A place to look at the coming modernization of systems in the US Army
US Army Modernization
- Thread starter Albany Rifles
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While really a story from a year ago published this past Spring, this article is a look into how the Army plans to handle modernization into the future. And it does bring up one of the issues with the original AFC charter...control of funding for new systems. By statute that MUST stay under the civilian control within the Army Secretariat through the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquistion, Logistics & Technology. Beneath the ASALT resides numerous Program Executive Offices. These can be military or civilian but are always general officer or civilian Senior Executive Service personnel. Under them are a myriad of Project, Program & Product managers who are responsible for specific systems. They are responsible for Cost, scheduling, funding & sustainment of new and already deployed systems. These offices don't work in a silo; they work hand in hand with AFC. Previously we did this with TRADOC and it was very rigid. We are now much more agile these days. Some of the systems we have sent to Ukraine are a result of this new relationship...NASAMS being a big one.
BTW if you look in the tree under Program Executive Office for Enterprise Information Systems and go way down you will see my fat ass where I am the PM for Sustainment. I have been in various roles in the Acquisition Corps since 1989 when it was called Procurement.
Futures Command faces identity crisis as Army shifts mission
Futures Command faces identity crisis as Army shifts mission (defensenewsthrough out the Army. But they don't do it in a silo. We know work with counterparts of AFC. It is much better .com)
BTW if you look in the tree under Program Executive Office for Enterprise Information Systems and go way down you will see my fat ass where I am the PM for Sustainment. I have been in various roles in the Acquisition Corps since 1989 when it was called Procurement.
Futures Command faces identity crisis as Army shifts mission
Futures Command faces identity crisis as Army shifts mission (defensenewsthrough out the Army. But they don't do it in a silo. We know work with counterparts of AFC. It is much better .com)
WASHINGTON — Gen. Mark Milley confronted a daunting challenge when he became chief of staff of the Army in 2015.
Virtually all of the Army’s recent modernization efforts — from the sprawling Future Combat Systems program, centered around a network that connected new vehicles, drones and other technology, to the Comanche helicopter to the Crusader weapon system intended to replace aging artillery — had ended in cancellation.
When Milley, who now leads the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Pentagon’s top officer, became Army chief, he sketched out a new approach. Over his first several months in the position, he proposed a four-star command, dubbed “Army Futures Command,” that would ultimately lead the service’s modernization programs, grouped into six priority categories.
Milley saw the command as a new way forward, breaking free of the bureaucracy and silos that had hampered previous efforts.
“Here we are 40 years later, and the vehicles and weapon systems that were brought online when I was a lieutenant were still the vehicles and weapon systems — and organization and the doctrine are pretty much the same,” he told Defense News in an exclusive interview.
Over his four-year term as the Army’s chief of staff, Milley, working with top service officials, shifted billions of dollars into modernization programs and based the new command in Austin, Texas, an area known for its innovative, technology-focused workforce. The Army gave the command’s chief and the leaders of new groups, dubbed “cross-functional teams,” the authority to manage requirements and the leeway to direct dollars.
Now, four years into the experiment, top service officials are rethinking Army Futures Command, shifting it from an organization with control over investment decisions to an advisory body focused more on emerging technology and less on near-term programs. The move, they say, is meant to reaffirm civilian control of the military.
Gen. James McConville, then-vice chief of staff of the Army, uses a virtual reality flight simulator during a 2018 tour of the Capitol Factory in Austin, Texas. (Sgt. Brandon Banzhaf/U.S. Army)
But the shift has raised questions about the future influence of the command and where the changes would leave the Army’s critical modernization efforts. It has also revealed a rare public schism among Pentagon leaders on how the service should approach modernization.
The divide comes at a critical time. The service hopes to get 24 new systems to soldiers by September 2023, an important milestone to prove the Army can move past its previous acquisition failures and address threats posed by Russia and China.
“We must transform quickly so we have continued overmatch against those who wish us harm and those who threaten our national security,” Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville said at the Association of the U.S. Army’s annual convention last fall.
“Our competitors have been aggressively investing in modernizing their forces with new technology and new weapons in order to maintain overmatch,” he added. “We must modernize now.”
The beginnings of Army Futures Command
As Milley planned Army Futures Command, he wanted an organization entirely concentrated on fielding new equipment. Unlike Training and Doctrine Command, where modernization had to compete for attention alongside training, recruitment and professional military education, a more focused organization would enable the Army to move faster.
