Sadat's war

[Double Edge]

Fascinating listen

Caught everyone with their pants down, Soviets, US & Israelis.

Kissinger going on about detente how they were not going to get dragged into any more proxy wars and that is exactly what happened.

All Sadat wanted was to get the American's attention. To get them to influence the Israelis. Not march to Tel aviv.

Who can trust a man who wants peace that is crazy enough to start a war over it (!)

The man was a visionary. The guy who succeeded him, not so much.

Lippman says it changed the world. An Egyptian Tet. PR win.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

All Sadat wanted was to get the American's attention. To get them to influence the Israelis. Not march to Tel aviv.

Who can trust a man who wants peace that is crazy enough to start a war over it (!)

I really hate these damned revisionists. Of course he wanted to march to Tel Aviv, just as much as Hanoi wanted Tet to massacre Saigon and drive the Americans from Vietnam. It's when they failed and they've got some propaganda victory, then they said this is what they wanted all along. In the meantime, they were completely defenceless against a counter-attack.

No one starts a war expecting to lose and most certainly, no one starts a war to want to leave themselves defenceless.

 

[Doktor]

Why was he assassined?

 

[Double Edge]

Why was he assassined?

This is the sad bit. He released the muslim brotherhood in '79 an attempt to counter the leftists. He did not realise at the time they had become radicalised. They were not into "go along to get along".

By then Egypt was completely isolated by the arab world for
a) recognising the zionist entity as Israel was known then.
b) going to tel aviv

He was shot by some radicals at a parade, his own troops. No answer given as to how live ammunition got into that parade.

He was considered a success in international relations but a failure at home, there are some egyptians that would strongly disagree with that last bit.

4 previous US presidents attended his funeral. What he set in place endures to this very day.

 

[Double Edge]

I really hate these damned revisionists. Of course he wanted to march to Tel Aviv, just as much as Hanoi wanted Tet to massacre Saigon and drive the Americans from Vietnam. It's when they failed and they've got some propaganda victory, then they said this is what they wanted all along. In the meantime, they were completely defenceless against a counter-attack.

There is no evidence in either american or soviet archives to suggest this whatsoever. There are two passes that have to be crossed in the Sinai. The Egyptians did not have any plans to even cross them. Hafez was not interested in doing anything more than try to get the Golan back. There were arguments here and some truths not told between Sadat & Hafez. Sadat expected more.

The Arabs were militarily incapable of doing it. Sadat threw out the 15,000 soviet advisors and helpers before he started the war. He wanted to be in charge. When he started the war the Soviets coughed up the weapons because they did not want to lose influence.

Israel could have marched to Cairo & Damascus. Israel could have destroyed the entire egyptian 3rd army. But did not do it why ? brezhnev thought the americans were not doing enough to hold the Israelis back and threatened unilateral action pushing the Americans to Defcon2. Sec def & Sec state who did not agree with each other did this. Nixon is still fighting watergate.

it does make me question the isreli narrative about this war. How they threatened to use nukes. Like hell. Not a single shot was fired inside israel during this war it all occurred in territory Israel has seized in '67 ie arab. But it did rattle them a good deal.

No one starts a war expecting to lose and most certainly, no one starts a war to want to leave themselves defenceless.

Yeah this is what the americans thought. impossible that such could even occur. Not even Kissinger could see it. American intel could see it coming months before, but nobody in power listened to them.

That it did occur is the main point. The Soviets did not want another crushing Arab defeat that would devalue their equipment and advice. They had no choice.

Militarily it was a complete defeat. But he got the Americans to take him seriously. That was his goal. To be at the table with at least something when the Israelis held all the cards. Begin still out negotiated him. But he got the Sinai back and Camp David accords holds to this day.

In the end american influence grew at the cost of Soviet influence in Egypt. Egypt was the Soviets crown jewel in the arab world. See the Russian push back in Syria, they don't want another Egypt.

Lippman has been in the middle east for decades i see him more as a contrarian here. A man like Sadat is rare in the Arab world. An accidental president whom at the outset his own people could not take seriously let alone outside Egypt.This is about setting Sadat's legacy right. More people need to realise this.

