rundown
New member
Rundown, let me explain a few of things of your sources for materiels.
1. Baer is a historian and a damned good one. But some of his conclusions have been seen as possibly flawed or drawing incorrect conclusions. Fact of life when you write as he did.
2. Many of these articles you have drawn from are based on papers which are written by students in the various service staff colleges. You write papers on topics which often times prove to be incorrect by later events. I wrote about the lack of valie of heavy armor in combat in built up areas when I went to CGSC in 1991....and my old oufit, 2d Bde 3 ID proved me wrong in Baghdad in 2003. Hell I wrote a paper in college in 1977 which said the M1 was not needed and was a waste of money. Many of these papaers fall into this category.
3. This may come as a surprise to you but DOTE often gets it wrong and is staffed by folks who lack the proper expertise to evaluate the very systems they are evaluating. I have been in Army Acquisition for 25 years and have had to correct poor assumptions and lack of knowledge on the part of DOTE staffers who did not understand what they were evaluating.
4. As for the modeling versus operational experiences you and the Colonel were "discussing" earlier ALL modeling is based on previous oeprational experience as it comes to doctrine and tactics....it has to in order to develop the metrics required to evaluate and run the model. Operational testing by field units validates or shows faults in the models. No competent Western military has based its major weapon systems and doctrine on computer modeling and simulation only. Even nuclear weapons had masses of data to draw on from all of the atomic and nuclear testing done for 2 decades.
Allow me also to explain some things, in order you posted above:
1. Baer is way more than historian, albeit with historical background (I believe he has Ph.D from Harvard), he is an immense scholar of strategy and doctrine. As for possibly flawed--absolutely, no perfect scholar exist in this world. I, however, refereed to a specific set of facts made by Navy's brass not to Baer's conclusions in the page I posted. Those facts are beautifully corroborated by none other than Zumwalt in his remarkable autobiography. So far no discussion about Baer's conclusions (flawed or not) exists here--it is totally separate matter. I used the scan having Baer in this case precisely as you described him--historian and narrator.
2. Those "students" happen to be the officers who went through rigorous training in respective service academies and many with some substantial service experience. It is, obviously, very naive to expect that everything there will be confirmed by latter events. My thesis was on ASW (well, that was in 1985)--did things change. You bet, but number of fundamental principles (the ones which are usually described in preambles and first chapters) remains (and will remain) unchanged. For illustration of those principles those referrals which I made work very well, even if some of them may be "flawed" (whatever is understood under this term).
3. No, it is not surprise for me whatsoever. I presented merely a single source ( I underscore--an open one). There are many more which do corroborate the conclusions. But then, of course, comes a very sensitive matter--my personal experiences and experiences of my whole environment from 1980 through approximately 1992. For now I abstain from listing those experiences as a source and use otherwise open sources, with a huge emphasis on the English-language sources.
4. Allow me to politely disagree on some detail--it is not based only on operational experiences, although they play a huge part in it. Tactics is a system of measures which allow to maximize the combat effectiveness of the weapon systems organic to a tactical unit for conducting the battle. It is rough definition but it will do for now. Tactics written not only from the position of operational (and hm..tactical) experience but in conjuncture with capabilities of the organic weapon system. Those capabilities are foundation for tactics, operational experience is the tool which enhances effectiveness of those weapon systems, that is why tactics does change and so do manuals. There are constants and they are called such for a reason, those constants derive from the organic properties of weapons, that is why we do not fight tank battles on the sea or pull ships into the desert to fight a armored warfare. Case in point: change of technological paradigm brings the change of tactics--the adjustments come later through the operational experience. No better illustration exists for that than the evolution of submarine warfare--from platforms to their weapons. As for red--agree completely but the operational analysis, or broadly the Theory Of Operational Research is the course which goes in conjunction with the Tactics course in any first rate military academy. Than it continues to a higher levels such as War Colleges etc. This is precisely why I posted the reference to the 51-st Report--an excellent illustration of how operational experiences hone and develop tactics. But to say that only operational experience is responsible for that, although I have to give you here a benefit of a doubt since this whole issue can be, indeed framed as chicken and egg problem.