M21,
I posted this on PakDef, don't know if you've seen it.
For those who are unfamiliar with some terms.
The War Zone Campaign (WZC) is the People's Republic of China's (PRC aka Communist China) People's Liberation Army (PLA - though the term says Army, the org at this echelon is really akin to the DoD/DND/MND)'s new doctrine based upon the American Field Manual 105 (now FM 3.0). It is a political action supported by military action and is classified into 3 military phases
1) reconaisance by force
2) initial force entry to establish the "war zone."
3) decisive force winning a battle of annhilation in the "war zone.
M21 and I have been discussing how the PLA would actually invade Taiwan (TW aka the Republic of China (RoC)). The PLA lacks the forces and the lifts necessary for a Normandy type landing. However, the PLA views WZC as the essential doctrine in winning that conflict. This is the result of some of that work.
Since that time, we've gone beyond these initial thinking.
The PLA may very target the RoCA 10th or 8th Corps instead. Each also offer a tempting political solution via a military victory. 10th Corps is the smallest of the three RoCA Armies and thus, a tempting target. Defeating 10th Corps would split the island in two. 8th Corps is tougher. However, defeating that and the PLA controls TW's industrial areas and 2nd largest city. TW would cease to exist economically.
Patrick Garrick of GlobalSecurity.org has been kind enough to send us DoD Report on China.
In it, we learn that TW has been designated as part of the Nanjing Warzone
I posted this on PakDef, don't know if you've seen it.
For those who are unfamiliar with some terms.
The War Zone Campaign (WZC) is the People's Republic of China's (PRC aka Communist China) People's Liberation Army (PLA - though the term says Army, the org at this echelon is really akin to the DoD/DND/MND)'s new doctrine based upon the American Field Manual 105 (now FM 3.0). It is a political action supported by military action and is classified into 3 military phases
1) reconaisance by force
2) initial force entry to establish the "war zone."
3) decisive force winning a battle of annhilation in the "war zone.
M21 and I have been discussing how the PLA would actually invade Taiwan (TW aka the Republic of China (RoC)). The PLA lacks the forces and the lifts necessary for a Normandy type landing. However, the PLA views WZC as the essential doctrine in winning that conflict. This is the result of some of that work.
Canuckian Posted: Jul 26 2003, 11:45 PM
M21 and HF3,
CDF's discussions on this has been heavy and fruitful. Along with TMF members, we've flushed out alot of details.
One thing that we still haven't nailed down is the approach but the PLA Army (the PLA used the term Army to distinquish the ground forces from their other branches. As a general note, the PLA includes the PLAAF, the PLAN, 2nd Artillery Corps, the Army, the Logistics dept, the Central Military Commission HQ, and their various sub branches) is avoiding that responsibility and leaving it to the PLAN.
As I stated before, the PLA does not view airpower with high regard. Though intellectually, they understand its value, culturally, they minimize its importance. All media coming from the PRC points to the effectiveness of the Serb's passive defences against the toughest AFs on earth. In the Iraq War, the PRC media has been spouting just how ineffective Iraqi AD (passive and active) were, not how well the Coalition AFs did. They make special mention of Karbala.
The above must be taken into context. The PLA simply doesn't have the experience to critique what went right and what went wrong. They go by their own experiences, dating back from the Korean and Vietnam Wars in which even strong AFs must take time to mount SEAD ops.
The PLA envisions the War Zone Campaign (a take off of the US FM-105) as the basis of their OPLAN. The context here is to establish an Area of Operations (known as the War Zone in their jargon) and then to destroy the enemy's warfighting capabilities within that war zone.
A couple of things jumped right out at our TMF friends. They identified a very significant sector that could act as the WZ. The Taipei Area which is defended by the RoCA 6th Corps. The AO could also be cut off at Hsinchu and Ilan (TMF's MikeH). TMF's Bryan C also noted that one of the weaknesses of the RoCA defences is the number of rivers and the few bridges that crosses over them. Also, the AO is lacking in RoCAF and RoCN strength which has its bulk in the south.
This put a few twists and raises some very interesting scenarios. The 15ABC can now be seen as the blocking force - ie taking the bridges and holding them against the RoCA 10th Corps driving north.
We have not been able to identify with motor rifle bde, guns bde, engr regt, or group armies would take part. However, from the WZC, we do know that Phase II is comprised of a motor rifle bde, a guns bde, and engr regt. Phase III is div to corps (Group Army) lvl.
What we have been able to figure out is that the guns bde would come ashore via armed cargo frieghters and would provide fire from the beaches. It is highly doubtful that the guns bde would disembark.
Also, we have been able to determine that the M9/M11 batteries are under army control. There are three opinions on their usage - taking out airfields, reduce the RoCA's LOC (ie attacking the bridges), or battlefield suppression. I am of the opinion that they are meant as battlefield suppression which fits the army's role instead of airfields (AF) or bridges (2AC).
IF the rifle bde can breach the bombarded defences and the engr regt can clear a path through the defences and rubble, then they would have accomplish Phase II.
IF this holds true (and it is a very big if at the moment), then the PLA Army should be able to disembark a single corps (I know they would prefer the 38th Group Army or the 39th Group Army but it would be more likely a corps based upon lighter arm'd such as the Type-99 amphibious tank).
The PLA Army believes no one on earth is their equal in a meeting engagement, especially close quarters. They would be driving in, anticipating the RoCA 6th Corps rushing out to meet them. There is some logic in this. 6th Corps is responsible for Taipei and to prevent it from being damaged by PLA guns, they have to go out and stop the PLA corps from getting into guns range of Taipei.
Once defeating 6th Corps, the PLA would have at their mercy, Taipei, the economic and political centre of Taiwan. The PLA would envision some sort of negotiated settlement if not outright surrender.