 

[Doktor]

Why was he assassined?

I know why he got shot. By his own guards. The question was rethorical one. How come a man who sends entire army on Israel gets shot for being too close to the Jewish state?

On a side note, if you had an opportunity to see footages from Egypt around Sadat's assassination, you'd notice a lack of burkas.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

There is no evidence in either american or soviet archives to suggest this whatsoever. There are two passes that have to be crossed in the Sinai. The Egyptians did not have any plans to even cross them.

Sadat's objective was the Sinai but he was met with the victory disease and panic spread amongst the Israelis after their first counter-attack failed. When the Israelis were running, Sadat was most certainly chasing. Israeli collapse was seen more and more likely, prompting Dayan to ask for the nuclear option. Dayan certainly saw the fall of the Third Temple (ie, Israel)

Israel could have marched to Cairo & Damascus. Israel could have destroyed the entire egyptian 3rd army.

They didn't had the time nor the munitions. The Israelis were spent just busting through the Egyptian lines. They needed reloads before they could move forward and Kissinger stopped munition flow.

But did not do it why ? brezhnev thought the americans were not doing enough to hold the Israelis back and threatened unilateral action pushing the Americans to Defcon2.

Brezhnev already had SSBNs in the area with orders to burn Israel to ashes if one Israeli mushroom cloud appeared.

it does make me question the isreli narrative about this war. How they threatened to use nukes. Like hell. Not a single shot was fired inside israel during this war it all occurred in territory Israel has seized in '67 ie arab. But it did rattle them a good deal.

Dayan did ask Meir for a nuclear demonstration. It was shot down in cabinet before Dayan could even make his proposal. While the actual details of the proposal was kept secret, the intent was somehow leaked and everyone, both Moscow and Washington, started looking for signs. They thought they've seen them when some MIRAGES were being loaded but kept on the ground.

Lippman has been in the middle east for decades i see him more as a contrarian here. A man like Sadat is rare in the Arab world. An accidental president whom at the outset his own people could not take seriously let alone outside Egypt.This is about setting Sadat's legacy right. More people need to realise this.

The point was that Sadat sought a military victory. Not a negotiating table.

 

[Double Edge]

Sadat's objective was the Sinai but he was met with the victory disease and panic spread amongst the Israelis after their first counter-attack failed. When the Israelis were running, Sadat was most certainly chasing. Israeli collapse was seen more and more likely, prompting Dayan to ask for the nuclear option. Dayan certainly saw the fall of the Third Temple (ie, Israel)

So question of morale among the Israelis as a result of initial losses. Dayan had to consider the chance of a defeat no matter how small. Fact still remains not a single shot was fired inside Israel during this war.

Whatever victory disease the Egyptians had at the outset evaporated once Sadat's troops stretched beyond their SAM umbrella and became sitting ducks for the Israeli air force. They never made it to the passes. Even if they did they would be exposed in the open desert. How far could the Egyptians go.

That map from wiki is quite telling as to meagre egyptian victories on the battlefield.

They didn't had the time nor the munitions. The Israelis were spent just busting through the Egyptian lines. They needed reloads before they could move forward and Kissinger stopped munition flow.

But if the US could persuade Israel not to finish of the 3rd army then it puts them in a better position with the Egyptians after the war. An opportunity to wean the Egyptians away from the soviets. To take Egypt out of any future Arab military alliance. And that is what happened and the arabs ostracised Egypt in 1979 by moving the arab league's HQ out of Cairo.

The point was that Sadat sought a military victory. Not a negotiating table.

To rally support for the operation i'm sure that is what he would have told his partners.

But the odds of victory were so low that war was unthinkable by outside watchers. Why start a war with nothing to show for. There has to be a backup otherwise it would be for nothing. Had to up the ante until the Americans were involved. No Americans in the picture then everything goes for a toss. There was good reason to expect american involvement for reasons mentioned in my previous para..

Sadat knew that even if he lost he'd still be able to get to the table as he now had the Americans attention. He knew Israel had no biblical claims on the Sinai. It was just a defensive buffer.

Sadat got the Sinai back not on the battlefield but by negotiating. No meaningful military victory was possible.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

STo rally support for the operation i'm sure that is what he would have told his partners.

