PLA – A quick Reference.

Forgive a dumb question who is totally ignorant on this matter but what DOR posted seems reasonable.

Can you explain why it's a bad idea, Colonel?
 
About 15 years ago, they started something called Brigadization, trying to replace a division with a brigade; mainly taking a division, subtract 2 combat regiments out, and let the remaining regiment keep half of the division's logistics BUT they kept the taskings the same. What they learned was that no single re-enforced regiment can do the job of 3 regiments no matter how well supplied it was. They eventually was forced back to division. The poor brigade HQ was overtasked and had insufficient supplies to do the job of a division.

Simple math didn't even occurred to the PLA. If you taking half the supplies away and cut two thirds of your combat power, you're going to do less than half of what the division used to do.

A quick look at any of the Cat A Group Armies (and they are Group Armies, not Corps) showed that none of the divisions are in a position to take the artillery, engineering, service brigades. Simply put, a re-enforced division is not going to do the job of an army.

Correction: About 25 years ago. This was the 90s.
 
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in short it requires a complete rebuild from ground-up. they're trying to change from a Soviet system to a US-style system but while it's a bit easier to change headquarter responsibilities and titles at the MND, it's a lot harder to do it with operational units.
 
recently wrote an article for War on the Rocks regarding military diplomacy with the PLA.

https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/w...pla-a-guide-to-meeting-with-the-chinese-army/

Part i liked in this article got nthing to do with military and more to do with anthropology

Chinese culture as a whole is very high-context, reliant on nonverbal communication and understandings developed over a long period of time. Flattery, cajolery, and fulsome phrases are used with acquaintances, but genuine expressions of emotion are almost never used — even with loved ones and relatives. Ultimately, this use of “friend” is meant to draw you into a facsimile of social obligation, with the demands becoming greater depending on the level of your “friendship.”

The linked article to high vs low context cultures is very interesting. The above quote applies to most non-western cultures. The challenges of making relations between east and west. Imagine how much more conflicted east - east relations can be.

So was the link on drinking : D

Remember Your ABCs: If for some reason you are having difficulty finding a starting point, then begin with your ABCs:

Kenneth Allen,

Dennis Blasko, and

Bernard “Bud” Cole.

These three former military officers offer some of the best analysis available on the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Ground Forces, and the PLA Navy (PLAN), respectively. In addition to bringing their military expertise to bear on the challenges of evaluating a foreign military, all three have voluminous publication records. This is not to say that talent is in short supply coming up; one need look no further than the prolific

Andrew Erickson on the PLAN,

Michael Chase on the Second Artillery (China’s conventional and strategic rocket forces),

Daniel Hartnett on military policy, and

Timothy Heath on party-army relations among many others.

However, chances are if a journal article or book does not make at least a nod to the ABCs of PLA studies, then it should be viewed with suspicion.

Those are the sources to follow
 
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The China Leadership Monitor is the only thing I have time for at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. It is excellent (and free) for those of us into elite Chinese politics.

And Then There Were Seven: The New, Slimmed-Down Central Military Commission
by James Mulvenon, Wednesday, May 16, 2018

In October 2017 at the first plenary session of the 19th Central Committee, Chinese state media announced the lineup of the new Central Military Commission (CMC). While a smaller CMC had been rumored in the weeks prior, the new configuration shattered previous paradigms of military leadership. Not only was the number of members reduced from 11 to 7, but there was a wholesale change in the assignment of seats by office, reflecting the tectonic changes from the PLA’s massive reorganization discussed in CLM 49. This article examines the transition, analyzes the individuals chosen and the logic for their selection, and assesses the implications for party-Army relations.

https://www.hoover.org/research/and...-new-slimmed-down-central-military-commission
 
Promotions all around!

Promotions all around!

Chinese President Xi Jinping promotes 170 PLA officers in move to streamline ranking system

Minnie Chan, SCMP Dec 15, 2019

Chinese President Xi Jinping last week promoted more than 170 senior military officers as part of an ongoing reform of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) designed to align people’s ranks with their place in the broader hierarchy.

The move came after the release on December 8 of a circular aimed at providing clearer procedures for the promotion of officers with the rank of major general or above across all branches of the armed forces.

