pakistan possesses in Afghanistan. The conviction in the Pakistani security establishment is that the West will quit Afghanistan leaving civil war behind, and that India will then throw its weight behind the non-Pathan forces of the former Northern Alliance in order to encircle Pakistan strategically.

    Concerning the Pakistani Taleban and their allies, however, like the military as a whole, the ISI is now committed to the struggle against them, and by the end of 2009 had lost more than seventy of its officers in this fight – some ten times the number of CIA officers killed since 9/11, just as Pakistani military casualties fighting the Pakistani Taleban have greatly exceeded those of the US in Afghanistan. Equally, however, in 2007-2008 there were a great many stories of ISI officers intervening to rescue individual Taleban commanders from arrest by the police or the army – too many, and too circumstantial, for these all to have been invented.
    It seems clear therefore that whether because individual ISI officers felt a personal commitment to these men, or because the institution as a whole still regarded them as potentially useful, actions were taking place that were against overall military policy – let alone that of the Pakistani government. Moreover, some of these men had at least indirect links to Al Qaeda. This does not mean that the ISI knows where Osama bin Laden (if he is indeed still alive), Aiman al-Zawahiri and other Al Qaeda leaders are hiding. It does however suggest that they could probably do a good deal more to find out.

    On the crucial question of support for terrorism against India, it is obvious that not just the ISI but the military as a whole are committed to keeping Lashkar-e-Taiba (under its cover as Jamaat-ut-Dawa) at least in existence, both as a potential future weapon against India and because they are genuinely scared of driving this very powerful and popular group to revolt.
    Jamaat-ut-Dawa’s extensive international network in the Pakistani diaspora also leads Pakistani officers to fear that if they attempt seriously to suppress the group it will also launch successful terrorist attacks in the West, with disastrous results for Pakistan’s international position. Lashkar-e-Taiba members certainly have contacts with Al Qaeda, and helped Al Qaeda operatives escape from Afghanistan after the defeat of the Taleban and helped shelter them within Pakistan. As Stephen Tankel writes:

    “Ideologically, for all of its strategic restraint following 9/11 Lashkar is, after all, a jihadi organization with a long history of waging pan-Islamic irredentist campaigns. Indian-controlled Kashmir may be the group’s primary ideological and strategic target, but it has never been the apotheosis of Lashkar’s jihad.”

    Blaming Pakistan

    All the groups and individuals within this net hate the US, Israel, India and indeed Russia alike, though they have different targets at different times. Despite LeT’s strategic decision to concentrate on India, therefore, there is no ideological barrier to its members taking part in actions against the West. The jihadi world could even be called a kind of cloud of gas in which individuals join some clump for one operation and then part again to form new ad hoc groups for other attacks. This also makes it extremely hard for the ISI to keep tabs on the individuals concerned, even when it wants to.

    By far the biggest terrorist attack actually carried out by LeT itself was that in Mumbai in November 2008. The great majority of the Pakistani experts and retired officers whom I know do not think that the Pakistani high command, either of the ISI or the army, was involved in ordering Lashkar-e-Taiba’s terrorist attack on Mumbai in November 2008. They point out in particular that while deliberately targeting Westerners greatly boosted LeT’s prestige among international militants, it would have been an unprecedented, reckless and pointless strategy for the Pakistani high command, ensuring a furious reaction from the international community.
    Equally, there is an overwhelming consensus that this operation could not have been planned without ISI officers having been involved at some stage and without the ISI knowing that some sort of operation was being planned. Whether the operation then continued as it were on autopilot, was helped only by retired officers, or whether the junior officers concerned deliberately decided to pursue it without telling their superiors, is impossible to say at this stage.

    ISI help is however not necessary for Islamist terrorists who wish to carry out attacks against India (though it has certainly occurred in the past). The discontent of sections of India’s Muslim minority (increased by ghastly incidents like the massacres of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002, encouraged by the Hindu nationalist state government) gives ample possibilities of recruitment; the sheer size of India, coupled with the incompetence of the Indian security forces, gives ample targets of opportunity; and the desire to provoke an Indian attack on Pakistan gives ample motive. But whether or not the ISI is involved in future attacks, India will certainly blame Pakistan for them.

    This creates the real possibility of a range of harsh Indian responses, stretching from economic pressure through blockade to outright war. Such a war would in the short term unite Pakistanis, and greatly increase the morale of the Army. The long term consequences for Pakistan’s (and possibly India’s) economic development could however be quite disastrous; while if the US were perceived to back India in such a war, anti-American feeling and extremist recruitment in Pakistan would soar to new heights.

    All of this gives the US every reason to press the Pakistani military to suppress some extremist groups and keep others on a very tight rein. Washington also however needs to press India to seek reconciliation with Pakistan over Kashmir, and to refrain from actions which will create even more fear of India in the Pakistani military."


    This article was first published in The National Interest, Washington DC, no.94, March/April 2008, under the title “All Kayani’s Men”.

    This thread isn't a comparative study of regional force balances. As such, fanboys should find little of interest here. Pakistani tactics, techniques & procedures (TTPs) are welcome if sustainable by valid sources but disparaging or deriding comments will be edited as will the entire post if I suspect malfeasance.

