2022-2024 Russo-Ukrainian War

Mithridates

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gets no help from either Turkey or Poland? Biden appears to have ruled out a role for NATO air units in support of Ukrainian ground forces.
 
As of today there are currently 92,000 Russian troops at the eastern border, give or take a few more thousand volunteers from the pro-Russian rebel factions. This is not even nearly enough to make a major offensive push into Ukraine, never mind occupy ground. Even if the Russians decide to go all-in and manage to occupy Kiev, the ensuing insurgency will deplete the Kremlin's blood and treasure to a degree not seen since Afghanistan.
 
As of today there are currently 92,000 Russian troops at the eastern border, give or take a few more thousand volunteers from the pro-Russian rebel factions. This is not even nearly enough to make a major offensive push into Ukraine, never mind occupy ground. Even if the Russians decide to go all-in and manage to occupy Kiev, the ensuing insurgency will deplete the Kremlin's blood and treasure to a degree not seen since Afghanistan.
???

The Russians hold the C4ISR advantage. They can run circles around Ukrainian formations. What this essentially means is that the Russians can destroy the Ukrainian forces threatening the DNR and LNR. We're not giving the Ukrainians anything close to what they need to repulse the Russians. Sure the Ukrainians can bleed the Russians white but not before yielding ground to the Russians.
 
Even if the Russians decide to go all-in and manage to occupy Kiev, the ensuing insurgency will deplete the Kremlin's blood and treasure to a degree not seen since Afghanistan.
Not to be a Debbie Downer, but the Wikipedia article only shows 5,660 Russian dead in the desultory back-and-forth over the Donbass. Maybe this time, it's different, but the Ukrainians haven't exactly done much to the Russians. Of course, the Afghans took 1m dead in the course of evicting the Russians, so you could argue that the Ukrainian exchange ratio is way better.
 
???

The Russians hold the C4ISR advantage. They can run circles around Ukrainian formations. What this essentially means is that the Russians can destroy the Ukrainian forces threatening the DNR and LNR. We're not giving the Ukrainians anything close to what they need to repulse the Russians. Sure the Ukrainians can bleed the Russians white but not before yielding ground to the Russians.

Sir I agree, my point was that in a conventional war, the Russians would pummel the hell out of the Ukranians (maybe even make it to Kiev?) and overall dominate the conventional war. However, the ensuing insurgency would bleed them dry to a point where it is simply not worth the price of holding that captured ground.

Col. you may have a differing view on this but IMO the adage "Deterrence is not Warfighting" holds true for the Ukrainians. They don't have to match the Russians toe-to-toe, they just have to present enough of a force to convince the Russians that the cost wouldn't be worth it.
 
Not to be a Debbie Downer, but the Wikipedia article only shows 5,660 Russian dead in the desultory back-and-forth over the Donbass. Maybe this time, it's different, but the Ukrainians haven't exactly done much to the Russians. Of course, the Afghans took 1m dead in the course of evicting the Russians, so you could argue that the Ukrainian exchange ratio is way better.

The current conflict in the Donbass would significantly pale in comparison to a larger occupation of Ukraine as a whole. That occupation will not have the benefit of a majority population that is amenable to Kremlin rule.
 
thought I saw greater than 100k a couple weeks ago

I'm going off of the Reuters estimates, but I could see it being even higher as the Kremlin deploys more troops, or maybe even if they include "volunteers" from the rebel groups in the estimate.
 
Russia Demands ‘Urgent’ U.S. Talks, Warning of ‘Military Response’ to NATO Activity
In its list of demands published Friday, Russia demanded that the U.S. not establish any new military bases in ex-Soviet countries and that NATO guarantee to block these states' future memberships.

Russia also wants NATO to abandon all military activities in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus region and Central Asia.

Additionally, Russia wants NATO to pledge not to deploy troops in former-communist member states Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltics without Moscow’s consent.
 
"Give us this security guarantee."
"Not on your life buster."
"Allright then, we invade. What are you going to do about it?"
"We'll negotiate to try and stop you invading due to no one being willing to send our troops or military equipment into harm's way, but if you don't accept our negotiations we'll throw at you financial sanctions we have proven multiple times in multiple conflicts do nothing."

(Aren't the Russians still on financial sanctions from Crimea 7 years ago?)

Like I said elsewhere yesterday: if some countries want Ukraine in NATO, a mutual defense organization where an attack on one is an attack on all and they would be obligated to come to their defense if Ukraine was attacked, no one is coming to Ukraine's help here when such aid is voluntary. That's a pretty clear signal on the likelihood of any NATO membership prospects for Ukraine. If NATO does enlarge however and the Western and Central European attitude of run away from any conflict still holds, NATO is getting setup to get Rio Treaty'd in the future of state inside NATO is attacked and everyone ignores the mutual defense clause in the name of "sucks for you, but it serves the greater peace".
 