The mass promotion was the biggest ever carried out by Xi, who also chairs the Central Military Commission.

A long-running problem within the PLA has been the lack of correlation between rank and status. For example, a corps commander with the rank of colonel would have seniority over a division leader with the rank of major general – a situation that would be impossible in most other militaries around the world.
While the dual system created loopholes and bred corruption, earlier attempts to reform it failed because of resistance from top Communist Party leaders and others with a vested interest to maintain the status quo.

Military observers said the overhaul was long overdue.

One insider, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that in the past it was easier for officers in administrative positions to gain promotions as they had closer ties to senior leaders, which “caused resentment among officers whose duties required them to put their lives at risk”.

“It could take years for the commander of a combat unit to earn a promotion [in rank] because the PLA hasn’t fought a major war in decades,” he said.
Zeng Zhiping, an expert on military law at Soochow University in east China’s Jiangsu province and a retired PLA lieutenant colonel, said a lack of checks and balances with regard to the promotion process had led to widespread abuse of the system, with some officers effectively buying their way up the hierarchy.
That had created the problem of senior officers lacking experience and, more importantly, the respect of their troops, he said.

“The new rules are essential for the PLA because it’s impossible to convince any soldier to follow a commander who doesn’t understand modern warfare.”
Adam Ni, co-editor of the China Neican online newsletter, said the new rules would pave the way for the merging of the PLA’s parallel hierarchies of ranks and job positions, though the process could take years to complete.

“In the long term, military ranks and [job] grades will be integrated into one system, which is easier for the top brass to manage and may help improve the PLA’s command and control system,” he said.

“But I am hesitant to say that this will lead to a fairer and more transparent promotion system, because there are other factors such as factional struggles.
“The PLA is an army that follows the rule that ‘the party controls the gun’,” he said.

Antony Wong Dong, a military observer based in Macau said that Xi had been planning the streamlining of the ranking system for many years but had faced resistance from other senior officials.

“That’s why Xi targeted senior officers with the circular,” he said, adding that the move, if implemented successfully, was likely to improve morale among middle-ranking officers.

While China has made giant strides in upgrading and developing new military hardware and weapon systems, analysts have said repeatedly that it needs to strengthen its command and control hierarchy to meet the needs and challenges of modern warfare.

Drew Thompson, a visiting senior research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at National University of Singapore, said China’s military modernisation had been uneven.

“The PLA’s biggest challenge is simultaneously improving both its hardware and software,” he said.
“While it is probably capable of conducting punitive strikes, it is an open question whether it can conduct a joint operation under hi-tech conditions.”


BEIJING, Dec. 12 (Xinhua) -- Seven Chinese military officers have been promoted to the rank of general, the highest rank for officers in active service in China.
Xi Jinping, chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), presented the officers with certificates of order at a ceremony held by the CMC in Beijing on Thursday.
The promoted officers are Commander of the Eastern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) He Weidong, Political Commissar of the PLA's Eastern Theater Command He Ping, Political Commissar of the PLA's Southern Theater Command Wang Jianwu, Commander of the PLA's Northern Theater Command Li Qiaoming, Commander of the PLA Rocket Force Zhou Yaning, Commander of the PLA Strategic Support Force Li Fengbiao, and head of the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences Yang Xuejun.

Xu Qiliang, CMC vice chairman, announced the orders of promotion at the ceremony, which was presided over by his fellow CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia.
 
I'm curious. Is not the PLA now a volunteer force and not a conscript? So with the economy of China improving along with wages wouldn't that make it harder to maintain their volunteer force since private pay jobs can rival and beat military jobs with way less stress. Bad economy = volunteer, Good economy = do not volunteer.
 
I'm curious. Is not the PLA now a volunteer force and not a conscript? So with the economy of China improving along with wages wouldn't that make it harder to maintain their volunteer force since private pay jobs can rival and beat military jobs with way less stress. Bad economy = volunteer, Good economy = do not volunteer.

The same reason why more recruits come from Arkansas than Silicon Valley: the lack of a smooth-as-ice socio-economic system means what the armed forces have to offer one candidate looks much more attractive than the same package offered to another.
 
