China-Taiwan: Aircraft carrier 'seals off' island on third day of drills

Amled

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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65229003
I bet that the pilots and all others; including the mission planners back in Beijing, are inordinately pleased and proud.
They now know that they can seal off the island of Taiwan!!!
Of course it did help that there was no opposing anti-aircraft ground fire. That there were no opposing planes in the air to contest them,
But hey, they can return home knowing that in an “uncontested” campaign, they can win in a “walk-over”!:tongue:
 
on the other hand, the carrier didn't conduct a lot of sorties anyway. political symbolism.
 
What's worrying is that Taiwan didn't detect the carrier.

Here’s a layman’s question.
Would it not be in the interest of the Taiwanese military to red-faced admit that they hadn’t seen the aircraft or the carrier, even if they had!
After all wouldn’t it be a better tactical move to have a potential enemy consider you weaker or ill prepared?
 
The PLA says, yes I know says, deterrence is a form of war fighting. From their standpoint if the US does not intervene, that is them defeating the US.

regarding the carrier specifically, frankly not sure how much that matters. It’s merely symbolism. PLAN wouldn’t put that carrier there if there was even the slightest hint of US intervention. And if Taiwan was fighting alone, that carrier would not only be a very very hard target for Taiwan to crack, it would also be low down on the priority pole.
 
I would have to imagine that the US Navy knew where that carrier was and if it were in position to actually launch real attacks it wouldn't be long for this world.

As a former SUPPLOT watch stander, I would be beyond surprised if we didn't know where it was from the moment it left port.
 
Always kind of figured the overly simple version of this war if it ever went hot is Chinese blockade of Taiwan (or in Cuban Missile Crisis terms a "quarantine"), which means we should be seeing a lot of submarines and ballistic missiles wanting to sink surface ships from both sides.
 
Always kind of figured the overly simple version of this war if it ever went hot is Chinese blockade of Taiwan (or in Cuban Missile Crisis terms a "quarantine"), which means we should be seeing a lot of submarines and ballistic missiles wanting to sink surface ships from both sides.

The problem for China though is that if they launch a blockage before assembling the units and sea lift assets needed for the invasion then they are telegraphing their intentions weeks if not months prior to the invasion because it takes time to concentrate all the various assets at the embarkation points even if all the planning has been completed well in advance. And of course concentrating the landing forces prior to establishing the embargo does the same thing.

As I believe I noted before on other chat groups if not this one, China can attack Taiwan any time it wants on short notice, perhaps as short as only 30 minutes or so. What it can't do is invade Taiwan on short notice.
 
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The problem for China though is that if they launch a blockage before assembling the units and sea lift assets needed for the invasion then they are telegraphing their intentions weeks if not months prior to the invasion because it takes time to concentrate all the various assets at the embarkation points even if all the planning has been completed well in advance. And of course concentrating the landing forces prior to establishing the embargo does the same thing.

As I've believe I noted before on other chat groups if not this one, China can attack Taiwan any time it wants on short notice, perhaps as short as only 30 minutes or so. What it can't do is invade Taiwan on short notice.

Perhaps signaling intentions is the first step?
They might believe that openly preparing for an invasion would trigger surrender negotiations.
 
PLA Discusses Integration of Strategic Systems, Capabilities

"Since the March 2023 National People’s Congress, PLA subject matter experts have begun discussing an emerging concept related to maximizing efficiencies in economics and defense. On March 8, in a speech at the First Session of the 14th National People’s Congress, PRC leader Xi Jinping called for the “consolidation and enhancement of integrated national strategic systems and capabilities” (巩固提高一体化国家战略体系和能力). According to Xi, better coordination between economic development and defense requirements is essential to realizing the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and the PLA’s transformation into a “world-class military.”

Xi Jinping had briefly referred to the “consolidation and enhancement of integrated national strategic systems and capabilities” in his report to the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 2022. PLA subject matter experts also had been advocating for the idea before the Party Congress. Xi’s speech in March shone a spotlight on the concept, demanding the PLA’s attention and implementation.