Even so, he said he faced skeptics in the Obama administration. Milley told Defense News that when he shared his ideas with Pentagon officials, he initially “did not get a lot of support.”
But in early 2017, the Trump administration arrived, and Milley found a potential backer in acting Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy.
During an initial meeting at the Pentagon, McCarthy asked Milley to name his modernization priorities. Milley grabbed a paper dinner napkin on the desk and made a list.
Core to the Army and the first priority, Milley said, was fires. The military uses fires, such as artillery, to destroy or disable enemy forces’ ability to attack.
Next, he thought about movement, leading to the second and third priorities: a new combat vehicle and a vertical lift aircraft program.
To shoot and move in a coordinated manner, the Army would need to securely and reliably communicate, making the network the fourth priority.
“Then you have to be able to protect all of that,” Milley said, meaning the Army needs air defense, a capability considerably weakened when the Army shifted its focus to a counterinsurgency fight in the Middle East. Air and missile defense became the fifth priority.
“The last key function is to sustain” the force, he added, which leads to a focus on systems that enhance individual soldier capability — the final priority.
McCarthy was sold, and the two began hashing out the details. With the help of Army Secretary Mark Esper, who was confirmed in 2017, and Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville, the four worked to make Army Futures Command a reality.
Milley and other top Army officials wanted the command to benefit from rapid technology development taking place at companies like Google and Amazon. Locating the headquarters in the tech town of Austin was meant to help the service learn how innovative businesses operate.
To lead the command, the Army tapped Gen. Mike Murray, who, as the Army’s G-8 chief, was in charge of making the service’s funding match up with its equipment needs. Suddenly, Murray went from wearing Army camouflage every day to donning button-down shirts and cowboy boots.
Milley said that was by design; civilian clothes made more sense in Austin because the uniform can be a “barrier.”
Then-Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy, right, walks with Gen. John Murray, left, who led Army Futures Command and is seen here in civilian clothes — a deliberate decision to close the gap between the military and the innovative private sector. (Luke J. Allen/U.S. Army)
But what the command really needed was money. Top service officials launched a process to cut other programs to find dollars for their new top priorities.
Through this approach, dubbed “night court” and led by McCarthy and McConville, the Army shifted, in the first round, more than $30 billion over five years away from projects that weren’t top priorities — like an Army lab effort to develop a bullet that would drop grass seed when it was shot — to the six priority areas.
In its first year, night court eliminated 41 programs and reduced or delayed 39 more. The Army, for example, canceled the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System and a service life extension program for the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, and the service delayed the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.
Esper also gave significant autonomy to the service’s four-star commanders overseeing forces, training, doctrine, materiel and modernization in the investment process. The idea was to allow leaders to quickly make decisions — whether for readiness or requirements.
Army Futures Command seemed to be taking root — but Milley said “a lot of antibodies” remained within the service.
Perhaps no group was more affected than the Army’s acquisition branch, which now had to contend with an entirely new command’s processes. The branch raised concerns AFC had too much freedom to direct funding and that its processes could undermine civilian control of the budget.
The tension between the acquisition office and the new command became most clear in the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle program, a competition to replace the Bradley fighting vehicle, a critical armored troop carrier.
In fall 2019, only General Dynamics Land Systems submitted a bid for the next phase of the program, despite the service’s efforts to create a competitive project.
Officials at Army Futures Command and those in the service’s acquisition branch clashed over whether the program could move forward, but the service ultimately started over, delaying the program by roughly two years.
Hoping to defuse the tension, McCarthy in 2020 issued a directive meant to clarify the authorities of AFC and those of the service’s acquisition office.
The order put Army Futures Command in the driver’s seat, establishing it as “leading the modernization enterprise.” It designated the command as the “Chief Futures Modernization Investment Officer acting on behalf of the Army” but noted it should work “in coordination with [the Army acquisition office], on all matters pertaining to research and development.”
Rep. Ken Calvert, R-Calif., speaks during a news conference in 2015 on Capitol Hill. (Alex Wong/Getty Images)
Army Futures Command was also starting to win supporters in Congress.
“I had my doubts in the beginning,” Rep. Ken Calvert, R-Calif., the ranking member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, told Defense News in a recent interview. He said he questioned whether it cost too much and was in the right location — even “the entire concept.”
But, he added, “I was always in favor of doing things differently than what has been done in the old Army because, obviously, that wasn’t working.”
