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below is an abstract from http://www.acus.org/files/publicatio...IssueBrief.PDF, while th main article is focused on the future of NATO, I wanted to put this part up for discussion, which applies to a global arena, the article is well worth the read as a whole and is fairly short, the below part constitutes a major chunk, the article refers to and it is important to consider the below future realities in the context of the rise of multiple powerful nations globally and the tensions that will arise over resources.
New Security challenges
Rising Poles in the international System
The 2007 cyber attacks in Estonia, the 2008 South Ossetia War between Russia and Georgia and the 2009 gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine heightened fears that Russia would once again become NATO’s principal adversary. This focus on Russia distracts attention from security challenges that will require new and unorthodox responses and from the impact the rise of other geopolitical powers will have on the Alliance. This first challenge is of a geopolitical nature:
The geopolitics of power are shifting as U.S. hegemony gives way to a multipolar world in which the United States and Europe compete with China, India and Russia as centers of military, political and economic power. International relations scholars maintain that a multipolar system is less stable than a unipolar or bipolar one. In a multipolar world there is heightened risk of misperceptions, which undermines trust and stability. Moreover, emerging powers will reshape the geopolitical landscape because they are likely to be
more assertive, casting a larger shadow on their regions and the world.
Due to the reshaping of geopolitics the West’s shaping power will decline. This trend is reinforced by the difficulties encountered in counterinsurgency operations.
As the shaping power of the West is weakened, it will be increasingly difficult to protect interests. This will make the West less reluctant to use its armed forces if
vital interests are not affected.
A power struggle with new poles could have important repercussions for international security, the efficacy of international law and the functioning of international institutions. New centers of power may see it to their advantage to block western action in multilateral institutions. The difficulties of reaching agreement within the United Nations Security Council on Iran and Sudan are a clear prelude to how this might work.
Anti-western sentiment is growing in many parts of the world, with both states and non-state actors trying to undermine liberal democratic systems. Many new NATO members see Russia as the real threat and view its increasingly assertive tactics as an attack on their own democratic systems of government. These fears are no longer contained to Central and Eastern Europe. The 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis forced many West Europeans to realize the extent of the continent’s worrisome energy dependence on Russia.
Competition over Scarce Resources
The geopolitical challenge is closely related to the issue
of scarcity:
Industrialized and industrializing nations demand unrestricted access to resources, particularly energy supplies and scarce minerals, as a prerequisite for continued economic growth and socio-political stability. The most pressing issue is perhaps not energy, but minerals. Substitutes are available, but their development may still be some years off. As competition for resources is a zero-sum game, scarcity is becoming a major source of geopolitical strife, putting the stability of the entire system at risk. Scare resources are now the key driver for China’s foreign policy and increasingly so for the United States and Europe, although many Europeans still consider raw materials in terms of trade politics instead of power politics.
Scarce resources will threaten NATO’s interests in a number of ways. In resource-rich countries resource nationalism and nationalistic appeals could, if they have gripped the populace, lead to emotional and irrational confrontational policies. Venezuela’s resource nationalism could foreshadow a shifting energy landscape and its impact on the interests of NATO member states. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has long threatened America with an oil boycott, but up until recently he had no other logical choice but to provide the United States with its heavy sour oil because only American refineries can refine it. But Chavez may be able to strike a future deal with China now that Beijing has decided to build similar power plants.
For the sake of domestic stability resource-poor countries have no other choice but to defend their economic interests. China is already pursuing increasingly assertive policies in an attempt to gain access to raw materials in Africa, and now in South America as
well. Countries could try to acquire bases in resource rich countries and could transfer arms to resource-rich or transit countries. In Pakistan, China is building a naval base and a listening post in Gwadar, and a deepwater port in Pasni. On the southern Coast of Sri Lanka, China is building a fuelling station and facilities are being built in Bangladesh and Myanmar as well. Finally, China is one of the biggest arms suppliers to resourcerich African states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. This development could turn the Indian Ocean into the flashpoint of future geopolitical strife.
Resource-rich countries and major consumers such as China could form blocks to advance geopolitical interests. The formation of new blocks will increase the negative effects of mulipolarity. In Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet, Michael T. Klare warned of the destabilizing effects of proto-blocks led by the United States and Japan, and Russia and China. As an example, in November 2008, Russian warships sailed into a Venezuelan port in the first deployment of its kind in the Caribbean since the end of the Cold War. Miscalculations become more likely when gunboat diplomacy is used in boundary disputes over resources, such as in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the North Pole region.
Resource-poor western democracies may have to deal with stronger resource-rich autocracies with a state capitalist economic system. As China’s wealth grows, Beijing’s soft power could even replace America’s soft power.
The vulnerability of pipelines and the stability of providers of energy and minerals remain a serious challenge as well. The world’s largest oil reserves, together with trans-national pipelines and major shipping routes, all lie within a ‘zone of instability’ that encircles the globe. This zone of instability faces numerous challenges, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as a growing risk of terrorism, organized crime and piracy. Instability is compounded in some parts by the destabilizing effect of youth bulges, competition for scarce drinking water and localised
conflicts for regional domination.
