Xi Jinping's Third Term
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tbm3fan
Defense Professional
DOR
Voter
CCP (finally) Announces Third Plenum
The CCP 3rd Plenum (meeting) traditionally has been held at the end of the year (or very early in the next year following the National Party Congress, and focuses on the economy. Last Autumn, Xi Jinping decided otherwise, and set Sinologists on a quest to understand why.
The Central Committee typically holds seven plenums during its five-year term, although the 8[SUP]th[/SUP] CC (1956-69) held at least 12, and the .9[SUP]th[/SUP] just two. The 1[SUP]st[/SUP] is held immediately after the National Party Congress, and selects its leadership: Secretary General (nee Chairman), Politburo, Military Affairs Commission, and Discipline Inspection Commission. Each of these, in turn, decides on its own top leadership (e.g., the Politburo Standing Committee, the top party organ) … at least, according to organization theory and the party constitution. The second plenum attends to nominations for top state government posts, just prior to the annual Spring meeting of the National People's Congress.
The Third Plenum is the economic policy one, and typically takes place in the Autumn, a year after the National Party Congress. Xi Jinping seems to have decided it wasn't necessary to follow the seasonal pattern laid down by Deng. Either that, or he faced serious push-back, which seems unlikely.
Plenum No. 4 and No. 6 have no fixed agenda, but may be an opportunity to reshuffle the party leadership. No. 5 works on the outline of the national Five-Year Plan.
The 7[SUP]th[/SUP] plenum is now traditionally the one just before a new National Party Congress. It is responsible for setting the agenda and determining candidates for the Central Committee.
70 Years of 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Plenums
(*) 7[SUP]th[/SUP] Central Committee's 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Plenary Session (Jun 1950) – The first CCP CC meeting held in Beijing, focusing on government work. The Korean War broke out two weeks later.
(*) 8[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Sep-Oct 1957) – Report on the Anti-Rightist Campaign and outline of the Great Leap Forward.
(*) 9[SUP]th[/SUP] – there were only two plenums, in April 1969 (immediately following the 9[SUP]th[/SUP] National Party Congress; and in Aug-Sep 1970, when new provincial party committees were established.
(*) 10[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Jul 1977) – Hua Guofeng was ratified as Chairman, Deng Xiaoping was restored to all his previous posts, and the Gang of Four were expelled from the party.
(*) 11[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Dec 1978) – Inauguration of the Reform Era. Nine former central committee members from pre-Cultural Revolution days were brought back into the fold. Chairman Hua Guofeng renounced his “Two Whatevers” ideology.
(*) 12[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Oct 1984) – Formal party adoption of Deng's reforms.
(*) 13[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Sep 1988) – Wage and price reforms, to control inflation (high inflation helped spark the Tiananmen protests the following year).
(*) 14[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Nov 1993 – Decision on establishing the Socialist Market Economy System, i.e., Deng's re-seizure of power post-Tiananmen and post-Southern Tour.
(*) 15[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Oct 1998) – 20 year review of economic reform.
(*) 16[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Oct 2003) – Revision of socialist market economy and promotion of private enterprise within the party.
(*) 17[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Oct 2008) – Rural reform and development.
(*) 18[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Nov 2013) – sweeping re-centralization of the security apparatus as part of a 300-step reform program of the economy, society, armed forces, and party.
(*) 19[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Feb 2018) – first major anomaly: state government positions there the main topic.
The CCP 3rd Plenum (meeting) traditionally has been held at the end of the year (or very early in the next year following the National Party Congress, and focuses on the economy. Last Autumn, Xi Jinping decided otherwise, and set Sinologists on a quest to understand why.
The Central Committee typically holds seven plenums during its five-year term, although the 8[SUP]th[/SUP] CC (1956-69) held at least 12, and the .9[SUP]th[/SUP] just two. The 1[SUP]st[/SUP] is held immediately after the National Party Congress, and selects its leadership: Secretary General (nee Chairman), Politburo, Military Affairs Commission, and Discipline Inspection Commission. Each of these, in turn, decides on its own top leadership (e.g., the Politburo Standing Committee, the top party organ) … at least, according to organization theory and the party constitution. The second plenum attends to nominations for top state government posts, just prior to the annual Spring meeting of the National People's Congress.
