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Army-Marine doctrine retools way U.S. fights beyond Iraq
JOHN MILBURN
Associated Press
FORT LEAVENWORTH, Kan. - Army officials say a new counterinsurgency doctrine should make soldiers and Marines better prepared to fight an atypical enemy but shouldn't be viewed as a roadmap for getting out of Iraq.
Two years in the making, it is the military's first major effort to combine chapters on low-intensity conflict, guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgencies contained in numerous documents from the past quarter century.
Written for battalion and division commanders, the manual discusses the tone and scope of counterinsurgencies, emphasizing a need to see operations as fighting a "three-block war." Additional documents outlining tactics, techniques and procedures will be produced.
"This isn't the silver bullet," said Col. Steve Boylan, spokesman for the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, where the manual is being produced.
Conrad Crane, director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa., said the new manual has "more of a bite to it," with some focus on Iraq and al-Qaida.
"There are some people out there that you have to kill or capture," he said. "There's been a reinforcement that there are some people who you aren't going win over."
The manual is to be published by mid-December, though a draft has been widely circulated since June and is being used by the Army and Marines, which are writing it together.
The authors say the manual shouldn't be viewed as competing with the Iraq Study Commission's recommendations or as the military rebuking strategies from Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, who has resigned.
Crane said suggestions from agencies outside the military, humanitarian groups and the media were key.
"From the beginning we tried to get a lot input from the different agencies to make counterinsurgency work," said Crane, one of the manual's authors. "The bottom line is this isn't just for Iraq."
The final version will reflect comments from more than 1,000 people who critiqued the June draft.
Anthony Cordesman, an Iraq analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, called the new manual "an absolutely critical step forward." But he also said: "It obviously isn't the answer to every problem."
The 167-page doctrine replaces an interim manual released in October 2004.
Army officials said after Vietnam, counterinsurgency fell to the special forces, trained in low-intensity warfare. The rest of the military focused on fighting a large-scale conventional war against the Soviet Union. Chapters in military doctrine were devoted to counterinsurgency, but other than a 1986 manual on guerrilla warfare, little else was produced in one volume.
After conflicts in Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq, officials saw a need for reshaping doctrine.
Maj. Barry Periatt, who coordinated the manual, said conditions on the ground will determine how U.S. forces function. The manual stresses that soldiers must build relationships and gather intelligence to assess an insurgency's strength and how to react.
"We just put it all together to come in focus with reality," Periatt said. "The situation is always changing. You can't afford to say, 'It was like this week; it's going to be like this next week.' You set yourself up for failure that way."
Boylan said the military is learning that while it's good at taking over land and destroying enemies, fighting insurgents isn't as easy as once thought.
"It's this part - nation building, counterinsurgency - which is the hard stuff that we haven't trained for," Boylan said. "That paradigm, where everybody thought if you can do the high-end you can do the low-end, was proven incredibly wrong, and now we're playing catch-up."
The first chapter sets the tone by tracing counterinsurgency efforts over the past century, including the U.S. cavalry's hunt for Geronimo and lessons from Vietnam.
Cordesman said the manual contains strategies that could help get the U.S. out of Iraq. But he said the military and policymakers must consider how their operations affect the populace, instead of just trying destroy the enemy.
"I think the worst thing people should do is try to find some magic answer for Iraq," he said.
Boylan said the document has been expedited because of demand as troops prepare for deployments to Iraq.
At Fort Riley, while one brigade of the 1st Infantry Division is scheduled to go to Iraq in 2007, another brigade is training military teams to advise Iraqi and Afghan forces. Periatt said both missions put the manual into effect.
Lt. Col. Patrick Frank, commander of 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, said the manual was vital to preparations for Iraq. Frank served in Iraq with the 101st Airborne Division. Frank called the manual "a must read for all of our leaders."
ON THE NET
Fort Leavenworth: http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/
Army-Marine doctrine retools way U.S. fights beyond Iraq
JOHN MILBURN
Associated Press
FORT LEAVENWORTH, Kan. - Army officials say a new counterinsurgency doctrine should make soldiers and Marines better prepared to fight an atypical enemy but shouldn't be viewed as a roadmap for getting out of Iraq.
Two years in the making, it is the military's first major effort to combine chapters on low-intensity conflict, guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgencies contained in numerous documents from the past quarter century.
Written for battalion and division commanders, the manual discusses the tone and scope of counterinsurgencies, emphasizing a need to see operations as fighting a "three-block war." Additional documents outlining tactics, techniques and procedures will be produced.
"This isn't the silver bullet," said Col. Steve Boylan, spokesman for the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, where the manual is being produced.
Conrad Crane, director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa., said the new manual has "more of a bite to it," with some focus on Iraq and al-Qaida.
"There are some people out there that you have to kill or capture," he said. "There's been a reinforcement that there are some people who you aren't going win over."
The manual is to be published by mid-December, though a draft has been widely circulated since June and is being used by the Army and Marines, which are writing it together.
The authors say the manual shouldn't be viewed as competing with the Iraq Study Commission's recommendations or as the military rebuking strategies from Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, who has resigned.
Crane said suggestions from agencies outside the military, humanitarian groups and the media were key.
"From the beginning we tried to get a lot input from the different agencies to make counterinsurgency work," said Crane, one of the manual's authors. "The bottom line is this isn't just for Iraq."
The final version will reflect comments from more than 1,000 people who critiqued the June draft.
Anthony Cordesman, an Iraq analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, called the new manual "an absolutely critical step forward." But he also said: "It obviously isn't the answer to every problem."
The 167-page doctrine replaces an interim manual released in October 2004.
Army officials said after Vietnam, counterinsurgency fell to the special forces, trained in low-intensity warfare. The rest of the military focused on fighting a large-scale conventional war against the Soviet Union. Chapters in military doctrine were devoted to counterinsurgency, but other than a 1986 manual on guerrilla warfare, little else was produced in one volume.
After conflicts in Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq, officials saw a need for reshaping doctrine.
Maj. Barry Periatt, who coordinated the manual, said conditions on the ground will determine how U.S. forces function. The manual stresses that soldiers must build relationships and gather intelligence to assess an insurgency's strength and how to react.
"We just put it all together to come in focus with reality," Periatt said. "The situation is always changing. You can't afford to say, 'It was like this week; it's going to be like this next week.' You set yourself up for failure that way."
Boylan said the military is learning that while it's good at taking over land and destroying enemies, fighting insurgents isn't as easy as once thought.
"It's this part - nation building, counterinsurgency - which is the hard stuff that we haven't trained for," Boylan said. "That paradigm, where everybody thought if you can do the high-end you can do the low-end, was proven incredibly wrong, and now we're playing catch-up."
The first chapter sets the tone by tracing counterinsurgency efforts over the past century, including the U.S. cavalry's hunt for Geronimo and lessons from Vietnam.
Cordesman said the manual contains strategies that could help get the U.S. out of Iraq. But he said the military and policymakers must consider how their operations affect the populace, instead of just trying destroy the enemy.
"I think the worst thing people should do is try to find some magic answer for Iraq," he said.
Boylan said the document has been expedited because of demand as troops prepare for deployments to Iraq.
At Fort Riley, while one brigade of the 1st Infantry Division is scheduled to go to Iraq in 2007, another brigade is training military teams to advise Iraqi and Afghan forces. Periatt said both missions put the manual into effect.
Lt. Col. Patrick Frank, commander of 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, said the manual was vital to preparations for Iraq. Frank served in Iraq with the 101st Airborne Division. Frank called the manual "a must read for all of our leaders."
ON THE NET
Fort Leavenworth: http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/