Xi Jinping's Third Term

DOR

DOR

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The Party, effective October 2022

Politburo Standing Committee: Xi Jinping, Li Qiang (Premier), Zhao Leji (National People's Congress Chair), Wang Huning (Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee Chair), Cai Qi (Central Committee Secretariat 1st Secretary), Ding Xuexiang (Executive Vice Premier), Li Xi (Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary)

Politburo: Ding Xuexiang, Xi Jinping, Ma Xingrui, Wang Yi, Wang Huning, Yin Li, Shi Taifeng, Liu Guozhong, Li Xi, Li Qiang, Li Ganjie, Li Shulei, Li Hongzhong, He Weidong, He Lifeng, Zhang Youxia, Zhang Guoqing, Chen Wenqing, Chen Jining, Chen Min'er, Zhao Leji, Yuan Jiajun, Huang Kunming, Cai Qi

Secretariat: Cai Qi, Shi Taifeng, Li Ganjie, Li Shulei, Chen Wenqing, Liu Jinguo, Wang Xiaohong

Military Affairs Commission
Chairman: Xi Jinping
Vice chairmen: Zhang Youxia, He Weidong
Members: Li Shangfu, Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, Zhang Shengmin
Zhong Shaojun General Office Director

Discipline Inspection Commission
Secretary: Li Xi
Deputy secretaries: Liu Jinguo (CC), Zhang Shengmin (MAC, CC), Xiao Pei (CC), Yu Hongqiu (f.), Fu Kui, Sun Xinyang, Liu Xuexin, Zhang Fuhai
Members of the Standing Committee of the CCDI (in the order of the number of strokes in their surnames): Wang Xiaoping (f.), Wang Aiwen, Wang Hongjin, Liu Jinguo, Liu Xuexin, Xu Luode, Sun Xinyang, Li Xi, Li Xinran (Manchu), Xiao Pei, Zhang Shengmin, Zhang Fuhai, Chen Guoqiang, Zhao Shiyong, Hou Kai, Yin Bai (Naxi), Yu Hongqiu (f.), Fu Kui, Mu Hongyu (f)



The Cabinet, effective March 2023

Premier: Li Qiang
Vice premiers: Ding Xuexiang, He Lifeng, Zhang Guoqing, Liu Guozhong
State councilors: Li Shangfu, Wang Xiaohong, Wu Zhenglong, Shen Yiqin, Qin Gang
Secretary-general of the State Council: Wu Zhenglong

Qin Gang, minister of foreign affairs
Li Shangfu, minister of national defense
Zheng Shanjie, head of the National Development and Reform Commission
Huai Jinpeng, minister of education
Wang Zhigang, minister of science and technology
Jin Zhuanglong, minister of industry and information technology
Pan Yue, head of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission
Wang Xiaohong, minister of public security
Chen Yixin, minister of state security
Tang Dengjie, minister of civil affairs
He Rong, minister of justice
Liu Kun, minister of finance
Wang Xiaoping, minister of human resources and social security
Wang Guanghua, minister of natural resources
Huang Runqiu, minister of ecology and environment
Ni Hong, minister of housing and urban-rural development
Li Xiaopeng, minister of transport
Li Guoying, minister of water resources
Tang Renjian, minister of agriculture and rural affairs
Wang Wentao, minister of commerce
Hu Heping, minister of culture and tourism
Ma Xiaowei, head of the National Health Commission
Pei Jinjia, minister of veterans affairs
Wang Xiangxi, minister of emergency management
Yi Gang, governor of the People's Bank of China
Hou Kai, auditor-general of the National Audit Office.


Notes
Five members of the cabinet are not members of the CCP Central Committee, including one, Ecology and Environment
minister Huang Runqiu, who is not even a communist (he is vice chair of the Jiusan Society).