The Third Plenum is the economic policy one, and typically takes place in the Autumn, a year after the National Party Congress. Xi Jinping seems to have decided it wasn't necessary to follow the seasonal pattern laid down by Deng. Either that, or he faced serious push-back, which seems unlikely.
Plenum No. 4 and No. 6 have no fixed agenda, but may be an opportunity to reshuffle the party leadership. No. 5 works on the outline of the national Five-Year Plan.
The 7[SUP]th[/SUP] plenum is now traditionally the one just before a new National Party Congress. It is responsible for setting the agenda and determining candidates for the Central Committee.
70 Years of 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Plenums
(*) 7[SUP]th[/SUP] Central Committee's 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Plenary Session (Jun 1950) – The first CCP CC meeting held in Beijing, focusing on government work. The Korean War broke out two weeks later.
(*) 8[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Sep-Oct 1957) – Report on the Anti-Rightist Campaign and outline of the Great Leap Forward.
(*) 9[SUP]th[/SUP] – there were only two plenums, in April 1969 (immediately following the 9[SUP]th[/SUP] National Party Congress; and in Aug-Sep 1970, when new provincial party committees were established.
(*) 10[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Jul 1977) – Hua Guofeng was ratified as Chairman, Deng Xiaoping was restored to all his previous posts, and the Gang of Four were expelled from the party.
(*) 11[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Dec 1978) – Inauguration of the Reform Era. Nine former central committee members from pre-Cultural Revolution days were brought back into the fold. Chairman Hua Guofeng renounced his “Two Whatevers” ideology.
(*) 12[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Oct 1984) – Formal party adoption of Deng's reforms.
(*) 13[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Sep 1988) – Wage and price reforms, to control inflation (high inflation helped spark the Tiananmen protests the following year).
(*) 14[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Nov 1993 – Decision on establishing the Socialist Market Economy System, i.e., Deng's re-seizure of power post-Tiananmen and post-Southern Tour.
(*) 15[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Oct 1998) – 20 year review of economic reform.
(*) 16[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Oct 2003) – Revision of socialist market economy and promotion of private enterprise within the party.
(*) 17[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Oct 2008) – Rural reform and development.
(*) 18[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Nov 2013) – sweeping re-centralization of the security apparatus as part of a 300-step reform program of the economy, society, armed forces, and party.
(*) 19[SUP]th[/SUP] / 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] (Feb 2018) – first major anomaly: state government positions there the main topic.
DOR
Voter
Can Xi Jinping Control the PLA?
China Leadership Monitor [https://www.prcleader.org/post/can-xi-jinping-control-the-pla]
By Joel Wuthnow, March 1, 2025
Synopsis: "Recent purges of senior Chinese military officers have renewed the question of how firmly in charge of the People’s Liberation Army is Xi Jinping. This article suggests that while Xi’s authority should not be underestimated, it is circumscribed by political realities: he has largely preserved a tradition of PLA autonomy relative to the party leadership, both to consolidate his own power and to persuade the PLA to accept wide-ranging reforms and to focus on its warfighting missions. The article begins with a review of the recent purges and then describes the mix of coercive tools that Xi has used since his ascension to power in 2012 to control the military. It thereafter discusses the limits on those tools and evaluates the ways in which Xi has respected PLA autonomy and other interests. It ends with consideration of the implications for PLA readiness, party-army trust, and the future ability of Xi and his successor to maintain control."
Comment:
In Xi Jinping’s first round of purges, he removed Military Affairs Commission (MAC) vice chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong; PLA Chief-of-Staff Fang Fenghui; and more than fifty other officers at the Major General rank, or higher. More recently,
From Purge to Control: A Recent Pivot in Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Crackdown
China Leadership Monitor [https://www.prcleader.org/post/from...ot-in-xi-jinping-s-anti-corruption-crackdown]
By Minxin Pei, March 1, 2025
Synopsis: "A striking anomaly marks Xi Jinping’s never-ending anti-corruption campaign. Twelve years after its launch, the number of party members and officials punished for violating CCP discipline has more than doubled. In addition to raising questions about the effectiveness of Xi’s approach to fighting corruption since a successful campaign should have already reduced the level of corruption and the number of officials disciplined, this anomaly may also be the result of a shift from purge to control in the emphasis of Xi’s anti-corruption drive. As evidenced by three successive revisions of the party’s discipline code within an 8-year period, the party under Xi’s rule has greatly expanded the range of actions it deems to be in violation of political and organizational discipline. An examination of the new rules shows that most of these new rules are vaguely worded, perhaps deliberately so, in order to give the party greater discretion in disciplining its members. Analysis of sample cases involving disciplined senior and mid-level officials in 2023–24 indicates that these revisions have indeed given the party new instruments to control its officials, with about 10–25 percent of the disciplined officials accused of violating the newly established rules."
