PLA – A quick Reference.

Actually, quite a broad spread across key Group Armies, and some guys who stayed put for decades:

Fan Changlong is a life-long 16th GA (Shenyang MR) man. Lots of interesting guys on his Facebook contacts list: Li Desheng, Xu Caihou, Fu Kuiqing, Liu Jingsong, Wang Ke, Li Xinliang, Liang Guanglie, Liu Zhenhua.

Fang Fenghui (21st GA, Lanzhou MR, 1968-Dec 2003)

Zhang Yang (42nd GA, Guangzhou MR, 1996-2007)

Zhao Keshi (31st GA, Nanjing MR, 1968-2012)

Zhang Youxia (13th GA, 14th GA, Beijing MR, 2005-2012)

Chang Wanquan (47th GA, Lanzhou MR, 1968-2003)
 
Liang Guanglie has a Facebook account? wonder how he could bypass the GFW of China.
 
Leading figures in the professional Chinese military watching community

Leading figures in the professional Chinese military watching community

Leading figures in the professional Chinese military watching community

In my humble opinion, the following is a list of names I believe are the leading figures in the professional Chinese military watching community. They are by no mean the only authority on the matter, but for me, they are the go-to folks. They are also very friendly and personable too :wors:

Ground force -- Col (Ret’d) Dennis Blasko
Airforce – Col (Ret’d) Kenneth Allen and our very own Astralis :red:
Navy (Aircraft carrier, gulf of Aden deployment) -- Dr Andrew Erickson of the US Naval War College
Navy (Submarine) -- Dr William Murray of the US Naval War College
Navy (doctrine) -- Dr Bernard D. Cole of US National War College.
Coast Guard -– Dr Lyle Goldstein of US Naval War College
PLA doctrine -- Dr Andrew N.D. Yang, Deputy Minister of Defense of ROC and Jonathan Pollack, Director of the Strategic Research Department at the Naval War College
PLA C4I and cyber strategy –- Dr James Mulvenon of Center for Intelligence Research
PLAAF history –- Dr Zhang Xiaoming of the USAF Air War College
PLA personalities –- Dr Li Cheng
 
China's Military Just Got a Big Structural Shakeup

Big organizational changes at the PLA. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s overhaul has finally been announced and will involve a serious regrouping of the hierarchy in the Chinese military, in effect consolidating power with President Xi Jinping and the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) even further. The restructuring announcement came at the CMC’s leading group for national defence and military reform, which Xi attended. As analysts have noted in the Diplomat, this may be the PLA’s closest analog to the United States’ own Goldwater-Nichols Act, which reformed the U.S. Department of Defense in the late-1980s.

http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/chinas-military-just-got-a-big-structural-shakeup/

More.

China announced guidelines for reforming the People’s Liberation Army as top brass wrapped up a three-day meeting in Beijing on Thursday.

President Xi Jinping vowed a “breakthrough” in the overhaul by 2020, according to a statement from the Central Military Commission, which Xi chairs, on the website of the PLA Daily.

The overhaul is aimed at moving away from an army-centric system towards a Western-style joint command in which the army, navy and air force are equally represented.

The CMC statement highlighted the general direction of the overhaul, including plans to reorganise the four headquarters – General Staff, General Political, General Logistics and General 8Armaments – and to consolidate the seven military command regions.

A disciplinary commission would be created within the CMC to tackle corruption, the statement said, adding that inspectors would be sent to every level of the military to ensure strict discipline.

Key areas of the long-anticipated military reform include:

Reorganising the military headquarters
Rezoning the seven military commands
Setting up new strategic zones and joint operation command systems
Strengthening the Central Military Commission command structure
Imposing strict discipline on the army
Pushing for more innovation
Reforming personnel management system
Pushing for integration between the building of national defence and economic development

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/dipl...ows-breakthrough-long-awaited-military-reform
 
Last edited:
China's PLA reforms slash political posts as part of a 300,000 cut in non-combat pers

China's PLA reforms slash political posts as part of a 300,000 cut in non-combat pers

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/poli...-pla-reforms-will-see-many-political-posts-go

Many rank-and-file political officers are expected to lose their jobs in the reform of the People's Liberation Army.