Since Xi’s speech, PLA institutions and experts have begun penning articles affirming and discussing the task of improving China’s integration of national strategic systems and capabilities. For example, an article by a PLA National Defense University (NDU) research center dedicated to studying Xi Jinping Thought asserted that China’s national security is in a “high-risk period” as countries around the world are uniting various instruments of national power in pursuit of their own strategic aims. To “win the initiative in military competition,” the NDU research center argued that China must muster and integrate all its national resources, including a “system of military forces” supported by and in support of the national economy.

An article by an author affiliated with the Armed Forces Political Work Research Institute of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences described the concept of “consolidation and enhancement of integrated national strategic systems and capabilities” as essential to future competition in priority areas for strategic capability development. According to the author, “emerging fields,” including “maritime, space, cyber, biology, and new energy,” have “enormous power and potential” and must be strengthened to improve national strategic systems and capabilities. The author claimed that “getting a grasp” on these fields is key to success in future competition.

Based on multiple articles discussing Xi’s March 8 speech, the concept of “consolidation and enhancement of integrated national strategic systems and capabilities” is clearly related to the PLA’s concept of “military-civil fusion” (军民融合). The degree of continuity between these two concepts remains to be seen."
https://www.cna.org/our-media/newsletters/pla-update
 
Perhaps signaling intentions is the first step?
They might believe that openly preparing for an invasion would trigger surrender negotiations.

First thing it would trigger is an alarm call by Taiwan to the the US, the UN and every pro-western nation on the planet followed by a general mobilization on Taiwan's part. Only if the invasion actually went ahead and looked like succeeding would Taiwan consider surrender and even then only if the US and its Pacific Allies failed to break China's air and naval blockade.
 
First thing it would trigger is an alarm call by Taiwan to the the US, the UN and every pro-western nation on the planet followed by a general mobilization on Taiwan's part. Only if the invasion actually went ahead and looked like succeeding would Taiwan consider surrender and even then only if the US and its Pacific Allies failed to break China's air and naval blockade.

I agree with your assessment, but what I am suggesting is that the "scare them into surrendering" strategy is one Beijing might be under the mistaken impression would work.
And, if it doesn't, then just call it a military exercise and no one loses face.
 
I agree with your assessment, but what I am suggesting is that the "scare them into surrendering" strategy is one Beijing might be under the mistaken impression would work.
And, if it doesn't, then just call it a military exercise and no one loses face.

[FONT=Times New Roman, Times, serif]So, just a continuation of the same strategy that the PLA have been; without any visible sign of success,
using against the people of Taiwan for over 50 years: trying to scare them into surrender!
Now unless there's an ulterior motive behind the air/sea incursions they're really come off as quite pathetic!
[/FONT]
 
I agree with your assessment, but what I am suggesting is that the "scare them into surrendering" strategy is one Beijing might be under the mistaken impression would work.
And, if it doesn't, then just call it a military exercise and no one loses face.

Based on their history I don't believe Taiwan' would be so be easily 'bluffed into surrendering. Plus the blockade even if it was a bluff would be illegal under international law and just piss off every single nation in the developed world. The same ones that China itself does business with! We already have an ongoing example of what happens when some idiot decides to do that.
 
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Based on their history I don't believe Taiwan' would be so be easily 'bluffed into surrendering. Plus the blockade even if it was a bluff would e illegal under international law and just piss off every single nation in the developed world. The same ones that China itself does business with! We already have an ongoing example of what happens when some idiot decides to do that.

Again, I agree, but "illegal under international law" doesn't fly with China, which claims that's all their territory, including the ocean around Taiwan.
 
Again, I agree, but "illegal under international law" doesn't fly with China, which claims that's all their territory, including the ocean around Taiwan.

I also agree about China's view of international law. The point was though that a clear violation of the law like a blockade would give all of Taiwan's trading partners an equally blatant reason/excuse to take action.
 
I also agree about China's view of international law. The point was though that a clear violation of the law like a blockade would give all of Taiwan's trading partners an equally blatant reason/excuse to take action.

The sole reason for Taiwan's trading partners to take action is Enlightened Self Interest.
Remove that, and nothing happens.
Invoke that, and nothing will stop them.
 
Based on multiple articles discussing Xi’s March 8 speech, the concept of;" blah blah blah blah blah blah and blah blah blahblahblah" is clearly related to the PLA’s concept of “blah-blah-blah” (军民融合). The degree of continuity between these two concepts remains to be seen."
https://www.cna.org/our-media/newsletters/pla-update[/FONT][/SIZE]

So much easier to understand when limited to one word...
 