Comment:
In the civilian sector, Xi purged rival Bo Xilai (albeit, prior to Xi taking his senior-most offices), former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, Central Committee General Office Director Ling Jihua.
Since 2013, the party has disciplined 6,225,000 cadres. The pace was clipping along at a 12.7% growth rate year-by-year in 2013-23, then jumped 45.7% in the first nine months of 2024, over the entirety of 2023.
At the senior-most level, violations of party discipline include “resisting investigation,” “withholding information,”, “reading or possessing banned publications,” “seeking political patrons,” and “befriending political fraudsters.”
China Leadership Monitor [https://www.prcleader.org/post/can-xi-jinping-control-the-pla]
By Joel Wuthnow, March 1, 2025
Synopsis: "Recent purges of senior Chinese military officers have renewed the question of how firmly in charge of the People’s Liberation Army is Xi Jinping. This article suggests that while Xi’s authority should not be underestimated, it is circumscribed by political realities: he has largely preserved a tradition of PLA autonomy relative to the party leadership, both to consolidate his own power and to persuade the PLA to accept wide-ranging reforms and to focus on its warfighting missions. The article begins with a review of the recent purges and then describes the mix of coercive tools that Xi has used since his ascension to power in 2012 to control the military. It thereafter discusses the limits on those tools and evaluates the ways in which Xi has respected PLA autonomy and other interests. It ends with consideration of the implications for PLA readiness, party-army trust, and the future ability of Xi and his successor to maintain control."
Comment:
In Xi Jinping’s first round of purges, he removed Military Affairs Commission (MAC) vice chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong; PLA Chief-of-Staff Fang Fenghui; and more than fifty other officers at the Major General rank, or higher. More recently,
- Admiral Miao Hua, PLA General Political Department Director (10/17-11/24), the top political commissar in the armed forces. He took over from the disgraced Zhang Yang.
- General Li Shangfu, Defense Minister (3/23-10/23), who replaced the disgraced Wei Fenghe.
- General Ding Laihang, Air Force Commander (8/17-9/21).
- General Li Yuchao, Rocket Force Commander (1/22-7/23), who replaced the disgraced Zhou Yaning.
- General Ju Qiansheng, commander of the PLA Stratigic Support Force (6/21-4/24).
- Lt. General Zhang Zhenzhong, Deputy Chief-of-Staff (3/22-12/23); and ex-Rocket Force Deputy Commander.
- Lt. General Li Chuanguang, Rocket Force Deputy Commander (3/18-1/24).
From Purge to Control: A Recent Pivot in Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Crackdown
China Leadership Monitor [https://www.prcleader.org/post/from...ot-in-xi-jinping-s-anti-corruption-crackdown]
By Minxin Pei, March 1, 2025
Synopsis: "A striking anomaly marks Xi Jinping’s never-ending anti-corruption campaign. Twelve years after its launch, the number of party members and officials punished for violating CCP discipline has more than doubled. In addition to raising questions about the effectiveness of Xi’s approach to fighting corruption since a successful campaign should have already reduced the level of corruption and the number of officials disciplined, this anomaly may also be the result of a shift from purge to control in the emphasis of Xi’s anti-corruption drive. As evidenced by three successive revisions of the party’s discipline code within an 8-year period, the party under Xi’s rule has greatly expanded the range of actions it deems to be in violation of political and organizational discipline. An examination of the new rules shows that most of these new rules are vaguely worded, perhaps deliberately so, in order to give the party greater discretion in disciplining its members. Analysis of sample cases involving disciplined senior and mid-level officials in 2023–24 indicates that these revisions have indeed given the party new instruments to control its officials, with about 10–25 percent of the disciplined officials accused of violating the newly established rules."