The other four are:
Li Xiaopeng, Li Peng's son and Transportation Minister
Yi Gang, Governor of the People's Bank of China
Liu Kun, Finance Minister
Wang Zhigang, Science and Technology Minister
 
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Xi Seeks to Reinvigorate Military-Civilian Integration
China Brief Volume: 23 Issue: 7
By: Arthur Ding, K. Tristan Tang
https://jamestown.org/program/xi-see...n-integration/


Introduction

In a speech to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP) delegation to the National People’s Congress (NPC) on March 8, Chinese President and Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping called for accelerating the development of “integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities” (INSSC:一体化国家战略体系和能力) (Xinhua, March 8). Xi defined the key elements of developing INSSC in the defense and military portion of his political report to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 20th Party Congress last October. He stated that:

“We will consolidate and enhance integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities. We will better coordinate strategies and plans, align policies and systems, and share resources and production factors between the military and civilian sectors. We will improve the system and layout of science, technology and industries related to national defense and step up capacity building in these areas. We will raise public awareness of the importance of national defense. We will improve our national defense mobilization capacity and the development of our reserve forces and modernize our border, coastal and air defenses. We will better motivate service personnel and their family members through military honors and do more to protect their rights and interests. Better services and support will be provided to ex-service personnel. We will consolidate and boost unity between the military and the government and between the military and the people” (Xinhua, October 25, 2022).

While Xi’s vision of INSSC is extremely comprehensive and all-encompassing, it has also been persistent. The concept was raised in Xi’s work report to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017. At that time Xi, stated:

“We will accelerate implementation of major projects, deepen reform of defense-related science, technology, and industry, achieve greater military-civilian integration, and build integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities. We will improve our national defense mobilization system and build a strong, well-structured, and modern border defense, coastal defense, and air defense. We will establish an administration for veterans; we will protect the legitimate rights and interests of military personnel and their families; and we will make military service an occupation that enjoys public respect…” (Xinhua, October 27, 2017).
 
Two key appointments

BEIJING, July 25 (Xinhua) -- China's top legislature voted to appoint Wang Yi as foreign minister and Pan Gongsheng as central bank governor, as it convened a session on Tuesday.

Nothing terribly unusual about that. However, …

BEIJING, July 25 (Xinhua) -- Pan Gongsheng, newly appointed governor of the People's Bank of China (PBOC), made a public pledge of allegiance to the Constitution at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Tuesday.

First, he is pledging allegiance to the state constitution, not that of the party.
Second, he is not a member of the Central Committee, nor an alternate member, nor a member of the Discipline Inspection Commission.
He is the CCP secretary of the PboC (since July 1), and has been Deputy Governor since late December 2012, and head of foreign exchange management (SAFE) since 2015. Since he is only 60 years old, it is odd that he was not named to the Central Committee last autumn.
 
DOR said:
Two key appointments

BEIJING, July 25 (Xinhua) -- China's top legislature voted to appoint Wang Yi as foreign minister and Pan Gongsheng as central bank governor, as it convened a session on Tuesday.
Click to expand...


So what has happened to Qin Gang since being MIA for seven months?
 
tbm3fan said:
So what has happened to Qin Gang since being MIA for seven months?
Click to expand...


Qin has been out of the public eye for one month, not seven. He met the Russian, Vietnamese, and Sri Lankan foreign ministers June 25[SUP]th[/SUP].

No one outside the inner circle knows for sure why he was replaced. Speculation hovers around
  1. It’s time to pull back on the wolf warrior style of foreign policy, and dumping the FM is a good way to signal the change;
  2. It’s time to get much more aggressive with the USA, and the ex-Ambassador (2021-23) isn’t the right guy for the job;
  3. Last September, he quoted Abraham Lincoln to defend China’s concept of “socialist whole-process democracy (from the people, to the people, with the people, for the people), so obviously he’s suspected of being soft on foreigners;
  4. Yi Gang, his predecessor and the senior-most official in charge of foreign affairs may not have liked something or other, or maybe just got up on the wrong side of the bed;
  5. Qin served under former Premier Li Keqiang, so obviously he has to go. Why do you ask?
 
DOR said:
Qin has been out of the public eye for one month, not seven. He met the Russian, Vietnamese, and Sri Lankan foreign ministers June 25[SUP]th[/SUP].

No one outside the inner circle knows for sure why he was replaced. Speculation hovers around
  1. It’s time to pull back on the wolf warrior style of foreign policy, and dumping the FM is a good way to signal the change;
  2. It’s time to get much more aggressive with the USA, and the ex-Ambassador (2021-23) isn’t the right guy for the job;
  3. Last September, he quoted Abraham Lincoln to defend China’s concept of “socialist whole-process democracy (from the people, to the people, with the people, for the people), so obviously he’s suspected of being soft on foreigners;
  4. Yi Gang, his predecessor and the senior-most official in charge of foreign affairs may not have liked something or other, or maybe just got up on the wrong side of the bed;
  5. Qin served under former Premier Li Keqiang, so obviously he has to go. Why do you ask?
Click to expand...

