An interesting thread, not without presumptions and personal feelings, to be sure - the question asks more than just "did you read that book".
As a former crewmember of NEW JERSEY (1968-69) and an acquaintance of Rusty's thru correspondence and phone calls over 25 years, I would like to address several of the comments made in this thread to this point with a bit of historical reference that may help understand the state of IOWA class ships at the time of the accident (1989).
First, a point of reference from the 1960's - NEW JERSEY was picked as the ship to be re-commissioned for Vietnam Service due to her more extended electronics upgrades in the mid-50s than the other 3 ships had not received. While WISCONSIN was probably in a better material condition (she was also the newest of the 4 ships with less sea time on her "clock"), she had experienced a fire in her wardroom prior to decommissioning in 1958 (I am using my memory here, so this I can't verify as I'm not where my reference materials reside) and the Navy did not wish to have to re-do the damage from that event. The crew was, to a certain extent, all volunteer - men who WANTED to be there. Only after our 1968-69 Westpac Cruise were personnel transferred to/from the ship as they would have been in any other fleet asset. We had one hang-fire event in Turret 2 (center gun) during the cruise and it was handled according to regs - the projectile successfully fired off the starboard side with a 1 half-charge bag of powder by a single GMC in the turret. We de-commissioned the ship in 100 days in Bremerton, WA and the ship was in that condition for 12 years until being towed to Long Beach in 1981 for recomm. She was, once again, the lead ship due to the obvious modernization in the mid-60s. With only one battleship planned for this service, our prospective CO, Capt. J. Edward Snyder was able to hand pick the lots of 16" projectiles and powder from the naval magazines and as such, he was able to eliminate to a certain extent problems that he perceived with various lots and kept them off the ship. He was a former battleship officer with extensive bag gun expertise and education. Therefore, we went into that commission with several factors in our favor which the subsequent re-commissioning's in the '80s were not able to duplicate (or possibly those officers without the prior battleship experience either weren't aware of or simply had no interest in looking into).
NEW JERSEY was modernized at Long Beach Naval Shipyard as was MISSOURI - our own Rusty Landgraff was involved fully with both ships and had a vast wealth of knowledge (which has been properly noted above) to lend to these projects which, I think, gave those two ships in particular a slight advantage - also, being handled in a Navy yard, I think they got a better treatment than did IOWA and WISCONSIN at Pascagoula, LA - a private shipyard. Keep in mind that times had changed and in the '80s the Navy had to be able to prove to Congress that they were passing the work around to keep work going on and while it would probably have been better to have had the work done "in house", that wasn't the case. I was present for the re-commissioning of NEW JERSEY in Dec. 1982 and went aboard later that afternoon - a different ship than I had served in, to be sure. Same, but different.
OK, so I've also read Schwoebel's Explosion Aboard The IOWA and have also had extended conversation with Rear Adm. J. Edward Snyder regarding the IOWA explosion; it was the main topic of our (he and I and our wives) Friday night "all nighter" discussion at the 1995 NEW JERSEY vets reunion in Norfolk, VA. I was curious as to his explanation and whether or not the Navy reached out to him in the subsequent hearings. On that item I am not sure that they did (or wanted his input), but I DO know what his thoughts were regarding the event. I would agree 100% with his feelings that the accident was no more (or less) than a simple mechanical over-ram of the last bag of powder - the one that has the detonator patch sewn into the end. That patch was broken and the retraction of the ram caused a spark....the rest is history. This, seems to me to be a completely logical explanation as to the cause of the event. We all know how this all played out officially and in the media - a sad ending for 47 crewmen.
Regarding the replies above:
1) The statement regarding IOWA's material status at the time of the explosion is presented without documentation, etc. - simply an opinion - one that I don't share. NEW JERSEY, on her last cruise in 1990, returned to Long Beach on one screw - she WAS in a materially critical condition but hers due to the extent of actual use and at sea wear and tear. Without seeing the actual upkeep/maintenance logs of these ships, it is hard to say one way or another as to a particular ship's material condition at any given point in their life. Maintenance is done within that ship's budget and therein lies the problem. Scheduling and mission also play into this, as well.
2) The statement regarding the Navy's opinion as to the main 16" battery being secondary to the missile systems is something I've never heard before and would ignore as naïve without some sort of factual backup of support for that opinion. One of the main reasons for bringing those particular ships back into the fleet was for their ability to counter the Soviet large cruiser threat at the time and these ships more than accomplished that.
3) The deficiencies in IOWA and WISCONSIN (as noted above) were addressed as I believe Rusty noted in his book. The four IOWAs were NOT modernized identically but similarly and this is noticeable by even a casual viewer - there were other differences within each ship that would not be modified at all. We (NEW JERSEY) had received a small digital computer from Naval Development Labs in 168 that was never duplicated on the other three ships. It was located in Main Battery Plot - I'll have to check and see if it's still there the next time I'm on board. It augmented the Ford Mk. 1 Main Battery Mechanical Computer.
4) Whether admitted in public or not, IOWA was the main battery "Guinea pig" for the 16" guns. As such, she did carry out firing drills with newer shells being developed for lighter weight and much longer range. While I can't confirm this, it is my personal belief that when the explosion took place the ship was doing firing drills and testing that would have fit into this scenario.
At the Morehead City Seafood Festival several years ago I ran into a former IOWA crewman who was one of the first in the fire brigade to get into the lower barbette of Turret 2 - we ended up talking about that for 2 hours - he saw it all and his memories will last a life time. It was not a pleasant reminiscence for two former battleship sailors. I was surprised he still had his sanity. That accident COULD have been prevented.
To say that the Navy didn't put any resources into 16" gun program etc. is, once again, an opinion without basis. The fact that we are dealing with an all-volunteer force that was, to a certain extent, a more "diverse" force than when I was serving would more than likely cause problems we didn't have to deal with in years before; at least, we dealt with them differently! The fact remains that the gun crews were not a coherent team on IOWA and this cannot be blamed on the equipment - put the blame where it belongs - personnel policy, training, proper guidance, and above all - an officer corp. that is dedicated to the ship and crew they serve in - not themselves! I'll leave it there.
A ship is only as good as it's crew can (or is able) maintain it, operate it, and serve in it. Leadership, above all comes from the top and in this case, was totally lacking. When we put NEW JERSEY into storage in 1969, we did so in 100 days - something unheard of at the time (usual decomm was 6+ months). We left her in good shape for the next crew/commissioning. I have been working on a 1/200 scale model of NEW JERSEY for the past 5 years and in my research I've come across a lot of information regarding all the IOWAs - most informative and factual, some not so much. I find it always best to note an opinion with factual backup before stating it publically because it is always subject to other's questioning and scrutiny.
So, to answer the original question "have I read Glimpse of Hell?" - no, I have not! I do hope this provides a better understanding of the IOWA class in recent times.
