USS San Francisco

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The Navy has presented medals or letters of commendations to 20 crewmen whose actions helped the USS San Francisco make it home after the submarine hit a seamount Jan. 8.

The highest awards, the Navy's Meritorious Service Medal, went to Hospitalman 1st Class James H. Akin, the ship's “doc,” and Lt. j.g. Craig E. Litty for organizing the crew's mess into an emergency trauma center and providing triage to more than 70 injured sailors over two days.

“When initial medical supplies were expended, (they) devised innovative methods to provide continued oxygen and other first aid treatment,” the citation reads. The citation also credited their “accurate diagnoses of injuries and exacting recommendations” for treatment.

Meanwhile, the captain of a submarine being decommissioned at Norfolk (Va.) Naval Shipyard will be transferred to Guam to take command of the San Francisco, Navy sources said.

Cmdr. Kevin Brenton, skipper of the USS Portsmouth during its final Western Pacific deployment in 2003 and 2004 and during its participation in Exercise Northern Edge in the Gulf of Alaska last year, will become the new captain of the San Francisco. He will replace interim commanding officer Cmdr. Andrew Hale, who was deputy commander of Submarine Squadron 15 before he assumed duties as San Francisco's commanding officer after the accident.

The San Francisco was making a trip to Australia when it slammed into a seamount in an area where official Navy charts list 6,000 feet of water. Despite extensive damage to the ship, the crew got it to the surface and kept it floating long enough to limp back to its homeport of Apra Harbor, Guam.

Machinist Mate 3rd Class Joseph Ashley was killed when he was thrown more than 20 feet and struck his head on a large pump. Almost two dozen others were injured so badly they could not perform their duties, though within days most were treated and released from the hospital in Guam. Most of the crew were treated for some injury.

The captain was found guilty of putting the ship in danger at an admiral's mast last month, and relieved of command. Last week, six more crewmen were cited for putting the ship into danger or dereliction of duty, and received punishments that included demotions and letters of reprimand.

The awards ceremony Friday recognized the actions of the crewmen who saved the ship after the accident, including nine men who received the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal. They were:

• Lt. Jeff M. McDonald, cited for a “flawless weapons off-load” in the wake of the accident, including removing two torpedoes that were in the bow tubes and had to be taken out with emergency handling procedures, and later handling the first submarine drydocking in Guam in more than 15 years.

• Senior Chief Machinist's Mate Danny R. Hager, who directed the stabilization of the ship on the surface and, though injured himself, designed a temporary oxygen system from the ship's oxygen banks to provide oxygen to more seriously wounded crewmen. He also was credited with advising the captain on how to operate some of the damaged systems to get the ship back to Guam.

• Sonar Technician 1st Class Christopher L. Baumhoff, cited for recognizing that Ashley's best hope lay in outside medical care, at which point he and Machinist Mate 2nd Class Gilbert L. Daigle, who also was presented with the medal, planned and set up the equipment for a hazardous open ocean personnel transfer.

• Culinary Specialists 2nd Class Jeremy Y. Key and David J. Miller, and Electronics Technicians 2nd Class Scott M. Pierce and 1st Class Bryan C. Powell, and Yeoman 2nd Class Carnell L. Smoot, cited for their work to convert the crew's mess into a trauma center, helping with first aid, and volunteering to assist in getting Ashley off the ship for medical attention.

Four other crewmen were awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal for their actions after the accident: Chief Electronics Technician Maximum L. Chia; Chief Machinist's Jacob M. Elder; and Machinist's Mates 2nd Class Ian P. Cross and Matthew R. Thurman

A letter of commendation from Rear Adm. David Gove, commander of Submarine Group Seven, went to Electrician's Mate 1st Class Joshua D. Barrow; Machinist's Mate 1st Class Richard T. Bolton; Fire Control Technician 1st Class Scott C. Deranleau; Machinists Mate 1st Class Benjamin J. Sidwell; and Machinist's Mate 2nd Class Joseph D. Anderson.

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More on USS San Francisco...

DefenseWatch "The Voice of the Grunt"
04-13-2005

Why We Almost Lost the Submarine



By Raymond Perry



Specific details of the investigation into the collision of the USS San Francisco with a seamount in the Pacific Ocean are beginning to emerge and they reveal the incident was far more serious than we originally were led to believe.