However, the Chinese Communist Party's grip on the military's political ideology will be tightened with the setting up of a discipline commission that will take over the responsibilities for military discipline from political officers and their deputies in lower level military units.

A unique feature of the PLA means political officers - the most senior of whom are commissars - hold military rank equalling that of unit commanders to ensure the party's absolutely control over combat forces. Political officers, who exist at all levels, oversee discipline and manage non-combat units, including medical, communications, academies, promotion of personnel, as well as army entertainment troupes.

President Xi Jinping said a cut of 300,000 military personnel by 2017 - affecting many non-combat units overseen by the political departments - would lead to the PLA downsizing to two million personnel.

The decision to have fewer non-combat personnel means there will be no need for so many political officers.
"The planned reorganisation will affect many departments, with non-combat units either removed or downsized, so it will lead to a fewer political officers," Hong Kong-based military observer Liang Guoliang said.
Analysts said the number of political officers had increased in the past few decades.

During wars in the 1930s and 1950s, political commissar posts were held by commanders or deputy commanders. Former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping and former defence minister Peng Dehuai were political commissars.

In the 1950s, an army unit would have one political commissar and one deputy. Some local military commands now have six deputy political commissars.

Such posts have become hotbeds for corruption. Disgraced Central Military Commission vice-chairman Xu Caihou , a former Shenyang political commissar, took bribes in return for making appointments.
Chen Daoyin , an associate professor at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, said "the overhaul means the political status of departments and political commissars will be weakened … and the new disciplinary commission will help the party control the army more".
 
How is this going to work? PLA career path used to be that combat officers often switch tracks to political officers just to get promoted. In fact, you used to have to get your ticket stamped as a political officer before you reach SrCol.
 
Chinese military launches two new wings for space and cyber age

Chinese military launches two new wings for space and cyber age

President urges army to adapt to digital era as Beijing sets up separate command for land forces
SCMP, by Liu Zhen, Jan 1, 2016

China has officially launched two new wings of the military and established a separate command for ground units as it presses on with a massive overhaul of the armed forces. The Central Military Commission also released a guideline on Friday aimed a driving the rest of the reform programme.

At an inauguration ceremony in Beijing on Thursday, President Xi Jinping conferred flags on the new PLA Rocket Force and PLA Strategic Support Force, as well as the general command for the Army of the People’s Liberation Army.

The Rocket Force is founded on what was the Second Artillery Corps – the PLA’s strategic missile force – and will take charge of missiles and rockets, according to a source close to the army. The Strategic Support Force would be responsible for hi-tech warfare in space and on the internet, the source said.

Defence ministry spokesman Yang Yujun said on Friday that the creation of the rocket force was consistent with China’s nuclear policy and strategy. Xi said the inauguration of the commands of the three forces was a strategic step to establish a modern military system with Chinese characteristics.

In its guideline, the CMC said the defence system would be restructured to build a modern military for the information age by 2020, with most of the reforms expected to be completed by the end of this year. It follows sweeping changes to the military’s leadership and command system last year.

Once the changes are in place the CMC will take direct charge of administering all military wings, including the PLA, the People’s Armed Police, and the militia and reserve forces.

Under the plan, four main vertical chains – command, development, administration and supervision – will be better defined with clear lines for decision-making, planning, implementing plans and evaluating processes. The five battle zone commands, which replace seven military regions, will focus on combat, and each of the various military services will pursue their own development.

The departments of General Staff, Political, Logistics, and Armaments – or the so-called “four general departments” of the CMC – would be devolved into various departments to streamline the organisation. The guideline also calls for the creation an integrated command system that can operate in both war and peace time.

The main changes to the composition of the armed forces, military academies and colleges, and armed police will be completed by the end of this year. The militias will also be trimmed and reorganised. More adjustments and improvements will be rolled out gradually from 2017 to 2020, as conditions allow, according to the guideline.

