Eating Soup with a Spoon

[Shek]

ARMED FORCES JOURNAL - Eating soup with a spoon - September 2007 - LTC Gian P. Gentile

The Army's new manual on counterinsurgency operations (COIN), in many respects, is a superb piece of doctrinal writing. The manual, FM 3-24 "Counterinsurgency," is comparable in breadth, clarity and importance to the 1986 FM 100-5 version of "Operations" which came to be known as "AirLand Battle."

The new manual's middle chapters that pertain to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations are especially helpful and relevant to senior commanders in Iraq. But a set of nine paradoxes in the first chapter of the manual removes a piece of reality of counterinsurgency warfare that is crucial for those trying to understand how to operate within it.

The title of a highly regarded book on how to conduct counterinsurgency warfare, "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife," tries to convey in a sound-bite metaphor the complexity of counterinsurgency operations. The new COIN manual takes this premise further with its "paradoxes" of counterinsurgency warfare in the first chapter. These paradoxes, such as "the more you protect yourself, the less secure you are" and "tactical success guarantees nothing," are intended to wrench soldiers and Marines out of their Cold War-conventional-military-operations mind-set and thrust them into the world of complex counterinsurgency operations. The reader can imagine the authors of the manual sending them this pensive, subliminal message: "Hey you, American soldier or Marine. We know what you are thinking. We know that you want to go out and fight large-scale battles with tanks on tanks and infantry on infantry. But those days are over, and if you want to win in a counterinsurgency fight like Iraq, you must start thinking otherwise. So ingest the obvious contradictions in these paradoxes, embrace them, and you will have moved from the dark side into the light and will be ready to execute full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan and thus will be able to eat soup with a knife."

Yet the paradoxes actually deceive by making overly simple the reality of counterinsurgency warfare and why it is so hard to conduct it at the ground level for the combat soldier. The eminent scholar and strategic thinker Eliot Cohen noted that counterinsurgency war is still war, and war in its essence is fighting. In trying to teach its readers to eat soup with a knife, the COIN manual discards the essence and reality of counterinsurgency warfare fighting, thereby manifesting its tragic flaw.

[Shek]

This article's title is a play on LTC John A. Nagl's Amazon.com: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Books: John A. Nagl,Peter J. Schoomaker.

However, I found it a flawed article that misinterpret's FM 3-24. The first thing that jumped out at me was the appeal to authority fallacy:

The eminent scholar and strategic thinker Eliot Cohen noted that counterinsurgency war is still war, and war in its essence is fighting.

While I am certainly an Eliot Cohen fan, the ironic fact is that Eliot Cohen co-authored Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency, which spelled out the very paradoxes that LTC Gentile wants to criticize. If you want to appeal to Dr. Cohen's scholarly credentials, then it is curiously odd that you then want to flat out reject his thoughts on the same subject (counterinsurgency) in the very next sentence.

Next, he relies on a single anecdote to define how the paradoxes should be interpreted, through the use of a "senior officer" interpretation, as well as relying on some strawmen. Instead of rewriting my full thoughts on this, I'll just cut and paste another response on the article that I wrote last week:

however, the path that your argument uses to link the paradoxes and their potential impact on the moral/spiritual domain requires the use of a strawman – the claim that “tactical success guarantees nothing” should be read “accomplishes nothing.” If tactical success are not needed, then why would the manual not state that? However, this is not enough, and you then proceed to flail tactical failure by the counterinsurgent, which in no way, shape, or form is advised by the FM. So, your causal link between the tactical success paradox and a negative impact upon the morale of the fighting soldier requires a particular interpretation that removes the paradoxes from the reality of chapter in which you can find them.

Next, while recognizing that you have some great insights to offer about the moral/spiritual domain of soldiers at the unit level based on your squadron’s experience in Iraq, I don’t see how this experience provides you with any special insight on how to read and/or interpret the meaning the paradoxes (it can provide some special insights on how other officers serving in Iraq interpreted the paradoxes, but this is not the same as having a special line to the best reading of the paradoxes). As you look at your discussion of the paradoxes, you remove them from the reality of their purpose, which is to “stimulate thinking” and not to “limit it.” Additionally, you can read the ten pages prior to the paradoxes and find the following excerpts (emphasis mine):

Quote:
Originally Posted by FM 23-4
1-105. The purpose of America’s ground forces is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. Throughout history, however, the Army and Marine Corps have been called on to perform many tasks beyond pure combat; this has been particularly true during the conduct of COIN operations. COIN requires Soldiers and Marines to be ready both to fight and to build—depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors. The full spectrum operations doctrine (described in FM 3-0) captures this reality.