A new administration
Army Futures Command received attention and gained traction as it opened its headquarters in downtown Austin in August 2018. Across the street, it opened the Army Applications Laboratory, which helped startups meet the service. The lab was based at the Capital Factory, a hub connecting entrepreneurs with investors.
Milley said the command was able to bring “more successful programs in the last 24 months to actual reality, at least an initial operating concept, than the Army did in the previous four years.”
Although some of those efforts were already in development, the command has touted it was able to push programs through development and into soldiers’ hands faster than previously planned.
In 2021, the Army delivered a new short-range air defense system to Europe; the service now is working to field the same system with a 50-kilowatt laser capability in fiscal 2022.
Also last year, the service bought and fielded two Iron Dome systems for Indirect Fires Protection Capability, briefly deploying one to Guam. In addition, the Army delivered Enhanced Night Vision Goggles.
This year, soldiers are on track to get a new air and missile defense sensor, a command-and-control capability, the mixed-reality Integrated Visual Augmentation System, and the Next-Generation Squad Weapon.
After Christine Wormuth became Army secretary in May 2021, she made two visits to Army Futures Command’s headquarters. She told Defense News she quickly identified some “ambiguity” in the direction given to the command and the service’s acquisition office about their roles and responsibilities.
At the same time, Wormuth moved to centralize investment authority in Army headquarters.
Army Secretary Christine Wormuth, right, receives a brief on capabilities by Col. Jay Whisham, director of the Army Applications Lab, left, and Casey Perly, director of technical insights and analysis at the lab, on Sept. 20, 2021, in Austin, Texas. (Anthony-Matthew Sualog/U.S. Army)
Then, in May 2022, she issued a memo voiding previous Army modernization directives and shifting much of AFC’s control over funding back to the acquisition branch. This included funding for laboratory research as well as development and prototyping.
Wormuth told Defense News the memo was meant to “make some minor adjustments to the relationship between” the acquisition office and the command.
“I didn’t want to make any changes through that directive that would get in the way of delivering results,” she added.
But Calvert said the new directive “basically guts the entire intention of the Army Futures Command.”
“Why the hell did we do it in the first place?” he said. “If bureaucrats want to take over the operation and tell the military to take a back seat … that’s just an entire bureaucratic power play from my perspective, and we’re going to be back to where we were.”
Thomas Spoehr, a former three-star Army general once in charge of force development who now works at the Heritage Foundation think tank, said Wormuth’s directive has left the “perception — whether correct or not — that the Army headquarters is seeking to rein in AFC.”
“That impacts their ability to get things done,” he said of Army Futures Command.
Army officials have pushed back on claims they weakened the command.
“Army Futures Command never had acquisition authority,” Doug Bush, the Army’s acquisition chief, stressed in testimony on Capitol Hill this spring. “That has always resided, as required by law, on the civilian secretariat side in my office.”
The AFC commander’s “got his job, I’ve got mine. No one person is in charge of everything,” he added.
The Army has not named a new AFC chief since Murray left in late 2021. According to multiple sources who weren’t authorized to discuss the matter publicly, Lt. Gen. Walter Piatt was the front-runner for the job. However, he reportedly was reluctant to send the National Guard to stop the Jan. 6 insurrection, spurring concerns his nomination wouldn’t survive a Senate confirmation process.
From left, then-President Donald Trump and then-Maj. Gen. Walter Piatt view air assault exercises at Fort Drum, N.Y., on Aug. 13, 2018. (Carolyn Kaster/AP)
With no one in the top job, Lt. Gen. James Richardson, Murray’s deputy, is serving as acting commander. He has made few public appearances, and the command has returned to wearing military uniforms more regularly at the request of the new command sergeant major.
Spoehr said leaving the command without a chief is “inexplicable.”
“I am not aware of an Army four-star command ever going this long without a nomination for a commander,” he added. “There is no substitute for a confirmed four-star commander when the command deals with the Pentagon officials, industry and the public. People know four-star generals are a rare breed.”
Wormuth said the Army is working to name a new commander, and she remains “very hopeful that we will see a nominee going to the Senate in short order.”
The path forward
The Army’s modernization programs have a busy year ahead. By the end of this fiscal year, the service is slated to choose a team to build a new long-range assault aircraft.
The Army is also on schedule to deliver in FY23 a new long-range Precision Strike Missile; a cannon capable of shooting out to 70 kilometers; a long-range hypersonic weapon; a ship-killing midrange missile; a new lightweight tank; the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle; and a new tactical unmanned aircraft system.
