Whatdya make of this Shek?

[Bill]

Scott Cunningham posted this on Tanknet:

"Was just in a training action against a STRYKER BDE yesterday at NTC. They don't have any tanks. We decimated a battalion (approx 30 STRYKER kills) and paralysed the entire BDE for 4 hours with 2 tanks (as well as a few ATGMs and a town strongpoint). Eventually we were ordered to retreat our tanks out of contact because the BDE was pinned down and unable to move. Training could not continue as long as tanks were present. Tanks still have their place."

Any comment?

[Shek]

Snipe,

There really isn't enough information for me draw any real insightful conclusions from the post. There's no reference to friendly assets (was CAS or Attack Aviation available). There's no reference to the scenario or mission, which affects how you fight the battle. There's no terrain references.

So, I can't isolate whether it was tactics, techniques, or procedures; home field advantage; or some other variable that affected the outcome. Obviously, a tank has an advantage in a head to head confrontation with a Stryker. However, based on our NTC rotation, we smoked up their vehicles at first because they hugged the terrain features and our dismounted Javelin teams ate them up. Then, the just stood back beyond the range of our Javelins and picked us off. Of course, they were in the middle of the planned CAS box, but we didn't have any CAS. Real world, CAS would have been there at some point and made them pay for their decision to stand off.

So, without some of these questions being answered, you just can't pin down whether the unit is ate up, whether the cards were just stacked against the unit, since it doctrinally requires an attack aviation plus up for high intensity ops, or if its just your standard BLUEFOR op where it runs into the OPFOR buzzsaw.

As far as his conclusion, that the tank is still relevant, that's a no sh!t Sherlock! I don't think you'll find anyone who'll say otherwise.

Lastly, while you know that the combat training center experience is designed to put the BLUEFOR at a disadvantage to test their agility, I'll share this story just to put some perspective on any NTC/JRTC/CMCT a$$ drubbings for the others on the board. One of my fellow company commanders had done a Korea tour prior to coming to the unit, and so he was late on his command timeline. One of his buddies had finished command and was an O/C at NTC prior to the start of OIF. He had said that one of the 3ID brigades had gone through a rotation, and that they were one of the worst rotations in a while. Anyways, you know how 3ID went through the Iraqis like a buzzsaw (granted, they certainly weren't a world class fighting force), and so as you know, performance at a CTC is always relative.

[Bill]

I was actually hoping you'd be familiar with this particular scenario at NTC, as most of them are basically canned missions with some changes in the details.

I'll certainly try to find out more details/parameters for you.

Stay tuned. ;)

PS: Thanx for the initial analysis that you were able to provide.

[Shek]

I was actually hoping you'd be familiar with this particular scenario at NTC, as most of them are basically canned missions with some changes in the details.

I'll certainly try to find out more details/parameters for you.

Stay tuned. ;)

PS: Thanx for the initial analysis that you were able to provide.

Nope. Only one NTC rotation under my belt (three CMTC and one JRTC), and in preparation for our potential deployment to Afghanistan or Iraq, we fought a motorized rifle regiment and spent a whopping total of ZERO FRIGGIN' DAYS on urban ops during the rotation. What a great prep My guess is that they wanted to compare how a SBCT with a total of maybe five CAS sorties and zero attack aviation did against the MRR with TF Angel and HINDs. Like I said, it wasn't pretty (but then again, it rarely is for the BLUEFOR, even when they are an armor heavy BDE TF).

There's a few terrain features that I remember, but since I didn't hit any of the MOUT sites, nothing will ring a bell with mental imagery other than Tiefort, Bike Lake, and the Dustbowl. Some names may sound familiar (e.g. the Whale), but it won't conjure up any "there I was" memories without an ensuing terrain description or picture.

[Bill]

OK gotcha.

I cycled NTC three times when i was in, unfortunately it was so long ago about the only 'named' terrain feature i remember at all is the dust bowl. It's also pretty likely that the types of scenarios they were running in the late 80s havnt been run since........well..........the late 80s.

LOL.

[Bill]

GOT SOME MORE ON THIS:

Scott Cunningham
post Tue 21 Feb 2006 1912
Post #40
Crew
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Group: Members
Posts: 9,449
Joined: Wed 24 May 2000 1800
From: Las Vegas Nevada
Member No.: 129

Your mean that an entire STRYKER BDE could not out flank & defeat two tanks! :blink:
Oh, & a few ATGMs. ;)

"Exactly.

Today we were down to 1 tank (they took the other away), and it killed 20 Strykers before running out of ammo."


http://63.99.108.76/forums/index.php...pic=14863&st=0
(Here's the link in case you want to track him down)

[lemontree]

Bill,
I could'nt get all the terms of reference and details of that training exercise. However, I do know what damage you and your recee types can do by calling down arty fire on those "two tanks" who are blazing away at those Strykers.

[Bill]

Bill,
I could'nt get all the terms of reference and details of that training exercise. However, I do know what damage you and your recee types can do by calling down arty fire on those "two tanks" who are blazing away at those Strykers.

Heh, me too.

Maybe all the IVIS and radios were out???? ;)

[Shek]

Heh, me too.

Maybe all the IVIS and radios were out???? ;)

This is what gets me. The SBCT has dozens of LRAS3s, a UAV, 155mm arty, G/VLLDs, and so coordinating a Copperhead mission wouldn't be that difficult. It makes me wonder if this was indeed a BDE misssion or just a BN mission, also whether the BN/COs had the Raven UAV, whether this was regular training rotation or a MRE (I don't think so because 3/2 ID is scheduled for next month), or whether these were EXEVALs for 2ACR as they are standing up and therefore not yet at the top of their game (the difference in our performance between our EXEVALs and our JRTC rotation six months later was night and day).

