High Altitude Warfare: The Kargil Conflict & the Future

[lemontree]

Kams posted a query in another thread about thesis on High Altitude Warfare: The Kargil Conflict & the Future

Those who have read the above thesis, will notice that the author brings out the basics of infantry tactics. Apart from the complications caused by the altitude and extreme weather conditions, the basics remain the same - fire and move.

The thesis also brought out the limitations of the airforce and ingenuity employed to indirectly affect the infantry battles.

The comparisions with the US ops in Afghanistan and employment of both arty and air is well brought out.

Does anyone thinks otherwise?

[Officer of Engineers]

One thing not mentioned is the effect of thermobaric munitions. Those caves suddenly became death traps.

What got me when reading this is that in the case of defence, insufficent reserves and logistical support doomed the failed defences including the Greek Metaxas Line, and the NLI's position at Kragil. Those defences that succeeded that he mention (not the PLA but the PVA in Korea) were not only "light front, heavy rear", (ie reverse slope) had secured and active LOCs.

The inability to answer an attacker's heavy fire with even heavier fire lead to being fixed and finally being enveloped.

I don't know about the comparison with the Jaeger units and the Indian/American examples. The Germans had time to collect extremely good intel on the location and strength of the Metaxas Line. The Indians and Americans had to, as the GS Gun Grape stated, buy their intelligence with blood.

[lemontree]

Sir, the main points brought out by the thesis are basics of mountain warfare:

Troops

• Mountain warfare is the domain of light infantry and SF/SOF.

• Acclimatization of troops is a crucial element.

• Physical fitness of troops and mountaineering skills are of paramount importance.

Strategy

• Arty should be the choice or arm for fire support, with limited dependence on air power.

• Maneuver and tactical surprise

• Concentrated fire support

Air power

• Should be employed for destruction of fixed targets

• Emergency CAS

• Control the air

• Keep own lines of communication open and destroy enemy lines of communication.

[Officer of Engineers]

I absolutely agree with that. However, he listed successful assualts (ie, where the defender failed) without examining where the details where the defender succeeded. He glosses over successful defences without comparing the two.

[lemontree]

I absolutely agree with that. However, he listed successful assualts (ie, where the defender failed) without examining where the details where the defender succeeded. He glosses over successful defences without comparing the two.

Sir, some of the points relating to the defenders successes were:
1. Lack of acclimatization of the assault troops.
2. Daylight assaults, that enabled the defender to bring down aimed fire.
3. Dispersion of troops by the defender that rendered air attacks ineffective.
4. Terrain – cover offered by the terrain offered natural shelters.
5. Use of MANPADs by the defender to force the attackers’ aircraft to fly above 10,000 ft, thereby reducing efficacy/ accuracy of CAS.

Sir, let us debate the tactical errors of the defender. The most important error was lack of maneuver troops to complement the static defences.

[Officer of Engineers]

Captain,

I will have to reply later. I'm running late and will be running later still. Dinosaur bones are just not as strong as they're used to be.

[troung]

Great article. Thought the writing about the logistics effort and Indian artillery was very interesting.

Wouldn't one of the lessons be to rotate men in and out on a regular basis so they don't start to fall apart because of the rare air and weather? The article makes the case that the NLI rank and file started to break down just being there.

Reading about the NLI's positions other then the fact they were on the foward slopes and open to direct fire from the Bofors/IFG/M-46s the article mentioned that their defensive positions did not have good fields of fire (not just the judging of distance issue) and were generally undermanned and lacked solid positions due to logistics and the climate (freezing of cement). Were there better positions they missed that could have covered the approaches better? What would be the best way to set up; use lightly held positions with the reserve on the rear slope of the mountains and reinforce when India starts to attack?

[lemontree]

Wouldn't one of the lessons be to rotate men in and out on a regular basis so they don't start to fall apart because of the rare air and weather? The article makes the case that the NLI rank and file started to break down just being there.

This is debatable, since both India and Pak have troops in Siachen for months together. Earlier they use to face arty barrages, infantry assaults and the weather too.