Lockheed Martin conducts a flight test of the Army's Precision Strike Missile in May 2021. (Courtesy of Lockheed Martin)
In a recent interview, Wormuth and Bush vowed Army Futures Command will remain in Austin and have a four-star chief. And, along with McConville and Richardson, they confirmed their commitment to seeing the service’s modernization priorities to the finish line.
But Wormuth told Defense News she sees the command evolving to focus on thinking about the longer-term future rather than on programs for the next decade.
According to her directive, the command “is responsible for force design and force development and is the capabilities developer and operational architect for the future Army.”
“AFC assesses and integrates the future operational environment, emerging threats, and technologies to provide warfighters with the concepts and future force designs needed to dominate a future battlefield,” it added.
The command should be “helping us think about where we need to be not just in 2030, but thinking ahead to the Army of 2040,” Wormuth said, adding that the organization “is fundamentally about doing a lot of conceptual work.”
Now, Wormuth is focused on pushing a total of 35 signature systems into soldiers’ hands by 2030. About 24 will either enter the field or be in late prototyping phases by the end of FY23.
But Congress wants more answers about who is overseeing the Army’s modernization work. A provision in the House version of the latest defense authorization bill, submitted as an amendment by Rep. Mikie Sherrill, D-N.J., requires the service to prepare a plan that “comprehensively defines the roles and responsibilities of officials and organizations of the Army with respect to the force modernization efforts of the Army.”
If the Army fails to submit this plan on time, the head of Army Futures Command will revert to the roles and responsibilities laid out during the Trump administration. In other words, Wormuth’s latest directive would “have no force or effect.”
How Army modernization goes in the coming years could also influence Milley’s effort to create a joint futures command that would encompass all of the military services.
He considers Army Futures Command “an enormous success.” This model, he told Defense News, could pave the way for the joint force to determine what it will need to operate successfully in the future.
“As we go forward, we need to make sure [the Army] maintains that momentum that it’s built,” Milley said, “which is actually leading the way for joint modernization.”
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For all the 'commonalities' the new light tank is supposed to have with the Abrams I see a 120 mm gun isn't one of them.
Probably would've pushed it over the desired weight limit
True, but I can't really see the point in adopting a 105mmm caliber barrel either. Unless they've come up with something really new in terms of barrel/charges/shells designs a 105 round won't stop a modern MBT but is overkill for just about anything else.
The only reason I can think of (Of the top of my head) for doing what they've done is so that commanders of units equipped with these tanks don't fall into the same psychological trap British Commanders did during WW1 i.e. be tempted to use well armed but more lightly armored BCs against German BBs.
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It's not intended to duel with enemy tanks, rather it's supposed to be an infantry support system.
According to Maj. Gen. Glenn Dean, the program executive officer for ground combat systems, the M10 is "intended to support our infantry brigade combat teams by suppressing and destroying fortifications, gun systems, entrenchments, and, secondarily, then providing protection against enemy armored vehicles”
Of course, you know what they say about "intentions"
Had issues with the WAB over the weekend. The M10 uses the same soft recoil 105mm on the Stryker MGS. A 105mm APDS-t M900A1 will kill a T-72 but not a T-80. But as Joe says it's primary mission is not to take on tanks. It is meant to handle other armor and direct fire support to Infantry in light units (I consider a serious armored vehicle one with a phone on the back). It also has the tried and true M240B 7.62 mm COAX and the M2.HB .50 Calinber MG in a CROWS commanders' station. You can carry 2 in a C-17. So they wouldn't be in the initial assault wave but would be in early follow ons. Not what the task organization will be...a company per BCT or a BN at division level. That is still getting bandied about.
It's not intended to duel with enemy tanks, rather it's supposed to be an infantry support system.
According to Maj. Gen. Glenn Dean, the program executive officer for ground combat systems, the M10 is "intended to support our infantry brigade combat teams by suppressing and destroying fortifications, gun systems, entrenchments, and, secondarily, then providing protection against enemy armored vehicles”
Of course, you know what they say about "intentions"
Yes it's the 'intended' part that worries me. When have intentions ever won a war for anyone? The programs supporters appear to be operating in the belief that no enemy will deploy MBTs into combat in sectors where these vehicles are deployed. How do they know this will be the case? And since it manifestly isn't that means they must intend to deploy Abrams along side them anyway.