From the military part, this ignores the RoCA 10th Corps and further south, 8th Corps. However, the PLA expects these corps to surrender or at least cease hostilities as a result of the Taipei situation.
Please note that neither CDF nor TMF say that this is workable but all evidence points to the PLA thinking in this manner.
M21 and HF3,
CDF's discussions on this has been heavy and fruitful. Along with TMF members, we've flushed out alot of details.
One thing that we still haven't nailed down is the approach but the PLA Army (the PLA used the term Army to distinquish the ground forces from their other branches. As a general note, the PLA includes the PLAAF, the PLAN, 2nd Artillery Corps, the Army, the Logistics dept, the Central Military Commission HQ, and their various sub branches) is avoiding that responsibility and leaving it to the PLAN.
As I stated before, the PLA does not view airpower with high regard. Though intellectually, they understand its value, culturally, they minimize its importance. All media coming from the PRC points to the effectiveness of the Serb's passive defences against the toughest AFs on earth. In the Iraq War, the PRC media has been spouting just how ineffective Iraqi AD (passive and active) were, not how well the Coalition AFs did. They make special mention of Karbala.
The above must be taken into context. The PLA simply doesn't have the experience to critique what went right and what went wrong. They go by their own experiences, dating back from the Korean and Vietnam Wars in which even strong AFs must take time to mount SEAD ops.
The PLA envisions the War Zone Campaign (a take off of the US FM-105) as the basis of their OPLAN. The context here is to establish an Area of Operations (known as the War Zone in their jargon) and then to destroy the enemy's warfighting capabilities within that war zone.
A couple of things jumped right out at our TMF friends. They identified a very significant sector that could act as the WZ. The Taipei Area which is defended by the RoCA 6th Corps. The AO could also be cut off at Hsinchu and Ilan (TMF's MikeH). TMF's Bryan C also noted that one of the weaknesses of the RoCA defences is the number of rivers and the few bridges that crosses over them. Also, the AO is lacking in RoCAF and RoCN strength which has its bulk in the south.
This put a few twists and raises some very interesting scenarios. The 15ABC can now be seen as the blocking force - ie taking the bridges and holding them against the RoCA 10th Corps driving north.
We have not been able to identify with motor rifle bde, guns bde, engr regt, or group armies would take part. However, from the WZC, we do know that Phase II is comprised of a motor rifle bde, a guns bde, and engr regt. Phase III is div to corps (Group Army) lvl.
What we have been able to figure out is that the guns bde would come ashore via armed cargo frieghters and would provide fire from the beaches. It is highly doubtful that the guns bde would disembark.
Also, we have been able to determine that the M9/M11 batteries are under army control. There are three opinions on their usage - taking out airfields, reduce the RoCA's LOC (ie attacking the bridges), or battlefield suppression. I am of the opinion that they are meant as battlefield suppression which fits the army's role instead of airfields (AF) or bridges (2AC).
IF the rifle bde can breach the bombarded defences and the engr regt can clear a path through the defences and rubble, then they would have accomplish Phase II.
IF this holds true (and it is a very big if at the moment), then the PLA Army should be able to disembark a single corps (I know they would prefer the 38th Group Army or the 39th Group Army but it would be more likely a corps based upon lighter arm'd such as the Type-99 amphibious tank).
The PLA Army believes no one on earth is their equal in a meeting engagement, especially close quarters. They would be driving in, anticipating the RoCA 6th Corps rushing out to meet them. There is some logic in this. 6th Corps is responsible for Taipei and to prevent it from being damaged by PLA guns, they have to go out and stop the PLA corps from getting into guns range of Taipei.
Once defeating 6th Corps, the PLA would have at their mercy, Taipei, the economic and political centre of Taiwan. The PLA would envision some sort of negotiated settlement if not outright surrender.
From the military part, this ignores the RoCA 10th Corps and further south, 8th Corps. However, the PLA expects these corps to surrender or at least cease hostilities as a result of the Taipei situation.
Please note that neither CDF nor TMF say that this is workable but all evidence points to the PLA thinking in this manner.
The PLA may very target the RoCA 10th or 8th Corps instead. Each also offer a tempting political solution via a military victory. 10th Corps is the smallest of the three RoCA Armies and thus, a tempting target. Defeating 10th Corps would split the island in two. 8th Corps is tougher. However, defeating that and the PLA controls TW's industrial areas and 2nd largest city. TW would cease to exist economically.
Patrick Garrick of GlobalSecurity.org has been kind enough to send us DoD Report on China.
In it, we learn that TW has been designated as part of the Nanjing Warzone
Page 47 to 48
During a major military campaign against Taiwan, the Nanjing MR would become part of the socalled “Nanjing War Zone,” which probably would include, at a minimum, the three group armies in the Nanjing MR, elements from group armies based in adjacent military regions Guangzhou and Jinan MRs), as well as China’s airborne and marine forces. Air assets would come primarily from the Nanjing MR augmented by mission-critical aircraft from other parts of China. The PLAN would commit assets from both the East and South Sea Fleets, as well as mission-critical assets from the North Sea Fleet. Finally, all deployed SRBMs most likely would be available to the “war zone” commander.
During a major military campaign against Taiwan, the Nanjing MR would become part of the socalled “Nanjing War Zone,” which probably would include, at a minimum, the three group armies in the Nanjing MR, elements from group armies based in adjacent military regions Guangzhou and Jinan MRs), as well as China’s airborne and marine forces. Air assets would come primarily from the Nanjing MR augmented by mission-critical aircraft from other parts of China. The PLAN would commit assets from both the East and South Sea Fleets, as well as mission-critical assets from the North Sea Fleet. Finally, all deployed SRBMs most likely would be available to the “war zone” commander.
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