China's aircraft carriers play 'theatrical' role but pose little threat yet
WSB633ENRFLCVEGJNGPFKGMLOY.jpg

A helicopter takes off from China's Shandong aircraft carrier, over Pacific Ocean waters, south of Okinawa prefecture, Japan, in this handout photo taken April 15, 2023 and released by the Joint Staff Office of the Defense Ministry of Japan April 17, 2023.

HONG KONG, May 5 (Reuters) - When China sailed one of its two active aircraft carriers, the Shandong, east of Taiwan last month as part of military drills surrounding the island, it was showcasing a capability that it has yet to master and could take years to perfect.

As Beijing modernizes its military, its formidable missile forces and other naval vessels, such as cutting-edge cruisers, are posing a concern for the U.S. and its allies. But it could be more than a decade before China can mount a credible carrier threat far from its shores, according to four military attaches and six defence analysts familiar with regional naval deployments.

Instead, China's carriers are more of a propaganda showpiece, with doubts about their value in a possible conflict with the U.S. over Taiwan and about whether China could protect them on longer-range missions into the Pacific and Indian oceans, the attaches and analysts told Reuters.

China's Defence Ministry did not respond to questions about its carrier program, though dozens of articles in state-linked journals reviewed by Reuters reveal awareness among Chinese military analysts about shortcomings in the country's carrier capability.

While some regional press coverage, partially based on Chinese state media reports, portrayed recent drills around Taiwan as active patrols and a military challenge to the U.S. and its allies, the Chinese carriers are effectively still in training mode, eight of the experts said.

Landing of aircraft at night and in bad weather, for instance - crucial to regular offshore carrier operations - remain far from routine, several of the attaches and analysts said.

And in a conflict, China's carriers would be vulnerable to missile and submarine attacks, some of the experts said, noting the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has not perfected protective screening operations, particularly anti-submarine warfare.

"Unlike other parts of their military modernisation, there is something politically theatrical about their carrier deployments so far," said Trevor Hollingsbee, a former British naval intelligence analyst.

"Carrier operations are a very complicated game, and China's got to figure this out all by itself. It still has a long, long way to go."

At times, China's carrier pilots have relied on land-based airfields for takeoffs or landings, as well as for extra air cover and surveillance, the attaches told Reuters on the condition of anonymity as they were not authorised to speak publicly.

And though China's Liaoning and Shandong carriers have each sailed into the western Pacific in recent months, approaching U.S. bases on Guam, they remained within range of coastal Chinese airfields, according to Rira Momma, professor of security studies at Takushoku University's Institute of World Studies, who reviewed Japanese defence ministry tracking data.

Both the Liaoning - a refitted ex-Soviet vessel - and the Chinese-built Shandong have jump ramps for take offs, which limit the number and range of aircraft on board.

Anti-submarine helicopters operate from both carriers and China's Type 055 cruisers but the carriers have yet to deploy an early warning aircraft, relying so far on land-based planes, the 10 experts said.

A new plane, the KJ-600, designed to perform a similar role to the E-2C/D Hawkeye launched from U.S. carriers, is still in testing, according to the Pentagon's latest annual report on China's military.

FROM SKI JUMPS TO CATAPULTS
As the Liaoning and Shandong gradually increase the tempo of their drills, China is preparing for sea trials of its next-generation carrier, the 80,000-tonne Fujian, state media reported last month. The Fujian is significantly larger, though conventionally powered, and will launch aircraft from electromagnetic catapults.

The ship, which the Pentagon report said could be operational by 2024, is expected to carry new variants of the J-15 jet fighter, replacing the existing model that foreign analysts consider underpowered.

"The Fujian, with its more modern capabilities, will be just another test bed for a good few years," said Collin Koh, a defence scholar at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

"It won't be until we see the next generation of carriers that the Chinese designs and the PLAN's intentions will really settle down."

The carrier program reflects the ruling Communist Party's aim of making the People's Liberation Army (PLA) a "world class" military by 2049, part of President Xi Jinping's vision of building "a great modern socialist country".

