U.S. Carriers Becoming Too Vulnerable To Be Relevant? New Report Says Yes

Get back to me when a sub launched Brahmos is operational and not in the testing phase
 
rundown said:
You stated something about Cold War. I am talking about NOW. You continue to refer to REFORGER. Now the question--WHAT my essay?? But then again, you don't know what "First Operation" stood for. As for carriers COs--don't rush with that kind of conclusions. Do you need me to offer you an opinion of none other than Adm. Rickover to the Congress in 1982 or of some other carriers' COs precisely on this issue or will you trust my word?? As for the rest, please, can you use less pathos, especially since we are not discussing here Cold War.
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YOU'RE THE ONE PULLING THE DUTCH INTO THIS! AND THAT WAS THE COLD WAR!

And if the Soviets could not do it then, who could today? The Chinese?

As for Adm Rickover, tell me that he would keep the CVBG at home or send them out to fight? I don't care what his testimony was in Congress. He was not going to keep the carriers at home and he was more than confident enough to punch his way through ... alll the way through.
 
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Now... THIS escalated quickly.

I wonder if there is/are subs that can wolfpack (yay) and approach CBG at a firing distance and launch missiles towards the CVN without CBG's anti missiles (AEGIS?) neutralizing them?
 
Officer of Engineers said:
YOU'RE THE ONE PULLING THE DUTCH INTO THIS! AND THAT WAS THE COLD WAR!

And if the Soviets could not do it then, who could today? The Chinese?

As for Adm Rickover, tell me that he would keep the CVBG at home or send them out to fight? I don't care what his testimony was in Congress. He was not going to keep the carriers at home and he was more than confident enough to punch his way through ... alll the way through.
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Well, Dutch happened to do exactly what (partially) this shitstorm started about--wargames, including against several CBGs simultaneously. Don't trust my word--I posted the cover of the book, published, mind you, by none other than United States Naval Institute Press, by Roger Thompson. It is very late where I am, but tomorrow, if you would like I will be more than happy to scan and post you a partial list of how all those simulated attacks, including by the Soviets (that is a separate issue altogether), happened. In conclusion (I have to go to bed) who am I to doubt your word, especially since you, obviously, know more about Rickover than Rickover himself but just for the heck of it a quote from Thompson's book: The Late Admiral Hyman Rickover, US Navy (Retired) didn’t think much of his own carrier-centered navy, either. When asked in 1982 about how long the American carriers would survive in an actual war, he curtly replied that they would be finished in approximately 48 hours. (c)
 
YellowFever said:
Oh, come on, give it a shot.

Maybe we can pull our heads out of our asses and discuss tactics and such instead of posting just formulas and equations...
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Can you solve a simplest approach to the salvo distance against a target moving with the specific course and speed? Classic tactical problem. So, no Operational Sweep, well. Just for you I will post this--may be you will believe a truly great naval mind on what is tactics and what numbers have to do with it. Just two pages. ;) Just intro. As for numbers--there is NO tactics without numbers--none, does not exist.

View attachment 32790
 
rundown said:
Can you solve a simplest approach to the salvo distance against a target moving with the specific course and speed? Classic tactical problem. So, no Operational Sweep, well. Just for you I will post this--may be you will believe a truly great naval mind on what is tactics and what numbers have to do with it. Just two pages. ;) Just intro. As for numbers--there is NO tactics without numbers--none, does not exist.

View attachment 32790
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Sure professor.

Just as soon as you tell me how a SUKHOI can get within 300km to launch the Brahmos at a carrier in war footing.
 
YellowFever said:
Sure professor.

Just as soon as you tell me how a SUKHOI can get within 300km to launch the Brahmos at a carrier in war footing.
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In all fairness Yellar, at 300km your not including any of the SAMs the CBG may be deploying due to range so its simply a case of fighters v fighters. Then its a case of numbers. A single regiment of Sukhoi's then yes they will get their arses handed to them. Too bad the Chinese (im using them as an example) would probably send a multi-regimental strike force of J16/SU30/JH-7A/H-6 striker/bombers escorted by several more regiments of J-10s/J-11/J-20s etc. Even a multi carrier force of 3-4 carriers could only send up a finite source of fighters to intercept. If you have a smart enemy who is willing to mass sortie their drone force of retired J-7s as well (you dont know they are drones, you still need to kill them) to eat up AAMs... then it gets interesting.