But the odds of victory were so low that war was unthinkable by outside watchers. Why start a war with nothing to show for.

But it was not unthinkable. The Egyptians had a plan and initial success said that they could do it. They breached Israeli obstacles with ease and decimated both the Israeli air force and the Israeli counter-attack. Their plan was working. They moved forward with the intent to surround and destroy the Israeli army in the Sinai. That the Israelis ran with their tails between their legs was something the Egyptians didn't plan for.

 

[Double Edge]

But it was not unthinkable. The Egyptians had a plan and initial success said that they could do it. They breached Israeli obstacles with ease and decimated both the Israeli air force and the Israeli counter-attack. Their plan was working. They moved forward with the intent to surround and destroy the Israeli army in the Sinai.

Yes and then what, you get into the open desert without any air support with the Israelis hitting you from the air and before you know it end up getting surrounded. Disaster ? no, it turns out.

Any watcher would have predicted this outcome, that is why it is unthinkable. Why bother. Without expecting something else.

That the Israelis ran with their tails between their legs was something the Egyptians didn't plan for.

Tactical retreat. Not defeat.

If it was a position Israel could not afford to lose they would have held their ground to the last.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

Yes and then what, you get into the open desert without any air support with the Israelis hitting you from the air and before you know it end up getting surrounded. Disaster ? no, it turns out.

You surround the enemy army. You destroy the enemy army. What other army is there to oppose you?

Tactical retreat. Not defeat.

If it was a position Israel could not afford to lose they would have held their ground to the last.

That wasn't my point. My point was the Israelis escaped the encirclement.

 

[YoungIndia]

All Sadat wanted was to get the American's attention. To get them to influence the Israelis. Not march to Tel aviv.

egypt didnt have enough strength to go to tel aviv.

A combination of partial military recovery(since thats all his strength permitted) of lost sinai, a defensive battle before ceasefire and hope for external pressure to force israeli concessions...
Losses inflicted on the enemy, recovery of lost prestige ofcourse are other objectives.

 

[Double Edge]

You surround the enemy army. You destroy the enemy army. What other army is there to oppose you?

That wasn't my point. My point was the Israelis escaped the encirclement.

Tension was building up around that border since '70.

There is one very simple fact i've missed, wounded egyptian pride. He did not have to motivate anybody, they were dying for a scrap, all he had to do was say when. This would make war sometime likely. Not unthinkable, foolhardy but not impossible. This is what the watchers missed or more level minded people failed to convince him of. Would he ever listen given the imperative.

Win or lose was not important, some face saving would be enough.

He had the Americans at the back of his mind, but the crap going on in the WH was not conducive at the time, enter the next administration and he worked it to the hilt.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

But this is still revisionism. Sadat went into that war with the main primary objective of a military victory. A win is most certainly wanted and needed. The other outcome, a military defeat, was unpalatable, prompting a Soviet intervention threat.

Sadat may have played his hand big time afterwards but to state that he launched a war to get American attention is absurd. He wanted to destroy the Israeli Army.

 

[Double Edge]

The other outcome, a military defeat, was unpalatable, prompting a Soviet intervention threat.

Could he think that the soviets would intervene on his behalf. They were against the war because they did not want another loss. He threw out 15,000 of their personnel, maybe because they would not give him the support he wanted. In the end they intervened to save his army. They were not willing to help him win that war. They did not believe it was possible.

Sadat may have played his hand big time afterwards but to state that he launched a war to get American attention is absurd. He wanted to destroy the Israeli Army.

How to explain starting the war then. He's got people ready & willing. he knows his odds are not that great.

What gave him the confidence to start that war. So soon after the major setback they were dealt with not more than five years earlier. How much time does he have to recoup losses and re-arm. Starting so soon instead of later which would imply a will to go further. If he did that the Israelis would know something was up and there goes the element of surprise.

Ambition might be sky high but without the capabilities, no top leader is going to take as monumental a risk as this without some thing. The element of surprise helps at the beginning but it takes much more to sustain the momentum. Does he really believe he can outdo the Israelis at their own game.