One indication of China's ambitions, the attaches said, will be if carriers built after the Fujian are nuclear-powered like U.S. ones, allowing global range.

A study published in December by the non-partisan U.S. Congressional Research Service noted that China would use its carriers to project power "particularly in scenarios that do not involve opposing U.S. forces" and "to impress or intimidate foreign observers".

Several countries operate aircraft carriers but the U.S. remains the most dominant, running 11 carrier battlegroups with global reach.

China, by contrast, could use its carriers primarily in the Asian theatre, working in tandem with submarines and anti-ship missiles to attempt to control its near seas.

The Shandong's appearance off Taiwan's east coast to stage mock strikes last month surprised some analysts, given the island's proximity to land-based airfields. But, in the short term at least, China's military would struggle to defend the carrier out in the western Pacific in a clash with U.S. and allied forces.

"China's objective with the deployment of the Shandong is clear, it is a symbol of its political anger" over U.S. engagement with Taiwan, said Yoji Koda, a retired admiral who commanded the Japanese fleet.

In a battle, he said, it "would be a very good target for U.S. and Japanese forces, and they would take it down at the very beginning."

A U.S. defence official, speaking on the condition of anonymity as they were not authorised to talk publicly, said while China had made progress with its carriers, it had yet to master operations in difficult conditions or how to protect the vessels.

One question was how the ships would be relevant in a conflict, the official said.

HOPES AND SHORTCOMINGS
Chinese military and government researchers appear aware of the challenges, according to a Reuters review of over 100 recent articles published in dozens of publicly available Chinese defence journals.

The official PLA Daily in October published an interview with an aircraft carrier aviation unit where the deputy chief of staff, Dai Xing, acknowledged "many shortcomings in preparing for war", and a gap between sailors' training level and combat requirements.

A September editorial published in a magazine run by a PLA weapons manufacturer, titled "Four great advantages the PLA has in attacking Taiwan", did not mention the role of Chinese carriers. Instead, it said, China's land-based ballistic missiles would be enough to overwhelm potential intervention from U.S. carriers.

Two earlier editorials in the same publication, Tank and Armoured Vehicle, noted that China's carriers would remain in their infancy for the foreseeable future and that other surface ships would be more useful in a conflict in the East China Sea.

Other articles in similar publications outline pilot recruitment and training problems, vulnerabilities to submarine attack and command issues - which some foreign analysts say is a problem for a navy that still sails with political commissars with executive authority.

When at sea, U.S. carriers fly almost constantly, routinely operating fighter, electronic-warfare and surveillance aircraft to create a protective screen around the battlegroup.

Beyond the expense and danger of such operations, one key element is mastering devolved command systems, particularly in a crisis such as a fire or crash onboard when planes are airborne and the flight deck is disabled.

The U.S. has spent decades perfecting such systems, having expanded carrier operations after their importance was highlighted in the Allied victory over Japan in the Pacific in World War Two.

"The continuous operation of its carriers sits at the very core of what makes the U.S. military absolutely preeminent," said Singapore-based defence analyst Alexander Neill, an adjunct fellow with Hawaii's Pacific Forum think tank.

In the medium term, China is likely to start sending battlegroups into the Indian Ocean, where China's presence is minimal beyond routine submarine operations, the attaches and defence analysts said.

Operating far from the security of land-based airfields would test China's capability, but preparations are underway.

The pier at China's first major offshore military base in Djibouti was recently extended, and could now fit a carrier, the Pentagon report noted.
_______
 
I still will say their carriers will never survive in the open ocean for more than 48 hours before they run afoul of any of our attack subs be it Los Angeles, Seawolf, or Virginia. The subs will know where they are before they know where the subs are.
 
I still will say their carriers will never survive in the open ocean for more than 48 hours before they run afoul of any of our attack subs be it Los Angeles, Seawolf, or Virginia. The subs will know where they are before they know where the subs are.

And the only way to prevent that if they do sortie would be to tie up so many of their blue water surface assets as screens and close escorts that they don't have enough left to cover the invasion forces! Kind of hard to be in two places at once even when you are desperately needed in both.
 
All of you are ignoring the real threat. Never mind the god damned carriers. They'll be sunk just after leaving port. The Taiwanese can make sure of that.