    Finally, flaming and trolling. If you can't read the comments and contain yourselves, if you won't read the supporting documents and sustain your arguments then this thread isn't where you should be.

    There IS room for subjectivity. Anatol Lieven engages in some of his own within the above comments. If you can write to that level of speculative thinking your thoughts will be welcome. While no longer a mod, I retain editing and deletion privileges. I'll exercise them here. Just that simple. You may complain to management via P.M. and they can over-ride my actions.

    If this is the only post to this thread I'm fine with that too.

    Last edited by S2; 22 May 11,, 03:00.
    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

  • #2
    Army (Pakistan), Army
    Assessment
    The army is large, well trained, reasonably well equipped and has good morale. Senior leadership is of a high quality and there is no evidence of religious extremism among senior officers, largely due to tight monitoring of promotion and selection boards by successive army chiefs, although it appears there may be some extremists in junior ranks.The army's weaknesses include: a shortage of high-quality officers; inadequate co-operation with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) (although this issue is slowly improving); insufficient appreciation that, in conventional war, Indian tactical air power is probably its major threat; and difficulty in retraining to meet the militant/insurgency threat in the western regions concurrently with conducting large-scale operations and maintaining an effective defensive posture on the eastern border. Some planning has been based on unrealistic assessments of achievement of local air superiority over the forward edge of the battle area (although, given the Indian Air Forces's difficulties in maintaining adequate air superiority capability, the situation is not now as critical as it was in the late 1990s). There is emphasis on ground Air Defence (AD) by surface-to-air missiles (such as the Swedish RBS 70 and US Stinger) and extensive gun systems. Both strike corps have considerable AD assets intended to be deployed rapidly during obstacle crossings and breakout, and mechanisation has been steadily improving, although, given the necessary emphasis on training for internal security and especially counter-insurgency duties and increasing fuel costs, it has been necessary to cancel exercises involving armoured formations.Following the 1989 exercise Zarb-e-Momin ('Believer's

    Assessment
    The army is capable of holding its own against Indian forces in conventional war on the eastern border and could even gain ground if air parity existed, which is possible, given India's ageing and diminishing numbers of tactical strike and air defence aircraft. However, the army's lack of flexibility, evident from concentration on large-scale manoeuvre tactics involving armoured formations, was demonstrated in its initial attempts to cope with the insurgency in the north west that developed following the US invasion of Afghanistan. Units and formations committed to the area lacked expertise in counter-insurgency warfare and suffered unnecessary casualties and general military setbacks until training facilities were established and much-needed instruction imparted. Even then, as the threat developed and the campaign intensified, some units moved from east to west were lacking in CI/CRW skills, especially logistics elements whose convoys proved to be vulnerable. Accordingly there has been stress on counter-insurgency training at all levels, although there is continuing reluctance to accept the consequential de-emphasising of the Indian threat.The army has shown that it is capable of meeting a guerrilla campaign, but only by extensive use of strikes by its own integral armed helicopters and air force ground attack assets, both of which have created much concern and resentment by virtue of inevitable civilian casualties. Its use of heavy artillery and armour in the Swat Valley was regarded as heavy-handed, but proved to be effective against the militants. The dichotomy between counter-insurgency and conventional operations (and training) has grown, and argument continues




    edited due to copyright

    Parihaka

    Comment


    • #3
      notorious_eagle Reply

      Please try to source the document from fatman17 if possible. I suspect it comes from his JANE's subscription so it won't likely be available to the readership here but, at least, would be properly attributed.

      In any case, though, thanks. It's helpful.
      "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
      "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

      Comment


      • #4
        Yes Sir its from his Jane's subscription. In my opinion, this is possibly the most accurate description i have read of PA considering how secretive of an organization PA is. It outlines 70% of the hardware that PA had in 2008, other hardware which Janes didnt outline has been kept hidden as it was acquired from our Chinese friends under the radar. I will add more to the discussion later regarding the structure of the ISI and the Officer Core of the Pakistan Armed Forces.

        The army's weaknessesses include a shortage of high-quality officers, lukewarm co-operation with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF)

        These problems have been addressed and there has been an influx of high quality officers in Pakistan Army. As sanctions on Pakistan were removed after 9-11; PA actively sent cadets and officers abroad to the US, UK, Australia, Germany, France etc for training.

        The synergy achieved between PA and PAF under the leadership of current COAS and CAS has been phenomenal. The recent exercises performed by PA and PAF together and active operations in FATA is a good example of the synergy between these two sister services.
        Last edited by notorious_eagle; 22 May 11,, 17:18.

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by notorious_eagle View Post
          Yes Sir its from his Jane's subscription. In my opinion, this is possibly the most accurate description i have read of PA considering how secretive of an organization PA is. It outlines 70% of the hardware that PA had in 2008, other hardware which Janes didnt outline has been kept hidden as it was acquired from our Chinese friends under the radar. I will add more to the discussion later regarding the structure of the ISI and the Officer Core of the Pakistan Armed Forces.

