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**lemontree** · 07 Feb 05,, 11:34

Ethnic cleansing by West Pakistanis. Below picture of a Pakistani soldier checking for proof of Hindu or Muslim (circumcision), in East Pakistan 1971.

**lemontree** · 07 Feb 05,, 11:36

**Samudra** · 07 Feb 05,, 11:47

Joe Galloway: Rest in Peace Archer Blood, American Hero
http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,...110304,00.html

November 3, 2004
Arch Blood was 81 years old and a retired diplomat. He might have had an unremarkable if satisfying career, moving from Greece to Germany to Afghanistan to New Delhi, but in the bloody year of 1971 he found himself consul-general in Dhaka, East Pakistan.

There Blood witnessed the beginning of a massacre that would take hundreds of thousands if not millions of lives. The Pakistan army, faced with an incipient rebellion among the Bengalis, slaughtered thousands in a pre-emptive attack on the University of Dacca and the barracks of Bengali police. Columns of troops followed the roads throughout the country, burning and killing.

Blood in his first cable described what he termed a "selective genocide," alerted President Richard Nixon and national security adviser Henry Kissinger to what was happening and urged them to pressure Gen. Yahya Khan, the Pakistani dictator, to stop the killing.

His cable, dated March 28, 1971, was declassified last year. In it Blood wrote: "Here in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror of the Pak military ..."

The trouble was that Nixon and Kissinger had tilted toward Pakistan as a counter to Soviet influence in the subcontinent. The administration didn't want to hear what Blood was reporting.

That cable was followed by another, signed by 20 Americans stationed in East Pakistan with various U.S. government agencies, decrying the official American silence as serving "neither our moral interests broadly defined nor our national interests narrowly defined ..."

Blood did not sign that cable, but he added a footnote subscribing fully to the views it expressed and then wrote prophetically: "I believe the most likely eventual outcome of the struggle under way in East Pakistan is a Bengali victory and the consequent establishment of an independent Bangladesh." He argued strongly against "pursuing a rigid policy of one-sided support to the likely loser."

Nixon chose an option of trying to help Khan negotiate a settlement with the Bengalis, but added, in his own handwriting, "To all hands: DON'T squeeze Yahya at this time." So nobody in authority squeezed Yahya Khan, the killings continued and 20 million Bengali refugees poured into India.

To counter reports of the army's massacre, the Pakistanis brought in a few foreign journalists for a tightly controlled tour that it said would prove that it was actually Bengali Hindus slaughtering non-Bengali Muslims. At the end of the tour the reporters would be packed off without hearing any other stories.

I was on that trip. At the end of the tour, on ancient crop-duster planes literally coated with DDT, I simply declared myself deathly ill and refused to leave. Security was heavy when I left the hotel and so it was too dangerous to interview on the streets, but they couldn't follow me into the American consulate.

There I met Arch Blood, who told me that he had been officially "silenced" by Washington, but that my suspicions of a continuing slaughter of Bengalis by the Pakistan army were quite correct.

Blood said he couldn't speak, but he had scores of Bengalis on the consulate staff. He pointed to an office across the hall and said: "It's yours for as long as you need it. Those staffers who want to tell you their stories will come visit you there."

For the better part of a day I listened to men and women who wept as they told how parents, siblings, even children had died in Dhaka and in towns from Chittagong to Naryanganj to the hill country tea plantations. When my plane lifted off from Dhaka I began banging out a lead I still remember:

"Fear, fire and the sword are the only things holding East and West Pakistan together ... "

I never saw Arch Blood again, but I never met a more upright and courageous diplomat. Not long after that he was called back to Washington and put in the doghouse, for as long as Nixon was in the White House.

In 1971 his colleagues in the American Foreign Service voted Arch K. Blood the recipient of the Christian A. Herter Award for "initiative, integrity, intellectual courage and creative dissent."

His death made headlines in Bangladesh, the nation that emerged in 1971 as Blood predicted. A delegation of Bengalis attended his memorial service in Fort Collins, Colo. His wife, Margaret, has been swamped with mail from Bangladesh.

Arch Blood spread the news of a new nation being born amid calamity. He ought to be remembered as an American hero as well.

**Jay** · 07 Feb 05,, 16:27

Missing links of history

Brigadier General M. Sakhawat Hussain

On 15th December 2003, ARY Digital TV network, a Pakistani owned private TV station that beams from Dubai, aired a program that no Pakistani or Pakistani media had done before. It was an interview based TV talk show that centered on a few characters that played keys role in military operations in the then East Pakistan in 1971. Not only Pakistanis, but one of the Bangladeshi stalwarts, the only surviving sector commander and post Liberation Chief of Army Staff, Major General KM Shafiullah also participated in voicing his opinion. In his interview General Shafiullah in brief explained the aim and objective and the circumstances that led to Bengali resistance to Pakistani brutality that led to the War of Independence.

The TV programme was designed to dig out the 'missing links' of the story around the fall of Dhaka and emergence of Bangladesh, particularly in the Pakistani perspective and inform young Pakistanis what twist that history took to break, in presenter's opinion, the largest Muslim country in the world, by trying to put some missing links together.

The compere of the program raised couple of pertinent questions. One of those was a very pointed allegation on his Pakistani guests, two of the infamous generals involved in the Bengali massacre, Major General Rao Farman Ali, Civil Affairs adviser to the then governor of East Pakistan, and the last Pakistani Commander Eastern Command, Lieutenant General AAK Niazi, the man who surrendered to the joint Indo-Bangla command on 16th December 1971. It may be mentioned that that was the last phone-in interview of these two infamous generals, a week before their death. The only other civilian person interviewed, was Mr. Saleh Khaled then SSP of Dhaka.

