By Admiral James A. Winnefeld, U.S. Navy (Retired), and Michael J. Morell
The beginning of major state-on-state conflict is almost always a surprise . . . at least to one of the two sides. The China–Taiwan conflict of early 2021 was no exception. The overlapping factors that brought it about now seem so obvious in retrospect. First, the convergence of Thucydides’ three sources of conflict—fear, honor, and interest—was unprecedented at the time. On top of this, Chinese recognition of a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity and leader Xi Jinping’s eagerness to solidify his re-election in 2023 made it almost inevitable.
As China’s leaders began to consider their response options, they sensed an opportunity emerging in late November. No one was surprised that the U.S. election results turned out to be contentious and contested—indeed, senior Chinese leaders were aware of the Russian influence campaign intended to amplify American divisions. But the degree of enmity surrounding the prolonged cases in multiple state and federal courts, rising to violence in a number of major metropolitan areas, rose beyond what Beijing thought likely.
It soon became clear to the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) that the 2021 U.S. political transition would be an even more vulnerable time than usual for U.S. decision-making. Xi, needing his own political win before his 2023 re-election, argued to his hand-picked allies on the Committee that such an opportunity would only appear every few decades. Once the members came to agreement that China would be willing to suffer what it believed would be temporary and half-hearted opprobrium from the international community in exchange for achievement of a long-held goal, the die was cast. The PBSC decided in mid-December to place in motion Operation Red Province—to bring Taiwan back into China.
The PRC deliberately ratcheted up tensions with the island in December 2020 and commenced a major military exercise along its east coast in early January that was ostensibly designed to be a signal to Taiwan. The West, distracted by the U.S. election drama and the ongoing pandemic, viewed this as mere saber-rattling.
The operation unfolded quickly, beginning on the evening of 18 January, two days before the scheduled—and still in-doubt—U.S. presidential inauguration. A message was transmitted to Taiwan’s leaders that they had the option of immediate peaceful capitulation or armed coercion, and that in the case of the former there would be no recriminations.
Simultaneously, a series of closely coordinated Chinese military moves unfolded that were intended to put a stranglehold on Taiwan and deter any other nation from interfering. All over Taiwan, Chinese intelligence operatives and special forces not in uniform–China’s own “little green men”—emerged to take control of key facilities and sabotage military facilities. A host of cyberattacks crippled Taiwan’s public media and took down key elements of the power grid. The attack on Taiwan was underway.
Chinese forces previously engaged in the exercise swiftly turned their attention across the Strait, and, after tough resistance on the ground, seized several islands claimed by Taiwan, including Quemoy, Matsu, and the Penghus. Peoples Liberation Army Navy submarines deployed to close the northern and southern entrances to the Taiwan Strait, and also deployed east of Taiwan to prepare for potential action against U.S. Navy ships. Any Taiwan Navy surface ships underway were engaged quickly and sunk. Chinese media highlighted the presence of thousands of ballistic and cruise missiles in launching positions capable of targeting key facilities on Taiwan. An immediate sea and air blockade of the island was announced, pending Taipei’s decision on Beijing’s ultimatum.
Meanwhile, China’s “Wolf Warrior Diplomats” commenced an engagement blitz to offer carrots and sticks to governments across the globe to support, or at least not resist, this important and long-needed move by China. Particular care was taken with Japan to ensure it was clear to the government of Japan that any support provided to a U.S. response would be considered hostile action against China.
In Washington, Chinese Ambassador Cui Tiankai summoned the head of the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs to the embassy on the morning of 19 January, delivering an explicit warning to the United States not to intervene, noting that China would take all necessary measures to prevent such interference. Similar warnings were delivered to Australia, Japan, South Korea, and other close U.S. allies. A sudden, mysterious power outage in Indianapolis that afternoon was loosely attributed to a Chinese cyberattack, which seemed carefully calibrated not to provoke the United States, but to suggest “We can do more.”