Comment:
In the civilian sector, Xi purged rival Bo Xilai (albeit, prior to Xi taking his senior-most offices), former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, Central Committee General Office Director Ling Jihua.
Since 2013, the party has disciplined 6,225,000 cadres. The pace was clipping along at a 12.7% growth rate year-by-year in 2013-23, then jumped 45.7% in the first nine months of 2024, over the entirety of 2023.
At the senior-most level, violations of party discipline include “resisting investigation,” “withholding information,”, “reading or possessing banned publications,” “seeking political patrons,” and “befriending political fraudsters.”
DOR
Voter
BEIJING, June 11 (Xinhua) -- A total of 49 senior officials of 42 departments and units under the State Council, China's cabinet, pledged allegiance to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China at a ceremony on Wednesday.
Premier Li Qiang oversaw the ceremony and gave a speech.
And . . . not one mention of Xi Jinping.
Premier Li Qiang oversaw the ceremony and gave a speech.
Senior Chinese officials pledge allegiance to Constitution
Senior Chinese officials pledge allegiance to Constitution-
english.news.cn
And . . . not one mention of Xi Jinping.
DOR
Voter
My previous post wasn't the only one on the topic of Xi Jinping's political fortunes:
Xi Jinping’s Central Position in Official Media Starts to Erode
By: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, June 21, 2025
https://jamestown.org/program/xi-jinpings-central-position-in-official-media-starts-to-erode/
Executive Summary:
Xi Jinping’s Central Position in Official Media Starts to Erode
By: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, June 21, 2025
https://jamestown.org/program/xi-jinpings-central-position-in-official-media-starts-to-erode/
Executive Summary:
- The relative absence of supreme leader Xi Jinping in authoritative media could indicate that his power, though still unassailable, is waning.
- There were no references to Xi or his eponymous ideology in coverage of crucial trade talks with the United States, the announcement of a new policy to boost social welfare, or at a ceremony where Premier Li Qiang and others pledged allegiance to the state constitution.
- Xi continues to face problems in two important areas: the military and the techno-industrial complex. In the former, purges have eroded his bases of support. In the latter, the unveiling of a third “big fund” for bankrolling the semiconductor industry indicates that return on investment—in the form of critical breakthroughs—has been underwhelming.
- In a first for a Party leader, Xi invited his daughter to join a dinner hosted for Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The rationale behind Xi Mingze’s appearance is unclear, though it could indicate he is making preparations for a partial retirement.
DOR
Voter
Divergent Implications for Xi’s Power From New Party Regulations
By: Peter Mattis, Arran Hope, Matthew Johnson, Peace Ajirotutu, China Brief Volume: 25 Issue: 13
Executive Summary:
- Speculation is growing about a power struggle at the top of the Party. An announcement of new regulations for influential decision-making and coordinating bodies is a clear sign of change in how the leadership makes policy. Its implications for Xi Jinping’s power remain unclear.
- One interpretation sees the regulations as evidence of Xi enhancing his vertical control over the system, while another reading sees him being constrained by the rest of the leadership.
- If Xi’s power remains supreme, the new regulations signal tighter control, allowing him to more effectively drive his agenda and giving more formal authority to Cai Qi.
- If the regulations are an attempt to bind Xi to formal mechanisms, the move to institutionalize the organizations through which he has driven the Party-state system could signal that other parts of the leadership are wresting some power from Xi and forcing him to abide by bureaucratic procedure.
Another attempt to figure out if Xi Jinping is ever more powerful, or on the verge of being relegated to the trash heap of history.
DOR
Voter
What’s going on?
BEIJING, Nov. 20 (Xinhua) -- The Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee on Thursday held a symposium to mark the 110th anniversary of the birth of Hu Yaobang *, a former prominent leader of the Party, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, also general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, delivered an important speech, calling for emulating the lofty demeanor and venerable conduct of Hu in pressing ahead to secure solid progress in all undertakings.
…
Presiding over the meeting, Cai Qi, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, urged efforts to advance the cause of building a strong nation and advancing national rejuvenation on all fronts through Chinese modernization.
Li Xi, who is also a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, was present at this meeting.
- - - - -
Three PBSC members, including mass out-reach (Cai Qi, CPPCC) Chair and Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary, Li Xi.