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Report: Russia now has 265,000 troops near Ukraine border
Russia now has about 265,000 troops stationed within 250 miles of its border with Ukraine, according to a new assessment of troop movements by Ukrainian Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Oleksiy Danilov.

Danilov revealed the assessment of Russian military activity during a visit to the Ivano-Frankivsk region, the Ukrainian state-run National News Agency of Ukraine (also known as Ukrinform) reported on Wednesday.

Danilov said of the 265,000 Russian troops, 122,000 are located within 200 km (125 miles) of the Russian border with Ukraine. Another 143,500 troops are located between 200 and 400 km (250 miles) of the Ukrainian border.

Danilov’s assessment represents an increase in Russia’s troop presence in recent days. For weeks, Russian troops have been massing near the Ukraine border. Until now, assessments have put the number of Russian troops near Ukraine’s border at between 80,000 and 110,000.
 
Putin threatens military action if NATO rejects Russian ultimatum

President Vladimir Putin said Sunday that if NATO does not provide binding guarantees to curtail military deployments in Eastern Europe and to bar Ukraine from membership in the alliance, he will be forced to consider a variety of options, including a military response.

Putin's demands are contained in a pair of draft treaties Russia submitted to NATO earlier this month.

POLITICO reported that Putin, whose remarks aired on Russian state TV Sunday, expressed concerns about the possibility of missiles being deployed in Ukraine if the former Soviet satellite joins NATO.

"We have nowhere to retreat," Putin said. "They have pushed us to a line that we can't cross. They have taken it to the point where we simply must tell them; 'Stop!'" When asked about the exact nature of the response he was proposing, Putin said it would "depend on what proposals our military experts submit to me."

NATO is unlikely to agree to Putin's terms. "NATO member countries decide who is a member of NATO, not Russia," White House press secretary Jen Psaki told reporters, according to The Washington Post. President Biden has threatened increased sanctions if Russia invades Ukraine.

The Russian military announced Saturday that more than 10,000 Russian troops had returned to their bases after a month of drilling on the Ukrainian border, Reuters reports. Despite this reduction, Russia still has tens of thousands of troops stationed on the Ukrainian border, and intelligence analysts continue to warn that an invasion could be imminent.

Russian state media frequently refers to Ukraine as "a colony of the West" and smears Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, without evidence, as a drug addict, according to BBC. Over 14,000 people have been killed in fighting between Ukraine's military and Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine since 2014.
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Sounds like pure bluff to me....but I've been known to make mistakes...from time to time.:confused:
 
Tend to agree. It will be at least a decade, probably two before Ukraine has its game up to spec for NATO membership (or for that matter EU membership). There's a whole raft of reforms needed, not least of which is, as you just noted attention to the woeful levels of corruption in the country. Putin should be gone by then so we get to see what the next Tsar makes of it all.
 
A Former Supreme Commander of NATO on What Putin's Up to in the Ukraine
For the past several months, Ukraine and its western partners have been watching Russia methodically build up a powerful force of over 100,000 soldiers on their shared border. While he claims not to intend an invasion, President Vladimir Putin has several objectives. He wants to appear strong and decisive to his domestic base; divide the U.S. and NATO over the response to a potential strike; impress his allies, especially President Xi Jinping of China; prevent Ukraine from joining NATO and the E.U., tying them Russia’s sphere of influence; and make the Biden administration appear weak and indecisive in the run-up to the 2021 midterms—especially after the U.S. failed to support former ally Afghanistan.

For the U.S., NATO, and the world’s democracies, this is a challenging moment. Above all, the Biden Administration wants to show that it can be relied upon to support a fellow democracy. Ukraine, while not a formal NATO member, has been a loyal partner to NATO and sent troops on NATO missions—and they desperately want to join the Alliance. Putin insists that Russia be afforded a veto of any further NATO expansion, and also wants military troops removed from former members of the Cold War Warsaw Pact—which includes many current allies like Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and others. NATO cannot afford to give him such sway.

This is a significant confrontation, and the stakes are high. How should we think about the challenges on the edge of Europe, and above all what will Putin do next?

When I was Supreme Allied Commander at NATO, I spent a fair amount of time looking at Russian military options around the periphery of Europe. I had taken command of NATO military operations after Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, which resulted in the conquest of two provinces of that small, western aligned democracy. It was a straight forward offensive attack against the tiny nation of under four million—Russian tanks, troops, bombs, fighter jet, infantry, and artillery strikes provided the heavy punch.