However, the TV program was laudable in that it tried to extract some vital information from two main characters i.e. Generals Farman Ali and Niazi in a bid to find the missing link of the black history of Pakistan. The two issues that formed the basis of the programme were one, who was responsible for killing of the Bengali intellectuals. Two, who is to be blamed for the actions that saw the end of united Pakistan?

It was Rao Farman Ali, first to be interviewed, who blamed the trio, General Yahya, Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and General Pirzada for the Bangladesh crisis. For the military defeat he blamed General AAK Niazi.
However, Farman Ali was asked about his role in the killings of the Bengali intellectuals on 14 December 1971, couple of days prior to the liberation. Farman Ali partly denied his connivance with this gruesome cold-blooded execution that rivals Hitler's SS force but he inclined to make Niazi culpable for the crime. What the General said as an effort to clear his name was that it was the work of al-Badr anti-liberation militia, and he only came to know about that once he was in the Indian POW camp. He rather sheepishly agreed that he did control the movement of this militia raised and armed by Civil Affairs Adviser's office. Al-Badr was essentially controlled by Jamat-e-Islami, but Farman Ali totally declined the suggestion that he did move or authorise any armed group to seize any one from Dhaka University area. But the factual position was that Farman Ali, having been the Civil Affairs Adviser, controlled the operation of such armed militia that operated in support of the Pakistani authority.

What happened in 14th December 1971 could not have taken place without the connivance of the Pak Military oligarchy. In his disposition he said that after the resignation of the governor in first week of December, he (Farman Ali) moved inside Dhaka cantonment where he found Niazi listing people to be arrested to which he (Farman) wanted to intervene suggesting that when the Indian army was within striking distance of Dhaka there was hardly any time to indulge in such a foolhardy operation. What Farman Ali implied was that it was Niazi who could have done such an atrocious act but he could not ascertain the names that Niazi insisted on arresting prior to surrender.

To the charge of intellectual killings Niazi denied to have had any hand. What transpired from the interview was that, among these two, any one of them could have had a hand in the most coward and un-soldierly act. History however records the name of Rao Farman Ali who had total control on the events of then East Pakistan and the anti-liberation forces, arming and training them as the Civil Affair Adviser to the provincial government. Be that as it may, the question that remains unanswered is why these intellectuals were killed couple of day before the surrender of Pakistani troops when for the entire duration of the liberation war these celebrities never left their premises? The irony is that no inquiry was ever held in Pakistan to ascertain the conduct of their officers in a war that they had lost. This could have helped Pakistan army to shed the historical burden that they will carry for generations.

However, when asked whom they would hold responsible for 1971, all the Pakistanis interviewed had no hesitation in pointing that it was Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who had misguided Generals Yahya Khan, Hamid and Pirzada. Mr. Bhutto proved to be a power-hungry man, who not only tacitly supported the military action but also planned the action in advance before he left Dhaka under the cover of darkness on 25th March 1971. On reaching Karachi he had thanked God for saving Pakistan, a phrase that is still haunting Pakistani politics.

A very interesting piece of information that Farman Ali revealed was Bhutto's ambition to be in power. Farman Ali, who met Bangabandhu in one of the political parleys that was taking place in the Governor's house, told the general that Mr. Bhutto had cajoled Awami League to assure him of the presidency but Mujib declined to commit as he (Mujib) is said to have told Bhutto that it was the parliamentary committee to decide. Farman Ali further said that the Awami League had some one else in mind to appoint as president of Pakistan. The LFO for drafting constitution provision for a West Pakistani president in case of a East Pakistani prime minister and vice versa. One could take Farman Ali's statement as nearer to fact as he had access to both the leaders, though as he stated, he never attended any political parleys. In sum and substance General Farman Ali absolved Sk. Mujibur Rahman and the Bengalis as responsible for the event.

What these two main players of 1971 events revealed would burden Pakistan history for betrayal with their people for generations to come. What the Bengalis aspired in 1970 election was minimum of autonomy within Pakistan but that was denied by those who had played little a part in creating Pakistan.

Yet the then East Pakistan was considered a burden for Pakistan since exploitative policies faced challenges from Bengalis. It was the Pakistani ruling elites who were even ready to trade off the majority province for rest of Kashmir. The fact that West Pakistan was more than willing to leave East Pakistan at its 'mercy' was well documented by Lieutenant General AAK Niazi in his book 'Betrayal of East Pakistan' where he exposed how over the years Pakistani policy makers became less interested to keep Pakistan united. Niazi writes, "immediately after 1970 elections Mr. Bhutto had asked MM Ahmed, advisor Economic Affairs Division, and Mr. Qamar-ul Islam, Deputy Chairman Planning Commission, to prepare a paper for him ( Bhutto) to prove that West Pakistan could flourish without East Pakistan.

However, the question remains why is that we could not foresee the events that had clear indication of the execution of the plan? The political build up prior to the war of liberation had no plans incorporated to resist the probable military onslaught. The fact is well documented even by those who led the War of Liberation and confirmed from the statement of Rao Farman Ali. He said that Bangabandhu was working for a political agreement and a minimum of his earlier 'six point' till last.

The fact remains that Bangladeshis were hardly prepared to face the military onslaught on night 25th March 1971. It was a handful of Bengali members of the Armed Forces, EPR (East Pakistan Rifles) and Police who took up arms to initiate the war of liberation and provide space for politicians to render political support. Major General KM Shafiullah substantiated the fact when he spoke at the TV talk show. Major General KM Shafiullah, categorically stated that they remained loyal to Pakistan Army till the army he was part of launched murderous attacks on unarmed Bengalis. It was sheer patriotism of Bengalis that motivated them, not necessarily under any particular ideology.