Birth anniversaries symposia are more common on century marks, rather than at the 110th year, which makes this particular gathering very interesting. Is Xi Jinping shoring up his support among the more liberal wing of the party, and the younger members? Time will tell.
* Hu Yaobang was Deng Xiaoping’s choice to lead the CCP after the ouster of Hua Guofeng, in 1981; the two worked closely together for decades. Hu was considerably more liberal than any other leader in CCP history, and for that was ousted by the Eight Immortals in 1987. His death, in early 1989, was one of the triggers for the Tiananmen protests, and later massacre.
BEIJING, Nov. 20 (Xinhua) -- The Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee on Thursday held a symposium to mark the 110th anniversary of the birth of Hu Yaobang *, a former prominent leader of the Party, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, also general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, delivered an important speech, calling for emulating the lofty demeanor and venerable conduct of Hu in pressing ahead to secure solid progress in all undertakings.
…
Presiding over the meeting, Cai Qi, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, urged efforts to advance the cause of building a strong nation and advancing national rejuvenation on all fronts through Chinese modernization.
Li Xi, who is also a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, was present at this meeting.
- - - - -
Three PBSC members, including mass out-reach (Cai Qi, CPPCC) Chair and Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary, Li Xi.
Birth anniversaries symposia are more common on century marks, rather than at the 110th year, which makes this particular gathering very interesting. Is Xi Jinping shoring up his support among the more liberal wing of the party, and the younger members? Time will tell.
* Hu Yaobang was Deng Xiaoping’s choice to lead the CCP after the ouster of Hua Guofeng, in 1981; the two worked closely together for decades. Hu was considerably more liberal than any other leader in CCP history, and for that was ousted by the Eight Immortals in 1987. His death, in early 1989, was one of the triggers for the Tiananmen protests, and later massacre.
DOR
Voter
China’s Perennial Succession Problem
Xi Jinping, the paramount leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has a problem.
It isn’t a new one, and it doesn’t involve Donald Trump, the US 7th Fleet, Taiwan, deflation, or unemployment.
Mr Xi’s problem is that he needs to retain as much power as he can, for as long a possible, while grooming a successor who will protect and promote his legacy. The alternative might be disgrace , or worse: historic irrelevance.
Mao Zedong had this problem, and so, too, did Deng Xiaoping. Both had successors in mind, but then threw them aside when it came time to pass the torch. Mao dropped at least three, arguably four heirs apparent; Deng dumped two. In the end, and largely due to failing health (Mao died at age 83; Deng lived a decade longer), both men passed the torch to decidedly second-rate men.
Read the rest of my essay here:
https://eastasiapoliticseconomics.wordpress.com/2025/11/23/chinas-perennial-succession-problem/
DOR
Voter
The Dictator’s Dilemma toward the 21st Party Congress: Elite Reshuffling and Power Restructuring
By Guoguang Wu, China Leadership Monitor, Issue 86 Winter 2025 (Dec 1)
https://www.prcleader.org/post/the-...ess-elite-reshuffling-and-power-restructuring
The 21st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which will convene in late 2027, will continue the Xi Jinping leadership as he enters his fourth term as supreme leader. When Xi secured his third term as party leader at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, he effectively abolished the term limits that had been in place since the 1990s, so it is unrealistic to expect that he will not seek a fourth term at the forthcoming Party Congress. Regardless of widespread rumors in recent years that he will be forced to resign, such a scenario is highly unlikely because there currently seems to be no serious challenge to his leadership. But his regime has encountered a number of problems in elite management, as powerfully demonstrated by the recent high tide of purges of incumbent Central Committee members and high-ranking PLA generals. This article uses the concept of the “dictator’s dilemma” to explain these recent purges and personnel shifts. Seen through such a lens, the article provides a preview of the reshuffling of elite personnel that will take place around the time of the next congress. The article considers the potential escalation of factional rivalry, the process of cadre evaluation, the unfolding timeline for preparations ahead of the next Party Congress, and the likely composition of the 21st Central Committee.