New Security challenges
Rising Poles in the international System
The 2007 cyber attacks in Estonia, the 2008 South Ossetia War between Russia and Georgia and the 2009 gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine heightened fears that Russia would once again become NATO’s principal adversary. This focus on Russia distracts attention from security challenges that will require new and unorthodox responses and from the impact the rise of other geopolitical powers will have on the Alliance. This first challenge is of a geopolitical nature:
The geopolitics of power are shifting as U.S. hegemony gives way to a multipolar world in which the United States and Europe compete with China, India and Russia as centers of military, political and economic power. International relations scholars maintain that a multipolar system is less stable than a unipolar or bipolar one. In a multipolar world there is heightened risk of misperceptions, which undermines trust and stability. Moreover, emerging powers will reshape the geopolitical landscape because they are likely to be
more assertive, casting a larger shadow on their regions and the world.
Due to the reshaping of geopolitics the West’s shaping power will decline. This trend is reinforced by the difficulties encountered in counterinsurgency operations.
As the shaping power of the West is weakened, it will be increasingly difficult to protect interests. This will make the West less reluctant to use its armed forces if
vital interests are not affected.
A power struggle with new poles could have important repercussions for international security, the efficacy of international law and the functioning of international institutions. New centers of power may see it to their advantage to block western action in multilateral institutions. The difficulties of reaching agreement within the United Nations Security Council on Iran and Sudan are a clear prelude to how this might work.
Anti-western sentiment is growing in many parts of the world, with both states and non-state actors trying to undermine liberal democratic systems. Many new NATO members see Russia as the real threat and view its increasingly assertive tactics as an attack on their own democratic systems of government. These fears are no longer contained to Central and Eastern Europe. The 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis forced many West Europeans to realize the extent of the continent’s worrisome energy dependence on Russia.
Competition over Scarce Resources
The geopolitical challenge is closely related to the issue
of scarcity:
Industrialized and industrializing nations demand unrestricted access to resources, particularly energy supplies and scarce minerals, as a prerequisite for continued economic growth and socio-political stability. The most pressing issue is perhaps not energy, but minerals. Substitutes are available, but their development may still be some years off. As competition for resources is a zero-sum game, scarcity is becoming a major source of geopolitical strife, putting the stability of the entire system at risk. Scare resources are now the key driver for China’s foreign policy and increasingly so for the United States and Europe, although many Europeans still consider raw materials in terms of trade politics instead of power politics.
Scarce resources will threaten NATO’s interests in a number of ways. In resource-rich countries resource nationalism and nationalistic appeals could, if they have gripped the populace, lead to emotional and irrational confrontational policies. Venezuela’s resource nationalism could foreshadow a shifting energy landscape and its impact on the interests of NATO member states. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has long threatened America with an oil boycott, but up until recently he had no other logical choice but to provide the United States with its heavy sour oil because only American refineries can refine it. But Chavez may be able to strike a future deal with China now that Beijing has decided to build similar power plants.
For the sake of domestic stability resource-poor countries have no other choice but to defend their economic interests. China is already pursuing increasingly assertive policies in an attempt to gain access to raw materials in Africa, and now in South America as
well. Countries could try to acquire bases in resource rich countries and could transfer arms to resource-rich or transit countries. In Pakistan, China is building a naval base and a listening post in Gwadar, and a deepwater port in Pasni. On the southern Coast of Sri Lanka, China is building a fuelling station and facilities are being built in Bangladesh and Myanmar as well. Finally, China is one of the biggest arms suppliers to resourcerich African states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. This development could turn the Indian Ocean into the flashpoint of future geopolitical strife.
Resource-rich countries and major consumers such as China could form blocks to advance geopolitical interests. The formation of new blocks will increase the negative effects of mulipolarity. In Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet, Michael T. Klare warned of the destabilizing effects of proto-blocks led by the United States and Japan, and Russia and China. As an example, in November 2008, Russian warships sailed into a Venezuelan port in the first deployment of its kind in the Caribbean since the end of the Cold War. Miscalculations become more likely when gunboat diplomacy is used in boundary disputes over resources, such as in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the North Pole region.
Resource-poor western democracies may have to deal with stronger resource-rich autocracies with a state capitalist economic system. As China’s wealth grows, Beijing’s soft power could even replace America’s soft power.
The vulnerability of pipelines and the stability of providers of energy and minerals remain a serious challenge as well. The world’s largest oil reserves, together with trans-national pipelines and major shipping routes, all lie within a ‘zone of instability’ that encircles the globe. This zone of instability faces numerous challenges, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as a growing risk of terrorism, organized crime and piracy. Instability is compounded in some parts by the destabilizing effect of youth bulges, competition for scarce drinking water and localised
conflicts for regional domination.
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