Why do I ask?

First. The BBC said out of view seven months. Don't ask me why but I now see since July 25th in another article. Either mistake or I misinterpret what the BBC was referencing.

Second. When people disappear from view things get interesting as it is usually from saying something they shouldn't have said. Ala Jack Ma, that tennis player, and some assorted millionaires and billionaires.

Third. Why not you're here and I knew you would respond :rolleyes:
 
I suspect DOR is being tongue-in-cheek...:-)

Qin has been out of the public eye for one month, not seven. He met the Russian, Vietnamese, and Sri Lankan foreign ministers June 25[SUP]th[/SUP].

No one outside the inner circle knows for sure why he was replaced. Speculation hovers around
  1. It’s time to pull back on the wolf warrior style of foreign policy, and dumping the FM is a good way to signal the change;
  2. It’s time to get much more aggressive with the USA, and the ex-Ambassador (2021-23) isn’t the right guy for the job;
  3. Last September, he quoted Abraham Lincoln to defend China’s concept of “socialist whole-process democracy (from the people, to the people, with the people, for the people), so obviously he’s suspected of being soft on foreigners;
  4. Yi Gang, his predecessor and the senior-most official in charge of foreign affairs may not have liked something or other, or maybe just got up on the wrong side of the bed;
  5. Qin served under former Premier Li Keqiang, so obviously he has to go. Why do you ask?
Click to expand...
feels to me much more like internal political knife-fighting to me, vs policy. he wasn't popular within MFA because he was seen as Xi's jumped-up obsequious pet.

then Qin banged that TV presenter and that was just enough excuse for the knives to come out. he wasn't an old colleague of Xi, so Xi didn't bother expending the political capital to save him. Wang Yi will do just as well in the meanwhile.
 
astralis said:
I suspect DOR is being tongue-in-cheek...:-)
[/LIST] feels to me much more like internal political knife-fighting to me, vs policy. he wasn't popular within MFA because he was seen as Xi's jumped-up obsequious pet.

then Qin banged that TV presenter and that was just enough excuse for the knives to come out. he wasn't an old colleague of Xi, so Xi didn't bother expending the political capital to save him. Wang Yi will do just as well in the meanwhile.
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Thanks for recognizing my rather sad sense of humor.

Lt General Wang Shaojun (67 years old), head of politburo security (Central Guards), died in March; he had been in the post since March 2015. No reason given for delaying the announcement.
 
DOR said:
Thanks for recognizing my rather sad sense of humor.

Lt General Wang Shaojun (67 years old), head of politburo security (Central Guards), died in March; he had been in the post since March 2015. No reason given for delaying the announcement.
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I hear Seinfeld will be conducting a class over at Cal this fall...
 
This was written by Eric Wishart, a veteran journalist I knew when he was President of the Foreign Correspondents Club of Hong Kong. He posted it on LinkedIn, but I reproduce it here without authorization so please do not repost.

Quite a few journalists know or have met Qin Gang.

He was the foreign ministry spokesman from 2005 to 2010 and was also a very active ambassador in Washington. I had two or three lunches and dinners with him when I was AFP Asia director and he came to AFP's celebration event to mark the 50th anniversary of us opening a bureau in Beijing.

He liked to wind me up (as a Scotsman) by insisting that the Chinese had invented golf. He liked a drink and I found him old school tough but pragmatic. He was labelled a wolf warrior but having dealt with "wolf warriors" I didn't think he was.

I had asked him how could he be the spokesman for China and he said, "just know the policy", a rule he seemed to be following with his tough rhetoric when he was Xi Jinping's foreign minister. He had worked at the London embassy and spoke excellent English. We had a good relationship, and it's rather strange knowing someone who reached that height in the Chinese government then disappeared. I wonder when, how and if he will reappear?

(In the photo [not included here], we are at the AFP 50th anniversary event in Beijing in June 2008 and he was telling me AFP would not be given permission to send a reporting team to Tibet because President Nicolas Sarkozy had met the Dalai Lama. I was trying to explain that AFP was not the state news agency but without success. It didn't stop us enjoying the champagne, though...).
 