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Yes it's the 'intended' part that worries me. When have intentions ever won a war for anyone? The programs supporters appear to be operating in the belief that no enemy will deploy MBTs into combat in sectors where these vehicles are deployed. How do they know this will be the case? And since it manifestly isn't that means they must intend to deploy Abrams along side them anyway.
I assume this to get armored firepower in-theater as quickly as possible. The original program name for the M10 was Mobile Protected Firepower.
The Abrams is simply too porky to move around quickly, but as Buck pointed out, a C-17 can carry two M10s (versus just one Abrams)
Up until now, light forces haven't had much more than the troublesome M1128 Mobile Gun System Stryker and only a relative handful of those, and they're pretty thin-skinned.
It's almost important to note that, should light forces encounter a tank that the M10 can't handle, they (the light forces) are themselves carrying things like Javelin and accompanied by TOW-2B which can be mounted on darn near anything with four wheels.
On the other hand, I might also be talking out of my fourth point of contact....
I assume this to get armored firepower in-theater as quickly as possible. The original program name for the M10 was Mobile Protected Firepower.
The Abrams is simply too porky to move around quickly, but as Buck pointed out, a C-17 can carry two M10s (versus just one Abrams)
Up until now, light forces haven't had much more than the troublesome M1128 Mobile Gun System Stryker and only a relative handful of those, and they're pretty thin-skinned.
It's almost important to note that, should light forces encounter a tank that the M10 can't handle, they (the light forces) are themselves carrying things like Javelin and accompanied by TOW-2B which can be mounted on darn near anything with four wheels.
On the other hand, I might also be talking out of my fourth point of contact....
I just keep on thinking about how fast, flexible and readily deployable worked out for the LCS program. Or in other words 'how about adding a larger gun 'in case'.
Great question Sir
It is a separate stand alone unit which will be allocated to Infantry Brigade Combat Teams and whose doctrine & training is being shared between the Infantry & Armor Schools at the Maneuver Sentence of Excellence at FT Moore, GA. The Military Occupational specialty (Soldiers) and Modified Table of Organization & Equipment (how a unit is structured and the equipment a unit is authorized) will be 19-Series...I.E. Armor since it is a direct fire support unit as opposed to an indirect fires support unit.
The Army's LCS was Future Combat Systems (FCS). We already made our bonehead money waster of an idea in the Oughts.
I did a great write up on my iPhone last night except the system wouldn't accept it! So here I'll try again.
Each Light Infantry Division (10 MTN, 82 ABN, 101 ABN, 36 ID) has an attack helicopter battalion (101st has 2) and air cav squadron equipped with AH-64D attack helicopters. They deploy in early. In addition each of the 9 Infantry battalions has a Weapons Company with an AT platoon of 12 TOW HMMWVs...that's 108 Heavy ATGMs. Each of the 27 Rifle companies have 6 Javelins (2 per rifle platoon),,,that's 162 JAVELINS per division. All of that is a lot of antitank capabilities.
Not saying the M10s will never face MBTs, just that there are other assets organic to the unit to handle tanks. And while a JAVELIN or TOW can be used in direct fire mode the M10 can fire 105mm HEAT rounds into a building every 5 seconds...and that's a low capable crew.
Also, after you get over half of the LID the doctrine is to start airlifting Heavy Infantry Task Forces into the airhead ASAP.
With less capability than we have today in the aftermath of the Battle of Mogadishu the US had airlifted a mech/tank team+ into Mogadishu within 24 hours after the Blackhawk Down battle. We didn't trust the other UN forces to provide timely assistance to TICs. Bradleys & M1s would not be held up by the burning tire roadblocks the enemy set up that stopped wheeled vehicles.
tbm3fan
Defense Professional
AR have you listened to this channel on Youtube?
The entire list:
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCHZ7F2-e_gZlEZ8OIG-wnAQ/videos
The entire list:
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCHZ7F2-e_gZlEZ8OIG-wnAQ/videos
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One of the issues with the dissolution of the US Seventh Army in Europe with the fall of the The Wall is a lot of the corps and Army level support units were disbanded by all NATO nations. In the early 1980s when I was stationed there we had bridging units out the wazoo. Each division had its own bridge company. Corps had more bridging assets as did Army. Heck, there were even bridge units operated by Labor Service units.
One of the ways the US was able to race across NW Europe in WW 2 was pushing bridge assets forward. Each armor division typically had a Treadway Bridge battalion attached. Infantry divisions a company (+).