Enter the 'get the americans attention' argument. Do enough but no more then hope for the best.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

Ambition might be sky high but without the capabilities, no top leader is going to take as monumental a risk as this without some thing. The element of surprise helps at the beginning but it takes much more to sustain the momentum. Does he really believe he can outdo the Israelis at their own game.

You're putting way too much credit in Sadat. His army 4 times more prepared than the last war Egypt fought and he has a 2 front war with Syria in the north. Military expertise is not something the Arabs can boast about and notice that the Israelis have been mighty silent about being the best military on earth after the Kuwait War.

Bottom line: Sadat had the confidence in the military objectives when he started the war.

 

[YoungIndia]

How to explain starting the war then. He's got people ready & willing. he knows his odds are not that great.

A limited war to strengthen his position in whatever ways possible.

war is means to achieve political ends...so a strong military position first in a limited campaign and then a combination of external/internal pressure on Israel to return remaining occupied
lands for peace.

US is play a major role as a chief ally of Israel ofcourse but not the sole criterion.

they basically wanted Sinai back..

The best military position would be one or the two of the strategic passes giddy and mitla in Egyptian hands and the Golan plateau in syrain hands and after establishing a defensive line within Sinai, they would hang on till ceasefire is enforced. Then the superpowers and internal politics were supposed to come in suggesting return of lands for peace.

That he can declare 'victory' with some good battlefield performnaces and losses inflicted on Israel were other benefits.(albeit replenished by US help over 22000 tons)

What gave him the confidence to start that war.

Honest appraisal of the 1967 war,effective corrective actions, change in command, intense training and unexpectedly successful deception.

 

[Double Edge]

Little update to this thread. The Israelis had a mole inside the Egyptian administration. The man is Ashraf Marwan. He was Gamal Abdul Nasser's s-i-l. After Nasser passes away and his Vice Sadat takes over. Ashraf becomes Sadat's personal secretary. There was a netflix movie called the Angel.

Idea was to weaken Israel not destroy Israel. Sadat wanted the lost territory back.

Here is a review of the book the movie was based upon.

The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel | CSI | Volume 60, No. 4 (December 2016 (pdf)

Bar-Joseph spends much of the book addressing whether “the Angel” was genuine. After all, Ashraf Marwan (a.k.a. “the Angel”) was the son-in-law of Egyptian President Gamal Nasser and a close adviser to President Sadat. Marwan started in 1970 as a “walk-in,” offering Egypt’s order-of-battle to Mossad officers in London. A skeptic could not be blamed for thinking there was something too good to be true about Marwan, but the author makes a good case that sometimes intelligence services get lucky.

Most persuasively, Bar-Joseph argues the nature of the intelligence Marwan gave the Israelis was simply too destructive of Egyptian interests. From the start, the Angel gave Israel not “seed corn”—intelligence that was true but of marginal consequence—but highly damaging, order-of-battle information. As the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War would eventually show, Marwan provided accurate intelligence about how the Egyptian military would conduct itself and the signs to watch for in its battle preparations a year before the attack, giving Israel plenty of time to ready its defenses.

Divisions in the intelligence ranks contributed to Israel’s being less prepared to halt a Sinai crossing than a Syrian takeover of the Golan Heights. After Prime Minister Meir gave mobilization orders, having received Marwan’s convincing intelligence about an imminent attack, the director of military intelligence told the military commander in the Sinai that he still didn’t believe Sadat would fight a limited war. As a result, this commander did not take the orders seriously; however, his counterpart in the north did—and took action. This saved Israel from having to begin a major and bloody campaign to retake the Golan Heights, and freed up forces to counterattack in the Sinai desert, where Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and made major inroads into the Sinai Peninsula.

The Yom Kippur War came as a surprise to the US Intelligence Community, where analysts shared the consensus Israeli Military Intelligence view that a major Egyptian attack was unlikely in 1973. However, US analysts did at least entertain the possibility that Sadat had adopted the more limited war aims about which Marwan had warned the Israelis.

Like their Israeli counterparts, US analysts as late as October could not shake the compelling logic of Egypt’s only fighting a winnable war, which they were in no position to launch.