Rocket Force Shake-up

The two top officers in China’s Rocket Force have been replaced, and are presumed purged. Generals Li Yuchao (commander) and Liu Guangbin (deputy commander; not to be confused with the Olympic speed skater of the same name) were replaced by Wang Houbin and Xu Xisheng, respectively. Wang was previously a navy deputy commander; Xu moved up from the post of Southern Theater Deputy Political Commissar. Both were promoted one rank, to full general, in connection with the new assignments. Xu replaces Political Commissar General Xu Zhongbo, who had been in office since July 2020.

The move comes days after Foreign Minister Qin Gang and People’s Bank of China Governor Yi Gang were removed from office, and one month after the reported death of Rocket Force Deputy Commander Wu Guohua, and (earlier) Central Security Bureau (bodyguards) Director Wang Shaojun.

Separate reports suggest that PLA Deputy Chief-of-Staff Lt. General Zhang Zhenzhong, a former satellite launch center commander, has also been relieved of his duties.
 
Defense Minister Li Shangfu was purged, barely seven months after being promoted. He served as head of equipment for the PLA (2017-23). No replacement named, as yet.

Finance Minister Liu Kun was also replaced, by Lan Fo'an, lately of the Shaanxi branch of the Xi Jinping Fan Club. Liu (67 yrs old) does not appear to have been purged.

Rocket force, foreign ministry, defense ministry, finance ministry ... someone's new cabinet isn't looking very good.
 
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it's pretty impressive that the difference between the April and October IMF 5-year forecasts for China's economy is -$15 trillion.
 
HONG KONG -- China's former Premier Li Keqiang died of a heart attack in the early hours of Friday, according to state media. He was 68.

He had served as premier for a decade, from 2013 until this year.


Nothing suspicious here, folks, nothing at all.
 
DOR said:
HONG KONG -- China's former Premier Li Keqiang died of a heart attack in the early hours of Friday, according to state media. He was 68.

He had served as premier for a decade, from 2013 until this year.


Nothing suspicious here, folks, nothing at all.
Click to expand...

Authoritarian vs a moderate liberal? Familiar story? Where have I heard that before?

__________________________________________________ ___________________________

https://www.bbc.com/

The death of a leader in China can usher in big changes, it did after Mao Zedong, or can lead to political upheaval, like it did when grieving for Hu Yaobang morphed into the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.

For this reason, the passing of former premier Li Keqiang has already triggered various measures to ensure that stability is maintained.

A crackdown on VPN use is under way to reduce the access of Chinese citizens to the parts of the internet not controlled by the Communist Party.

The Party doesn't want mourning for a popular, liberal, former number two leader to generate wider criticism of the current administration, led by Xi Jinping.

It is not just that Li died so suddenly, suffering a heart attack just months after stepping down, but because of what he represented: a way of potentially governing China with different priorities to those of the General Secretary Xi.

He was a bright pragmatist who didn't seem so concerned with ideology. And this is one reason why he cut such a lonely figure in the previous, seven-man Politburo Standing Committee, the country's most powerful decision-making body.
Then there's what would become known as the "Li Keqiang Index" which was born via a famous US state department memo, and came to light in Wikileaks. As the then Party Secretary of Liaoning Province, Li is said to have told the US ambassador in 2007 that the local GDP figures were unreliable as a way of judging economic health.

He reportedly said that he used three other indicators to analyse growth: railway cargo volume, electricity consumption and bank loan disbursements.

Criticising China's official statistics, even behind closed doors, to the Americans cannot have gone down well with his political opponents.

The former premier was considered one of the smartest political figures of his generation. He was accepted into the prestigious Peking University Law School soon after the universities were reopened following Chairman Mao's disastrous Cultural Revolution.

In a Party dominated by engineers, he was an economist, who become known for "telling it like it is" by honestly and publicly acknowledging China's economic problems as a means of finding solutions to them.

During the recent pandemic, he spoke about the damage which Mr Xi's signature zero-Covid approach was doing to the economy, and to ordinary Chinese.

Naturally, he didn't question the country's paramount leader directly, or the policy itself, but he didn't sugar coat the impacts of the amelioration measures either.
In May 2022, during a virtual meeting said to involve more than 100,000 government and business representatives, he first spoke highly of the "effective work" from officials facing "unexpected challenges" during the crisis but then he went on: "The difficulties, in some areas and to a certain degree, are even greater than the severe shock of the pandemic in 2020."

He added that there was a clear way forward, saying that "development is the basis and key to solving all problems in China". It's worth noting that he said development, not ideological vigour.