It was a people's struggle. And struggle continues to achieve excellence as a forward-looking nation in the world community.

http://www.thedailystar.net/supplime..._day/vic12.htm

**Jay** · 07 Feb 05,, 16:46

The following are the excerpts of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, published in the latest issue of weekly magazine India Today:

This commission of Inquiry was appointed by the President of Pakistan in December, 1971 to inquire into and find out �the circumstances in which the Commander, Eastern command, surrendered and the members of the Armed Forces of Pakistan under his command laid down their arms and a ceasefire was ordered along the borders of West Pakistan and India and along the ceasefire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.� After having examined 213 witnesses the Commission submitted its report in July 1972.

(MY COMMENTS)>> Intrestingly a commission of inquiry was not set up for the alleged rape/torture/killings in then East Bengal.

Glaring cases of moral lapses amongst officers posted in East Pakistan
(1) Lt. Gen A.A.K. Niazi

14. In the Main Report we have mentioned the allegations, and the evidence relating thereto as regards the personal conduct of Gen Yahya Khan, Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan the late Maj Gen (Retd) Khuda Dad Khan, Lt. Gen A.A.K. Niazi, Maj Gen Jehanzeb and Brig Hayatullah. We wish to supplement those observations as regards Lt. Gen Niazi.

15. From a perusal of Paragraphs 30 to 34 of Chapter 1 of Part V of the Main Report, it will be seen that the graveness of the allegations made against Lt. Gen. Niazi is that he was making money in the handling of Martial Law cases while posted as G.O.C Sialkot and later as G.O.C and Martial Law Administrator at Lahore; that he was on intimate terms with one Mrs. Saeeda Bukhari of Gulberg, Lahore, who was running a brothel under the name of Senorita Home, and was also acting as the General's tout for receiving bribes and getting things done; that he was also friendly with another woman called Shamini Firdaus of Sialkot who was said to be playing the same role as Mrs. Saeeda Bukhari of Lahore; that during his stay in East Pakistan he came to acquire a stinking reputation owing to his association with women of bad repute, and his nocturnal visits to places also frequented by several junior officers under his command; and that he indulged in the smuggling of Pan from East Pakistan to West Pakistan. These allegations were made before the Commission by Abdul Qayyum Arif (witness No. 6), Munawar Hussain, Advocate of Sialkot (Witness No. 13), Abdul Hafiz Kardar (Witness No. 25), Maj Sajjadul Haq (Witness No. 164), Squadron Leader C.A Wahid (Witness No. 57) and Lt. Col Haliz Ahmad (Witness NO. 147).

16. During the present phase of our inquiry damaging evidence has come on the record regarding the ill repute of General Niazi in sex matters, and his indulgence in the smuggling of Pan. A mention may be made in this behalf of the statements made before us by Lt. Col. Mansoorul Haq (Witness No. 260), ex GSO-I, 9 div. Lt Cdr. A.A. Khan (Witness No. 262), of Pakistan navy, Brig I.R Shariff (Witness No. 269) former Comd. Engrs. Eastern Command, Mr. Mohammad Ashraf (Witness No. 275) former Addl. D.C. Dacca, and Lt. Col. Aziz Ahmad Khan (Witness No. 276). The remarks made by this last witness are highly significant: "The troops used to say that when the Commander (Lt. Gen. Niazi) was himself a raper, how could they be stopped. Gen. Niazi enjoyed the same reputation at Sialkot and Lahore."

17. Maj Gen Qazi Abdul Majid Khan (Witness No. 254) and Maj Gen Farman Ali (Witness No. 284) have also spoken of Gen Niazi's indulgence in the export of Pan. According to Maj Gen Abdul Majid, Brig Aslam Niazi, commanding 53 Bde, and Senior Superintendent of Police Diljan, who was residing with Gen Niazi in the Flag Staff House at Dacca, were helping Gen Niazi in the export of Pan. Maj Gen Farman Ali has gone to the extent of stating that "Gen Niazi was annoyed with me because I had not helped him in Pan business. Brig Hamiduddin of PIA had complained to me that Corps Headquarter was interfering in transportation of Pan to West Pakistan by placing limitation on poundage. I told ADC to Gen Niazi, who visited me in my office, that this was a commercial matter and should be left to the arrangements arrived at between PIA and Pan exporters." We understand that the insinuation is that a son of Gen Niazi was engaged in the export of Pan from East Pakistan to West Pakistan. According to Major S.S. Haider (Witness NO. 259) and Brig Atta Mohammed (Witness No. 257) even Brig Baqir Siddiqui, Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, was a partner of Gen Niazi in the export of Pan.

18. The allegations mentioned in the preceding paragraphs were put to Lt. Gen. Niazi during his appearance before us, and he naturally denied them. When asked about his weakness for the fair sex, he replied, "I say no. I have been doing Martial Law duties. I never stopped anybody coming to see me. I became very religious during the East Pakistan trouble. I was not so before. I though more of death than these things."

19. As regards the allegation that he was indulging in the export of Pan, he stated that he had ordered an enquiry into the matter on the complaint of a man called Bhuiyan who was aggrieved by the monopoly position occupied by the Pan exporters. He alleged that in fact Brig Hamiduddin and PIA staff were themselves involved in the smuggling of Pan.

20. From the mass of evidence coming before the Commission from witnesses, both civil and military, there is little doubt that Gen. Niazi unfortunately came to acquire a bad reputation in sex matters, and this reputation has been consistent during his postings in Sialkot, Lahore and East Pakistan. The allegations regarding his indulgence in the export of Pan by using or abusing his position in the Eastern Command and as Zonal Martial Law Administrator also prima facie appear to be well-founded, although it was not our function to hold a detailed inquiry into the matter. It is for the Government to decide whether these matters should also form the subject of any inquiry or trial which may have to be ultimately held against this officer.

**Jay** · 07 Feb 05,, 17:59

And the following were the justifications (even if they so, it aint) the commission gave for the grave human rights abuses and genocide conducted by the Pakistani Army...

