Does anybody have an orbat or any other info on the Cuban military?
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Cuban military
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Sort of like a TO&E?Meddle not in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with ketchup.
Abusing Yellow is meant to be a labor of love, not something you sell to the highest bidder.
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TOE - Table of Organization and Equipment
ORBAT - Order of Battle
TOEs gives specific details of an echelon (ie how many vehicles and personnel).
ORBAT gives the name of the unit involved which allows the intel people to research the history and effectiveness of the unit, including its commanders.
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Why do you want the Cuban miilitary?Meddle not in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with ketchup.
Abusing Yellow is meant to be a labor of love, not something you sell to the highest bidder.
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Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)
Ejercito Revolucionario (ER)
Total Armed Forces
(1999-2000)
ACTIVE e58,000
(includes Ready Reserves; conscripts) Terms of Service: 2 years
RESERVES
Army 39,000 Ready Reserves (serve 45 days per year) to fill out Active and Reserve Units; see also Paramilitary
ARMY e45,000
(includes conscripts and Ready Reservists)
Headquarters; 3 Regional Commands, 3 Army
* 4-5 armed brigade * 9 mechanized infantry brigade (3 mechanized infantry, 1 armored, 1 artillery, 1 Air Defense artillery regiment) * 1 Airborne brigade * 14 reserve brigade * 1 frontier brigade
* Air Defense: Air Defense artillery regiment and Surface-to-Air Missile brigade
EQUIPMENT (some 75% in store)
MAIN BATTLE TANK e900 includes: T-34, T-54/-55, T-62
LIGHT TANK some PT-76
RECONNAISSANCE some BRDM-1/-2
ARMORED INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE some BMP-1
ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER e700 BTR-40/-50/-60/-152
TOWED ARTILLERY 500; 76mm: ZIS-3; 122mm: M-1938, D-30; 130mm: M-46; 152mm: M-1937, D-1
SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY 40; 122mm: 2S1; 152mm:2S3
MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER 175: 122mm: BM-21; 140mm: BM-14
MORTAR 1,000: 82mm: M-41/-43; 120mm; M-38/-43
STATIC DEFENSE ARTILLERY JS-2 (122mm) hy tk, T-34 (85mm)
ANTI-TANK GUIDED WEAPON AT-1 Snapper, AT-3 Sagger
ANTI-TANK GUNS 85mm: D-44; 100mm: SU-100 SP, T-12
AIR DEFENSE GUNS 400 includes: 23mm: ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 SP; 30mm: M-53 (twin)/BTR-60P SP; 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60 towed, ZSU-57-2 SP; 85mm: KS-12; 100mm: KS-19
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SA-6/-7/-8/-9/-13/-14/-16
YOUTH LABOR ARMY 65,000
CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE 50,000
TERRITORIAL MILITIA (Reserves) e1,000,000
FOREIGN FORCES
US1,080: Navy 590, Marines 490
RUSSIA 810: 800 SIGINT, e10 mil advisers
Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)
(1999-2000)
NAVY e3,000
(includes 550+ Navy Infantry)
NAVAL DISTRICTS: Western Headquarters - Cabanas, Eastern Headquarters - Holguin
BASES: Cienfuegos, Cabanas, Havana, Mariel, Punta Movida, Nicaro
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5
MISSILE CRAFT 4 Soviet Osa II
PATROL,COASTAL 1
1 Soviet Pauk II Fast Patrol Craft, Coastal with 1 x 76mm gun, 2 Anti-Submarine Weapon Rocket Launcher, 4 Anti-Submarine Torpedo Tube
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6
2 Soviet Sonya Mine Sweeper Coastal, 4 Soviet Yevgenya Mine Sweeper Inshore
SUPPORT AND MISCELLANEOUS 1
1 Intelligence Collection Vessel
NAVAL INFANTRY (550+)
2 amphibious assault battalion
COASTAL DEFENSE
ARTILLERY 122mm: M-1931/37; 130mm: M-46; 152mm: M-1937
Surface-to-Surface Missile 2 SS-C 3 systems, some mobile Bandera IV (reported)
Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)1
Defensa Antiaerea y Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria (DAAFAR)
(1999-2000)
AIRFORCE e10,000
(includes Air Defense and conscripts); 130+ combat aircraft of which 25 are operational, 45 armed helicopters
Annual flying hours: less than 50
FIGHTER GROUND ATTACK 2 squadrons with 10 MiG-23BN
FIGHTER 4 squadrons
2 with 30 MiG-21F, 1 with 50 MiG-21bis, 1 with 20 MiG-23MF, 6 MiG-29
(Probably only some 3 MiG-29, 10 MiG-23, 5 MiG-21bis in operation)
ATTACK HELICOPTER 45 Mi-8/-17, Mi-25/35
AIR SURFACE 5 Mi-14 helicopter
TRANSPORT 4 squadrons with 8 An-2, 1An-24, 15 An-26, 1 An-30, 2 An-32, 4 Yak-40, 2 II-76 (Air Force aircraft in civilian markings)
HELICOPTER 40 Mi-8/-17
TRAINING 25 L-39, 8* MiG-21U, 4* MiG-23U, 2* MiG-29UB, 20 Z-326
MISSILES
AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE AS-7
AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE AA-2, AA-7, AA-8, AA-10, AA-11
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE 13 Active SA-2, SA-3 sites
CIVIL AIRLINE
10 II-62, 7 Tu-154, 12 Yak-42, 1 An-30 used as troop transport
Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)
Ministerio del Interior (MININT)
Total Armed Forces
(1999-2000)
PARAMILITARY1
STATE SECURITY (Ministry of Interior) 20,000
BORDER GUARDS (Ministry of Interior) 6,500
about 20 Soviet Zhuk and 3 Soviet Stenka PFI<, plus boats
High Command Reserve (Reserva del Alto Mando - RAM)1 is composed of an armored division and all its firepower support units forming a defensive ring around the capital of Havana. RAM is located in Managua military base near Havana and its mission in wartime consists of being combat ready when the Commander-in-Chief orders their mobilization.