At the inauguration ceremony, Xi urged the army to adapt to the digital age, explore new approaches in land warfare and transform itself into a powerful modern land force. He told the Rocket Force to improve nuclear deterrence and counterstrike capacity and advance its medium- and long-range precision strike ability. He called on the Strategic Support Force to leapfrog developments in key fields.
 
China to overhaul land troops in bid to transform world’s biggest army into nimble fighting force: sources
Strong resistance expected as old Soviet-model of organising army corps to be replaced with smaller-sized divisions, say sources
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/dipl...43/china-phase-out-pla-army-corps-sources-say
SCMP, 24 August, 2016

China will reorganise more than half of its 1.55 million land force troops, phasing out its army corps as it tries to mould a more nimble fighting force, sources familiar with the military said, adding that strong internal resistance to the change was expected.

Some of the existing 18 Army Corps will be turned into 25 to 30 divisions, they told the South China Morning Post. The size of a corp varies from 30,000 to 100,000 soldiers.
The approach was inherited from the Soviet Union, but it’s a bulky model no longer suited to the demands of modern warfare, which prizes modularity, according to a retired senior colonel based in Beijing.

“This is a main trend in modern warfare. Even the Russian army has tried to learn from the US army by reducing the size of their troops, making land forces become more nimble and quick-response,” the veteran said.

“The style of the US 101st Airborne Division is the best example that the [People’s Liberation Army’s] land forces will study, especially its quick deployment, equipment and logistic supplies, as well as other supporting networks, which reflect the success of its nimble and efficient system.”

A defence white paper that came to light last year highlighted the importance of building small, multifunctional and modular units that could take on different purposes for joint operations.
The overhaul comes amid a broader shift that the PLA embarked on early this year.

Under the direction of President Xi Jinping, who also heads the decision-making Central Military Commission, the four general headquarters were dissolved, before setting up 15 new organisations including the Joint Staff Department. The seven military commands were reshaped into five theatre commands. Some 300,000 troops will also be cut by 2017.
Under the new arrangement, divisions will receive instructions from the relevant theatre command, which reports directly to the Joint Staff Department which is now part of the Central Military Commission, before giving orders to frontline troops.

The shift away from corps was the focus of Xi’s visit to the headquarters of the land force in Beijing a few days before the anniversary of the founding of the PLA on August 1, a source close to the military said.

The source said Xi called on leaders of the land force to speed up reforms in administration and combat capability.
Currently the biggest land force in the world, the army comprises 1.55 million soldiers, of which 850,000 are mobile troops, most of whom are under the army corps, while the rest are regional garrison troops.

A source said it was only a matter of time for the army corps units to be either downsized or scrapped, although the change would inevitably encounter strong opposition from the ground force.

The transition to divisions is likely to result in the dismissal of tens of thousands of military personnel. and, hence, trigger huge resistance from the troops affected.
Xi appears to be tightening his grip on military power by letting go of some generals while promoting others who have his trust, as he tries to streamline the force and root out corruption within the ranks.

The past two years have seen the downfall of several top brass, including former Central Military Commission vice-chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou.
Xi wasted no time spelling out his expectations for the army when he inspected the Guangzhou Military Command in early December 2012, less than a month after becoming chair of the commission, saying: “When you are summoned, you must come at once; when you come, make sure you can fight, and when you fight, be certain to win.”

To the surprise of many, Xi announced for the first time that the PLA would cut troop levels by 300,000, in a speech right after a massive military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the victory over the Japanese on September 3 last year. Rather than the air force and the navy, ground forces became the target for downsizing.
The 18 corps are classified into either category A or category B. The first are better equipped and have more manpower and resources. They include the 1st, 13th, 21st, 27th, 38th, 39th and 54th Army Corps, while the rest of the corps belong to category B.

Under the overhaul earlier this year, the seven military commands were replaced by five strategic zones – Central, North, South, East and West. State media revealed the distribution of the corps among the theatre commands later on.

