i think - and i believe that this is OoE's views as well - that its an accident of the colonial policing role that was the BA's bread and butter for several hundred years. relatively small forces could be responsible for quite large areas in an age where comms are either bad or non-existant, ergo the commander of that unit might need almost plenipotentary powers to make peace and war (particularly as 'divide and rule' is one of the best ways to secure influence when you don't have great numbers), obviously this isn't a job for a twenty-five year old... there are two other reasons that spring to mind, firstly that the US Army was built on a 'Prussian model', one of very strict discipline and a very 'top-down' operational model, whereas the BA has a somewhat different approach of not just allowing initiative at a very junior level, but requiring it - you can imagine that local initiative (and effectively self-sufficiency of command) is a requirement for a rifle company on the North-West frontier where the next level of command might be a weeks march away.
Dave,
I figured it probably had to do with the colonial roots of the British Army, but wasn't sure. I'd agree that the US Army model is loosely built on a Prussian model, although you don't see separate paths from early on in officers' careers that creates a professional staff officer. Instead, the US Army model is much more egalitarian, attempting to give every officer a chance at becoming the Chief of Staff of the Army.
There has been some change in this respect (and I am part of the change), where an officer can designate a career field and then competes within that career field for promotion instead of within his/her basic branch, with the knowledge that glass ceilings exist within the career field (e.g., while my basic branch is still infantry, I now work in the strategic plans and policy career field, meaning that I am guaranteed not to be promoted beyond O-6). This has created some peverse incentives, as many officers will choose a career field because it offers an opportunity (e.g. grad school) that no longer exists because the new dichotomy between basic branch/career field. However, I digress.
It's a model that worked when we were fighting conflicts where our industry/mass mobilization capabilities could shine, but I agree with you that it has its drawbacks with small wars.
dave angel said:
also woth noting that British junior officer ranks alternate betwwen command ranks and staff ranks (it doesn't always work out like that, but you get the jist): 2nd Lt isn't in charge of anything, least of all himself, a Lt actually does command a platoon/troop - though with significant input from SNCO's and Coy ic, a Captain might be an Ops Officer, Adjutant, Coy 2ic - generally a desk warrior, a Major will command a Coy/Sqn/Battery.
personally i prefer the British system, you allow a young officer to get a little more operational, command and administrative/study experience under his belt and then when you do give him a company command you allow him to get on with it in the way he sees fit. from personal experience when in Bosnia i watched a US Army battalion Orders Group that micro-managed the way Captains would operate to a degree that a British Corporal wouldn't accept. i imagine things have changed because of the Iraq experience, but it gave the impression of a command system that was obsessed with 'the plan' and couldn't handle the concept of 'we'll see when we get there' and therefore deliberately put people in sub-unit commands who wouldn't think of either challenging the plan or just binning it and making a new one to suit the conditions on the ground.
Some of the micromanagement that you saw existed because of the casualty adverse environment that was created post-Cold War, partly due to civilian emphasis on no to low casualties so that the mission would maintain domestic support (or probably more appropriately worded, to avoid domestic opposition) and also because military commanders didn't want to lose soldiers to a mission that they felt they shouldn't be doing.
Personally, I'd like to see the US Army more closely align company command with the timeline seen in the British Army. COIN and small wars, something that we will continue to do, requires folks that are thinkers just as much as fighting, and age provides experience and maturity that results more often than not in more thinking, which in this environment, means less fighting.
I'd like to see senior Captains commanding in the US Army. Invest in the human capital of our junior Captains by sending them to language schools, grad schools, internships with NGOs, IGOs, USGOs, etc., or other alternative assignments that will broaden their horizons and give them new perspectives to use when they are leading their companies. Who better to get a small village up and running that spent a year in language school and learning another culture, and then spent two years with a NGO in Africa figuring out how to kick start a local microeconomy? Even if that officer then needs to spend three months in a crash course on Arabic before going to Iraq (or Pashto/Urdu/Farsi before going to Afghanistan), he/she will be cognizant that they will be living in another culture, and thus will be sensitized to that and the benefits they can reap by overtly and honestly adapting to the local culture.
dave angel said:
Shek, you are one of the most interesting (and interested) US Army officers its been my privilige to 'meet', i think you particularly would get an awful lot out of an exchange tour with a BA infantry unit, especially one in Afghanistan.
(thats not a sly dig at the US Army, a kind of 'we'll show you how its done', but demonstrating an operational/intellectual model that you seem to be interested in. it would give you an opportunity to see if you think it actually works in practice)
I appreciate the kind words. An exchange would be fun and a great learning experience, although there are far too few of these opportunities.