I am glad the Army is starting to recognize it has a serious capabilities gap and are addressing the issue.
https://www.defensenews.com/land/20...p-army-validates-division-led-river-crossing/
One of the ways the US was able to race across NW Europe in WW 2 was pushing bridge assets forward. Each armor division typically had a Treadway Bridge battalion attached. Infantry divisions a company (+).
I am glad the Army is starting to recognize it has a serious capabilities gap and are addressing the issue.
https://www.defensenews.com/land/20...p-army-validates-division-led-river-crossing/
Bridging the gap: Army validates division-led river crossing
By Jen Judson
Friday, Dec 15
A Bradley Fighting Vehicle drives onto an Improved Ribbon Bay Bridge in preparation to cross Belton Lake during Remagen Ready 24-1, on Fort Cavazos, Texas, Nov. 3, 2023. Remagen Ready 24-1 is an 11-day training exercise focused on Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) with the division as unit of action. LSCO requires team cohesion to properly execute multi-domain operations across warfighting functions. (Spc. Jacob Nunnenkamp/U.S. Army)WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army successfully validated a force structure change meant to help it make better wet gap crossings during large scale combat operations, according to service leaders.:quality(70)/cloudfront-us-east-1.images.arcpublishing.com/archetype/3BNASYVQLBHSZF2GVBD24LBOSM.jpg)
Defense experts have long considered U.S. bridging capability inadequate, particularly in the European theater.
Building bridges over rivers or other bodies of water to advance forward in an operation sounds simple, but involves complex coordination to ensure the enemy is suppressed long enough to move thousands of soldiers and equipment across and that the bridges can support even the heaviest combat vehicles and tanks.
And strong wet gap crossing capabilities are expected to be needed in the Indo-Pacific region, according to both Army officials and defense experts.
“The U.S. clearly does not have enough river crossing capability, and river crossing is an important part of what’s happening in Ukraine,” retired Army Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, who previously led U.S. Army Europe, told Defense News in an interview earlier this year. Beyond Ukraine, bridging is “a capability that we need to have in a lot of places in the world.”
Typically, engineer brigades, which provide bridging capability, are a corps-level asset, but during a large-scale combat exercise — Remagen Ready — at Fort Cavazos, Texas, earlier this fall, the 36th Engineer Brigade was taken out of the III Armored Corps and brought into the 1st Cavalry Division, Maj. Gen. Kevin Admiral, 1st Cavalry Division commander, told Defense News in a Dec. 12 interview.
Corps are made up of two divisions and roughly 20,000 to 45,000 troops total, while divisions are made up of three brigades and 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers.
Wet gap crossings “is one of the most difficult things to do,” said Col. Aaron Cox, the 36th Engineer Brigade commander.
“We play one role, which is the actual building of rafts and full enclosure bridges. Those tactical challenges aren’t too difficult, but it is making sure that the fires threat is reduced, that there’s no enemy on the far side objectives, that we have obscuration, that the enemy’s logistics nodes on the far side have been suppressed,” he added. “That’s where the challenge comes from, and it’s converging all of those capabilities into one location in time so that we can successfully get across.”
Engineer units in divisions are “not purpose-built for large-scale combat operations,” Admiral noted. Those units are usually organized in battalions under brigade combat teams, which are not adequate to support large-scale combat maneuver. To conduct a wet gap crossing at the division level in large-scale combat, “I would need external resources that I don’t really have,” he said.
By putting the 36th Engineer Brigade into the 1st Cavalry Division for the exercise, it gave the division the assets and manpower it needed to execute the wet gap mission. Because the brigade was under the control of the division commander, it was easier to coordinate the complex movements needed to set the conditions for a safe crossing and then execute the crossing of about20,000 soldiers and their armored equipment.
The 1st Cavalry coordinated the two-day live wet gap crossing during the exercise with two physical bridges using what’s known as the Improved Ribbon Bridge, made up of panels that can be put on the back of a truck for transport and then combined to make larger rafts. Seven panels connected together can support an M1 Abrams tank.
The exercise validated the need to put engineer brigades underneath division command, Admiral said, part of a larger plan to redesign force structure as the Army modernizes and shifts from years of using the brigade combat team as the tactical unit where maneuver operations are planned and executed. Now, the service plans to give the division that responsibility.
During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, BCTs operated relatively independently, but large-scale operations across land, air, sea, space and cyber against adversaries like Russia and China would require division-level operations.
The exercise “gave us a good chance to do an initial validation of the Army 2030 Armored Strike Division,” Admiral said. “This is the right direction for the armored divisions.”