The Central Theatre Command, which is responsible for the safety of Beijing and a few provinces in its vicinity, boasts the largest number of corps – the 20th, 27th, 38th, 54th and 65th Combined Corps.

Second is the North Theatre Command, which commands four – the 16th, 26th, 39th and 40th Combined Corps.
The rest of the five theatre commands each have three corps, with the 1st, 12th and 31st belong to the East, the 14th, 41st and 42nd to the South, and the 13th, 21st and 47th to the West.
 
Forgive a dumb question who is totally ignorant on this matter but what DOR posted seems reasonable.

Can you explain why it's a bad idea, Colonel?
 
About 15 years ago, they started something called Brigadization, trying to replace a division with a brigade; mainly taking a division, subtract 2 combat regiments out, and let the remaining regiment keep half of the division's logistics BUT they kept the taskings the same. What they learned was that no single re-enforced regiment can do the job of 3 regiments no matter how well supplied it was. They eventually was forced back to division. The poor brigade HQ was overtasked and had insufficient supplies to do the job of a division.

Simple math didn't even occurred to the PLA. If you taking half the supplies away and cut two thirds of your combat power, you're going to do less than half of what the division used to do.

A quick look at any of the Cat A Group Armies (and they are Group Armies, not Corps) showed that none of the divisions are in a position to take the artillery, engineering, service brigades. Simply put, a re-enforced division is not going to do the job of an army.

Correction: About 25 years ago. This was the 90s.
 
Last edited:
in short it requires a complete rebuild from ground-up. they're trying to change from a Soviet system to a US-style system but while it's a bit easier to change headquarter responsibilities and titles at the MND, it's a lot harder to do it with operational units.
 
recently wrote an article for War on the Rocks regarding military diplomacy with the PLA.

https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/w...pla-a-guide-to-meeting-with-the-chinese-army/

Part i liked in this article got nthing to do with military and more to do with anthropology

Chinese culture as a whole is very high-context, reliant on nonverbal communication and understandings developed over a long period of time. Flattery, cajolery, and fulsome phrases are used with acquaintances, but genuine expressions of emotion are almost never used — even with loved ones and relatives. Ultimately, this use of “friend” is meant to draw you into a facsimile of social obligation, with the demands becoming greater depending on the level of your “friendship.”

The linked article to high vs low context cultures is very interesting. The above quote applies to most non-western cultures. The challenges of making relations between east and west. Imagine how much more conflicted east - east relations can be.

So was the link on drinking : D

Remember Your ABCs: If for some reason you are having difficulty finding a starting point, then begin with your ABCs:

Kenneth Allen,

Dennis Blasko, and

Bernard “Bud” Cole.

These three former military officers offer some of the best analysis available on the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Ground Forces, and the PLA Navy (PLAN), respectively. In addition to bringing their military expertise to bear on the challenges of evaluating a foreign military, all three have voluminous publication records. This is not to say that talent is in short supply coming up; one need look no further than the prolific

Andrew Erickson on the PLAN,

Michael Chase on the Second Artillery (China’s conventional and strategic rocket forces),

Daniel Hartnett on military policy, and

Timothy Heath on party-army relations among many others.

However, chances are if a journal article or book does not make at least a nod to the ABCs of PLA studies, then it should be viewed with suspicion.

Those are the sources to follow
 
Last edited:
The China Leadership Monitor is the only thing I have time for at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. It is excellent (and free) for those of us into elite Chinese politics.

And Then There Were Seven: The New, Slimmed-Down Central Military Commission
by James Mulvenon, Wednesday, May 16, 2018

In October 2017 at the first plenary session of the 19th Central Committee, Chinese state media announced the lineup of the new Central Military Commission (CMC). While a smaller CMC had been rumored in the weeks prior, the new configuration shattered previous paradigms of military leadership. Not only was the number of members reduced from 11 to 7, but there was a wholesale change in the assignment of seats by office, reflecting the tectonic changes from the PLA’s massive reorganization discussed in CLM 49. This article examines the transition, analyzes the individuals chosen and the logic for their selection, and assesses the implications for party-Army relations.

https://www.hoover.org/research/and...-new-slimmed-down-central-military-commission
 
Promotions all around!