The same reason why more recruits come from Arkansas than Silicon Valley: the lack of a smooth-as-ice socio-economic system means what the armed forces have to offer one candidate looks much more attractive than the same package offered to another.

https://www.cfr.org/article/demographics-us-military

In 2016 California was the largest source of enlisted personal at 17,729 recruits Arkansas provided 2000 or less. Silicon Valley at a population of 4 million as opposed to Arkansas 3 million. In the bay area Cal, Stanford, San Jose State and all UC's & CSU have ROTC. High schools have JROTC as well. There are number of local guard reserve units staffed by locals

63% of the enlisted personal come from households making $49,531 or more.

The Post 911 and Montgomery GI Bill give incredible learning and financial opportunities. Also the military is consistently educating it personal. Courses on leadership etc... The leadership of the United States Army is more diversified than elite university in the US.

I'm a 59 year old white guy who doesn't get it and I was invited to a USN Educator Orientation Visit in San Diego. It was cool to see a LA Class nuclear sub forward frames only, as well as a Ticonderoga Cruiser. Seeing the SH-60, got to talk wire cutters and settling with power. BUDS / SWCC talked to the applicants. Cool.

Really impressive was a 19 year old coxswain of 34' Muson? Utility boat. The best part was these 20's and younger was the quiet confidence of having done stuff. It was more impressive than the hardware. I am more confident in our youth than I am in our political parties and their leadership.
 
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China revises conscription law, eyeing Taiwan conflict


China enacted revisions to its military service law that will allow retired military personnel to be reenlisted to secure experienced soldiers.

The law also focuses on recruiting tech-savvy science and engineering students to prepare for warfare in new domains such as space and cyber, as the country tries to build its military strength to prepare for possible all-out war in the Taiwan Strait.




Nikkei Asia, May 7, 2023
 
China revises conscription law, eyeing Taiwan conflict


China enacted revisions to its military service law that will allow retired military personnel to be reenlisted to secure experienced soldiers.

The law also focuses on recruiting tech-savvy science and engineering students to prepare for warfare in new domains such as space and cyber, as the country tries to build its military strength to prepare for possible all-out war in the Taiwan Strait.




Nikkei Asia, May 7, 2023

Are retired military really that interested and anxious to join back up?

Are tech savvy and engineering students all that interested in joining the military versus working privately after college?
 
Are retired military really that interested and anxious to join back up?

Are tech savvy and engineering students all that interested in joining the military versus working privately after college?

Very high levels of college graduate unemployment in China at the moment something like 20%. from memory. Draftees might not be anxious to come back if they have a job (especially for a 'hot' war) but there should be plenty of takers for some roles if the military can find them term positions or some such.
 
Very high levels of college graduate unemployment in China at the moment something like 20%. from memory. Draftees might not be anxious to come back if they have a job (especially for a 'hot' war) but there should be plenty of takers for some roles if the military can find them term positions or some such.

If they are anything like college graduate American males joining the military was not their goal at all. They anticipated finding a good job and if not might settle for less in the private world in the meantime and stay home with parents. That is what is done here while waiting the slow economy out. OTOH high school graduates, who do not intend to go to college, are more likely the pool for the military such as here. My brother was a classic example. Only Chinese families place such a high emphasis on getting a college education/profession I would tend to think anything less would not be acceptable. Besides does a 21 year old student feel Taiwan is an issue for them. Maybe the POC needs to think about inducements to sign up like a large signing bonus otherwise I suspect they will fall short. Most 21-22 year old college grads are not thinking military anywhere in this world nowadays.
 
Are tech savvy and engineering students all that interested in joining the military versus working privately after college?
Maybe the POC needs to think about inducements to sign up like a large signing bonus otherwise I suspect they will fall short. Most 21-22 year old college grads are not thinking military anywhere in this world nowadays.
While China does not have any conscription or draft they do have mandatory "military education" both in high school and during college - two sets of about two weeks of drill training and similar intended to "instill a sense of patriotism and national defense". In general that two-week training in the way it is conducted seems to be more of a turn-off pushing college students away from ever even thinking about a military career.

However having this technically means they do already have a possible "tool" at hand if they wanted to go for some targeted advertising for recruitment. They're just not utilizing it. Yet.
 