In peacetime, RAM is maintained by the Eastern Army Commander, Army Corps General Leopoldo 'Polo' Cintra Frias, -- administratively subordinate but not operative.
RAM was created in the mid 1980s, based on the Soviet concept2 of having an important reserve3 force to be thrust upon the direction -- when detected -- of an enemy's principal attack, and in which direction the enemy has concentrated his offensive.
Defensive Counter-Landing of the Country Operation is the fundamental guide whereby all decisions are made. The Commander-in-Chief sets general guidelines based on his ideas of how an invasion of Cuba would occur. In accordance to this plan, the United States -- in an invasion of Cuba -- would attempt to land toward the East or West of the capital,
by Santa Maria del Mar and Guanabo beaches in the East or in between Salado and Mariel in the West. Advancing toward the borders in the Operation would be Cuban divisions defending themselves, and with the mission to reject U.S. landing attempts. According to Fidel's idea, depending on which direction -- East or West -- of Havana, the U.S. obtains a major success in landing there, a heavy thrust would be staged by the 1st Naval Infantry Division followed by the 3rd Armored Division.
Fidel's idea is to have an elite unit with the most modern armored means and major firepower to be used after U.S. forces land, and where they are introducing their principal forces.
According to a former US Government official, RAM was placed on alert during the "Maleconazo" of August 5, 1994 when hundreds of people spontaneously protested by the seawall in Havana known as the Malecón and adjacent streets. The protest was quickly quashed by the Cuban regime's security apparatus.
Cuban military commanders might closely study the possible U.S. military campaign in Iraq, principally, what will be U.S. tactics used to secure Baghdad5 that is protected by two defensive rings: regular Iraqi army, and three Republican Guard Armored Divisions (Medina to the south, Al Nida to the east and the Hammurabi to the west).
Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)
Note: Fidel Castro's rank is Commander-In-Chief (of the Revolution).
Abbreviations:
AG : Army General (General de Ejercito)
ACG : Army Corps General (General de Cuerpo de Ejercito)
DG : Division General (General de Division)
BG : Brigade General (General de Brigada)
RA : Rear Admiral (Almirante)
RMIJ : Division for Scientific and Technological Research
(Division para la Investigacion Cientifica y Technologica)
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Military Doctrine
Since its inception, the Revolutionary Armed Forces' (FAR) mission has been to protect and continue the revolution's accomplishments and preserve its status quo. It sees the United States as its principal external threat. To carry out this mission, Cuba's armed forces utilizes multiple doctrines of warfare, see Table 1, eg. conventional, unconventional, and irregular warfare, that are implemented dependent on the existing situation. There exists a conventional doctrine for the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), which is based on a "system of scientific criteria" of the principles of military science and operational as well as tactical art, and also that the Cuban forces must be prepared to wage conventional, unconventional and clandestine warfare.
Table 1 Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) Doctrines
conventional warfare
unconventional warfare - guerrilla, "War of All the People"
"War of All the People" - as the sole operating doctrine
A basis for such doctrines can be attributed to the influence and training by the former Soviet Union's military. It can be said that FAR has adopted Soviet military doctrine and organizational principles, with some modifications to suit the smaller size and less sophisticated armament of the Cuban forces.2 This influence is exemplified by the use of an offensive doctrine as used in Cuba's Third World campaigns. However, in an invasion of the island by U.S. forces, the FAR would implement a defensive doctrine that is its centerpiece of military doctrine.
The "War of All the People" doctrine is a defensive strategy that tries to counter an overwhelming invasion force. This strategy envisions an armed populace willing to fight for the defense of the homeland. It was announced in 1980 the creation of the Territorial Troop Militia (MTT) to increase the defense capability of the country. Fidel Castro stated that the MTT was necessitated in order to be "ready for combat operations not only using regular troops, but with the participation of the entire people." 3 Such a strategy of mass mobilization of the populace to assist conventional forces is not a new concept. During the French Revolution, citizens were used to fill the need for soldiers. "In early 1793, 300,000 men were called for, to be conscripted if they would not volunteer, and in August the decree of the levé en masse, putting all fit males at the disposal of the Republic, was promulgated."4 A recent example of this strategy is seen during the Vietnam war where guerrilla fighters assisted the regular forces of the North Vietnamese. This assistance was not the sole reason but only part of the North Vietnamese success. External assistance from the former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China was vital to the success of this strategy that Cuba presently lacks. "The models for the creation of the MTT and the doctrine of the War of the People were said to be the Soviet partisan movement during World War II in German occupied regions of the USSR and especially the Vietnamese concept of guerrilla struggle against superior forces of foreign occupiers, that is, France and the United States." 5
It remains to be seen if such a strategy would be successful in the event of an invasion from the United States. Without external support present, which was a factor to the success of North Vietnam, Cuba's armed forces will face a difficult struggle with superior number of forces and hardware. Another factor to the implementation of this doctrine is support from the populace to wage such a campaign of attrition. Approximately half of the MTT force is made up of women.6 Heavy losses is a reality to the MTT support component for the FAR and an unwillingness to continue fighting is a even larger possibility.
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