Army Futures Command continues to work on what a modernized force’s structure will look like in 2030 and beyond, incorporating lessons from exercises like Remagen Ready.
The Army’s plan to grow its engineer companies, according to the service’s acquisition chief, Doug Bush, is “on track. It’s just finding the money,” he said in an interview this fall. “It’s a big priority, especially as they learned a lot from trying to move around Europe.”
tbm3fan
Defense Professional
So how far away do fires need to be suppressed in order to get a crossing up, to be useful, in today's world of missiles?
tbm3fan
Defense Professional
Part of the clearing of an obstacle is SOSR...Suppress, Obscure, Secure & Reduce.
Part of the Suppress phase would be suppressive fires by MLRS batteries, both division and corps as well as any tube artillery which comes to bear. Also USAF/USN/USMC air will be involved. A division level river crossing is definitely a corps main effort these days.
And, of course, large numbers of ADA assets would be committed to guard the bridge.
S2
, Military Professional
"...large numbers of ADA assets would be committed to guard the bridge."
Enemy UAVs/drones really complicate an already very difficult operation. This is also going to spill into force structure design within ADA, reconnaissance, electronic warfare formations alongside the full range of fire support assets. Bridges need to stay up far beyond the crossing of an actual division. That division and every/anything else across that obstacle needs sustained resupply.
Enemy UAVs/drones really complicate an already very difficult operation. This is also going to spill into force structure design within ADA, reconnaissance, electronic warfare formations alongside the full range of fire support assets. Bridges need to stay up far beyond the crossing of an actual division. That division and every/anything else across that obstacle needs sustained resupply.
tbm3fan
Defense Professional
OK, AR, big article today about the Army eliminating posts (many already empty) and trying to shape their manpower needs for the future.
Your wisdom?
Your wisdom?
This has been coming for some time. We have too many organizations which have nondeployable Soldiers whose jobs could be civilianized.
Some slots are going away for units which were built up for OIF/OAF and are no longer needed.
And TBH we have too much real estate we don't need. Why do we still need Fort Hamilton which lies under the Verrazano Narrows Bridge? It is a remnant when the Army ran a port in Bayonne...now a cruise terminal. Those kind of posts are kept open for one reason only...the local Congressman.
I think this is a great thing. Knowing the actual combat range of many of our weapons is further than we see in the manual there is no reason not to push the envelope.
And even though it has been 35 years I know the Red Cloud Range Complex at Fort Stewart is highly capable of expanding scenarios.
ANd if things haven't changed there may be a need to push treelines back another 2000-3000 meters!
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/the-army-is-standardizing-how-armor-crews-train-and-shoot/
And even though it has been 35 years I know the Red Cloud Range Complex at Fort Stewart is highly capable of expanding scenarios.
ANd if things haven't changed there may be a need to push treelines back another 2000-3000 meters!
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/the-army-is-standardizing-how-armor-crews-train-and-shoot/
The Army is standardizing how armor crews train and shoot
Armor brigades with the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia are training with a new set of qualification standards, or gunnery tables.
BY PATTY NIEBERG | PUBLISHED MAR 1, 2024 5:05 PM EST
The Army is standardizing the way infantry platoons keep up with their combat vehicle skills with an initiative by the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Benjamin Hale).
The Army is standardizing the way crews of Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles keep up with their combat skills.
Brigades with the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia have taken the last month to train under a new set of qualification standards, or gunnery tables, against targets set at longer distances for their M1 Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles.
“What we are trying to do is train our crews to be more adaptable and be more lethal as our adversaries change,” said 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team Command Sgt. Maj. Ryan Roush. “Everyone will go through the exact same validation process. Once these tables are implemented Army-wide, we could receive a new soldier from any unit in the Army and know that the training standard that the soldier has used, are the exact same across the entire Army that we have and then base our performance and expectations off of that.”
Tank crews have to validate their skills twice a year on a unit’s gunnery tables. Under the current integrated weapons strategy there are six gunnery tables that crews must be certified in: Table I gunnery skills test; Table II simulations; Table III proficiency to train with live rounds; Table IV basic skills of the platform; Table V practice and Table VI qualification for crew to participate in live-fire exercises.
Master gunners could previously use their own discretion to create tables with time and distance categories for targets. But with this initiative, there would be set standards that soldiers and crews have to complete, said Sgt. Daniel Blandon, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team Abrams Master Gunner.