          The army's weaknessesses include a shortage of high-quality officers, lukewarm co-operation with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF)

          These problems have been addressed and there has been an influx of high quality officers in Pakistan Army. As sanctions on Pakistan were removed after 9-11; PA actively sent cadets and officers abroad to the US, UK, Australia, Germany, France etc for training.

          The synergy achieved between PA and PAF under the leadership of current COAS and CAS has been phenomenal. The recent exercises performed by PA and PAF together and active operations in FATA is a good example of the synergy between these two sister services.
          Unfortunately itś directly subject to copyright as being subscription only from Janes and thus we can´t allow it´s full reproduction here sorry.
          In the realm of spirit, seek clarity; in the material world, seek utility.

          Leibniz

          Comment


          • #6
            Further, I'd be interested to learn about the Pakistani military education system. Who becomes an officer? From what social stratas are they likely to be obtained? What is their background(s)? Are there special incentive programs to attract certain officer candidates (medical/nursing, engineer, business) and what of women?

            The army attracts a very wide range of applicants to its officer corps. The system is very competitive, with around 15,000 applicants applying every year of which only 400 (if I recall correctly) are eventually selected for training at PMA. The selection procedure is fair and objective for the most part, I've known sons of generals who got rejected. The people who get in are usually the ones who deserve it. Thus young men from a wide range of social, ethnic and (aye) religious backgrounds do apply. However in my experience, because the selection procedure is so cut-throat, those who're not familiar with the system are at an inevitable disadvantage. A boy/girl from interior Sindh who travels halfway across the country to a cantonment in Abbotabad for the tests would understandably not be as well equipped to deal with the tests as a son/daughter of a officer who has lived in such cantonments all his/her life, interacting with servicemen, running those same obstacle courses since he/she could walk, etc. Furthermore, young people from non-military affiliated cultures like interior Sindh would be less inclined to apply in the first place than people from places like Jhelum where atleast one son from every family is expected to serve. Point being, while some trends do emerge in terms of ethnically leaning officer recruitment, they are not a result of intentional or institutional bias. The army however is increasingly aware of this and has taken some measures to balance it out, like lowering standards for Balochi recruits. But there are some obstacles to this too, to ensure the Balochi tribes for instance contribute more evenly to the officer corps the army will need to build more infrastructure in their areas too, including cadet collages and recruitment centers for their youth, which is something the tribal chieftains have violently opposed since it is not in line with their primitive understanding of autonomy.

            In the end I would point out though that the purpose of the army, any army, is not to represent the demographic composition of the country it serves but to primarily serve the country by neutrally producing men and women capable of fighting a war. Consequently, much of the internal criticism mounted against the army's ethnic 'partiality', I think, is flawed, based more on unrealistic social and political ideals (if not self-serving political rhetoric) than on a proper understanding of military affairs.

            From what I've seen, heard and understand the vast majority of applicants for the officer corps are not of high quality. The reason for this is simple, the army does not offer much in the way of standard of living, particularly for higher classes that tend the produce more educated, competent and confident potential aspirants. The cream of the society goes to the civil sector, though there are always exceptions. What the army excels at is producing quality officers out of young men with little exposure before they joined the military. This is how the army represents the greatest contribution to social mobility in the country, or so I feel. Everyone gets the opportunity, regardless of social class, and like I said since the system is objective, the best people do get through. I applied to the officer corps 2 years ago, it was an interesting experience. I noticed that few of my fellow applicants (even those who made it to the end) could speak English with any level of fluency, while the mid-ranking officers evaluating us (obviously not the best since they ended up with this post) spoke English quite eloquently albeit with heavily localized accents. I'm not saying that English is all that important (though it is the army's battle tongue and foreign equipment manuals are all in English so its a definitive positive) but that this for me was indicative of how the army molded their confidence and skills after they joined the institution. The army does not rely on any particular social class or ethnic pool to raise its officers, the army is almost a social class onto itself. Pakistan is a country of 180 million, and the armed forces are 1.5 million serving and reserve service-men at best, add a few million family members and retirees, so this class is inevitably exclusive. And the subject of resentment in some quarters.

            I had a brilliant time in the trials, I was got to interact with and observe a wide variety people with different backgrounds and perspectives. I noticed that there was a large contingent of noisy urban kids but they had no major advantage over the relatively quiet rural kids; to the contrary in fact, rural kids tended to be physically tougher and I think our selectors preferred the silent, modest types. But there were many urban kids, particularly at the onset, and they I believe have been (and will be) the source of change in the army. The army now recruits heavily from the lower-middle urban classes which is in contrast to the early days when the officer corps was exclusively the domain of the land owning aristocracy. Contrary to popular perception, it is not the rural but the urban populace that is likely to harbor sympathies that have diluted the army's previously secular outlook. Urban recruits tend to be more politically and socially opinionated, while the rural kids have little previous exposure so they're perfect material for molding and absorbing the army's ethos and those ethos alone. They may be religious, perhaps more so than their urban counterparts, but their religiosity is more apolitical and traditional. Political Islamist influences are stronger in universities, collages and schools of big cities like Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. Educated professional Muslims are greatly more prone to ideas of politicized Islamist revival in Pakistan, or however you want to phrase it.