Provocation of the army

7. We mention these facts not in justification of the atrocities or other crimes alleged to have been committed by the Pakistani Army during its operations in East Pakistan, but only to put the record straight and to enable the allegations to be judged in their correct perspective. The crimes committed by the Awami League miscreants were bound to arouse anger and bitterness in the minds of the troops, especially when they were not confined to barracks during these weeks immediately preceding the military action, but were also subjected to the severest of humiliations. They had seen their comrades insulted, deprived of food and ration, and even killed without rhyme or reason. Tales of wholesale slaughter of families of West Pakistani officers and personnel of several units had also reached the soldiers who were after all only human, and reacted violently in the process of restoring the authority of the Central Government

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**Jay** · 07 Feb 05,, 18:00

The nature of allegations

8. According to the allegations generally made, the excesses committed by the Pakistani Army fall into the following categories:- a) Excessive use of force and fire power in Dacca during the night of the 25th and 26th of March 1971 when the military operation was launched.
b) Senseless and wanton arson and killings in the countryside during the course of the "sweeping operations" following the military action.
c) Killing of intellectuals and professionals like doctors, engineers, etc and burying them in mass graves not only during early phases of the military action but also during the critical days of the war in December 1971.
d) Killing of Bengali Officers and men of the units of the East Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles and the East Pakistan Police Force in the process of disarming them, or on pretence of quelling their rebellion.
e) Killing of East Pakistani civilian officers, businessmen and industrialists, or their mysterious disappearance from their homes by or at the instance of Army Officers performing Martial Law duties.
f) Raping of a large number of East Pakistani women by the officers and men of the Pakistan army as a deliberate act of revenge, retaliation and torture.
g) Deliberate killing of members of the Hindu minority.

**Jay** · 07 Feb 05,, 18:12

Substance of Evidence

10) Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, apparently in an endeavour to put the blame on his predecessor, then Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan, stated that "military action was based on use of force primarily, and at many places indiscriminate use of force was resorted to which alienated the public against the Army. Damage done during those early days of the military action could never be repaired, and earned for the military leaders names such as "Changez Khan" and "Butcher of East Pakistan."

11. Another significant statement was made in this regard by Maj. Gen. Rao Barman Ali, Adviser to the Governor of East Pakistan namely: "Harrowing tales of rape, loot, arson, harassment, and of insulting and degrading behaviour were narrated in general terms.... I wrote out an instruction to act as a guide for decent behaviour and recommended action required to be taken to win over the hearts of the people. This instruction under General Tikka Khan's signature was sent to Eastern Command. I found that General Tikka's position was also deliberately undermined and his instructions ignored...excesses were explained away by false and concocted stories and figures."

12. About the use of excessive force on the night between the 25th and 26th March 1971, we have a statement from Brigadier Shah Abdul Qasim (witness No. 267) to the effect that "no pitched battle was fought on the 25th of March in Dacca. Excessive force was used on that night. Army personnel acted under the influence of revenge and anger during the military operation." It has also been alleged that mortars were used to blast two Residence Halls, thus causing excessive casualties. In defence, it has been stated that these Halls were at the relevant time not occupied by the students but by Awami League insurgents, and were also being used as dumps for arms and ammunition stored by the Awami League for its armed rebellion.

13. Still another significant statement came from Brigadier Mian Taskeenuddin (Witness No. 282): "Many junior and other officers took the law into their own hands to deal with the so-called miscreants. There have been cases of interrogation of miscreants which were far more severe in character than normal and in some cases blatantly in front of the public. The discipline of the Pakistani army as was generally understood had broken down. In a command area (Dhoom Ghat) between September and October miscreants were killed by firing squads. On coming to know about it I stopped the same forthwith."

14. Maj. Gen. Nazar Hussain Shah, GOC 16 Division, conceded that "there were rumours that Bengalis were disposed of without trial." Similarly, Brigadier Abdul Qadir Khan (Witness No. 243) Commander 93 (A)? admitted that "a number of instance of picking up Bengalis did take place." Lt. Col. S. S. H. Bokhari, CO of 29 Cavalry, appearing as Witness no 244, stated that "In Rangpur two officers and 30 men were disposed of without trial. It may have happened in other stations as well." An admission was also made by Lt. Col. S. M. Naeem (Witness No 258) CO of 39 Baluch that "innocent people were killed by us during sweep operations and it created estrangement amongst the public."

Indiscriminate killing and looting could only serve the cause of the enemies of Pakistan. In the harshness, we lost the support of the silent majority of the people of East Pakistan.... The Comilla Cantt massacre (on 27th/28th of March, 1971) under the orders of CO 53 Field Regiment, Lt. Gen. Yakub Malik, in which 17 Bengali Officers and 915 men were just slain by a flick of one Officer's fingers should suffice as an example.

There was a general feeling of hatred against Bengalis amongst the soldiers and officers including Generals. There were verbal instructions to eliminate Hindus. In Salda Nadi area about 500 persons were killed. When the army moved to clear the rural areas and small towns, it moved in a ruthless manner, destroying, burning and killing. The rebels while retreating carried out reprisals against non-Bengalis.

16. Several civilian officers have also deposed in a similar vein, and it would suffice to quote here the words of Mr. Mohammad Ashraf, Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dacca, to whose evidence we have also referred earlier in another context. He stated that "after the military action the Bengalis were made aliens in their own homeland. The life, property, and honour of even the most highly placed among them were not safe. People were picked up from their homes on suspicion and dispatched to Bangladesh, a term used to describe summary executions. .... The victims included Army and Police Officers, businessmen, civilian officers etc....There was no Rule of Law in East Pakistan. A man had no remedy if he was on the wanted list of the Army.... Army Officers who were doing intelligence were raw hands, ignorant of the local language and callous of Bengali sensibilities."

17. About the attitude of senior officers in this behalf, Brigadier Iqbalur Rehman Shariff (Witness no. 269), has alleged that during his visit to formations in East Pakistan General Gul Hassan used to ask the soldiers "how many Bengalis have you shot".