Yeah, the carriers are probably toast in the war but I doubt it will be the Taiwanese that will do it. too hard a target for them, and not high enough on the priority list. same thing with the PLAN subs. Taiwan Navy is just gonna fight to survive, let alone conduct ASW.

Taiwanese is not expecting fire from the Pacific side of the island, be it from surface launched nor sub launched missiles.

they sure are now. they received warning from the US on this for years, and this was a wake-up call.

OTOH places like the Jiashan fortified mountain bunkers are gonna be a tough nut for PLA firepower to crack, even if they're hitting it from the Pacific side. moreover if the Chinese are gonna maneuver enough forces to actually execute a credible Pacific side attack, that by itself would work as serious indications and warnings that a real war is imminent.

and the US/Japan/Australian subs would be salivating at the prospect of the PLAN coming out to the eastern side to play...PLAN subs would have less survival time than a chew toy on this forum.
 
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Pacific side ... landing?
Crossing the Taiwan Strait is tough enough -- nothing like D-Day; really tough -- but executing a swing around the island?
Or, is this strictly airborne ?
 
Crossing the Taiwan Strait is tough enough -- nothing like D-Day; really tough -- but executing a swing around the island?

As the good Col mentioned, just standoff strike.

Think the most the PLA would swing in terms of actual landing MIGHT be an attempt on port of Keelung. Easiest to get to Taipei City from there, but I can’t imagine the second/third waves are gonna be real happy with their butt swinging open in the wind.
 
Taiwan 2024 Presidential Nominees

William Lai Ching-te, the 64 year-old Vice President, is a former Premier (2017-19), Tainan mayor (2010-17), DPP legislator (1999-2010), and National Assemblyman (1996-99). He resigned as President of the Executive Yuan (premier) after 16 months following severe setbacks in local elections. He then challenged President Tsai Ing-wen for the party leadership, and lost. Lai subsequently joined Tsai's successful campaign as the Vice Presidential nominee. He has a Master's degree in Public Health from Harvard.

Lai rose out of the former New Tide opposition faction associated with independence activists (as opposed to reform-minded elected Tangwai officials). Although the faction later moderated its independence stance, it has long been considered the more progressive – and very successful – wing of the non-KMT political spectrum. The party eliminated factions in 2006.

In his first speech to the Legislative Yuan, the newly appointed Premier said, "I am a political worker who advocates Taiwan independence" but that "We are already an independent sovereign nation called the Republic of China. We don't need a separate declaration of independence."

KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih (65) is a noncontroversial former head of the National Police Agency (2006-08) and mayor (2015-) and Vice Mayor (2010-15) of New Taipei City (the municipality of four million residents surrounding Taipei [population: 2.5 mn]). He has a doctorate in criminology. Hou has avoided commenting on independence, preferring to ask for unity in the face of “fierce and dangerous international circumstances.”
 
Crisis Management and the Taiwan Situation: Chinese Views and Conflict Avoidance,

by Michael D. Swaine, China Leadership Monitor Issue 76, Summer 2023, June 1,2023 [https://www.prcleader.org/76-swaine]


Abstract:
As the United States and China continue to clash over the contentious Taiwan issue, the likelihood of serious diplomatic and military crises between Washington and Beijing is poised to grow in the years ahead. Tendencies to overreact on both sides, reinforced by their deepening mutual hostility and suspicion, could make a dangerous escalation more likely in a crisis. It is increasingly crucial for Washington and Beijing to possess more reliable and effective bilateral crisis management mechanisms and procedures that can help them avoid crises and prevent escalation when crises occur. Despite some progress over the years, the U.S.-China crisis management system remains largely fragile and insufficient. The existing limits and deficiencies stem from a broad array of factors in Chinese and American crisis management views, approaches, and practices that drive both sides to engage in less credible and often escalatory behavior before and during a crisis.
 
Michael Swaine tries his hand at both-sides-ism.

Anyone who has worked on this issue of mil-to-mil knows the real reason is because the CCP is not interested in "bilateral crisis management mechanisms" because for the most part, they feel uncertainty works in their favor.

the one time the Chinese picked up the DTL was when THEY were scared that Trump was gonna do an October surprise via an attack.
 
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