The New London Day newspaper published a synopsis of the investigation on Apr. 9, 2005 (“Navy Faults Navigational Procedures In Crash Of Sub”), that paints a grim picture of what happened to the nuclear attack submarine on Jan. 8, 2005.



First, the damage done by the collision was nearly fatal. The article by reporter Robert Hamilton revealed that the forward bulkhead of the San Francisco buckled upon impact with the submerged seamount. Some of the photos of the submarine in drydock show that the deck immediately aft of the damaged ballast tank area has “bubbled up,” indicating significant bending of the hull itself. The buckling of the forward bulkhead noted by the investigation indicates that the ship was on the brink of catastrophic flooding.



The Navy investigation determined that the routine of laying out the navigation plan for the transit to Australia was seriously deficient. Charts in use were not updated to indicate a possible hazard just 6,000 yards from the collision location, and the ship chose to pass within 12 miles of charted pinnacles.



The probe also concluded that the organizational decision-making onboard the San Francisco was unacceptably “slack” by Pacific Submarine Force standards. Specific examples include:



* With the ship’s fathometer showing that water was shoaling over a period of time, key crewmembers took no action to verify the safety of continuing on the planned track.



* No attempt was made to verify and resolve the discrepancy in measured versus charted water depth, despite the fact that some key crewmen thought that the soundings taken were incorrect since they were taken at high speed.



* The chart used for daily navigation was a large-scale map with less detail. This was convenient for a long and fast voyage but conveyed a false sense of security when the ship was in fact passing through broken waters.



* It appears that the ship was not using a management tool, such as conducting daily briefs of the next 24 hours of operations, to ensure that all key crewmembers had considered and discussed future hazards.



An apparently mitigating circumstance was offered in that higher authority failed to send an operational order (called a “Subnote”) to the submarine until the night before its departure from Guam. However, this does not tell the full story. It is rare that a ship is sent out to sea with a subnote “out of the blue.” Were the San Francisco’s captain and crew truly ignorant of this pending voyage?



In a normal sequence of events, the ship itself would initiate the voyage planning process by submitting a request with a proposed track. Higher authority would either approve it or propose changes. The submarine would have the opportunity to negotiate changes in most cases. In any event, such a Subnote only certifies that the proposed track enjoys freedom from interference with other submarines or submerged towed bodies.



It is unlikely that there was much mitigating basis in the late receipt of the final track. In fact, this point seems to have had little sway in affecting 7th Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert’s decision on Feb. 12 to relieve San Francisco Commanding Officer Cmdr. Kevin Mooney during Article 15 Admiral’s Mast proceedings against him for the collision.



So why would a submarine with the fine reputation that this skipper had gained succumb to such unprofessional performance? The easy answer is to simply pass this off as “personnel error”, but I feel there is more to the story.



In the late 1980s and early 1990s Congress passed legislation requiring officers to be trained for “Joint Duty” assignments. Such training requires specific education and time spent in joint duty billets – that is, years spent away from an officer’s chosen specialty. My own naval experience has confirmed that this significantly reduces an officer’s available time for professional development in his critical specialty during the period from the 7th to 15th years of an officer’s overall service.



After the joint duty policies went into effect, it was the initial position of the Submarine Force that such training would seriously reduce the performance of Nuclear Trained Submarine Officers. Submarine Force commanders sought an exemption from the new requirement on grounds that the professions of both submarining and nuclear engineering were so demanding that they would not be able to do them justice with the added burden of joint duty. In a previous article (“Why Are Navy COs getting the Ax?” DefenseWatch, March 2, 2004), I discussed the demands of joint training and its impact on the professional development of Commanding Officers in the Navy.



Senior Submarine Force leaders frequently remarked at that time that if they could not obtain such an exemption then submariners would withdraw from joint duty altogether. The long-term implications were clear: Ultimately, there would be few submarine qualified admirals since the law required flag officers to have been trained for and to have served in qualifying joint billets.



But Congress rebuffed the submariners’ objections and directed “no exemption”. After a recent spate of submarine mishaps in recent years, the question arises that the Submarine Force leaders might have erred in not standing their ground.