18. The statements appearing in the evidence of Lt. Col. Aziz Ahmed Khan (Witness no 276) who was Commanding Officer 8 Baluch and then CO 86 Mujahid Battalion are also directly relevant. "Brigadier Arbbab also told me to destroy all houses in Joydepur. To a great extent I executed this order. General Niazi visited my unit at Thakargaon and Bogra. He asked us how many Hindus we had killed. In May, there was an order in writing to kill Hindus. This order was from Brigadier Abdullah Malik of 23 Brigade."

http://www.dawn.com/events/14aug2000/report/report2.htm

>>It goes and goes on about the un-officerly act of the Pakistani Army...its soldiers, officers and Commanders. Iraq episode is just a mole when compared with this mountain.

One question that may arise at the mind of the readers, how many officers of the Pakistani Army were charged with murder and rape of innocent civilians??

I believe the answer would be none, coz there are not many reports that talk about legal actions against the Generals and commanding officers outlined above.

**Jay** · 07 Feb 05,, 18:24

A partial list of Pakistani military officers who committed Genocide in Bangladesh in 1971

Here is a list of Pakistani military personnel involved in mass killings in occupied Bangladesh from March 25 through December 16, 1971. This partial list was prepared solely from reading the accounts of Brigadier Z.A. Khan who himself was an accomplice in Pakistan's genocidal military. Brigadier Khan's account was published in News From Bangladesh in early March in seven part series. This ex-military officer of Pakistan wrote in vivid details the untold tales of destruction and subjugation of Bengali nation. The surviving ex- military officers from the list should be brought to justice because they have committed crime against humanity. A few of the generals and most young officers of the day are still alive in Pakistan. They should know that while they had all but forgotten their misdeeds the Bengalis remember them very well. Like holocaust survivor who hunted the Nazis till this day, the Bengalis will also do the same to bring these criminals to justice. South Asia will be a better place for our descendents once these criminals are brought to justice - alive or posthumously.

Here is the partial list:
The Generals
1. General Yahya Khan, military president of Pakistan in 1971. He refused to transfer power to Awami League after the general election of December 10, 1970, when Awami League had won the general election.
2. General Abdul Hamid Khan, Chief of Army Staff (CAS), was one of the architects of Bangladesh Genocide. This general, popularly known as General Hamid (or Hameed) was in Dacca before March 26, 1971, working on a military plan to terrorize Bengalis. He also visited occupied Bangladesh several times to see firsthand the progress of the killing machine.
3. Lt. General Gul Hassan Khan, Chief of General Staff (CGS), Pakistani Army. Contrary to what he might have said, he was one of the principal architects of Bangladesh Genocide. His very presence in troubled land of Chittagong during the early days of Bengali resistance proves beyond any shadow of doubt that he was an active planner of Bangladesh Genocide.
4. Lt. General Tikka Khan, military chief in East Pakistan during March through December 1971. Planner and Chief Executioner of Bangladesh Genocide. He later became Governor of East Pakistan.
5. Lt. General A.A. Niazi, Planner and Executioner of Bangladesh Genocide. He joined the occupation force later. His soldiers burned the villages and killed thousands of Bengalis throughout rural Bangladesh
6. Lt. General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan.
7. Major General Rao Farman, Military Intelligence Chief in East Pakistan during March through December, 1971. Planner and Executioner of Bangladesh Genocide.
8. Major General A. O. Mitha. This general was everywhere in occupied Bangladesh causing destruction and death. This person had practically managed the killing machine of Pakistani army in erstwhile East Pakistan. He joined the army high command in Dacca in early March 1971. He was brought from West Pakistan solely for the death and destruction of Bengalis in East Pakistan.
9. Major General Khadim Hussain Raja. He suspected Brigadier Mazumdar, a Bengali officer, of siding with Bengalis. He came all the way from west Pakistan to arrest Brigadier Mazumdar. He later became chief of Chittagong operation for Pak Army.
10. Major General Akbar, Director General, ISI. He helped Pak Army carry out the Genocide by providing intelligence data. Major General M. Rahim Khan took control 14 Division and replaced Major General Khadim Hussain Raja. His forces were responsible for all the killings done in Mymensing-Dacca-Jessore area. This general was a first rate executioner of Bangla Genocide. He was responsible for atrocities committed along the Dacca-Bhairav Bazaar Railway line.
11. Major General Rahim Khan, Commander of 14 Division, was stationed in Dacca. His officers and soldiers were very much involved in Army-led Bangladesh Genocide. In June 1971, he was transferred from being the Divisional Chief of 14 Division to Martial law Headquarters in Dacca.