            This does not mean I think the army (and the country) is heading towards a train-wreck. But with recruitment from urban areas rising at a rate higher than that of urbanization itself, it does mean that the characteristics of Pakistan's burgeoning urban middle-class will be increasingly felt in the army (the westernized urban higher classes don't see military careers for their kids as viable anymore even if they're morally sympathetic of the military in general). The urban middle classes in Pakistan, I have to say, are increasingly sympathetic to political Islam for reasons that are complex and probably beyond my capacity to explain. Things however are not as bad as they might appear to foreigners, the middle class is increasing but its also heavily divided and complicated. Also, as I've stated, the Pakistani military itself is potent as an institution capable of instilling and inspiring loyalty. The army will inevitably, understandably and perhaps rightly represent a majority of the population and its inclinations. Whatever the social and political leaning of officers (when present) I feel the vast majority of them will be increasingly competent as the recruitment base is growing. Also, at the risk of sounding extremely pompous, since I did eventually get rejected I'd say the selection criteria is pretty strict. I applied for the Long Course, which is the most sought after for commissioned officers and those who graduate represent the heart of the institution. Other than this, they're somewhat easier courses for officers needed in posts as engineers, medical personal, etc. They don't train in PMA for as long and are not likely to achieve ranks higher than colonel. Women are also commissioned in the army, though only in signals and medical. Pakistan is the only country where a lady has achieved the rank of a Major General. Also, the army can be seen as a gaint welfare machine but it does not recruit cadets purposely for business endeavors that are only the domain of retirees, and are not allocated state resources.

            Some research into the demographics of Pakistan Army's Officer Corps.
            http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/...ficerCorps.pdf

            I'll provide my 2 cents to the other questions later on.
            Last edited by Kasrkin; 24 May 11,, 23:52.

            Comment


            • #7
              A newer piece by Lieven.

              U.S. STRATEGY toward Pakistan is focused on trying to get Islamabad to give serious help to Washington’s campaign against the Afghan Taliban. There are two rather large problems with this approach. The first is that it is never going to happen. As U.S. diplomats in Pakistan themselves recognize (and as was made ever so clear by the WikiLeaks dispatches), both Pakistani strategic calculations and the feelings of the country’s population make it impossible for Islamabad to take such a step, except in return for U.S. help against India—which Washington also cannot deliver.

              The second problem is that it gets America’s real priorities in the region back to front. The war in Afghanistan is a temporary U.S. interest, in which the chief concern is not the reality of victory or defeat as such (if only because neither can be clearly defined) but preserving some appearance of success in order to avoid the damage to American military prestige that would result from obvious failure. By contrast, preserving the Pakistani state and containing the terrorist threat to the West from Pakistan is a permanent vital interest not only of the U.S. military and political establishments but of every American citizen.

              And while the prospects for any sort of real success in Afghanistan look gloomy indeed, if saving Pakistan is the real priority, then things do not look so desperate, despite all the bad news from that country. This is because while getting large numbers of Pakistanis to help America is virtually impossible, getting enough Pakistanis to preserve their existing state is much easier. To a great extent, this is for negative reasons: the elites, and indeed many of the masses, have an acute sense of the horrors that would result from the country’s collapse. However, a degree of positive loyalty is also present in one key institution and in one key province: namely the military and the Punjab.

              If Pakistan is to be broken as a state, it will be on the streets of Lahore and other great Punjabi cities, not in the Pashtun mountains. By the same token, the greatest potential terrorist threat to the United States and its Western allies from the region stems not from the illiterate and isolated Pashtuns but from Islamist groups based in urban Punjab, with their far-higher levels of sophistication and their international links, above all to the Pakistani diaspora in the West.

              OF COURSE, the United States and some of its allies are embroiled in a war in Afghanistan, from which they have to try to extract themselves without humiliation. Inevitably, this conflict creates priorities of its own. Indeed, if the war in Afghanistan is to be America’s priority, then present U.S. concentration on the Pashtun areas of Pakistan is logical, since they are adjacent to Afghanistan, and it is there that the Taliban have their bases and from there that they draw much of their support (it is worth remembering that a majority of Pashtuns live in Pakistan, not Afghanistan, and that cross-border ties have always been very close).

              Nonetheless, it is essential that the makers of U.S. strategy also keep in mind the vital long-term interests of the United States and the safety of its citizens, interests which will remain long after the last American soldier has left Afghanistan. I have been struck, both in the United States and in Britain, by the tendency of officers and officials to speak and write as if protecting the lives of troops from Taliban attack is the first duty of the U.S. and British states. In fact, it is the duty of soldiers to risk their lives to protect the civilian populations of their countries, and the only valid reason why the U.S. and British militaries are in Afghanistan at all is to protect their fellow citizens from terrorism. If that equation is reversed, and the needs of the war in Afghanistan are actually worsening the terrorist threat to the U.S. and British homelands, then our campaign there becomes not just strategically but morally ludicrous.

