Armed Forces Branch Structure

JA Boomer

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A topic that I have been interested in for a long time.

If you were to completely reorganizing a military (without existing institutional bias) or start a new national military (yes, fairy-tale land), how would you organize it? Primary in respect to the administrative/training role of the branches and not related to how forces are deployed or operationally commanded.

-Do you think the US military has it figured pretty well with it's six branches?
-Could amphibious assault be better served by giving marine aviation to the navy and the army fielding marine divisions?
-Environmental branches like the Canadian Forces, where for instance the air force owns all aircraft?
-Should the army own the airspace (and airplanes) above its battle space like the US Navy does?
-Some other arrangement?

Basically I'm looking for ideas on what the optimal armed service branch setup would be for a military, which may differ based on the size of military of course.

Curious to get everyone's opinion. I have never served, but have a deep respect for the military and an interest in their equipment and organization. Plus a touch of OCD which drives me to find the "best" way to do something.
 
There is a lot of culture involved. For the British cultured, our home unit is the regiment (ex PPCLI). For the Americans, it is the division (82bd Airborne). For the Soviets/Chinese, it is the army (1st Moscow Crack Army).
 
1. Leave amphibious assault to the Marines. It is a core competency and what they are best configured for.

2. Fixed wing aviation is not and Army competency and has not been after 1945. The Army needs to concentrate on rotary wing and if anything improve the anti ballistic missile capabilities to it forces.

3. Space Force is an idiocy and should be a Unified Command under SECDEF/CJCS...just like US Transportation Command, US Special Operations Command, etc. Doesn't need it's own separate branch. It will lead to wasteful redundancies.

4. Air Force needs to concentrate on strategic, theater & tactical fixed wing, to include space operations.

Also keep in mind we have to deal with Title 10, US Code. All missions are baked into that and come from it...i.e., the Army always has the responsibility to build, develop and operate the theater of operations. That is why there are a LOT of Army force structure tied up in higher level units, mostly in the Reserves.
 
1. Leave amphibious assault to the Marines. It is a core competency and what they are best configured for.

2. Fixed wing aviation is not and Army competency and has not been after 1945. The Army needs to concentrate on rotary wing and if anything improve the anti ballistic missile capabilities to it forces.

3. Space Force is an idiocy and should be a Unified Command under SECDEF/CJCS...just like US Transportation Command, US Special Operations Command, etc. Doesn't need it's own separate branch. It will lead to wasteful redundancies.

4. Air Force needs to concentrate on strategic, theater & tactical fixed wing, to include space operations.

Also keep in mind we have to deal with Title 10, US Code. All missions are baked into that and come from it...i.e., the Army always has the responsibility to build, develop and operate the theater of operations. That is why there are a LOT of Army force structure tied up in higher level units, mostly in the Reserves.

So Albany, you think the US branch system is pretty close to ideal for that size of armed forces? Despite all the history and institution bias that got them to this point?

I confess I'm not sure how much inefficiency is baked into the US system where for instance five branches operate aircraft (three of them operating fix wing tactical aircraft).

One of the more interesting comments I've heard is that fix wing tactical aviation should be moved back under the Army. This would allow them to control the air above their battle space in a similar manner to how the Navy trains and operates to control on, under, and above the surface of the ocean.

I couldn't agree more with you about the Space Force, right now it should be handled the same as Cyber Command.

Everything seems to stem from Title 10, I will have to brush up on that.
 
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1. Fixed wing aircraft are NOT one size fits all. What some see as redundancies actually is application of core competencies. Air Force fixed wing is to gain and maintain air supremacy as well as to engage in strategic bombing, provide tactical air support to ground forces and provide theater level intelligence. Navy fixed wing is meant to project power forward across the globe. A carrier is 5 acre of sovereign US territory which can go anywhere in the globe and react to situations. The type of training and operations Naval Aviators get are completely different than USAF pilots and are not interchangeable. They provide air coverage to all operations to include amphibious operations. Marine air is purely to provide direct air support to engaged Marine and other ground forces. Their task is to get the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) ashore and sustain them there. This is why they have integrated rotary and fixed wing assets. USN/USMC squadrons can operate from land bases but USAF cannot operate from carriers.