The Officers
1. Brigadier Ghulam Jilani Khan, Chief of Staff (COS) of Eastern Command. He was an active person and was a part of planner of Bangladesh Genocide. He was a key person who knew every bit detail of the plan to exterminate Bengalis in the occupied land. During liberation period (in June 1971) he was promoted to the rank of Major General and was given the position of Director General, ISI in West Pakistan.
2. Brigadier Jehanzeb Arbab (later become Lt. General in Pakistan) aided the abduction of Sheikh Mujib.
3. Brigadier Iqbal Shafi, 53rd Brigade assaulted Bengalis in the Feni area. Later he moved to Chittagong area to help crush Bengali resistance.
4. Brigadier Asghar Hussain, 205 Brigade, was active in Chittagong area.
5. Brigadier Hesky Baig was very active in the Chittagong Port Area.
6. Brigadier Sherullah Beg was the Commander of Special Service Group and was stationed in Dacca.
7. Brigadier Ghulam Muhammad took over the command of Special Service Group from Brigadier Sherullah Beg sometime in May 1971.
8. Brigadier N.A. Hussain was the Chief of 27 Brigade in Mymensingh. All killings in that part of occupied land including Madhupur Garh was done by his soldiers.
9. Lt. Colonel Z.A. Khan (later become Brigadier in Pakistan) was very active in Chittagong and Chittagong Hill Tracts Area. He was the Commander of 3 Commando Battalion in Rangamati under Division 14.
10. Lt. Colonel Yakub Malik, Commanding Officer 53 Field Regiment Artillery, was very active in Comilla area.
11. Lt. Colonel A.H. Fatmi, Commanding Officer of 20 Baluch
12. Lt. Colonel Rathore of Signal Corps was active in Chittagong city area.
13. Lt. Colonel Shakur Jan was very active in Bhairav Bazaar area. He took active part in landing Pak army to Ashuganj side of Bhairav Bazaar railway bridge.
14. Lt. Colonel S.M. Naeem, Commanding Officer 39 Baluch Command, was very active in Brahamanbaria in late May 1971.
15. Lt. Colonel Jaffar Hussain visited occupied Bangladesh from Rawalpindi in June 1971. He was with Major General Mitha while visiting Dacca. He toured all over occupied land with the Major General.
16. Lt. Colonel Abdur Rehman (later was promoted to Brigadier in Pakistan) was the GSO 1 (Training) at eastern Command in Dhaka.
17. Lt. Colonel Iqbal Nazir Waraich came in June/July 1971 to take charge of 3 Commando Battalion in Rangamati.
18. Lt. Colonel Hanif Malik became the Commander of 2 Battalion in June/July 1971.
19. Colonel S. D. Ahmad. This person worked at the Martial Law Headquarters, Dacca at the time of crisis in March, 26, 1971. He was one of the executioners of Bangladesh genocide. He was involved in planning the abduction of Sheikh Mujib by the Pak military.
20. Colonel Akbar (later become Brigadier in Pakistan) was the GS of Eastern Command in Dacca.
21. Colonel Shigri, Officiating Commandant of the East Bengal Center in Chittagong
22. Major Shujauddin Butt was a part of Baluch Regiment but worked in Martial law Headquarters. At this headquarters dissident Bengalis picked up from all parts of Dacca were brought in. Most Bengalis never did come alive once brought to this place for questioning.
23. Major Bilal, Jangju Company, Pak Army, aided in planning Sheikh Mujib's abduction. Also, he took part in disarming 4 east Bengal Regiment.
24. Major Sultan (later become Lt. Colonel). He was the brigade major in Comilla.
25. Major Salman Ahmad, Ebrahim Company Commander. He was very familiar with the Headquarters of East Pakistan Rifles. He helped Pak Army to raid E.P. Rifles Headquarters.
26. Major Mohammad Iqbal (later become Brigadier in Pakistan), Ghazi Company Commander, was active in the Chittagong area.
27. Major Anees, 20 Baluch and 24 FF, was in Chittagong city.
28. Major Hedayet Ullah Jan, commander of 2 Commando battalion, was very active in Rangamati. He was aiding Lt. Colonel Z.A. Khan in Hill Tracts area to go after East Pakistan Riflemen who sided with Mukti Bahini.
29. Major Salman, 3 Commando Battalion, worked in the Chittagong area as an intelligence gathering agent for Pak Army.
30. Major Tariq Mahmood who later became Brigadier in Pakistan was Officer in Command, Parachute Training School, Dacca. He helped with aerial mobilization of Pak Army all across the occupied Bangladesh.
31. Major Beg, Ordnance Corps, was stationed in Chittagong.
32. Major Nadir was originally with Ordnance Corps but later transferred to the command of Lt. Colonel Z.A. Khan in Chittagong Hill Tracts. He was kept in Dacca by his supervisor, Lt. Col. Khan.
33. Captain Humayun. He also aided in planning Sheikh Mujib's abduction.
34. Captain Saeed, aided in the abduction of Sheikh Mujib.
35. Captain Sajjad Akbar of Hamza Company, stationed in Commilla.
36. Captain Kayani, 20 Baluch line, worked in Saeedpur-Bogra area.
37. Captain Zaidi (later become Brigadier in Pakistan), 2 Company Commando, also raided E.P. Rifles Headquarters.
38. Captain Parvez (later become Lt. Colonel in Pakistan), 2 Commando Battalion, was active in Chittagong area.
39. Captain Zahid (later become Brigadier in Pakistan), the GSO 3 of 53 Brigade in Rangamati.
40. Captain Munir worked with Lt. Colonel Z.A. Khan in Rangamati.
41. Lieutenant Haider of Hamza Company, Commilla.
42. Lt. Commander Akhtar (later became Captain) who secured Patenga Airport from E.P. Rifles

Non-Commissioned Officers:
1. Havaldar Major Khan Wazir. He was a member of a team to abduct Sheikh Mujib. He also physically assaulted Sheikh Mujib.
2. Subedar Ramzan was active in Kaptai Area.
3. Subedar Ramzan aided Captain Munir in Rangamati.
4. Subedar Major Zardad Khan was a part of 2 Commando Battalion stationed in Dacca.

Air Force Officers
1. Squadron Leader Abdul Munim Khan. This officer ran C-130 transport plane all across East Pakistan transporting Pakistani soldiers and food items.
2. Squadron Leader Shuaib Alam was Security in charge of Air Observer Unit, Tejgaon Airport.

Navy Officers
1. Commodore R.A. Mumtaz, stationed at Chittagong was the chief of navy in East Pakistan. Pakistan Navy aided the Army in the field of intelligence gathering, interrogating suspected Bengali freedom fighter.
2. Commander Tariq Kamal Khan (later he became Admiral and Chief of Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy) was stationed at Chittagong. He was the commander of PNS Jehangir, the destroyer. He helped the military with communication gears and firing at E.P. Rifle headquarters to crush Bengali resistance in Chittagong area.
3. Lt. Commander Shamoon Alam Khan was also working for ISI. He also helped Pak Army to recapture Rangamati.