              This statement is not intended as a standard attack either on the overweening power of the American armed forces or on the country’s “militarism.” Paradoxically, the U.S. military is not in general a militarist force in the shaping of U.S. policy, if one gives “militarist” its old connotations of aggression and warmongering. Under the last Bush administration, the military was far more cautious than many of the president’s political appointees, and military opposition reportedly played an important part in blocking a U.S. attack on Iran in the last year of Bush’s second term. Military caution is rooted in a strong and realistic sense of the limits on America’s resources and of the potentially catastrophic risks of further open-ended military commitments. The role of the armed forces in shaping and limiting a U.S. administration’s options may be questionable under the Constitution, but it is something for which we may have good reason to be grateful under a future Republican president after 2012 or 2016.

              On the other hand, if the U.S. military is already in a war, it does not like to be seen to lose it. This is as it should be. No country should want its armed forces to be made up of quitters. And, of course, apart from military pride, it is of great importance to U.S. power in the world, and to the struggle against Islamist extremism, that America not be seen to leave Afghanistan in defeat. But there comes a time in many wars when victory itself becomes so elusive, and the costs of pursuing it so great, that a broader and more detached view of national interests sees that these are best served by some form of compromise. This seems to me to be becoming the case in Afghanistan; not because of the costs of the Afghan war itself, which are bearable, but because of the way in which that conflict is destabilizing and radicalizing Pakistan, risking a geopolitical catastrophe for the United States—and the world—which would dwarf anything that could possibly occur in Afghanistan.

              THAT PAKISTAN is quite simply far more important to the region, the West and the international community than Afghanistan is a matter not of sentiment but of mathematics. With around 184 million people, Pakistan has nearly six times the population of Afghanistan—or Iraq—over twice the population of Iran and almost two-thirds the population of the entire Arab world put together.

              A central fact tends to be missed, in part because it is a deeply uncomfortable one for Americans, with their instinctive faith in democracy and their inborn desire to be liked and respected by other nations: that (and with deep regret I can attest to this from my own numerous interviews in Pakistan) the Afghan Taliban enjoy the sympathy of the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis at every level of society. And so the U.S. war there—and America’s demands of Pakistani assistance—are weakening the state. The support for the Taliban is not based in their religious ideology, which is alien to most Pakistanis. It is so prevalent because, as with the anti-Soviet mujahideen of the 1980s (who were also not admired for their extremist ideals), the Taliban are seen as a legitimate force of resistance against an alien occupation of the country.

              Underlying this is a hatred of U.S. strategy—and to some extent, hatred of the United States as a whole—which, as repeated opinion surveys have indicated, is among the highest in the world. This feeling is reflected in the fact (which I can also attest to from my own experience) that the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis believe that 9/11 was a CIA and/or Mossad plot intended to justify a U.S. invasion and conquest of parts of the Muslim world. That this is poisonously evil rubbish which no one with two brain cells should be able to believe isn’t the point. The point is that Pakistanis do believe it, and this belief both reflects and reinforces their hatred of America and of Pakistan’s alliance with the United States. In the West, politicians and the media have attacked the Pakistani government and military for not doing enough to help us against the Afghan Taliban. The great majority of Pakistanis by contrast think that Islamabad is doing far too much.

              These beliefs and sentiments are dangerous in a wider context as well, since they are wholly shared among people of Pakistani origin in the cities of Great Britain. And it is members of this minority in the UK who pose the greatest potential terrorist threat to the West from within the West. In their weakest incarnation, these anti-U.S. feelings create a willingness to make excuses for anti-Western terrorism; in their strongest, they may lead to active support and even participation in violence.

              The help of the Pakistani intelligence services to Britain has been vital in identifying the links of these potential terrorists to groups in Pakistan, and to preventing more attacks on the UK and elsewhere in Europe. Islamabad therefore has been only a partial ally in the “war on terror”—but still a critical and irreplaceable one. For we need to remember that in the end, it is only legitimate Muslim governments and security services that can control terrorist plots on their soil. Western pressure may be necessary to push them in the right direction, but we need to be careful that this pressure does not become so overwhelming that it undermines or even destroys those governments by humiliating them in the eyes of their own people.

              More threatening by far, however, is that these beliefs and feelings are almost certainly shared by a majority of Pakistani soldiers—who are to some extent insulated from society by military discipline and culture, but who obviously cannot be cut off from the influence of their families. The greatest potential catalyst for a collapse of the Pakistani state is not the Islamist militants themselves, who are in my view far too weak and divided to achieve this (a capacity for murderous terrorism should not be confused with a capacity for successful revolution); it is that actions by the United States will provoke a mutiny of parts of the military. Should that happen, the Pakistani state would collapse very quickly indeed, with all the disasters that this would entail.

              And, of course, Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and one of the most powerful armies in Asia. Western fears have been focused on the threat that Pakistani nuclear arms (or more realistically, the materials and expertise to make a “dirty bomb”) might fall into the hands of terrorists; but a more immediate threat is that a fraying of the Pakistani military would lead to enormous quantities of conventional munitions (including antiaircraft missiles) and large numbers of trained technicians and engineers making their way into the terrorist camp. This would enormously increase the terrorist danger to the West, even if the Pakistani military as a whole held together. If the army and the state were to disintegrate completely, the consequences hardly bear thinking about.