1-106. All full spectrum operations executed overseas—including COIN operations—include offensive, defensive, and stability operations that commanders combine to achieve the desired end state. The exact mix varies depending on the situation and the mission. Commanders weight each operation based on their assessment of the campaign’s phase and the situation in their AO. They shift the weight among these operations as necessary to address situations in different parts of the AO while continuing to pursue their overall objectives. (See figure 1-1.)

1-107. Offensive and defensive operations are integral to COIN. COIN differs from peacekeeping operations in this regard; indeed, this is a key point. In peacekeeping operations, combat is not expected and the goal is an absence of violence. In COIN, such an absence may actually mask insurgent preparations for combat. This was the case, for example, in the Sadr City area of Baghdad in 2003.

***

1-128. It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent. Clearly, killing or capturing insurgents will be necessary, especially when an insurgency is based in religious or ideological extremism. However, killing every insurgent is normally impossible. Attempting to do so can also be counterproductive in some cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge.

***

1-141. Any use of force generates a series of reactions. There may be times when an overwhelming effort is necessary to destroy or intimidate an opponent and reassure the populace. Extremist insurgent combatants often have to be killed. In any case, however, counterinsurgents should calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who wields it for any operation. An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents.

If one believes that the introductory chapter, of which the paradoxes are a part of, removes the reality that counterinsurgency doesn’t involve offensive operations or killing, then there is certainly an issue, but not one with the paradoxes.

Lastly, the senior officer example that you use involves a fundamental misinterpretation of the manual. As I indicated earlier, this is not an indictment of the manual, but rather, an indictment of the OES and OPMS that has allowed someone to advance through the ranks and to positions of responsibility that cannot holistically digest newly written doctrine or even worse, only reads a small segment of the manual. Paragraph 1-107 above clearly demonstrates that the statement by the senior officer to the reporter that "if we are shooting, we are not having a good day" is not categorically true.

I'd be curious as to other's thoughts on the subject.

[S2]

Shek Reply

Wow. I had to go to the SWJ discussion board and read the posts, re-read the nine paradoxes from FM 3-24, re-read Gentile's article, and read PRINCIPLES, IMPERATIVES, AND PARADOXES .

All to distill (for me) the discussion down to "fighting". COIN is war, and all wars devolve to fighting. The question becomes "what is fighting?" Must a rifle platoon leader ALWAYS equate "fighting" as an element of COIN warfare in strictly kinetic terms? Can he take the "fight" to the enemy as part of tactical offensive operations in ways and means other than violent and lethally charged operations? If so, can the moral and spiritual dimension of a soldier's perception be satisfied by other modes of "fighting", if properly explained by his leadership?

Your criticism of Gentile's interpretation of paradox 8- Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing- is sound. Gentile reaches deep to achieve his unusual conclusion given the straightforwardness with which this paradox is explained in FM 3-24.

I also found interesting the perception/criticism by Gentile of dogmatic application of TTPs grounded in the past, i.e. combat outposts as a legacy of the Algerian insurgency. He alludes to the strain imposed upon his squadron's troops by, I suppose, embracing this mis-applied COIN lesson at higher command levels. Too, he implies an absence of troops in the midst of the "surge". Fair enough. I never thought that the "surge" surged all that many anyway. Still, if so, combat outposts have proven an effective method to extend control deeper into the civilian populace with minimal forces. Certainly this is both worth trying and hardly dogmatic at this point. Talk to me five years hence when we are continuing a failed concept but, to date, it seems to be part of the equation of success we've recently experienced.

Interesting debate. SWJ is like a school of piranhas. I didn't look at the discussion board at AFJ yet, but I bet it's just as "interesting".