The above list was prepared from the memoirs "The way it was" written by Brigadier Z.A. Khan of Pakistani Army. As a commander of a Commando Force, Brigadier Z.A. Khan was very active in the systematic extermination of Bengalis all over occupied Bangladesh in 1971.

http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Styx...pakwarcrim.htm

>>Disclaimer : This is a geocities source. It may not be accurate/neutral. Some of the names dont have any refrences to the criminal act, they just did their duty, fought for the Pakistani Army. But it goes with rest of the story and it quotes a Pakistani General's book on Bangladeshi War.

**hammer** · 07 Feb 05,, 19:25

its funny to see how pakistanis talk about human right violations and act as if they are the victims every chance they get after all those inhumane attrocities they committed against bangla muslims and hindus.

**~~lulldapull~~** · 07 Feb 05,, 19:59

:) Chalo jee, Indians nay apnee bhund key sustee bharraas nikal lee!

Anything else boys? or something still left?

**Ray** · 07 Feb 05,, 21:43

Roll it in.

Make it more complete.

I will download it on my hard disk for posterity.

Also check justice Hamdoor Rehman Commission report. This a Pakistan Govt report. Quite interesting.

it is very voluminous and I have it on a CD.

Google and maybe you could find it.

**Samudra** · 08 Feb 05,, 04:09

Case Study:
Genocide in Bangladesh, 1971

Summary

The mass killings in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) in 1971 vie with the annihilation of the Soviet POWs, the holocaust against the Jews, and the genocide in Rwanda as the most concentrated act of genocide in the twentieth century. In an attempt to crush forces seeking independence for East Pakistan, the West Pakistani military regime unleashed a systematic campaign of mass murder which aimed at killing millions of Bengalis, and likely succeeded in doing so.

The background

East and West Pakistan were forged in the cauldron of independence for the Indian sub-continent, ruled for two hundred years by the British. Despite the attempts of Mahatma Gandhi and others to prevent division along religious and ethnic lines, the departing British and various Indian politicians pressed for the creation of two states, one Hindu-dominated (India), the other Muslim-dominated (Pakistan). The partition of India in 1947 was one of the great tragedies of the century. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed in sectarian violence and military clashes, as Hindus fled to India and Muslims to Pakistan -- though large minorities remained in each country.

The arrangement proved highly unstable, leading to three major wars between India and Pakistan, and very nearly a fourth fullscale conflict in 1998-99. (Kashmir, divided by a ceasefire line after the first war in 1947, became one of the world's most intractable trouble-spots.) Not the least of the difficulties was the fact that the new state of Pakistan consisted of two "wings," divided by hundreds of miles of Indian territory and a gulf of ethnic identification. Over the decades, particularly after Pakistani democracy was stifled by a military dictatorship (1958), the relationship between East and West became progressively more corrupt and neo-colonial in character, and opposition to West Pakistani domination grew among the Bengali population.

Catastrophic floods struck Bangladesh in August 1970, and the regime was widely seen as having botched (or ignored) its relief duties. The disaster gave further impetus to the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The League demanded regional autonomy for East Pakistan, and an end to military rule. In national elections held in December, the League won an overwhelming victory across Bengali territory.

On February 22, 1971 the generals in West Pakistan took a decision to crush the Awami League and its supporters. It was recognized from the first that a campaign of genocide would be necessary to eradicate the threat: "Kill three million of them," said President Yahya Khan at the February conference, "and the rest will eat out of our hands." (Robert Payne, Massacre [1972], p. 50.) On March 25 the genocide was launched. The university in Dacca was attacked and students exterminated in their hundreds. Death squads roamed the streets of Dacca, killing some 7,000 people in a single night. It was only the beginning. "Within a week, half the population of Dacca had fled, and at least 30,000 people had been killed. Chittagong, too, had lost half its population. All over East Pakistan people were taking flight, and it was estimated that in April some thirty million people [!] were wandering helplessly across East Pakistan to escape the grasp of the military." (Payne, Massacre, p. 48.) Ten million refugees fled to India, overwhelming that country's resources and spurring the eventual Indian military intervention. (The population of Bangladesh/East Pakistan at the outbreak of the genocide was about 75 million.)

On April 10, the surviving leadership of the Awami League declared Bangladesh independent. The Mukhta Bahini (liberation forces) were mobilized to confront the West Pakistani army. They did so with increasing skill and effectiveness, utilizing their knowledge of the terrain and ability to blend with the civilian population in classic guerrilla fashion. By the end of the war, the tide had turned, and vast areas of Bangladesh had been liberated by the popular resistance.

The gendercide against Bengali men

The war against the Bengali population proceeded in classic gendercidal fashion. According to Anthony Mascarenhas, "There is no doubt whatsoever about the targets of the genocide":

They were: (1) The Bengali militarymen of the East Bengal Regiment, the East Pakistan Rifles, police and para-military Ansars and Mujahids. (2) The Hindus -- "We are only killing the men; the women and children go free. We are soldiers not cowards to kill them ..." I was to hear in Comilla [site of a major military base] [Comments R.J. Rummel: "One would think that murdering an unarmed man was a heroic act" (Death By Government, p. 323)] (3) The Awami Leaguers -- all office bearers and volunteers down to the lowest link in the chain of command. (4) The students -- college and university boys and some of the more militant girls. (5) Bengali intellectuals such as professors and teachers whenever damned by the army as "militant." (Anthony Mascarenhas, The Rape of Bangla Desh [Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1972(?)], pp. 116-17.)

Mascarenhas's summary makes clear the linkages between gender and social class (the "intellectuals," "professors," "teachers," "office bearers," and -- obviously -- "militarymen" can all be expected to be overwhelmingly if not exclusively male, although in many cases their families died or fell victim to other atrocities alongside them). In this respect, the Bangladesh events can be classed as a combined gendercide and elitocide, with both strategies overwhelmingly targeting males for the most annihilatory excesses.