              It is essential to remember in this context that while the leadership of the Afghan Taliban has enjoyed a measure of official shelter in Pakistan (especially in northern Baluchistan and the city of Quetta, where several of them are credibly reported to be based), the Pakistani military has not actually supported the Afghan Taliban with sophisticated weapons, in the way that Pakistan, the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia and other countries supported the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets. This is obvious from the Taliban’s lack of sophisticated weaponry and training. Indeed, even in June 2010, according to a briefing by the British military which I attended, they were still far behind the Iraqi insurgents even in the construction of improvised explosive devices.

              This should serve as a stark reminder of just how much more Pakistan could do to help the Afghan Taliban (and other anti-Western groups) if the Pakistani state and military, or the relationship between Islamabad and Washington, were to completely fall apart. It is this terrifying outcome that present U.S. strategy in the region risks producing.

              IF THE Pakistani army were a chiefly Pashtun army, then it might well have disintegrated already, given the strength of Taliban support among that ethnic group and the links between the Pashtuns of Pakistan and those of Afghanistan. Fortunately, the Pakistani army is mainly Punjabi, more specifically a northern Punjabi force—and throughout Pakistani history, Punjab and the army have had a deep reciprocal influence, especially in terms of that complex, ambiguous, deeply flawed, very weak but surprisingly strong sentiment: Pakistani Muslim nationalism. Indeed, Pakistani nationalism is very feeble except in the extremely powerful institution of the military and the very strong province of Punjab (or part of it) from which that institution is chiefly drawn.

              With some 56 percent of Pakistan’s population, Punjab would naturally dominate the country and provide most of its soldiers. In fact though, the proportion of Punjabis in the army is around 75 percent (mainly from a few districts in the northwest of the province). Punjab’s weight within Pakistan, however, is not simply due to its domination of the military-bureaucratic establishment. The northern and some of the central districts of the province also possess almost three-quarters of Pakistan’s industry and its most productive agriculture.

              This economic dynamism is due to two factors above all: the great British and Pakistani irrigation schemes of the 1880s–1950s and the impact of the Punjabi Muslim refugees who fled from Indian East Punjab in 1947. Like many migrants, the experience of being uprooted and shaken out of old patterns of life instilled in these people a new sense of economic initiative. It also fostered a deep hatred of India. This went on to fuel both the Pakistani military’s obsession with the Indian threat and mass support for the jihadist groups, which from the end of the 1980s on began to launch attacks, first in Indian Kashmir, then in the rest of India. Herein lie the origins of what the Pakistani politician and former ambassador to Washington, Syeda Abida Hussain, has called Pakistan’s “Prussian Bible Belt” in Punjab, a phrase linking the region’s strong military ties with some of its increasingly militant forms of Islam.

              In Punjab, quite unlike the other provinces of the country, not only the great majority of the Punjabi establishment, but a great many ordinary Punjabis associate their provincial identity with that of Pakistan as a whole. The identities of most of Pakistan’s other nationalities are to a considerable extent shaped by their differences with the Punjabis (except for the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs whose ancestors migrated from India to Karachi and Hyderabad after 1947) and their ambiguous relationship with the Pakistani state.

              Many Punjabis by contrast believe that they are the state, and if they define themselves against anybody else, it is against India. As a senior official (of Mohajir origin) in Islamabad remarked sourly, “The difficulty about writing on Punjab as a province is that they think and behave as if they are the whole damn country.” This Punjabi commitment to Pakistani nationalism has profoundly shaped the country, and is indeed responsible for Pakistan’s survival as a state.

              THE OVERTHROW of the regime can never happen in peripheral areas like Waziristan, Baluchistan or even Karachi. It would have to happen in Punjab. A main reason for this: if mass Islamist unrest were to take place in the northern part of the province, the military high command would have to be very worried about its troops refusing to fight against the rebellion.

              A revolution from below in Punjab, however, would have to take place not just against the national government in Islamabad but against the provincial government in Lahore. While the national government is led by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), headed by the Bhutto-Zardaris, and is now widely loathed across much of Punjab, the provincial government is made up of the Pakistan Muslim League–N (PLM-N) run by the Sharif brothers—now in opposition at the national level. And while within Pakistan the national government is generally seen (however unfairly) as having become highly subservient to America, the Sharifs have sought with some success to portray themselves as moderate Islamists who would take a more independent line when in national power.

              Whether when actually in control—which they are certain to be sooner or later—the Sharifs would do anything very different vis-à-vis America is rather unlikely. In the countryside, the PML-N depends on the same networks of “feudal” power, kinship and patronage as the PPP. These “feudals” are tightly bound to the state by the webs of political patronage (or, if you prefer, corruption) which have long formed the most important part of their income. Examining the history of powerful local families in Pakistan, again and again you discover that while kinship links and local property are important, the breakthrough to real prominence came when they were able to be elected to Parliament (or selected by a military government) and thereby gained the ability to milk the state for benefits. The collapse of Pakistan would destroy all that and throw them back on the exiguous and fragile profits of their estates and urban rents.