As a retired career submariner, I believe that the collision and near loss of the San Francisco is an example of why they should have stood their ground. To fully understand the impact of joint duty assignments on career submariners, one must consider Cmdr. Mooney’s career in particular and ask whether he had had sufficient “time on the pond” to have mastered the difficult craft of commanding a submarine. The conservatism and skepticism required for an otherwise good leader to stand back from the day-to-day stresses of running a nuclear submarine and make tough decisions takes a lot of time at sea – not just completion of a PCO course.



Only experience gained from years of on-the-job work provides an officer with the sufficient background, depth of experience and seasoned knowledge to recognize in advance professional errors that seem small at the time but ultimately can have a major effect on the ship’s safety.



In command of a submarine, an officer faces a unique experience: for the first time in his career there is no one to ask if he has a question. The phone lines just aren’t long enough. The CO must solve problems himself – alone. No joint duty assignment can prepare an officer for this.



There is a second potential contributing element to the San Francisco collision. The Navy several years ago merged the Quartermaster rating with the Electronics Technician rating as a means of saving money during a period of personnel cutbacks. What did the Submarine Force lose in eliminating this professional set of sailors, and was it worth it?



Another key element of the San Francisco investigation appears to be that five key Notices to Mariners were not applied to the specific chart which the submarine was using to ensure safe passage at the time of the collision.



Updating charts to ensure all applicable Notices to Mariners have been entered is a mundane and never ending but truly vital task. To a Quartermaster, it is a key element of his professional performance. To an Electronics Technician, it might be, at best, another administrative task.



The chart makers have come in for their round of criticism for not updating the particular chart used by the submarine. In the world of cartography, there is never enough money to map the world and recent combat posed many critical and immediate demands on that community of specialists.



This chart had been updated five times in recent years, but the Navy probe found that Mooney’s subordinates did not ensure these updates made it onto the chart, and thus to the navigation team.



A third factor revealed in the probe is the common and expected practice of employing dead-reckoning to show if a ship is standing into danger. The practice is to lay out the ship’s present course and speed for the next few position fix intervals or four hours in the open ocean (See Chapter 7 of “The American Practical Navigator”). This practice presents a visual display of potential danger immediately available to those navigating the ship, if its course and speed are not changed.



Quartermasters do this in their sleep as second nature and a core element of their profession. To an Electronics Technician this too would be another administrative task among many.



Quartermasters know charts and the potential inaccuracies inherent in a chart based on information predating satellite mapping of the world (see “The Navigator’s Paradox,” DefenseWatch, Feb. 1, 2005). When a Quartermaster sees a series of soundings indicating a shoaling bottom not shown on the chart, it should, and does, set off loud warning bells.



Electronics Technicians are professionals too. They work hard in their chosen field. But each professional field within the Navy operates to different sets of priorities. When the Submarine Force did away with its Quartermaster rating and rolled its responsibilities into another rating, some things that were done instinctively disappeared.



I believe that the performance of key people in the chain of command within the San Francisco was deficient. Each of these individuals on board has paid a price for his performance.



But the Submarine Force leadership must also recognize and take responsibility for larger issues. When the core ethos of a professional organization is challenged as in the case of the joint duty requirement, leaders must not only recognize the proposal for what it really does to the organization, but also stand their ground.



Congress’ goal of creating a more perfect officer corps has its down sides. The most well-trained Joint Qualified Officer is of no value if he cannot get his ship to the fight, ready to fight on arrival.



Neither does a budget process that is incapable of recognizing when it has become pennywise and pound-foolish. Whatever savings were taken in doing away with the Submarine Quartermaster rate have been overrun many times by the cost of this accident.



The emerging full picture of the San Francisco accident is even more disturbing than we initially knew: Reduced “time on the pond” for a commanding officer and the loss of a set of core skills came together to set the stage for the near-loss of a submarine and its crew.



In fact, the underwater collision on Jan. 8 will probably result in the premature retirement of the submarine due to the high estimated costs of repairing it. As a forward deployed submarine, USS San Francisco was truly valuable in being permanently stationed within the vast Western Pacific operating area.



USS San Francisco’s loss to the Submarine Force, the Navy and the nation will be felt for years.



Lt. Raymond Perry USN (Ret.) is a DefenseWatch Contributing Editor. He can be reached at [email protected]. Please send Feedback responses to [email protected].

[Franco Lolan]

This is messed up. We need good subs and submariners!