2. US Army aviation has a completely different mission. It is almost exclusively rotary wing and is dedicated to troop lift, antiarmor and maneuver support in support of the ground commander's mission. Each Army division has its own combat aviation brigade. Those assets are his...no one elses. The corps commander cannot take them away from them. The corps has it's own aviation brigade (2 in fact) to conduct corps level aviation tasks which are outside of the divisions. The Marines can augment these but not replace. Since the 1950s this has been a core competency of the Army. The AIr FOrce cannot meet this need, especially as it has a major responsibility within the Nuclear Triad.

3. Amphibious operations is a very niche task best left to the USMC. While the US Army had a massive amount of expertise in amphibious assault in WW 2 that is in our history. It would take a massive investment in blood and treasure which would be a total waste. If the Army needs to make a forced landing on a hostile shore it would be done with an airborne assault on an airfield by an airborne brigade combat team augmented by Rangers and Special Forces. Follow on forces are flown in and reinforce. This mission is going to be near a port if needed and follow on forces flow through the court. The theater commander would have forces from across all Services dedicated for each part of their mission based on their core competencies.

4. The concept of inefficiency is really an outdated term. There are some areas of overlap but that has really shrunk over the last decades. For instance in Astan there are Army, Navy & Air Force medical facilities. But they are aligned regionally where they each specialize. Air Force pararescue units will evacuate Army/Marine/NATO casualties to the facility best postured to handle the care needed. If the wounded needs to evacuate them they are cared for by an Air Force aeromedical evacuation squadron and flown out in a medevac configured USAF C-17 to Germany, where they are taken to the US Army's Landstuhl Regional Medical Center right next to the USAF's Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany. If they are a burn victim they go to Brooke Army Medical Center in SaN Antonio regardless of service. From there they go to a service hospital in the States. And why does each service have their own hospitals? Cause the medical personnel rotate from there to the field.

5. FYI we have streamlined a lot. The US Army buys the majority of the tactical ground equipment for the Marines. All US military cooks and ground vehicle mechanics are trained here at FT Lee, VA, along with air load training (which is why I have a mock up of a C-130 & C-17 right outside my office.

So I think we just about have it right.
 
i'd also mention that "inefficiency" only makes sense in the context of the overall mission.

for instance, the entire structure of the US Cold War military was designed with "inefficiency" baked in, so that the military could rapidly expand in the event of WWIII. and we'd avoid the enormous growing pains that the US military went through in WWI and WWII.
 
i'd also mention that "inefficiency" only makes sense in the context of the overall mission.

for instance, the entire structure of the US Cold War military was designed with "inefficiency" baked in, so that the military could rapidly expand in the event of WWIII. and we'd avoid the enormous growing pains that the US military went through in WWI and WWII.

Yup...a rapid expansion for an international war was not something baked into the American Defense psyche until post World War II. Also what some see as inefficiencies were redundancies in order to survive and win in an NBC environment.

Also we had a lot of redundancy 2005-2015 to meet the requirements of rapid rotations to Iraq & Afghanistan.
 
This article looks at the opportunity, and the reopening of the debate over roles and missions of the current defense structure, that the creation of the Space Force gives the US.

Two sentences from the last paragraph give a summary.

"Defense and service departments are temporary constructs, reflecting national choices that are therefore worthy of continual examination as they often lose sight of their beginnings."
In theory our service departments are indeed "temporary constructs." To the people in them their service branch becomes part of their ethos and self image. On an individual level it becomes hard to see that what you put anywhere from three to forty years of your life into can be "temporary." At a congressional level the money that comes in for whatever activity happens to be going on in the district is a strong incentive to make that particular activity....... as permanent as possible.

"The first U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, stated in 1947: “Defense organization is driven by emotion, not by intelligence.” He could have added that sentimentality — worshipping prophets and false narratives — when creating an organization defines its culture and hinders its ability to find wisdom from the repository of experience while thinking of how to address and respond to genuine questions and challenges."
The power of emotion over reason.


LInk-
https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/space-force-creation-warrants-revisiting-defense-unification/
 
The very first thing ANY reformer/scholar/writer needs to do when discussing defense reorganization is read and know the US Code. Specific roles and responsibilities for various services and the reserves are laid out in US Code. If you don't do that you are doomed to failure.

Also there may be emotion involved but it's really kind of hard to argue that except some blended responsibility over space the services as now configured pretty much match to core competencies and do not really provide redundancies.

I have heard that the Army should divest itself of it's small boat fleet. Except the Army has the Title 10 responsibility to provide theater level sustainment...and those resources are used to achieve that mission in littoral areas. They are not for assaulting distant shores.
 