              In the cities of northern Punjab, the PML-N is much more closely linked to the industrialist class from which the Sharifs themselves were drawn into politics by then–President of Pakistan and Chief of Army Staff General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq in the 1980s. This class, which depends overwhelmingly on its ability to export textiles to the outside world, is also acutely aware of the shattering damage to the Pakistani economy and its own interests that would result from a collapse in relations with the United States and the imposition of trade sanctions on Pakistan.

              Equally important, the industrialists, like the “feudals,” are by their very nature an antirevolutionary force, fearful of the threat to their wealth and power from Islamist revolution. Both classes are also attached to Pakistan as a state by strong motives of collective interest. The industrialists depend on the existence of Pakistan for their very well-being. If the country were to fall apart, their industries would be ruined.

              Indeed, an Islamist revolution and the collapse of Pakistan are synonymous. This is a crucially important point, both because it is true and because enough Pakistanis know that it is true. This means an Islamist revolt that overthrows the existing state is not impossible, but it is highly unlikely—and only feasible if accompanied by a mutiny within the military. And it is simply impossible that such an uprising could lead to the establishment of an effective and united Islamist radical government, whether of the Iranian or the Taliban variety. Pakistan is too weak for the first and too strong for the second.

              In Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s movement was able to seize control of a relatively powerful state apparatus and, equally important, to fuse religious ideology with extremely strong and popular traditions of Iranian nationalism. Pakistan as a whole possesses no such nationalism, and while Punjab and the military have held the country together, they have never been remotely powerful enough to impose Pakistani nationalism on the very different traditions of the other provinces. On the other hand, Pakistan is a much more developed and complicated country than Afghanistan, which the Taliban were able to conquer in the years after 1994, albeit in the teeth of strong resistance from the non-Pashtun ethnicities.

              If the Pakistani state collapsed, the result would be not successful national revolution but a whole set of horrible local ethnic wars, in which much of the country would quickly be reduced from its present just-about-bearable level of existence to that of Somalia or the Congo. Once the current regime fell, it would be impossible to put it back together again because India would almost certainly make it its business to prevent Pakistan’s reconstitution by supporting local ethnic groups in their struggle for continued independence.

              Deeply unpleasant though the choice is, the United States may have to accept a tactical setback in Afghanistan rather than risk strategic defeat in Pakistan. For if the picture drawn here is correct, then U.S. and British soldiers are in effect dying in Afghanistan in order to make the world more dangerous for American and British peoples.

              AMERICAN AND British soldiers are dying in order to avoid the costs of failure: the negative effect this would have on America’s prestige in the world, on the reputation and morale of the U.S. and UK armed forces, and on the confidence of our extremist enemies. So, a humiliating scuttle from Afghanistan is not at all desirable. How to square this miserable and tragic circle?

              A new U.S. strategy must recognize that it is essential to ease the pressure on Pakistan, above all by reducing those factors which are increasing radicalization in the country and weakening the status and strength of the Pakistani state and army. This should lead to a completewithdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan—as soon as possible. At present, Washington’s intention is to pull most ground troops out once the Afghan security forces are capable of fighting on their own, but to leave major U.S. air bases and Special Forces in country to support them.

              This is badly mistaken, from three points of view. First, as long as U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan, the Taliban leadership will continue to fight. They have stated that again and again, and the view of both sympathizers and experts is that they could not abandon that stance without absolutely unacceptable disgrace. And as long as they continue to fight, Afghans and Pakistanis will be willing to join them. It should be remembered that the Soviets withdrew completely from Afghanistan in 1989—and by reducing the nationalist element of support for the mujahideen, they actually strengthened the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. If American forces remain, then the government in Kabul will inevitably go on being seen as a U.S. puppet. The war in Afghanistan might be diminished, but it will continue indefinitely, and so—much more importantly—will the destabilization of Pakistan. To reduce Pakistani mass fear and hatred of the United States, it is essential that America be seen clearly to take a step back from its presence on the ground in a Muslim country and region.

              Second, the continued presence of U.S. bases will make it far more difficult for Washington to develop what should be its core strategy in the region: handing responsibility for guaranteeing Afghanistan’s security to the major regional states. In particular, China, which on the one hand fears the Taliban but on the other is very close to Pakistan, may prove crucial in the long term to forging a regional consensus on this issue. Nothing of the sort can emerge, however, as long as these states can leave Afghan security to America, while fearing that Washington’s real motive for keeping bases is not to fight the Taliban but to build up U.S. regional power.

              Finally, to retain a military presence in Afghanistan will mean continual embroilment in Afghan politics—and the general future outline of this seems rather clear. If the United States continues its present strategy of building up the Afghan National Army while the state and the political systems remain weak and dysfunctional, then sooner or later the military will seize power. Yet, Afghanistan’s deep ethnic, political and regional differences would likely lead not to more effective government but to new clashes and further coups and countercoups. If U.S. troops are present in Afghanistan, then Washington will be drawn into these new conflicts as referee, participant or both—and will thereby confirm every belief in Muslim minds about America’s desire to dominate and weaken the Muslim world.

