Why soldiers are not winning the war vs Abu Sayyaf

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Why soldiers are not winning the war vs Abu Sayyaf


By Ramon Tulfo
Inquirer
Last updated 04:38am (Mla time) 12/02/2006

Published on Page A20 of the December 2, 2006 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer

MY secretary, Janet Bandoy, was inconsolable yesterday after she received a text message from Barangay Danag, Daraga, in Albay province, saying that most of her relatives—uncles, aunts, cousins, nephews and nieces—were swept away by flash floods.

I couldn’t bear to see my secretary crying like a baby. But I couldn’t do anything but try to console her, to ease her pain.

I wanted to tell her bad things—tragedy, mishap, loss—that visit upon us happen for a reason. But I just kept quiet.

Life is an endless cycle of joy and sadness, victory and loss. Sometimes you’re up, and at other times you’re down.

Nothing in this world is permanent. If you’re sad now, soon enough, you will be happy; and if you’re victorious now, you will experience defeat later.

* * *

Here’s a word of advice to people in power: Use your power to help—not oppress—others.

As sure as the sun rises in the east and sets in the west, you will be out of power. And the persons you oppress today may become your oppressors tomorrow.

I’m not implying anything. I have become spiritual to think of getting back at my oppressors, given a chance.

* * *

The motto of the Philippine National Police (PNP) is “to serve and protect.”

But how do you expect policemen to protect citizens when they shoot their own?

Chief Insp. Renato Poscablo, a police doctor, shot and wounded his own boss, Chief Supt. Federico Damatac, inside Camp Crame, the PNP headquarters, during a gathering of PNP medical personnel.

Take note: the assailant was a doctor and his victim was also another doctor. Poscablo also shot and wounded other police doctors, and exploded a grenade that killed another officer, Senior Insp. Winnie Temprosa.

Aren’t doctors supposed to save lives and not take them away?

There must be something very wrong with an organization that makes even its doctor-member run amuck.

* * *

Here’s a tip to Armed Forces chief of staff, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, on why the military is not winning the war against the Abu Sayyaf bandits: Some of your officers and men are in cahoots with the bandits.
Take it from my source in the United States military acting as adviser to Philippine troops fighting the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan and Sulu.

My source said the US military advisers could only shake their heads in disbelief at what they had witnessed when a busload of guns and ammunition was donated by their soldiers to Filipino troops during a joint US-Philippine military exercise.

Some of the donated guns and ammo went missing, according to my source. An investigation conducted by US personnel disclosed that the guns were reportedly stolen by some Filipino soldiers and sold to the Abu Sayyaf.
In one of the joint war exercises, US troops pinpointed the exact location of Abu Sayyaf bandits through the satellite-based GPS tracking device, my source said. The site was just a few meters away from the Filipino soldiers.

No action was taken by the Filipinos even when they had the upper hand in terms of new weapons provided by the US, backed by the element of surprise, the source said.


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U.S., Philippines apply 'soft power' against militants

By Jonathan Lyons, Asia Security CorrespondentTue Dec 5, 4:05 PM ET

The map in the U.S. briefing room looks like standard-issue military, but the colour-coded markings are not shorthand for fighting units, defensive positions, or future lines of attack.

Rather, the patchwork of shaded circles and ovals across the figure-eight-shaped island of Jolo bespeak a different kind of warfare, one that Washington hopes will finally end the Muslim insurgency that has long plagued the southern Philippines.

"This is not about firing shots. This is about changing the conditions that give rise to terrorism," said Colonel David Maxwell, commander of the U.S. Joint Special Forces Task Force.

Where traditional tactics might dictate heavy deployment of troops, or destruction of local villages that can harbor insurgents, Filipino and U.S. planners seek to use "soft power" to win over local residents and deny the rebels a place to hide.

As a result, the Task Force's briefing room map is dotted with circles -- strategically placed across the island to cut off suspected enemy positions. Each denotes a new school or road, a medical mission to a remote village, a water project.

Longer-term programs include reform of the Philippines security forces, large-scale economic development and political empowerment of the disenfranchised Muslim minority in this predominantly Catholic country.

U.S. officials say their approach to Jolo, in the southern Sulu Archipelago, is based on a successful turnaround that began in 2002 on neighboring Basilan.

Today that island, which once tied down 15 Filipino battalions, requires just two. A local fast-food chain opened an outlet there in a widely hailed sign of "normality."

A DIFFICULT TEST

But skeptics say Jolo might not prove so pliant, and some are increasingly impatient for outright victory over the Abu Sayyaf Group, Islamic militants turned kidnappers for ransom, and their allies.

"This has dragged on for years and years and has involved a hell of a lot of money," said U.S.-based analyst Zachary Abuza, speaking by telephone from Boston.

Abuza blames restrictions on U.S. troops, who are barred by the Filipino constitution from direct combat, and corruption in the armed forces for what he says is a lack of tangible progress.

If they are allowed to fight will they be more effective than their Filipino comrades? Special Forces or Green Berets will be the ones to go after the ASG while the local soldiers fall behind in the rear?

The facts on the ground also pose a problem.

Jolo is home to the archipelago's dominant warrior tribe, the Tausugs; it is awash in guns, from World War Two vintage to the latest models; it is far poorer than Basilan; and resentment at America's past colonial domination of the region still runs deep.

It also features treacherous terrain that makes road-building and other projects that much harder. In places, covering 500 metres (yards) on foot can take a soldier hours, while thick foliage provides plenty of hiding places.

Most important, Jolo has emerged as the last stronghold of the Abu Sayyaf, the Philippines' most dangerous militant group. A handful of Indonesian comrades wanted in connection with the Bali bombings and other attacks back home have also sought shelter on the island.

"Basilan was a huge success, but Jolo makes its neighbor look like child's play," said one Western military analyst who asked not to be identified because he works closely with his Filipino counterparts.

THE MEASURE OF SUCCESS?

According to Filipino intelligence sources, the Abu Sayyaf has seen its leadership cut off from the rank-and-file, some of whom have begun to surrender quietly rather than face life on the run through unforgiving jungle.

But authorities also acknowledge that the remaining leaders and their Indonesian allies from Jemaah Islamiah, Southeast Asia's biggest militant group, have highly tuned survival skills, and they have been busy building bombs for future attacks.

"Our reporting suggests that until recently the Indonesians were daily making IEDs (improvised explosive devices)," said one intelligence source, adding that recent military pressure had likely disrupted the bomb-making operations.

"We believe there are about 30 active Indonesians or other Southeast Asians with ASG, about eight to 10 of whom are traveling with (Abu Sayyaf chief Khadaffi) Janjalani," the source said. Overall, the Abu Sayyaf group is estimated at about 250 active fighters.

Among those being hunted on Jolo is the Indonesian militant Dulmatin, wanted in connection with the Bali bombings. The security forces recently detained his wife, but Dulmatin remains elusive.

U.S. and Filipino officials bristle at the notion that the true mark of success in Jolo is the arrest or killing of Janjalani, Dulmatin and other so-called high-value targets.

"Why haven't we found bin Laden?" retorts one U.S. officer. "The goal here is keep the bad guys off the battlefield, whether we kill them, capture them, or isolate them so they can't move."

Still, members of the U.S. mission know that they -- not their Filipino hosts -- will be judged on the success or failure of the mission.

"We are the 800-pound gorilla in the room," said one senior officer.