[Bill]

This is what gets me. The SBCT has dozens of LRAS3s, a UAV, 155mm arty, G/VLLDs, and so coordinating a Copperhead mission wouldn't be that difficult. It makes me wonder if this was indeed a BDE misssion or just a BN mission, also whether the BN/COs had the Raven UAV, whether this was regular training rotation or a MRE (I don't think so because 3/2 ID is scheduled for next month), or whether these were EXEVALs for 2ACR as they are standing up and therefore not yet at the top of their game (the difference in our performance between our EXEVALs and our JRTC rotation six months later was night and day).

It doesn't really add up to me either sir, that's why i asked you about it to begin with.

2 tanks, while certainly a threat, should IMO never in 100 years be able to score 20 consecutive kills against a stryker Bn under any kind of remotely normal circumstances.

If you decide to engage this fella with some questions please lemme know, i'd be interested in eavesdropping. :)

[Shek]

It doesn't really add up to me either sir, that's why i asked you about it to begin with.

2 tanks, while certainly a threat, should IMO never in 100 years be able to score 20 consecutive kills against a stryker Bn under any kind of remotely normal circumstances.

If you decide to engage this fella with some questions please lemme know, i'd be interested in eavesdropping. :)

Stryker debates on new forums are just a time sink, and the Stryker has enough positive experiences in Iraq to demonstrate that it is not the colossal failure that was predicted by all the critics. The 11th ACR guy can bask in the glory of his MILES kills.

Maybe it was the siren like call of the whopee lights calling out "drive to the flashing light, drive to the flashing light." Meanwhile, the BDE commander was probably watching the UAV coverage and screaming helplessly, "DON'T DRIVE TO THE FLASHING LIGHT! DON'T DRIVE TO THE FLASHING LIGHT! NET CALL! NET CALL! THIS IS THE MAN - DRIVER'S STOP! FREEZE! BACK UP!"

[Bill]

Like moths to a strobe, so are the days of our lives. ;)

Meanwhile, in the OPFOR tank,

TC: "target, Stryker, range 2500....damn there are a lot of these things....HEAT!"
Loader: "Gun Up!"
TC: "Hit em!"
Gunner: "On the waaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaay!!!!!!"

LOL. ;)

[Blademaster]

I have missed out regarding some aspects of the issue with M113s and Sparky.

I visited his webpage and found his comments intriguing such as M113s has better protection than Strykers and can be remodified. But then again, LCol. W Yu's comments reminded me that stored M113s are more than of a headache than they are worth since you cannot be sure about rust setting in and compromising chassis structural integrity and etc.

But one questions brings to mind, why can't you produce new M113s and outfit them with the electronic gears, anti RPG protection shields and advanced fire support that Strykers enjoy?

Is it tracks versus wheels? I understand for long durability, you would want wheels because it is so much easier to change tires than tracks.

By the way, I found the NTC to be totally unrealistic. Sure those two tanks can get a couple fires off but there's no way a real Stryker brigade will allow themselves to be sitting ducks. Like you guys say, battalions have their own fire & arty support and javelin teams.

Besides some people forget that Strykers are only for light engagements such as against insurgents where tanks can't go, bush warfare, quick deployments, duties that are fit for light infantry.

Tanks are primarily used to anchor a strategic defense or an offensive push. I fail to see how strykers can primarily be used in any offensive push to meet a strategic goal. They simply do not have the firepower that tanks have nor the protection that comes with.

But then again, LCol's comments come to mind, "If it looks like a tank and acts like a tank, it will get killed like a tank."

[Blademaster]

Sniper and Shek, what's your call sign over at Tanknet?

[Shek]

But one questions brings to mind, why can't you produce new M113s and outfit them with the electronic gears, anti RPG protection shields and advanced fire support that Strykers enjoy?

Is it tracks versus wheels? I understand for long durability, you would want wheels because it is so much easier to change tires than tracks.

Blade,
You can. The issue that won it for the LAV-III platform was maintenance statistics, commonality of parts, and hence, the ability to have a larger logistics footprint, making the deployability and sustainment goals more feasible.

The M113 vs. Stryker debate in a vacuum is not a fruitful one if you are discussing the SBCT context. You must talk the concept of the SBCT and it's minimal log footprint and deployability then sustainment requirements.

Besides some people forget that Strykers are only for light engagements such as against insurgents where tanks can't go, bush warfare, quick deployments, duties that are fit for light infantry.

Tanks are primarily used to anchor a strategic defense or an offensive push. I fail to see how strykers can primarily be used in any offensive push to meet a strategic goal. They simply do not have the firepower that tanks have nor the protection that comes with.

This is false. The SBCTs can fight high intensity ops; however, doctrinally, they are supposed to receive augmentation (MPs, ADA, aviation), and in early-entry scenarios, they will have the lion's share of CAS available as well.

SBCTs could have fought their way up to Baghdad just as 3ID did. However, it would have been much longer than three weeks because you don't have the protection to sustain meeting engagements like Abrams can.

So, your tradeoff would be a slightly higher casuaulty rate and a much more deliberate and slow march rate.

A fair statement would be that heavy forces are much more effective for quick operational campaigns, but that a SBCT could get the job done, albeit with more risk and much more slowly.