By Guoguang Wu, China Leadership Monitor, Issue 86 Winter 2025 (Dec 1)
https://www.prcleader.org/post/the-...ess-elite-reshuffling-and-power-restructuring
The 21st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which will convene in late 2027, will continue the Xi Jinping leadership as he enters his fourth term as supreme leader. When Xi secured his third term as party leader at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, he effectively abolished the term limits that had been in place since the 1990s, so it is unrealistic to expect that he will not seek a fourth term at the forthcoming Party Congress. Regardless of widespread rumors in recent years that he will be forced to resign, such a scenario is highly unlikely because there currently seems to be no serious challenge to his leadership. But his regime has encountered a number of problems in elite management, as powerfully demonstrated by the recent high tide of purges of incumbent Central Committee members and high-ranking PLA generals. This article uses the concept of the “dictator’s dilemma” to explain these recent purges and personnel shifts. Seen through such a lens, the article provides a preview of the reshuffling of elite personnel that will take place around the time of the next congress. The article considers the potential escalation of factional rivalry, the process of cadre evaluation, the unfolding timeline for preparations ahead of the next Party Congress, and the likely composition of the 21st Central Committee.
DOR
Voter
The Last Combat Generals Fall
Generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, the two remaining senior officers with actual combat experience, are reportedly under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law,” i.e., corruption.
Five of the six Military Affairs Commission (MAC) members appointed in 2022 have now fallen. The sole remaining member is Xi Jinping, supported by recently promoted General and disciplinary chief Zhang Shengmin (no relation).
Two-thirds (29 of 44) military members of the 2022 Central Committee have been purged, including both members of the politburo: Senior MAC Vice Chair He Weidong, and now Zhang. The latest revelations also point to the fall of Liu Zhenli, the armed forces Chief of Staff, and the only other general officer with combat experience.
Zhang Youxia joined the PLA (1968) and Chinese Communist Party (1969) during the Cultural Revolution, and spent the next 26 years in the PLA’s 14th Army. He was twice in combat against Vietnam (1979 and 1984). After completing higher military education, Zhang was assigned to the 13th Group Army (1994-2005). He was promoted to the CCP Central Committee in 2007, to the MAC in 2012, and to the politburo in 2017.
Liu Zhenli is a generation younger than Zhang Youxia; he enlisted in the PLA in 1983 and joined the CCP the following year. His Sino-Vietnam War experience dates to large-scale skirmishes in 1986. Liu commanded the 65th (2009-12) and 38th (2012-14) Group Armies before transferring to the People’s Armed Police (PAP). After less than six months, he was promoted to chief of staff of all regular army ground forces, and later commander (2021-22). He had been PLA Chief of Staff since September 2022.
Generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, the two remaining senior officers with actual combat experience, are reportedly under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law,” i.e., corruption.
Five of the six Military Affairs Commission (MAC) members appointed in 2022 have now fallen. The sole remaining member is Xi Jinping, supported by recently promoted General and disciplinary chief Zhang Shengmin (no relation).
Two-thirds (29 of 44) military members of the 2022 Central Committee have been purged, including both members of the politburo: Senior MAC Vice Chair He Weidong, and now Zhang. The latest revelations also point to the fall of Liu Zhenli, the armed forces Chief of Staff, and the only other general officer with combat experience.
Zhang Youxia joined the PLA (1968) and Chinese Communist Party (1969) during the Cultural Revolution, and spent the next 26 years in the PLA’s 14th Army. He was twice in combat against Vietnam (1979 and 1984). After completing higher military education, Zhang was assigned to the 13th Group Army (1994-2005). He was promoted to the CCP Central Committee in 2007, to the MAC in 2012, and to the politburo in 2017.
Liu Zhenli is a generation younger than Zhang Youxia; he enlisted in the PLA in 1983 and joined the CCP the following year. His Sino-Vietnam War experience dates to large-scale skirmishes in 1986. Liu commanded the 65th (2009-12) and 38th (2012-14) Group Armies before transferring to the People’s Armed Police (PAP). After less than six months, he was promoted to chief of staff of all regular army ground forces, and later commander (2021-22). He had been PLA Chief of Staff since September 2022.
tbm3fan
Defense Professional
Always read what you put up and always end up shaking my head. All of this reminds me of the TV show "Dallas" except on country level although it could be one massive Chinese family. I assume "corruption" is just a term of convenience when it comes to moving, dropping, or eliminating someone?
DOR
Voter
Or, questioning Daddy Xi's philosophy, wisdom, guidance, talent, motivation, tenure, ancestry ...