Promotions all around!

Chinese President Xi Jinping promotes 170 PLA officers in move to streamline ranking system

Minnie Chan, SCMP Dec 15, 2019

Chinese President Xi Jinping last week promoted more than 170 senior military officers as part of an ongoing reform of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) designed to align people’s ranks with their place in the broader hierarchy.

The move came after the release on December 8 of a circular aimed at providing clearer procedures for the promotion of officers with the rank of major general or above across all branches of the armed forces.

The mass promotion was the biggest ever carried out by Xi, who also chairs the Central Military Commission.

A long-running problem within the PLA has been the lack of correlation between rank and status. For example, a corps commander with the rank of colonel would have seniority over a division leader with the rank of major general – a situation that would be impossible in most other militaries around the world.
While the dual system created loopholes and bred corruption, earlier attempts to reform it failed because of resistance from top Communist Party leaders and others with a vested interest to maintain the status quo.

Military observers said the overhaul was long overdue.

One insider, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that in the past it was easier for officers in administrative positions to gain promotions as they had closer ties to senior leaders, which “caused resentment among officers whose duties required them to put their lives at risk”.

“It could take years for the commander of a combat unit to earn a promotion [in rank] because the PLA hasn’t fought a major war in decades,” he said.
Zeng Zhiping, an expert on military law at Soochow University in east China’s Jiangsu province and a retired PLA lieutenant colonel, said a lack of checks and balances with regard to the promotion process had led to widespread abuse of the system, with some officers effectively buying their way up the hierarchy.
That had created the problem of senior officers lacking experience and, more importantly, the respect of their troops, he said.

“The new rules are essential for the PLA because it’s impossible to convince any soldier to follow a commander who doesn’t understand modern warfare.”
Adam Ni, co-editor of the China Neican online newsletter, said the new rules would pave the way for the merging of the PLA’s parallel hierarchies of ranks and job positions, though the process could take years to complete.

“In the long term, military ranks and [job] grades will be integrated into one system, which is easier for the top brass to manage and may help improve the PLA’s command and control system,” he said.

“But I am hesitant to say that this will lead to a fairer and more transparent promotion system, because there are other factors such as factional struggles.
“The PLA is an army that follows the rule that ‘the party controls the gun’,” he said.

Antony Wong Dong, a military observer based in Macau said that Xi had been planning the streamlining of the ranking system for many years but had faced resistance from other senior officials.

“That’s why Xi targeted senior officers with the circular,” he said, adding that the move, if implemented successfully, was likely to improve morale among middle-ranking officers.

While China has made giant strides in upgrading and developing new military hardware and weapon systems, analysts have said repeatedly that it needs to strengthen its command and control hierarchy to meet the needs and challenges of modern warfare.

Drew Thompson, a visiting senior research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at National University of Singapore, said China’s military modernisation had been uneven.

“The PLA’s biggest challenge is simultaneously improving both its hardware and software,” he said.
“While it is probably capable of conducting punitive strikes, it is an open question whether it can conduct a joint operation under hi-tech conditions.”


BEIJING, Dec. 12 (Xinhua) -- Seven Chinese military officers have been promoted to the rank of general, the highest rank for officers in active service in China.
Xi Jinping, chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), presented the officers with certificates of order at a ceremony held by the CMC in Beijing on Thursday.
The promoted officers are Commander of the Eastern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) He Weidong, Political Commissar of the PLA's Eastern Theater Command He Ping, Political Commissar of the PLA's Southern Theater Command Wang Jianwu, Commander of the PLA's Northern Theater Command Li Qiaoming, Commander of the PLA Rocket Force Zhou Yaning, Commander of the PLA Strategic Support Force Li Fengbiao, and head of the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences Yang Xuejun.

Xu Qiliang, CMC vice chairman, announced the orders of promotion at the ceremony, which was presided over by his fellow CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia.
 
Back
Top