I sincerely hope the Army does not fall for the siren song of divesting it's logistics fleet. What those ships do has no counterpart in current Navy practice, requirement or ethos. Other than adding hulls to superficially increase the size of the Navy I struggle to see why the sea service would want these assets.

Agreed, there are not many redundancies. An example, airplanes. There can be questions as to why the Air Force and Navy, not to mention the Marines, seemingly mimic each other in the aspect of each having various types of planes. Why the Navy and Army have Logistic ships. (They float, are big, and colored gray….. other than that there is little in common) Why the Army and Marines have infantry. (The Iraq and Afghanistan wars, hell, Vietnam as well, did the Marines no favors in confusing the American people as to what the difference is between the Army and the Marines) As clear as the reasons for these service branches may be to this board…… they are not necessarily so clear to the average citizen. This may be the crux of why the Space Force is generating the conversations that are happening.

The Army’s role in theater level sustainment is mind boggling. It is the only service with the capability to conduct the theater sustainment mission on a large and enduring scale. As a planner thinking about theater opening, the port and terminal operations involved, the RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration), theater specific training, all the Common User Logistics (CULT) assets involved to the joint and if required the international force……… its statutory requirements are considerable. Mortuary Affairs, Bulk fuel support to the Joint Force, Bulk water, Mail, Exchange Services in theater, all requirements enshrined in the Title 10 code, which must be accomplished. Army Materiel Command, Surface Deployment Distribution Command, Veterinary services, a host of others under the Army umbrella. Indeed, one of the reasons the Marines can be so “lean and mean” is the Army Title 10 requirements to support them in any extended campaign. This is no knock against the Marines, they do what they do very well because they can concentrate on exactly that... well... with the understanding that currently there is experimentation going on as they redefine some of their roles and missions. Subject for another thread.
 
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I sincerely hope the Army does not fall for the siren song of divesting it's logistics fleet. What those ships do has no counterpart in current Navy practice, requirement or ethos. Other than adding hulls to superficially increase the size of the Navy I struggle to see why the sea service would want these assets.

Agreed, there are not many redundancies. An example, airplanes. There can be questions as to why the Air Force and Navy, not to mention the Marines, seemingly mimic each other in the aspect of each having various types of planes. Why the Navy and Army have Logistic ships. (They float, are big, and colored gray….. other than that there is little in common) Why the Army and Marines have infantry. (The Iraq and Afghanistan wars, hell, Vietnam as well, did the Marines no favors in confusing the American people as to what the difference is between the Army and the Marines) As clear as the reasons for these service branches may be to this board…… they are not necessarily so clear to the average citizen. This may be the crux of why the Space Force is generating the conversations that are happening.

The Army’s role in theater level sustainment is mind boggling. It is the only service with the capability to conduct the theater sustainment mission on a large and enduring scale. As a planner thinking about theater opening, the port and terminal operations involved, the RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration), theater specific training, all the Common User Logistics (CULT) assets involved to the joint and if required the international force……… its statutory requirements are considerable. Mortuary Affairs, Bulk fuel support to the Joint Force, Bulk water, Mail, Exchange Services in theater, all requirements enshrined in the Title 10 code, which must be accomplished. Army Materiel Command, Surface Deployment Distribution Command, Veterinary services, a host of others under the Army umbrella. Indeed, one of the reasons the Marines can be so “lean and mean” is the Army Title 10 requirements to support them in any extended campaign. This is no knock against the Marines, they do what they do very well because they can concentrate on exactly that... well... with the understanding that currently there is experimentation going on as they redefine some of their roles and missions. Subject for another thread.

What this guy said!
 
This is what you need the Marine Corps for:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sharp_Edge

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Eastern_Exit


Back before we got bogged down in the Middle East there was a Marine Battalion Landing team/MEU in/near every hot spot in the world.
We sat off the coast to let the players know that the US was watching with interest. We conducted Embassy reinforcements and evacuations, we did NEOs. Most of which no one ever heard a thing about. You can land a Marine unit on some far off shore and it doesn't make a lot of waves. Tell people the US Army just put troops in those same places and things go crazy.

We quit doing that and became another land army, now we want to be modern coast watchers and a raid force (Crazy)

Need to get back to doing the things the cold war Marine Corps did (put out brush fires).

And with that as our core mission the Corps could go down to 2 Divs
 
Tell people the US Army just put troops in those same places and things go crazy.