"To do a good job of epidemic prevention and control, we need financial and material resources. We need development to support stable employment, people's livelihoods and risk prevention," he said.

In May last year, with the zero-Covid policy still in place, he appeared unmasked at a university in Yunnan province. And neither the students nor officials gathering around him were wearing masks. This spurred viral discussion on social media, with posts praising the premier. Soon the hashtag #PremierAtYunnanUniversity was being censored.

During the first year of Covid, as the person technically in charge of the economy, Li decided to promote the job creating capacity of street stalls and was seen visiting street vendors in Shandong Province. Business was already heading into difficult waters, and he said that this type of commerce could add vitality and create more jobs.

Almost immediately, street vendors were back on the streets of Beijing, after having been banned for years. But they were never going to be allowed to stay, not under Mr Xi's vision of what the Chinese capital should look like.

Within days of Li's so-called push to revive street stalls, the move was already being undermined in the Beijing Municipal Party Committee's newspaper, The Beijing Daily. It ran a commentary saying that street stalls were "unhygienic and uncivilised". Other state media then joined with similar messages.

That the city government could so quickly - and so publicly and effectively - overturn a suggested policy by the premier of the country, showed just how limited his power had become.

Under the previous government of Hu Jintao, with its collective leadership, this would not have been possible. Various factions within the Party had to be balanced.

But under Mr Xi it is either the Xi Jinping way or the wrong way.
Before Li stepped down in March this year, he was the last senior government figure linked to the Hu-era and its way of doing things.

His presence represented another time, a less politically zealous approach, which focused more on business activity than party sloganeering.

As a fluent English speaker, he could be very charming when meeting foreign leaders. He would also wave and smile to journalists gathering to film his official meetings.

That his death has come just months after the unexplained removal of the high-profile Foreign and Defence Ministers has only added to its potential sensitivity.

The coming official ceremonies remembering him will be handled very carefully, lest they even slightly prompt a sympathetic view of the former Premier which might conflict with government's current path.

Those watching Chinese social media platforms will be monitoring the outpourings of sadness and shock online, as ordinary people remember him.

Li came through the ranks of the Communist Party at the same time as Mr Xi and, at one point, was in the running to become General Secretary himself, instead of Mr Xi.

Much speculation has been made of what China might have been like now, had Li taken the reins as paramount leader.
 
Mr Xi Cleans House

In late December, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC; the highest legislative body) dismissed from its ranks nine senior military officers. They are largely related to the on-going purge of the Rocket Force (previously known as the Second Artillery Corps) and Equipment Development Department (the old General Armaments Department), but also include the commander of the southern third of the navy.

Unlike in the old days when people disappeared overnight, the process now appears to be much more regulated. Removal from office is documented at each stage of the process.

General Li Yuchao, commander of the PLA Rocket Force was removed from office in July, as was General Ju Qiansheng, who commanded the Strategic Support Force.

General Li Shangfu, a former head of equipment development, was dismissed from his post as Defense Minister in October, the same month in which Foreign Minister Qin Gang and Central Bank of China party secretary Liu Liang were ousted, although it is unclear if these cases were related to any of the others.

Two other high profile personnel changes also took place in October: Finance Minister Liu Kun and Science and Technology Minister Wang Zhigang were removed from their posts (as was one of Wang’s vice ministers, Zhang Guangjun).

And, as the NPC dismissals confirm, Air Force Commander General Ding Laihang has been replaced, and like several other top ranking officers dropped from the legislature. The others include former Rocket Force Commander General Zhou Yaning, Deputy Chief-of-Staff Lieutenant General Zhang Zhenzhong, Rocket Force Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Li Chuanguang, and Equipment Development deputy director Lieutenant General Zhang Yulin.
 
Wannabe cadres, pay attention!
Your prospects for advancement depend on knowing what’s what.

”Political training (政治训练) will be made more solid and effective; the party spirit of cadres will be strengthened, the style of work will be mastered; political judgment (政治判断力),political comprehension (政治领悟力), and political execution (政治执行力) will unceasingly be improved; political discipline (政治纪律) and political rules consciousness (政治规矩意识) will be advanced and strengthened; and consciousness of political stance (政治立场), political orientation (政治方向), political principles (政治原则), and the political path (政治道路) will maintain a high degree of unanimity with the Party center with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core.”
 
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