If they are anything like college graduate American males joining the military was not their goal at all. They anticipated finding a good job and if not might settle for less in the private world in the meantime and stay home with parents. That is what is done here while waiting the slow economy out. OTOH high school graduates, who do not intend to go to college, are more likely the pool for the military such as here. My brother was a classic example. Only Chinese families place such a high emphasis on getting a college education/profession I would tend to think anything less would not be acceptable. Besides does a 21 year old student feel Taiwan is an issue for them. Maybe the POC needs to think about inducements to sign up like a large signing bonus otherwise I suspect they will fall short. Most 21-22 year old college grads are not thinking military anywhere in this world nowadays.

True, but the difference is in the US college grads have a choice about whether or not they may want to serve a term of enlistment in the military. China? Not the case if the government decides otherwise.
 
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True, but the difference is in the US college grads have a choice about whether or not they may want to serve a term of enlistment in the military. China? Not the case if the government decides otherwise.

Isn't that true everywhere?
Conscription may not be the law today, but tomorrow...?
 
Isn't that true everywhere?
Conscription may not be the law today, but tomorrow...?

Unless it's an end of the world scenario no government in the western world could re-introduce mass conscription and not expect to lose the next election. And that's not really a problem the Chinese Government has to worry about.
 
Unless it's an end of the world scenario no government in the western world could re-introduce mass conscription and not expect to lose the next election.
Eh, that's not the case at all.

Currently (as of March 2023) in surveys 61% of the adult, eligible-to-vote population in Germany is in favour of re-introducing/re-activating conscription - with majorities across all political allegiances and age groups.
 
Eh, that's not the case at all.

Currently (as of March 2023) in surveys 61% of the adult, eligible-to-vote population in Germany is in favour of re-introducing/re-activating conscription - with majorities across all political allegiances and age groups.

In a poll yes. Let's see what happens if the German Government ever actually tries to do it! Something tells me receiving a draft order (or having a close loved one receive it) might lead to a sudden change of view. Lots of things are good in 'theory'.
 
Another PLA Reorganization
Xi Jinping is once again shaking up China’s armed forces, which suggests that at least in the near term there will be a greater degree of caution in dealing with international affairs. No one wants to fight with an untested order of battle.

The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established in 2015 with responsibility for intelligence support, technical surveillance, electromagnetic warfare, cyberwarfare, and psychological warfare. Sub unites included the Network Systems Department and Space Systems Department, which ran the Astronauts Corps.

Effective April 19, 2024, the new Information Support Force (ISF) is commander by Lt General Bi Yi; General Li Wei is the Political Commissar. General Li was named SSF Political Commissar in December 2020, and Lt General Bi was SSF Deputy Commander. The ISF will operate at the same organization level – reporting directly to the Military Affairs Commission – as the space, cyberspace, and joint logistics support forces. China had not previously acknowledged the existence of the Space Force or Cyberspace Force.

Purge and Revamp
SSF Commander General Ju Qiansheng was purged in July 2023 after two years on the job. He was joined in political purgatory by former National Defense Minister Li Shangfu, Airforce Commander Ding Laihang, Rocket Force Commander Zhou Yaning, and several other senior officers and corporate executives. Among those was Space Systems Department Deputy Commander Shang Hong, who was dropped as a delegate to the 20[SUP]th[/SUP] National Party Congress without explanation. Shang had been Chief-of-Staff of the General Armaments Department under Li Shangfu.

Among those who appear to have survived (thus far) are Lt General Yang Xiaoxiang (SSF Deputy Political Commissar and Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary), Lt General Ding Xingnong (SSF General Political Department Director and a former Rocket Force Deputy Political Commissar), Space Systems Department Commander General Hao Weizhong, and Lt General Chen Hui, Commander of the Network Systems Department.
 