              The U.S. strategy should therefore be to continue the present offensive and efforts to buy up local Taliban commanders, while at the same time seeking initial contacts with the Taliban leadership using Pakistan as an intermediary. In other words, the purpose of the offensive should not be victory but a more advantageous deal with the insurgents. The basic terms of this should be Taliban control of the south of the country, continued development aid to this region and some participation in central government in return for the exclusion of al-Qaeda, a crackdown on the heroin trade and recognition of the Afghan national government. If successful, such a deal would surely involve a measure of humiliation for the United States, but would also have certain real advantages.

              Above all, however, the removal of the hated American presence, and the end of U.S. attacks inside Pakistan, would greatly diminish impulses to radicalize in that country, especially if the United States can help develop that state economically (admittedly a horribly difficult process, especially under the present Pakistani government).

              It is the possible collapse of Pakistan, not the outcome of the present war in Afghanistan, which is the really terrible threat to America and its allies from this part of the Muslim world.


              A Mutiny Grows in Punjab | The National Interest

              Comment


              • #8
                The Pakistan Army's Experience with COIN:

                http://www.acus.org/files/publicatio...insurgency.pdf

                Comment


                • #9
                  Hi Dear Steve,

                  I recently got hold of a book "The Crossed Swords" by Shujja Nawaz whose brother General Asif Nawaz was a COAS in early 90's. This book is widely considered the most comprehensive and very balanced work on Pakistan's Army and the battles within. Hopefully, I will contribute something when I'm done with reading of book.

                  As far as Liven's recent work "Pakistan: A Hard Country" is concerned, it lacks balanced and critical scrutiny of military establishment and ISI. Liven is widely considered the "hired intellectual" of Pakistan Army. Dr Ayesha Siddiqua-- the Pakistani defense analyst and unrelenting critic of Pakistan's military excesses--- writes in her recent article:

                  "The problem with the Pakistani state is that it is constantly on the lookout for safe scholars which does not necessarily mean people are good at their jobs. The state’s search has taken it in the direction of buying foreign scholars of dubious distinction to write books on Pakistan, presenting the establishment’s perspective. There are two such books that were published in 2011."

                  Link to the article

                  Restraining academia – The Express Tribune

                  Ms Ayesha Siddiqa is my personal acquaintance and she has been teaching at DSS (Defense and Strategic Studies) department of our Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad.

                  In her article, she refers to the two books but she doesn't mention the title of books. I recently asked her personally as to which two books she precisely referred to in her article, and she categorically told me, "Pakistan: A Hard Country by Anatol Lieven and another book which is about to come out by Carey Schofield".

                  Ms Ayesha further revealed to me that Ambassador General Mehmood Durrani had suggested the Pakistani Government in 2007 to employee Mr Liven as consultant to the Pakistan's Planning Commission. So, the Army's love for such paid "scholars" like Liven is beyond any doubt reflected in his favourable opinion of Army as the only saviour, and disciplined institution of Pakistan. There's no mention of the military's excesses and its deleterious impacts on social fabric of Pakistan in his work.

                  Regards,

                  IHM
                  Last edited by IHM; 29 Jul 11,, 23:09.
                  Peace, Peace, Peace

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Thx for the tip IHM.

                    Because the army wants writers to always put their best foot forward its very easy to get the wrong idea.

                    What are they paranoid about ? Is this a matter of national security.

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                    • #11
                      Inam,

                      I was going to mention Brian Cloughley. He's very popular among nationalist Pakistanis. Highly critical of America so that immediately boosts his circulation inside Pakistan. You'll like CROSSED SWORDS. Mr. Nawaz is very bright. I didn't know you'd studied under Ayesha Siddiqa. She, like Farhat Taj, worries me.
                      Last edited by S2; 30 Jul 11,, 07:50.
                      "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                      "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Why ?

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          "Why ?"

                          I fear for their safety.
                          "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                          "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            yeah, thats valid. I'm surprised to find Dr. Siddiqua lives in Pakistan, always throught she was in the US. I find her articles along with those of Ahmed Rashid to be quite informative. There's a list of other writers that IHM provided a while back...

                            Originally posted by IHM View Post
                            I re-iterate that a "New Class" is emerging in Pakistan which offers every counter-narrative to the parochial jingoistic narratives. This "New Class" trenchantly denounces mainstream narratives pertaining to foreign or domestic policies of Pakistan. I can pull hundreds of videos or articles to show you that how virulently this class is critiquing domestic and foreign issues of Pakistan. Some of them I would like to quote for reference: Nadeem F. Paracha, Hassan Nisaar, Fassi Zaka, Abbas Zaidi, Najam Saithi, Farhat Taj, Irfan Hussain, Cowasgee, et all.

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              As far as Liven's recent work "Pakistan: A Hard Country" is concerned, it lacks balanced and critical scrutiny of military establishment and ISI.
                              Quite to the contrary. Have you read the book?

                              Liven is widely considered the "hired intellectual" of Pakistan Army.
                              Hardly. That would be a terribly insulting thing to say about a scholar of his stature and background. Are you familiar with any of his other work?

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