Yeah, we tend to do this by infiltrating SOF then dropping in a Ranger Battalion and Airborne BCT.

Hard to keep that off of Reuters/BBC/RFI...
 
Well, the Arctic Angels are coming to an Arctic theater near you.

https://www.military.com/daily-news/...ic-troops.html



Army Creating Second Paratrooper Division as Service Forges New Identity for Arctic Troops

Soldiers stationed in Alaska will soon ditch the 25th Infantry Division's "Tropic Lightning" patch and be redesignated the 11th Airborne Division, in what could be an important step in the Army's recent focus on Arctic warfare.

Army Secretary Christine Wormuth told lawmakers that the move will give units in the state a clear identity. Soldiers there currently fall under the command of U.S. Army Alaska and wear the 25th Infantry Division patch. But that division is mostly associated with units in Hawaii that train for combat in the jungle, the opposite of Alaska's mission and something leaders and junior soldiers told Military.com has been a point of confusion.

U.S. Army Alaska will be redesignated as the 11th Airborne Division this summer and issued a new patch.

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"It would be a new common sense of identity for the soldiers there," Wormuth told lawmakers on the Senate Armed Services Committee during a hearing Thursday.

Some rank-and-file troops and leaders in Alaska told Military.com they don't have the proper equipment needed to be the service's premier Arctic force. Some of that is due to its primary vehicle, the Stryker, being ineffective.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville and senior leaders in Alaska have told Military.com they are skeptical of the Stryker's capabilities in Arctic climates, mostly due to the wheeled vehicles' inability to maneuver effectively off road in the snow and not being built to operate in minus-65 degree Fahrenheit weather, the benchmark commanders in Alaska say is needed.

"We're looking at the Arctic very differently. This would give the units the confidence all of this would come together," McConville told lawmakers at Thursday's Senate hearing.

But units there are starved of other critical resources, with some soldiers telling Military.com they can't even get ripped uniforms replaced. More importantly, bases in the region have struggled to tackle a growing suicide crisis. That lack of resources has been partly blamed by some on Alaskan units not having a clear identity and thus often being forgotten about by Pentagon planners, something this change is meant to address.

The move would give the active-duty Army its third named airborne combat unit and its second paratrooper division.

The two existing airborne combat units are the 82nd Airborne Division based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which falls under XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Europe. The 101st Airborne in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, is airborne in name only; it's actually an air assault division. The Texas National Guard has the 1st Battalion, 143rd Infantry Regiment, the only conventional airborne element of the component.

Two Alaska brigade combat teams would be most impacted by the redesignation -- the 1st and 4th Brigade Combat Teams of the 25th infantry Division. The 4th is the region's paratrooper element, while the 1st is a mechanized Stryker brigade.

Those brigades would be redesignated the 1st and 2nd Brigade Combat Teams of the 11th Airborne Division. It is unclear whether the move would mean the mechanized troops would convert to paratroopers in the future.

"The Army is reviewing options to convert the [Stryker] brigade combat team at Fort Wainwright from a Stryker to an infantry unit," Lt. Col. Randee Farrell, an Army spokesperson, told Military.com. "We are in the midst of consultation with our joint partners to ensure that any potential change enhances the ability of joint force commanders to achieve their mission."

The changes are yet another move the force is making since the wind-down of the post-9/11 wars, with a shift to focus on conventional fighting and outpacing China and Russia.

Airborne capabilities haven't been truly tested on a modern battlefield but are built to insert ground troops into enemy territory and to quickly seize critical terrain or infrastructure such as airfields.

Airborne units gained famed during the invasion of Nazi-occupied France with dangerous jumps that secured key terrain for the success of the allied invasion of Normandy. That legendary battle spurred paratroopers to be the Army's elite force. While still a conventional unit, airborne troops are traditionally called upon first to deploy and are often on high-paced training schedules.

Yet those tactics were seldom part of modern wars, with the last major use of airborne capabilities being the U.S. invasion of Panama, commonly referred to as Operation Just Cause in 1989. However, there were limited uses of special operations jumps in Afghanistan and Iraq. The last -- smaller -- conventional airborne assault was in Iraq in 2003 when the 173rd Airborne Brigade seized Bashur Airfield with virtually no resistance.

The 11th Airborne Division's legacy stems from its activation in 1943 during World War II. It fought in the Pacific Theater, where two of its soldiers, Pvts. Elmer Fryar and Manuel Perez Jr., earned the Medal of Honor. The formation was later used to occupy post-war Japan.