Large scale combat operations
Over the last two decades, training for Iraq and Afghanistan was focused on counterinsurgency operations “for a whole career of a soldier,” said Steve Krivitsky, chief of the weapons and gunnery branch at the Directorate of Training, Tactics and Doctrine for the Maneuver Center of Excellence. “There was a series of soldiers that never experienced the long range and then the large-scale, combat-operations-type training.”
Tank crews often were tested only on skills and targets their commanders deemed essential for Iraq and Afghanistan deployments, or that could be shot within the confines of the ranges of their own base.
“When you look at Fort Stewart and Fort Stewart’s ranges, they made a scenario that was tailored to their facilities and their training needs of their unit based on their past performance,” Krivitsky said. “What they chose to shoot would not be exactly the same as what something at Fort Carson might shoot.”
Soldiers at Fort Stewart, Krivitsky said, are “pushing the limits of the training ammunition and the system itself to hit targets up to 2,200 to 2,400 meters.”
The current qualification for the farthest main gun engagement is a single target at 1,800 meters. The requirements under the new tables would increase main gun engagements to seven targets between 1,800 and 2,400 meters.
The new tables also focus on multiple stationary and moving main gun engagements. Now, Tables V and VI will include an offense and defense four-target engagement.With the current gunnery qualifications – for all of the different types of engagements – the average is 31 seconds to defeat a single target, Kravitsky said. But the new standard would involve four targets in a shortened time frame.
“On a four target engagement, they don’t have two minutes, they have 75 seconds. And so that 31 seconds might overlap with another target’s 31 seconds because it’s exposed,” he said. “That speed in combat, the speed at which you deliver accurate fires first, your reward is you win. So our goal is to hit first, hit fast and move on to the next one.”
Officials are finding new ways to use the latest sensors and optics on Bradleys and Abrams. On the M1, for example, the vehicle commander has a Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station, or CROWS system for on-the-move target acquisition and first-burst target engagement.
The new standards for Table IV force the tank’s gunner to run through five defensive machine gun skills rather than use the main gun, while the vehicle commander has five tests on the CROWS system.
“When the gunner is executing the machine gun engagements, the vehicle commander is using the commander’s independent thermal viewer to identify supplemental targets,” Krivistky said. “It speeds the process of target acquisition and target hand-off to rapidly defeat multiple targets in sequence.”
The Maneuver Center of Excellence looked at all of the different possible target engagements that a tank crew might see and found 3,264 different variables. With the gunnery tables, officials need to decide which types of engagements are the best use of time and show a crew’s gunnery skills.
“We only have 30 engagements for live fire so we have to be really selective of which engagements have the biggest payoff to the crew’s experience because the other 3,234 would have to be done in simulations,” Krivistky said.
Once they collect all of the data from 3ID’s training, they will hand it off to the Maneuver Center of Excellence for analysis. Officials from the center will take their findings to the Armor School’s Commandant and if he approves the manual, they’ll go through the publication process which can take three to six months.
When a new book is published and there’s a “significant change in how we do things,” there will be an implementation period across the Army which takes about a year, Krivitsky said. The 3ID initiative “accelerates the completion of this training strategy and publication by at least nine months which in the Army system, that’s fast.”
:smile::smile::tongue::tongue:
Not the best of headlines.
More properly we are testing out an upgrade to our gunnery standards and methods. Once validated it will go Army wide,
It was done at Fort Stewart & 3 ID since it is the closest installation with armored brigade combat team to Fort Moore, the home of the Armor & Infantry Schools.
Not the best of headlines.
More properly we are testing out an upgrade to our gunnery standards and methods. Once validated it will go Army wide,
It was done at Fort Stewart & 3 ID since it is the closest installation with armored brigade combat team to Fort Moore, the home of the Armor & Infantry Schools.
Been doing a deep dive over the last two days on what the new Army force structure will be. One of the forcing functions has been the shortfalls in enlistments. But more importantly the Army has been looking at what is needed on the modern battlefield from a wide range of lessons learned...simulations, war games, Armenia-Azeri War, UKR-RUS War and a doctrinal shift brought on by LSCO. I really like what I am seeing. I believe this is the most consequential change since we went to AirLand Battle force structure 40 years ago. A real investment in improving and expanding anti air/drone/missile defenses, cyber and long range precision fires. Interestingly also an increase in watercraft capability as we look to the Pacific.
Bottomline...I like it. I like it a lot.
Bottomline...I like it. I like it a lot.