Poor guy. A peer, I see.:))

[Shek]

S-2,

LTC Gentile would contribute more at SWJ if he were less polemic. A recent editorial for the IHT (which was also posted to SWJ) was pretty solid. However, I would be curious as to how much he implemented the full gamet of prescriptions from the COIN FM (or for that matter, from Galula's book that is the COIN bible). For example, he states that he "surged" troops but didn't much for it. However, the question I would have is what population control measures were implemented? Was a census done? Was the movement of the population controlled ala a "gated" community (see the Colbert Report link in this post, http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/370875-post9.html, for more :) ). An incomplete execution of a strategy doesn't invalidate the strategy since it wasn't really tested.

[S2]

Shek Reply

"However, I would be curious as to how much he implemented the full gamet of prescriptions from the COIN FM (or for that matter, from Galula's book that is the COIN bible)."

Well, grab yourself a cup of coffee, walk down the hall and ask him.;) He's gotta know you post as "Shek". As for polemical- that was his intent, which is fair enough. Too bad for him, his contentions were poorly grounded and he's taking body shots.

[ofogs]

All to distill (for me) the discussion down to "fighting". COIN is war, and all wars devolve to fighting. The question becomes "what is fighting?" Must a rifle platoon leader ALWAYS equate "fighting" as an element of COIN warfare in strictly kinetic terms? Can he take the "fight" to the enemy as part of tactical offensive operations in ways and means other than violent and lethally charged operations? If so, can the moral and spiritual dimension of a soldier's perception be satisfied by other modes of "fighting", if properly explained by his leadership?

Sample size of one rifle PL here, but here's how it makes sense to me. As a caveat, while we prepared in full to own battlespace and conduct the full COIN fight, we're currently conducting convoy escort missions so I can't tell you much about how well this gels with the ground truth. With full warnings, here goes:

What is fighting?

War is a means to an end, it comes down to forcing an enemy to comply with my will. As an officer, I manage the elements of force and power at my disposal to bring about this result. It's not violence and killing for the sake of killing, but for a purpose. For that matter, I recognize there are many different ways to do this. At the tactical level, however, I also recognize what my IOBC 1SG told us: Always have a plan to kill everyone you meet. This is just a cool way of saying to always be prepared for any situation to become kinetic. It's much easier to be ready to go in hard and step back levels of force than the other way around.

Are there other ways to take the fight to the enemy?

Absolutely. To me, a lot of COIN revolves around Social Contract Theory, except in COIN, there are several elements in "negotiations" with the civilian population. My goal is to make my social contract offer the best, plus discredit the other options. Security is the foundation of the social contract, and allows everything else to flourish. I have plenty of military power at my disposal, but I can also use diplomatic powers through leader engagements and just day to day interaction with the population and involving the other organizations available to me. Additionally, a lot of this revolves around the IO campaign, both in Iraq AND with the rest of the world. As an organization, we are terrible at this. Is there a reason every terrorist organization has a website extolling their version of events and we can't do the same?

Can the moral and spiritual dimension of a soldier's perception be satisfied by other modes of "fighting", if properly explained by his leadership?

I had more trouble explaining some of these approaches to my platoon sergeant and some of my squad leaders than I did some of my newer soldiers. I think this was the result of a longer time in an institution which has now adjusted its focus, while the new guys recognize a lot of the changed requirements because this is the world they're growing up in. Also, the guys who had experienced Iraq three or four years ago and then gone to Afghanistan thought that since they'd been there then, they knew how it was now when, in fact, there has been a dramatic shift. Eventually, in my company, as the 1SG came around and we had some more recent Iraq vets trickle in, they were able to influence others who initially discounted the ideas. My PSG will tell you now that he's realized everything has changed since he was a squad leader in Afghanistan.

There is, and I suspect always will be, a culture with an emphasis on the "kinetic" side of things. While everyone recognizes the danger involved in the wish, they still all want to earn their CIBs.

[Cactus]

As a caveat, while we prepared in full to own battlespace and conduct the full COIN fight, we're currently conducting convoy escort missions so I can't tell you much about how well this gels with the ground truth.

ofogs,

How is the security situation in the countryside? Do your convoy escort range out into small-towns, villages and fields? Are Iraqis primarly urban dwellers, or rural dwellers, or uniformly distributed? What is the disposition of Iraqis outside the cities towards Americans? What are the chances of getting them to help in isolating cities?

Been meaning to ask these questions for a while now, sorry if it came out as being too inquisitive. The answers to these questions can have some significance to to this discussion, or maybe not.