Not saying the attacker wont get mauled and lose a big chunk of their force but the missiles will get launched.

Its not as simple as just assuming the missiles wont be launched or get through, you need to take into account that your not fighting idiots and thy have the numbers and the tech to make you work for your survival.
 
A couple of things....

A carrier is going to be more interested in where the subs are.
BM's can be picked up satellite (assuming that its not a "Pearl Harbour" scenario, then everyone will have their ears up - the guard range for the carrier is vastly different wartime than peacetime
At any stage a CBG is going to be aware of where it sits in the response box of red team land based air
A Carriers response and ability is way beyond the platform construct - it is a system and there are other assets within and external to that system that are also listening, reacting to and informing changes re red team posture - even non direct events are processed and inform posture

There are going to be "tells" going off that impact on force disposition and behaviour

I remain spectacularly unconvinced about the chat surrounding DF-21's and carriers because there is nothing thats been shown over the last 4 years (and there would be some supporting indicators that would start to show that they were on the way). Static targeting is not the same as tracking and targeting to kill at termination on a mobile and aware target. - and the target (CBG) has a whole pile of other systems informing it as she sails, even if she is shut down and not transmitting and providing assistance to "vanilla" tracking systems
 
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rundown said:
Well, Dutch happened to do exactly what (partially) this shitstorm started about--wargames, including against several CBGs simultaneously. Don't trust my word--I posted the cover of the book, published, mind you, by none other than United States Naval Institute Press, by Roger Thompson. It is very late where I am, but tomorrow, if you would like I will be more than happy to scan and post you a partial list of how all those simulated attacks, including by the Soviets (that is a separate issue altogether), happened. In conclusion (I have to go to bed) who am I to doubt your word, especially since you, obviously, know more about Rickover than Rickover himself but just for the heck of it a quote from Thompson's book: The Late Admiral Hyman Rickover, US Navy (Retired) didn’t think much of his own carrier-centered navy, either. When asked in 1982 about how long the American carriers would survive in an actual war, he curtly replied that they would be finished in approximately 48 hours. (c)
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He was out when he made the statement and therefore, not part of the mission parameters that you so so carefully tout forward. Again, would any Admiral kept any carriers at home or send them out to play?
 
chakos said:
In all fairness Yellar, at 300km your not including any of the SAMs the CBG may be deploying due to range so its simply a case of fighters v fighters. Then its a case of numbers. A single regiment of Sukhoi's then yes they will get their arses handed to them. Too bad the Chinese (im using them as an example) would probably send a multi-regimental strike force of J16/SU30/JH-7A/H-6 striker/bombers escorted by several more regiments of J-10s/J-11/J-20s etc. Even a multi carrier force of 3-4 carriers could only send up a finite source of fighters to intercept. If you have a smart enemy who is willing to mass sortie their drone force of retired J-7s as well (you dont know they are drones, you still need to kill them) to eat up AAMs... then it gets interesting.

Not saying the attacker wont get mauled and lose a big chunk of their force but the missiles will get launched.

Its not as simple as just assuming the missiles wont be launched or get through, you need to take into account that your not fighting idiots and thy have the numbers and the tech to make you work for your survival.
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I suggest you read these two threads at a different forum. You can wade through the nationalistic jingoism of fanboys and just pay attention to what the pros (gf being one of them) has to say since they dealt with this very issue a long time ago.

It deals with everything you had to say. they're long threads but well worth the read:


Is China capable of crippling US CSF's in Chinese ses? - Defense Technology & Military Forum

Sinking an Aircraft carrier - Defense Technology & Military Forum
 
Officer of Engineers said:
He was out when he made the statement and therefore, not part of the mission parameters that you so so carefully tout forward. Again, would any Admiral kept any carriers at home or send them out to play?
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Again, don't trust me--open Newport Papers, which are available in open since early 1990-s, especially NP #20. These are descriptions of those exact wargames about which we spoke earlier.