Younger men and adolescent boys, of whatever social class, were equally targets. According to Rounaq Jahan, "All through the liberation war, able-bodied young men were suspected of being actual or potential freedom fighters. Thousands were arrested, tortured, and killed. Eventually cities and towns became bereft of young males who either took refuge in India or joined the liberation war." Especially "during the first phase" of the genocide, he writes, "young able-bodied males were the victims of indiscriminate killings." ("Genocide in Bangladesh," in Totten et al., Century of Genocide, p. 298.) R.J. Rummel likewise writes that "the Pakistan army [sought] out those especially likely to join the resistance -- young boys. Sweeps were conducted of young men who were never seen again. Bodies of youths would be found in fields, floating down rivers, or near army camps. As can be imagined, this terrorized all young men and their families within reach of the army. Most between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five began to flee from one village to another and toward India. Many of those reluctant to leave their homes were forced to flee by mothers and sisters concerned for their safety." (Death By Government, p. 329.) Rummel describes (p. 323) a chilling gendercidal ritual, reminiscent of Nazi procedure towards Jewish males: "In what became province-wide acts of genocide, Hindus were sought out and killed on the spot. As a matter of course, soldiers would check males for the obligated circumcision among Moslems. If circumcised, they might live; if not, sure death."

**Samudra** · 08 Feb 05,, 04:14

Robert Payne describes scenes of systematic mass slaughter around Dacca that, while not explicitly "gendered" in his account, bear every hallmark of classic gender-selective roundups and gendercidal slaughters of non-combatant men:

In the dead region surrounding Dacca, the military authorities conducted experiments in mass extermination in places unlikely to be seen by journalists. At Hariharpara, a once thriving village on the banks of the Buriganga River near Dacca, they found the three elements necessary for killing people in large numbers: a prison in which to hold the victims, a place for executing the prisoners, and a method for disposing of the bodies. The prison was a large riverside warehouse, or godown, belonging to the Pakistan National Oil Company, the place of execution was the river edge, or the shallows near the shore, and the bodies were disposed of by the simple means of permitting them to float downstream. The killing took place night after night. Usually the prisoners were roped together and made to wade out into the river. They were in batches of six or eight, and in the light of a powerful electric arc lamp, they were easy targets, black against the silvery water. The executioners stood on the pier, shooting down at the compact bunches of prisoners wading in the water. There were screams in the hot night air, and then silence. The prisoners fell on their sides and their bodies lapped against the shore. Then a new bunch of prisoners was brought out, and the process was repeated. In the morning the village boatmen hauled the bodies into midstream and the ropes binding the bodies were cut so that each body drifted separately downstream. (Payne, Massacre [Macmillan, 1973], p. 55.)

Atrocities against Bengali women

As was also the case in Armenia and Nanjing, Bengali women were targeted for gender-selective atrocities and abuses, notably gang sexual assault and rape/murder, from the earliest days of the Pakistani genocide. Indeed, despite (and in part because of) the overwhelming targeting of males for mass murder, it is for the systematic brutalization of women that the "Rape of Bangladesh" is best known to western observers.

In her ground-breaking book, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape, Susan Brownmiller likened the 1971 events in Bangladesh to the Japanese rapes in Nanjing and German rapes in Russia during World War II. "... 200,000, 300,000 or possibly 400,000 women (three sets of statistics have been variously quoted) were raped. Eighty percent of the raped women were Moslems, reflecting the population of Bangladesh, but Hindu and Christian women were not exempt. ... Hit-and-run rape of large numbers of Bengali women was brutally simple in terms of logistics as the Pakistani regulars swept through and occupied the tiny, populous land ..." (p. 81).

Typical was the description offered by reporter Aubrey Menen of one such assault, which targeted a recently-married woman:

Two [Pakistani soldiers] went into the room that had been built for the bridal couple. The others stayed behind with the family, one of them covering them with his gun. They heard a barked order, and the bridegroom's voice protesting. Then there was silence until the bride screamed. Then there was silence again, except for some ****led cries that soon subsided. In a few minutes one of the soldiers came out, his uniform in disarray. He grinned to his companions. Another soldier took his place in the extra room. And so on, until all the six had raped the belle of the village. Then all six left, hurriedly. The father found his daughter lying on the string cot unconscious and bleeding. Her husband was crouched on the floor, kneeling over his vomit. (Quoted in Brownmiller, Against Our Will, p. 82.)

"Rape in Bangladesh had hardly been restricted to beauty," Brownmiller writes. "Girls of eight and grandmothers of seventy-five had been sexually assaulted ... Pakistani soldiers had not only violated Bengali women on the spot; they abducted tens of hundreds and held them by force in their military barracks for nightly use." Some women may have been raped as many as eighty times in a night (Brownmiller, p. 83). How many died from this atrocious treatment, and how many more women were murdered as part of the generalized campaign of destruction and slaughter, can only be guessed at (see below).

Despite government efforts at amelioration, the torment and persecution of the survivors continued long after Bangladesh had won its independence:

Rape, abduction and forcible prostitution during the nine-month war proved to be only the first round of humiliation for the Bengali women. Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman's declaration that victims of rape were national heroines was the opening shot of an ill-starred campaign to reintegrate them into society -- by smoothing the way for a return to their husbands or by finding bridegrooms for the unmarried [or widowed] ones from among his Mukti Bahini freedom fighters. Imaginative in concept for a country in which female chastity and purdah isolation are cardinal principles, the "marry them off" campaign never got off the ground. Few prospective bridegrooms stepped forward, and those who did made it plain that they expected the government, as father figure, to present them with handsome dowries. (Brownmiller, Against Our Will, p. 84.)

Strikingly similar and equally hellish scenes are described in the case-studies of genocide in Armenia and the Nanjing Massacre of 1937.

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