[rickusn]

USS San Francisco

Navy Report: San Francisco Crew Was Weak In Navigation
Shortcomings Are Seen As Key Factor In Sub's Undersea Crash


“All members of the (San Francisco's) navigation team believed that the E2202 chart was the best information available and that it was based on extensive U.S. Navy surveys. This assumption was invalid.”
From Navy report on events leading up to the grounding of the USS San Francisco



By ROBERT A. HAMILTON
Day Staff Writer, Navy/Defense/Electric Boat
Published on 4/22/2005

A preliminary report on the submarine that hit a seamount in the Pacific three months ago concludes that numerous warnings of shortcomings in the ship's navigation department existed at least a year before the accident.

In a January 2004 inspection, the USS San Francisco crew did not properly use its fathometer warning system and its electronic Voyage Management System, or VMS, which were both factors in the accident a year later, according to the report, a copy of which was provided to The Day.

In August 2004, during another inspection, the San Francisco navigation team was found deficient in the chart review process, and in a certification process in October 2004, the team failed to adequately highlight hazards to navigation on the charts, the report found.

The report outlines a series of weaknesses in the navigation process –– starting before the San Francisco left port –– that led to the Jan. 8 grounding that killed one crewman and injured almost everyone on board, 29 of them seriously enough to require hospital care.

“The navigation and command teams on SFO (San Francisco) failed to develop and execute an effective voyage plan that would ensure the safe and prudent navigation of the ship,” says the Mishap Investigation Report, as it is known. “This was the fundamental cause of the grounding.”

The report paints a grim picture of the first minutes after the accident, when the engineer did not recognize the ship had lost almost all its speed — the speed indicator was stuck on 25 knots as a result of the crash — and did not take steps to compensate for the reduced maneuverability of a submarine at slow speeds.

“This could have had drastic consequences,” the report says. “Although this lack of action in maneuvering did not contribute to the grounding, it could have resulted in the loss of the ship and crew had the forward main ballast tanks not held enough air to provide upward momentum.”

Within six seconds of the crash, however, the crew had the submarine in an “emergency blow,” rising quickly to the surface, but with the bow down as much as 14 degrees as it climbed 525 feet in less than 90 seconds.

The report provides considerable insight into the damage aboard the ship, and estimates it will cost $88 million to repair, though it cautions, “an engineering assessment is in progress that could substantially change this estimate.”

The report notes that all four torpedo tube doors were deformed and inoperable; that 15 torpedoes and two Tomahawk missiles had to be repaired, that the sonar dome was smashed and mostly missing and that the sonar sphere was breeched, along with three main ballast tanks.

It also lists page after page of other damage, such as computers, lockers, lights and other equipment that was smashed by men flying through the air.

The report praised the ship for doing an exceptional job at making sure equipment was stowed properly before the accidents so loose gear was not turned into missiles, and for a response to both the mechanical and medical problems that was very effective.

•••

The report found fault with Submarine Squadron 15 in Guam, where the San Francisco is based, and with Submarine Group Seven in Yokosuka, Japan, which oversees Squadron 15.

There has been considerable griping within the submarine community that that the San Francisco crew has shouldered all the blame while higher-ups have escaped criticism.

Although the report placed the blame for the accident squarely on the navigation team and command team on the San Francisco, it found that the squadron and the group could have done more to prepare the ship for sea.

In particular, the report noted that the squadron “did not take adequate action to correct previously identified deficiencies in open ocean navigation onboard SFO,” and did not even require the ship to report what it was doing to fix the problems.

In addition, the squadron did not provide adequate oversight of the San Francisco's navigation performance because it was understaffed, with two positions unfilled, and the squadron assistant navigator was assigned to one of the other squadron submarines for most of the previous year.

The report also notes the document known as a “Subnote” from the Group, which laid out a path and average speed, was delivered to the ship two-and-a-half days before San Francisco sailed, and the Group's own requirements are that it be to the ship three to five days before sailing.

But the report found the submarine captain spent as much time as he usually did reviewing the charts, as did other members of the navigation team, and that the timing of the Subnote did not contribute to the accident.

“Although the ship felt that the late delivery of the Subnote did not affect the method in which the voyage was planned, reviewed and approved, that is only because their process lacked the rigor to ensure such adequate voyage planning was accomplished,” the report concludes.