U.S. Naval War College | Newport Papers

This is Naval War College, not some pop-sci or Military Channel. Those contain some substantive answers (at least partial) on your question. More specifically, on what is red--that is why Project 60 came about in early 70-s and why a huge fight developed between Zumwalt, who became CNO, and Rickover. It was Arleigh Burke who said to Zumwalt "We need numbers"(c) and it was Zumwalt who understood what the fight for Sea Control meant for big carriers. This is not only extremely well described in his own autobiography "On Watch" but extremely well represented in the seminal work by George W. Baer "One Hundred Years Of Sea Power, The US Navy 1890-1990". In short, the answer is NO, for a simple reason and I quote from none other than Baer, the whole page warrants reading, not only marked in red. Hell, the whole book by the member of faculty (Strategy and Operations) of Naval War College is worth reading:

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As for "tout". I love the semantics. Allow me to respond, I am not touting--I am making a case, and a very constructive at that--count how many substantive links and references I provided since yesterday. In this case I refer to the highest level professionals and people of undoubted repute in the matter and will continue to do so, when time allows me to participate on this forum. Could it irritate people?? You bet--people don't like their preconceptions shattered but my idea is very simple--we either discuss the subject matter or we...discuss something else, if you know what I mean. The case for carriers' vulnerability does exists, it is extremely strong and yes, I did not make it, I am just saying that this case has to be discussed.
 
Doktor said:
Now... THIS escalated quickly.

I wonder if there is/are subs that can wolfpack (yay) and approach CBG at a firing distance and launch missiles towards the CVN without CBG's anti missiles (AEGIS?) neutralizing them?
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Wolfpack is the last thing to do for subs. This does not mean, however, that they will not be the part of heterogeneous force designed to "kill" CBG. AEGIS is not a magical pill, it is specific, however good, AD (well, it is slightly more than that) system and as any systems it has its own vulnerabilities and it has its own saturation threshold which is a closely guarded secret and there is a weighty reason for that.
 
YellowFever said:
Oh, come on, give it a shot.

Maybe we can pull our heads out of our asses and discuss tactics and such instead of posting just formulas and equations...
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Let me explain why it is not possible here to discuss real tactics. I will reiterate your yesterday's statement about, and I quote: This is a little misleading. One, it implied to me that this sub was quieter than U.S. nuclear subs but further research says it isn't. . (c). Obviously no such research exists since it is very well known fact. But here is highly professional opinion:

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So, in order to discuss anything one has to have at least some basic understanding of the problem. If a person acts upon totally made up "facts"--how anything could be discussed at all?? But this is only one part of the problem, another one is in understanding the fact that any tactics, but especially, naval tactics is extremely secret matter, tactical manuals remain a highly guarded secrets on board of any ship or sub and there is a huge reason for that--knowing precise tactical patterns can reveal just about anything about capability. The only way tactics could be discussed here, on the open forum, is in general form based upon open source data and what have been already declassified. Again, I reiterate, I posted earlier a hyperlink to the 51-st OEG Report--it gives a priceless insight into the physics and mathematics of ASW operations (which are just a small part of naval tactics) during WW II. I post link again:

HyperWar: Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II [Part II]

For example--here is the link to Offensive Search:

HyperWar: Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II [Chapter 13]

It gives an excellent insight into the issues of developing datums and probabilistic nature of operations.

This could be (in fact, should be) discussed and only from there some very approximate and cautious extrapolations could be made towards modern day. After all, fundamental math does not change--weapon systems do.
 
Rundown, let me explain a few of things of your sources for materiels.

1. Baer is a historian and a damned good one. But some of his conclusions have been seen as possibly flawed or drawing incorrect conclusions. Fact of life when you write as he did.

2. Many of these articles you have drawn from are based on papers which are written by students in the various service staff colleges. You write papers on topics which often times prove to be incorrect by later events. I wrote about the lack of valie of heavy armor in combat in built up areas when I went to CGSC in 1991....and my old oufit, 2d Bde 3 ID proved me wrong in Baghdad in 2003. Hell I wrote a paper in college in 1977 which said the M1 was not needed and was a waste of money. Many of these papaers fall into this category.

3. This may come as a surprise to you but DOTE often gets it wrong and is staffed by folks who lack the proper expertise to evaluate the very systems they are evaluating. I have been in Army Acquisition for 25 years and have had to correct poor assumptions and lack of knowledge on the part of DOTE staffers who did not understand what they were evaluating.

4. As for the modeling versus operational experiences you and the Colonel were "discussing" earlier ALL modeling is based on previous oeprational experience as it comes to doctrine and tactics....it has to in order to develop the metrics required to evaluate and run the model. Operational testing by field units validates or shows faults in the models. No competent Western military has based its major weapon systems and doctrine on computer modeling and simulation only. Even nuclear weapons had masses of data to draw on from all of the atomic and nuclear testing done for 2 decades.
 
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