[Draconion]

This is debatable, since both India and Pak have troops in Siachen for months together. Earlier they use to face arty barrages, infantry assaults and the weather too.

I believe the maximum time a soldier can be on the glacier is only 3 months, and then they decend to the base camp.(which is also very HiAlt, but better than the glacier itself.

While reading this, I was thinking of the soldiers who stay there for many years together...Poor Blighters.

I remember when my dad was the IO in 16 Corps in Nagarota, we had called over an officer for lunch who had just decended from the glacier. He had blood shot eyes, was not speaking very properly, and initially when he had decended, was very morose.

[Officer of Engineers]

Sir, let us debate the tactical errors of the defender. The most important error was lack of maneuver troops to complement the static defences.

Captain,

I want to restrict this to the Kragil because you and the Brigadier know better and I don't have to examine every detail.

1) The Paks under-estimated the Indian response, including the InA preparation to spread to an all out war.

#1 have severe implications in the lack of reserves. Let me ask you this. Had the NLI ever counter-attacked with sufficent force?

2) Insufficent support for minefields. I hate to say this but their machine guns should have cut the InA down.

3) What the hell with the bunkers? 6 months and you couldn't fix the overhang prolem?

4) No retreat?

5) Insufficent RPGs?

[lemontree]

Captain,

I want to restrict this to the Kragil because you and the Brigadier know better and I don't have to examine every detail.

That is o.k with me sir.

#1 have severe implications in the lack of reserves. Let me ask you this. Had the NLI ever counter-attacked with sufficent force?

The only counter attacks were local counter-attacks of section/ platoon strength, from within the defending unit. There was no external re-inforcement, though some units were rotated from the heights.

2) Insufficent support for minefields. I hate to say this but their machine guns should have cut the InA down.

Sir, hard rocky ground would have prevented laying of proper defensive minefields. I have not visited the battle sites hence I cannot comment on the siting of the defences.

3) What the hell with the bunkers? 6 months and you couldn't fix the overhang prolem?

I wonder why?

4) No retreat?

I did'nt quite get your question sir.

5) Insufficent RPGs?

I pressume they had their authorised issued quantity of RPGs, as per the TOE.

[JBG]

A most interesting article. Thanks Lemontree. And thanks to those who posted in response to the article - I have learnt a lot from this thread.

Jonathan

[Ray]

Kargil was a Pak failure for the basic reason that they had not given thought to logistic resupply. A few intermittent helicopters and the Adm Base at Muntho Dalo apparently was not adequate. Thus, the whole operation was doomed to failure right from the start.

They had probably expected local Kashmiri support. However, the support that they had expected never came.

I am not aware of the Pakistanis using cement or constructing classical bunkers. They ingenuously used the rock faces and caves and also had made sangars.

They could not withstand the Indian assault which mostly were multidirectional. At places, they resorted to local counter attacks which were defeated.

The Indian Bofors in Direct Role were devastating.

There is no doubt that acclimatisation is an absolute must. It can be added that classical acclimatisation by the Indians never came to pass.

The terrain is boulder strewn and craggy and therefore one could move from cover to cover even if the enemy (Pak) used their direct firing weapons in a devastating mode. The results came through close combat and the enemy melting into the blues.

The weather is so cold up there that even quick setting cement does not work well and anyway the Pak had no classical bunkers.

My personal opinion is that air failed except at Mantho Dalo, though Air Marshal Patney thinks otherwise. I was there, Patney wasn't.

The aim of the Pakistanis were also to draw in the reserves from the Kashmir Valley so that they could concentrate on the Valley at a later date.

[Draconion]

A nice view there Sir...!:)

[texasjohn]

Even as a civilian, I find a lot of infantry strategy information out there for free. An officer in a Military Academy surely is taught all this and more, right?

So my question is, why did no one in the PA think these issues through? Especially the high altitude warfare effects?

Was it overconfidence?

And has the IA now taken steps not to be "caught with their pants down"?

Ray and Lemontree please educate me!