DOR
Voter
Highly plausible. Having decimated the Rocketeers, the East Coast Mafia, and the South Sea Men means taking on Taiwan and the 7th fleet in time for the most politically desirable bits of the calendar (August 1, 2027, the PLA's century day) is less realistic.
tbm3fan
Defense Professional
So Zhang was a super important, very high level guy, with long time support going way back in time and Xi took him down. So was he profiting from his position at the expense of the PLA or Xi wants absolute control over the military which he now seemingly has.
DOR
Voter
Yes.
Either he was as corrupt as everyone else; he stood in the way of Xi's ego; and we haven't a clue what the real story is.
Some are saying he leaked nuclear data to the USA, others that he refused to sign off on an invasion of Taiwan. None of the above qualifies as a most likely scenario, as do all of them.
Welcome to the wonderful world of Pekingology!
DOR
Voter
The demise of Zhang Youxia hits different
By Drew Thompson, Jan 26, 2026
[[https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/th...ect=true&utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email]]
I was genuinely surprised by the announcement of Zhang Youxia's detention. I shouldn't have been. But this feels personal.
This post is a different than previous summaries of analysis and links to my essays and interviews.
I was genuinely surprised and frankly shocked by the announcement on Saturday that Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia is under investigation and presumably detained. I should not have been surprised. Hundreds of senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers have been investigated, detained and imprisoned since Xi came to power in 2012.
Corruption is endemic in the PLA giving Xi Jinping a perpetual and universal anti-corruption tool to purge politically suspect officers from the ranks. I have been hearing rumors since 2023 that he was being investigated, but I always assumed and even hoped that he would escape Xi’s endless purges. For five years Zhang was in charge of the PLA’s procurement enterprise which involves large budgets and presumably large kickbacks. PLA officers reportedly pay superiors for promotions with variable pricing depending on the rank and potential profitability of the position. Zhang’s predecessor and successor were both punished for corruption.
I assessed that Zhang Youxia’s combat experience, his self-confidence, intellect and life-long commitment to the defense of China and the Communist Party would protect him. I thought that his life-long relationship with Xi Jinping would be his insurance. Even their fathers were friends. I thought that some financial impropriety would be overlooked because of his abilities and relationship with Xi.
Mostly, I was rooting for him to survive the purges because I liked him.
General Zhang Youxia spent a week in the United States in May 2012 as part of a delegation led by Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie, hosted by then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. Zhang was Shenyang Military Region Commander at the time, one of over ten general officers on the delegation with Defense Minister Liang. In 2012, I was the Director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, responsible for planning and organizing the delegation’s visit to the United States. I accompanied them on the trip including meetings in the Pentagon and tours of military bases on the East and West coasts.
I got to know Zhang Youxia on that trip, and I liked him.
Zhang Youxia was different than most other PLA generals I encountered. The PLA is a political organization – it is the armed wing of the Communist Party – it is not a national army sworn to protect the constitution or the country. Officers’ careers are primarily determined by their political reliability and interpersonal relationships. Loyalty and ideology is more important than warfighting ability. Critical thinking and independent thought can be a liability, rather than an asset in the PLA. This is the PLA’s culture. Class struggle was the defining feature of Mao’s society and army so officers came from worker-peasant families, had little education and many were illiterate. That legacy has vestiges today. I encountered many senior PLA officers who were not well educated. They could be intelligent, but you could tell by their strong accents, vocabulary and discussions they were neither intellectual nor worldly. Some senior officers were very good at spouting the Party line by memory at length but could say little else.
Zhang Youxia stood out. Had seen combat and been humbled by it. He is educated, intellectual, intuitive. He would see something on display and understood its importance and value, and probably also understood why we were showing it to him.
I worked closely for years with my counterparts, the younger PLA staff officers responsible for US-engagement. We bonded over many, many meetings at all hours in Washington and Beijing, including travelling delegations like the one Zhang Youxia joined. There was healthy mutual respect between the China Desk in the Pentagon and the America’s Desk in the PLA HQ. My counterparts staffing the PLA delegations of course had their own relationships with their generals. It was always fascinating to me how they responded to and supported their own senior leaders. Some PLA generals needed hand-holding, spoon-feeding, lots of ego stroking, and those normally had little substance to offer in discussions. Their staff officers served them, but I could see they had less respect for those generals. I always guessed those officers paid for their positions and had proven the Peter Principle.
