War inquiry

[Ray]

As one from a third world country, notwithstanding the hype of my country being an 'emerged power' which it is not by a long chalk, I think Ironduke has a point.

It does make one uncomfortable.

If I may add, is the UN or the Secretary General, not subject to pressure to just obey and be done with it?

The UN intervention in Korea would not have happened if the USSR was not missing.

Rwanda did not warrant attention because it was not in anyway politically, economically or strategically important.

 

[tankie]

Bliars latest statement .




Tony Blair has revealed he disregarded his top legal adviser's warning that attacking Iraq would be illegal without further UN backing because the guidance was "provisional".

The former Prime Minister made the revelation in a statement ahead of his second appearance at the Chilcot Inquiry into the March 2003 invasion.

He was questioned by inquiry chairman Sir John Chilcot and his panel about possible gaps and inconsistencies in Mr Blair's justification for the war.

The-then Attorney General Lord Goldsmith told him on January 14 2003 that UN Resolution 1441 was not enough on its own to justify the use of force against Saddam Hussein.

But the next day Mr Blair told the Commons it was necessary to be able to say that Britain would still act if an unreasonable veto at the UN was put down.

Mr Blair has now said: "I had not yet got to the stage of a formal request for advice and neither had he got to the point of formally giving it.

"So I was continuing to hold to the position that another resolution was not necessary."

The peer revealed he was "uncomfortable" about Mr Blair's public comments that Britain could attack Iraq without further UN support.

Mr Blair said he believed Lord Goldsmith would come around to his interpretation of the legal position once he knew the full history of the negotiations behind Resolution 1441.

And in March 2003 before the invasion, Lord Goldsmith presented him with formal legal advice that a "reasonable case" could be made for launching an attack without extra UN backing.

Meanwhile, Mr Blair privately assured US President George Bush "you can count on us" in the run-up to the war.

The view was in a private note that will remain secret but Mr Blair summed up its contents and that of other statements to Mr Bush.

He said he had told Mr Bush: "You can count on us, we are going to be with you in tackling this, but here are the difficulties."

The inquiry released a newly declassified document from March 2002 in which Mr Blair said the UK should be "gung ho" about the prospect of getting rid of the Iraqi dictator.

In his evidence to the inquiry, Mr Blair said he made clear that he would always stand "shoulder to shoulder" with the Americans.

But he also claimed he succeeded in persuading the US leader to go down the "UN route" first.

The former Premier said regime change in Baghdad had always been "on the agenda" for the Americans after the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

He said the US/UK were trying to get a second UN resolution, and Chile and Mexico wanted to support them but France was threatening a veto.

He claimed the French were clear they would veto any resolution that included an ultimatum, and the US/French relationship had become "very scratchy".

Mr Blair said France believed Saddam was complying in part with weapons inspectors. The US was arguing he was not fully complying. Mr Blair claimed without full compliance, action must follow.

The ex-PM argued that if US/UK had backed off from Iraq in March 2003, it was at least possible that Saddam would still be there now with WMD.

 

[DOR]

Chilcot report: Tony Blair takes 'full responsibility' for Iraq war and expresses his

Chilcot report: Tony Blair takes 'full responsibility' for Iraq war and expresses his

The Telegraph's view:

The long-awaited official report into Britain's involvement in the Iraq war has delivered a scathing verdict on Government ministers' justification, planning and conduct of a military intervention which "went badly wrong, with consequences to this day".

Mr Blair presented the case for war in 2003 with "a certainty which was not justified" based on "flawed" intelligence about the country's supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) which was not challenged as it should have been, found report author Sir John Chilcot.


Excerpts from the Executive Summary:

In November 2001, the JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee] assessed that Iraq had played no role in the 9/11 attacks on the US and that practical co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida was “unlikely”.15 There was no “credible evidence of covert transfers of WMD‑related technology and expertise to terrorist groups”. It was possible that Iraq might use WMD in terrorist attacks, but only if the regime was under serious and imminent threat of collapse. p. 10

Although there was no evidence of links between Iraq and Al Qaida, Mr Blair encouraged President Bush to address the issue of Iraq in the context of a wider strategy to confront terrorism after the attacks of 9/11. p. 11

In early 2003, Mr Straw still thought a peaceful solution was more likely than military action. Mr Straw advised Mr Blair on 3 January that he had concluded that, in the potential absence of a “smoking gun”, there was a need to consider a “Plan B”.51 The UK should emphasise to the US that the preferred strategy was peaceful disarmament.
Mr Blair took a different view. By the time he returned to the office on 4 January 2003, he had concluded that the “likelihood was war” and, if conflict could not be avoided, the right thing to do was fully to support the US.52 He was focused on the need to establish evidence of an Iraqi breach, to persuade opinion of the case for action and to finalise the strategy with President Bush at the end of January. p. 20

There was no evidence that Iraq had tried to acquire fissile material and other components or – were it able to do so – that it had the technical capabilities to turn these materials into a usable weapon. p. 43

The Inquiry considers that there should have been collective discussion by a Cabinet Committee or small group of Ministers on the basis of inter‑departmental advice agreed at a senior level between officials at a number of decision points which had a major impact on the development of UK policy before the invasion of Iraq. Those were:

​

• The decision at the beginning of December 2001 to offer to work with President Bush on a strategy to deal with Iraq as part of Phase 2 of the “War on Terror”, despite the fact that there was no evidence of any Iraqi involvement with the attacks on the US or active links to Al Qaida.

​

• The adoption of the position at the end of February 2002 that Iraq was a threat which had to be dealt with, together with the assumption that the only certain means to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime was to invade Iraq and impose a new government. P. 58