Capt. Matthew S. Brown, a spokesman for Adm. Walter F. Doran, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, said the Mishap Investigation Report is an internal document, intended as a quick review of an accident.

“I'm not going to discuss the contents of a report that is not releasable,” Brown said. He said the final command investigation will be out soon, perhaps within another week or two, “that will go into much greater detail.”

•••

San Francisco left Guam just before 8 a.m. Jan. 7, headed for a liberty port call in Brisbane, Australia, according to the report, prepared by a team led by Capt. Kenneth D. Walker, commander of the Pacific Naval Submarine Training Center, in the weeks immediately after the accident.

At 1:53 a.m. the morning of Jan. 8, the navigation team shifted to chart E2203, which generally showed water depths of 7,200 to 7,800 feet along its intended path. But less than five hours later, the ship's fathometer recorded a depth of 5,610 feet.

From 6 to 7 a.m., the soundings were all about 1,200 feet shallower than what was shown on the charts. At 7:30 a.m., the ship went to periscope depth to use the global positioning system to fix its position on the charts accurately, and submerged again at 9:48 a.m.

At 11 a.m. the fathometer reported 8,652 feet of water; at 11:15, 5,988 feet; at 11:30, just under 6,588 feet.

At 11:43:21 a.m., the San Francisco ran into an underwater mountain at a speed greater than 25 knots, just as the crew was finishing lunch.

Machinist Mate 2nd Class Joseph Allen Ashley was killed as he was thrown into a large piece of equipment in the machinery spaces. Dozens of others were seriously wounded, and “nearly all of the 138 crew members suffered some sort of injury,” according to the report.

The investigation team faulted the San Francisco for not recognizing the shoaling water and for not becoming more cautious when the depths that were showing up on the fathometer did not match what was on the chart.

And it said the submarine should probably have been doing more than one sounding every 15 minutes — and certainly should have done one when the submarine changed its depth from 400 to 525 feet at 11:39.

“Had they taken a sounding at this point (four minutes prior to the grounding) it is likely that the sounding would have indicated a depth significantly shallower than charted water depth,” the report found.

A more serious problem emerged from a review of the use of charts on the San Francisco, the investigation found.

“All members of the (San Francisco's) navigation team believed that the E2202 chart was the best information available and that it was based on extensive U.S. Navy surveys,” the report found. “This assumption was invalid.”

In fact, the investigation team said, there was a notation that some of the features on the chart might be off by as much as three nautical miles, and the submarine had at least three other charts on board of the same area that showed an area of “muddy water” that was an indication of a seamount.

“The only chart on which this report does not appear is E2202, the chart in use at the time of the grounding,” the report says.

The investigation also found that the navigation team did not understand the nature of the hazards in the Caroline Island chain, where the accident occurred. Generally ships are told to use caution within 12 nautical miles of land; the San Francisco team was under the impression that two miles was sufficient.

•••

San Francisco had one of the most advanced navigation tools available today in the submarine force, the VMS. Though the system was not certified as a primary navigation tool, the ship could have programmed its Subnote into the system.

“Had this been done, the ship would have received a warning, alerting them to the presence of a navigational hazard along the ship's track,” the report says.

It found that the failure to use VMS was “the result of a lack of training, lack of adequate procedures and lack of supervision by both the internal and external chains of command.”

The report found that the Subnote did route the San Francisco through the area where it hit the seamount, and it recommends that in the future the group take more care to route submarines around known navigational hazards. It also said the Subnote “specifically states that navigational safety is not provided by the Subnote and rests with the ship.”

“Each member (of the navigation team) had an initial reaction of unease when viewing the charted transit through the Caroline Islands,” the report says. “However, each member convinced himself, without careful assessment of risk and evaluation of possible offsets, that the transit could be made safely as laid out on their chart.”

“After failing to conduct a proper assessment, the ship was left with a ‘business as usual' attitude exemplified by the CO's comment that he was operating on a 40 (nautical mile)-wide highway,” it continues.

The investigation also rejected the notion that the average speed laid out in the Subnote was too high, even though it was higher than the average in the last 30 Subnotes issued by Group Seven. In fact, at the time of the grounding, San Francisco was almost 40 miles ahead of where it had to be, and was going faster than required for operational considerations.