Zhang Youxia was different. He had an aura of competence around him. The other PLA generals and staff officers could see it, and they respected him for it. They stood up faster and straighter when he entered a room. They gave him their best. It wasn’t just that he was one of the few remaining officers to have fought (and lost) the brief war with Vietnam in 1979, or that he went to kindergarten with Xi Jinping, but he had that going for him too.
Zhang Youxia talked with me that week more than any other PLA general on a delegation. He was inquisitive, thoughtful, respectful. He had high empathy. He wasn’t afraid to talk to foreigners unlike some other senior officers who were often afraid or unable to engage. (Maybe my Chinese was too terrible for them to listen to). He treated his own staff officers with respect, and I suppose he was treating me the same way. I was impressed that he would engage me in conversation because it was unusual.
When we visited Fort Benning, Zhang became animated. We offered the opportunity for him to see static displays of some weapon systems, and the opportunity to fire a few. Many PLA officers are essentially focused on administrative and political roles, not warfighting. Many have never fired a gun and would hesitate before engaging non-commissioned officers on a firing range. Not Zhang. He jumped at the chance to fire a machine gun. He focused on all the static displays and asked the briefers good questions about US technology and doctrine (don’t worry, everything was unclassified!) Many generals don’t know what questions to ask a briefer because their staff didn’t give them questions in advance. Seeing Zhang Youxia tour a military base and absorb what he was offered revealed an intellect that stood out from his peers.
My hope – for the sake of stable US-China military-to-military relations and cross-Strait stability - was that Zhang Youxia would stay at the top of the CMC and remain Xi Jinping’s closest military advisor. I think he was the one active duty PLA officer who could give Xi the best, most objective advice about PLA military capabilities including the PLA’s shortcomings, and crucially the human cost of military conflict. I think he could assess US and Taiwan military capabilities objectively and explain to Xi Jinping what the military risks and costs of an operation to take Taiwan would be. A sycophant with no combat experience has to tell Xi what Xi wants to hear. Zhang’s intellect, experience and his relationship with Xi made honesty and objectivity possible, and that makes him an exception among PLA generals.
For a US deterrence strategy to be effective we need Xi Jinping to be surrounded by competent generals who will give him objective advice. The sole remaining general on the CMC is Zhang Shenmin, a career political commissar. Leaving aside the governance and operational risks of Xi being advised by and trying to command a million-man army through a one-man committee, I worry about the consequences of someone other than Zhang Youxia providing Xi Jinping with military advice.
Without Zhang Youxia on the CMC, the risk of miscalculation goes up.
Having worked on US-China relations in some way most of my adult life, that makes the potential consequences of an investigation and likely detention of Zhang Youxia a personal disappointment.
There is another layer to my personal feelings about Zhang Youxia’s demise.
In October 2023, South China Morning Post reporter Minnie Chan was visiting Beijing for the Xiangshan Forum when she disappeared. She was researching rumors that Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shenmin were being investigated at the time.
It is no secret that she and I were in regular contact. I was quoted in many of her articles about the PLA, providing my analytical assessment of whatever issue or fact she was researching and reporting on. She was a friend too. She knew the PLA as well as any outsider and we could compare notes all day. I usually learned more from her than she from me. We would sometimes speak on the phone, and sometimes text. Soon after she disappeared, all but one of her texts to me were deleted. I don’t know if she deleted them or if it was whoever is holding her and took control of her phone.
A month before her disappearance we were discussing whether or not Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shenmin were being investigated. She was certain. In September 2023 when I asked, “Do you think Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shenmin are in trouble and being investigated?” She responded succinctly, “Yes”.
That one word text is the only one in the string that was not deleted.
I don’t know why Minnie was detained and is still in custody. She had many Mainland sources and contacts and worked on many stories, so I have no idea if her investigation into investigations of Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shenmin in 2023 was the cause of her being disappeared.
My hope is now that the investigation of Zhang Youxia is public, Minnie can be released and can go back to producing excellent articles that provided accurate, authentic perspectives of China’s military and defense strategy so we can better understand China and reduce the risk of misperception.
I fear she has been forgotten.
I want my friends back.
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