PLA Military Aerospace Force: On the Frontier of Innovation and Competition
By: John Costello, China Brief Volume: 25 Issue: 13

Executive Summary:

  • The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Aerospace Force (ASF) is structured to rapidly integrate space-based surveillance, targeting, and offensive capabilities into any conflict involving the PLA, signaling Beijing’s strategic anticipation of conflicts over Taiwan or the South China Sea.
  • By consolidating the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) diverse military space assets, the ASF centralizes domain awareness and counter-space operations, significantly enhancing the PRC’s ability to conduct precision strikes and counterintervention operations against the United States.
  • The ASF’s seven primary “space bases” anchor the country’s space capabilities, with specialized units managing critical missions including satellite launches, space domain awareness, and early missile warning, reflecting deep reform and strategic prioritization within the PLA.
  • The ASF has driven technological advancements in space-based surveillance and anti-satellite weaponry, positioning the PRC to exploit vulnerabilities in U.S. military reliance on satellites—critical in Beijing’s strategy of denying adversary space operations. (In other words, “no satellite, no fight”).
 
China’s State Military Affairs Commission (1982-2026), RIP

China's State Military Affairs Commission (MAC) is no more.

China has two MACs, one in the party that makes all military related decisions, and one under the State Council that … doesn’t. Both have always been chaired by the same person, and had the same vice chairs and membership. The State MAC has never issued any decisions that were not originally made by the party MAC, and since the membership has been identical, no one seems to care.

Amid Xi Jinping’s purge of the general officer corps, no mention was made of any change of membership of the State MAC. An announcement removing people from the State MAC, and promoting Zhang Shengmin to Vice Chair should have followed the recently concluded National People’s Congress (NPC) session. That silence is the strongest signal yet that, after 44 years as a symbolic gesture to joint party-national control of the armed forces, the State MAC is no more.


Background
During the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, the armed forces were called in to restore order. Marshal Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Mao Zedong’s anointed heir apparent, allegedly pulled a failed coup d’etat in 1971, and died trying to escape. After 18 tumultuous months, Deng Xiaoping was brought back from the political wilderness in 1973, specifically to rein in the armed forces.

Deng succeeded in removing Marshal Lin’s most rabid followers, and laid the ground work for the post-Mao political transition. He was briefly removed from power six months before Mao’s death in September, and then quickly brought back into the top echelons the following year.

In between, the PLA high command removed Mao’s widow, Jiang Qing, and her Gang of Four from political power. This October 1976 coup d’etat brought the military back into the CCP leadership. In addition to Deng and titular party head Hua Guofeng, the 1977 11th National Party Congress’ 32-strong politburo included more than a dozen senior serving or retired general officers. Almost all of them held onto their positions through the 1982 12th party congress.

Having completed the initial tasks of purging the Cultural Revolution radicals, reestablishing governmental offices, and setting China on a reform path, Deng Xiaoping needed to find a way to put a new generation of leaders into power. His chosen heirs, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, could manage things well enough as long as Deng was around to keep the other party elders (the “eight immortals”) in line. For the civilians, Deng created the Central Advisory Commission, but he needed something for the military.

His solution was to create a state government equivalent of the Chinese Communist Party’s Military Affairs Commission. The intention was to lay the foundations for an eventual separation of party and state, albeit while retaining complete control of both. Initially, both MACs had identical leadership, although some lower-level cadres were only identified as being part of one or the other.

The separation of powers idea never got off the ground, and was permanently buried after the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Massacre. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao both retained the mirror-image State MAC, but only as a thin facade.


Mr Xi’s purges
As he assumed power in the last months of 2012, Xi Jinping saw to it that eight of the 10 members of the party MAC were retired. Hu Jintao was pushed aside, breaking the pattern of the former leader remaining as head of the MAC during his successor’s teething period. Xi then began cleaning house. Following each change in the membership of the Party MAC, the State MAC matched those actions, man for man.

Since the 2020 20th National Party Congress, Party MAC Vice Chairs He Weidong and Zhang Youxia have both been purged, as have regular members Li Shangfu, Liu Zhenli and Miao Hua. If there are still two functioning MACs, the National People’s Congress should have struck them from the State MAC. But, no mention of any changes to membership in the State MAC have surfaced.
 
After reading your article I decided to do a clarification concerning purged vs retired. Hey, what can I say other than that it seems no one in China retires. Then ran across this story which has an interactive chart where you can hover over a polygon to reveal a name and biographical information. I thought pretty cool not that the names mean much to me. The interesting part was status where most were listed as missing. Take a look and tell me what you think.

 
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