The 11th Airborne was transformed into a training formation at Fort Campbell in 1949. In the 1960s, the division was reorganized into three air assault brigades and designated the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) when the Army was in the early stages of developing tactics using helicopters on the battlefield. The unit was disbanded in 1965, transferring its equipment and personnel to the 1st Cavalry Division.

-- Steve Beynon can be reached at [email protected]. Follow him on Twitter @StevenBeynon.
 
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The formal reflagging...and the first issuance of the Arctic tab



Army re-activates historic airborne unit, reaffirms commitment to Arctic Strategy


By Joe Lacdan, Army News ServiceJune 8, 2022
FORT WAINWRIGHT, Alaska – Several hundred Soldiers gathered in formation within the Alaskan Interior on a bright June morning Monday to take part in the activation of the 11th Airborne Division, posturing U.S. forces for strategic advantage in the harsh Arctic terrain.

The 11th Airborne Division unites about 12,000 Soldiers in Alaska under one flag, marking the first time that the Army has activated an airborne division in 70 years. During flag ceremonies Monday at Fort Wainwright and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, shortened as JBER, the Army also re-designated the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team and the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, formerly of the 25th Infantry Division, into the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Teams of the 11th Airborne, respectively.

The activation reaffirms the Army’s commitment to its recently announced Arctic Strategy, which outlines the service’s plan to equip, organize and train with partner units to establish military dominance in the region. The division will be headquartered at JBER and members will wear the unit’s distinctive blue patch with a red and white emblem with angel wings to symbolize the unit’s call sign, “Angels.”
"Wherever you go, you will be the most highly trained, disciplined and fit Arctic warfighting unit in the world; ready to fight and win," Army Chief of Staff, Gen. James C. McConville said to Soldiers at Fort Wainwright. "That is what you will do. That is who you are. We are counting on you."​
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The activation also serves another purpose. By uniting the Army units as one airborne unit, Army leaders hope the activation can ignite a greater a sense of camaraderie and enthusiasm for Soldiers serving in one of the U.S. military’s most remote and desolate locations.

In recent months, the Army’s senior leaders have met with commanders at Alaskan installations to address quality of life concerns of Soldiers. Assessments revealed that the previous unit designations did not support unit cohesion.

“Experience has told us that units that have a common unit identity is a source of pride,” McConville said during a meeting with reporters. “It’s extremely important. And the history of a unit and the patch matter.”

McConville said the Soldiers of the 11th Airborne Division will be equipped with cold weather gear within the next 1 to 2 years. He added that the unit will serve as the Army’s leading experts for Arctic military operations.

McConville said that the Stryker Brigade Combat Team based at Fort Wainwright will transition to become a more mobile, infantry-based brigade combat team bolstered with a stronger air assault capability and the skills to maneuver effectively in extreme cold weather environments.

McConville added that the Army plans to move the armored Strykers out of Alaska by the end of the summer as it continues the acquisition process of Cold Weather, All-Terrain Vehicles or CATVs.

The 11th Airborne Division originally played a critical role during World War II and the Vietnam War. The Army credits the unit with the amphibious assault landing at Luzon, Philippines, and eventually helped secure the liberation of Manila from Japanese forces.

“The 11th Airborne Division has a storied history of valor during World War II in the Pacific and also has a proud history of innovation,” McConville said. “So we expect them to live up to the legacy … We expect them to be masters of their craft in Arctic warfighting and extreme cold weather and high altitude and terrain. We expect them to develop innovative ways of operating in this environment.”

The Army now has a strategically located unit that can quickly deploy to any region, especially those in cold weather climates such as Nepal and India.

“Their focus will be on dismounted and Arctic mobility and capabilities of sustained operation in the Arctic [and] extreme cold weather,” said 11th Airborne Division Commander Maj. Gen. Brian Eifler. “In addition, they will providing those capabilities in other cold weather environments.”

Eifler added that U.S. Army Pacific Commander Gen. Charles A. Flynn traveled to Nepal to meet with Nepalese leaders on coordinating more training opportunities with U.S. Army infantry brigade combat teams. Eifler said that includes the possibility of taking part in a joint expedition on Mount Everest.

Related links:

U.S. Army Alaska - 11th Airborne Division

U.S. Army Pacific

Army News Service

ARNEWS Archives
 
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