A few years later, Putin decided to invade a much-larger neighbor, Ukraine. In that case, he decided to use what has come to be known as “hybrid warfare,” a witches’ brew of non-uniformed soldiers (the so-called “little green men,”), high end special forces, sophisticated offensive cyber against command centers and the electric grid, social media disinformation, and amphibious operations. These relatively unconventional tactics were combined with more traditional elements—hence the sobriquet “hybrid”—with effect in 2014.

Here we are eight years later wondering what approach Putin will embrace if he does decide to invade Ukraine in the new year, perhaps as soon as late January as the ground freezes hard to support heavy armor and transport.

Putin and his generals are tactically innovative, and have a variety of options in front of them. They are a blooded army with commanders experienced in a wide variety of combat scenarios, most recently in the ongoing civil war in Syria and of course during their engagement in Ukraine itself. The combat in Ukraine continues both overtly (in occupied Crimea) and covertly (supporting a virulent separatist movement in the Donbass region in the southeast of the country, where 15,000 have been killed over the past decade).

In 2022, the first option they will consider would be simple: a highly traditional blitzkrieg, much as was used against Georgia. This will require not only the 100,000 troops currently on the border, but an additional 75,000 who would “fall in” on prepositioned equipment that the U.S. showed the world in intelligence photos around Christmas.

This approach would include heavy air strikes against Ukrainian command and control, artillery bombardment, strikes from naval vessels in the Black Sea, and surface-to-surface missiles. All of this would be accompanied by offensive military cyberattacks against Ukrainian defensive weapons systems, communication capabilities, and possibly against parts of the nation’s electric grid.

Helicopters would move shock troops forward fast, probably behind Ukrainian front lines. They would confuse and destabilize Ukrainian logistics and higher command authorities. Heavy infantry units would then cross the weakened border, and thrust deep into Ukraine, probably as far as the Dnieper River. The ethnically Russian southeast of Ukraine (especially Donetsk, Luhansk, and Mariupol) would be consolidated, creating a “land bridge” connecting Russia with Crimea, and grabbing another significant check of Black Sea waterfront.

At that point, Putin would pause, assess the situation, and decide whether to push forward to Kiev in order to effect regime change before pulling his troops back. He would likely go on to actually annex the southeast of the country, support a puppet regime in Kiev, and wait for the response of the west. This is the riskiest but also the highest payoff for the Kremlin, and is probably a 20% probability—not likely, but uncomfortable to contemplate.

A second option for the Kremlin would be to try and create a layer of deniability by using a strictly unconventional approach. This would be more akin to what he did in 2014 in Ukraine, and would include a massive cyberattack on the Ukrainian society, knocking out everything from gas stations to ATMs to rail and air systems. Using covert Russian forces already implanted in the Donbass region, he could unleash attacks across Ukraine—car bombs, mysterious criminal activities, assassination of military and civilian leaders. Social media would be central, discrediting the current government, documenting fictitious “massacres” of ethnic Russians in Ukrainian dominated sectors, and undermining confidence of the society as a whole.

When western critics decried his actions, he would call it “fake news” and the Ukrainian version of the “big lie,” saying that Russian engagement is key to maintaining stability on the shared border. This is a hyped-up version of what he is already doing, and increasing these tactics would make it harder for NATO to consider Ukraine for membership, one of his key objectives. It would also generate public support within Russia for his actions (protecting “Russian patriots” living in Ukraine) without the costs of a full-scale invasion. This seems a more likely approach than an all-out invasion, and poses less risk to Moscow. This is roughly a 40% probability and the likely approach Putin will take if talks in mid-January do not accomplish his objectives.

Finally, he is hoping he can achieve what he wants via the talks which will unfold this week—U.S.-Russia on 10 Jan., Russia-NATO on 12 Jan., and at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on 13 Jan. Putin wants assurances that Ukraine will never be allowed to join NATO; that NATO nations along the long Russian / NATO border will never be permitted to host significant NATO military forces; and that sanctions imposed on him over the 2014 invasion, the Skirpal nerve attacks in the U.K., and the attempted assassination of his political opponent Alexander Navalny will be lifted.

While the chances of achieving those sweeping objectives at the negotiating table appear low-to-impossible, he might be willing to settle for something less than everything he is demanding. His minimum is probably a federalist structure in Ukraine that gives real autonomy to the Russian speaking southeast of the country; at least a tacit acceptance of the annexation of Crimea; an under-the-table recognition that Ukraine (and Georgia) will not join NATO; and some sanctions relief that would increase over time.

If the west gives him some of what he seeks, Putin may be willing to put both the massive invasion and the amped up hybrid approach on hold, at least for the moment. He also has his eye on elections in the U.S., both this fall and more importantly in 2024. The idea of demonstrating weakness on the part of the Biden team is very appealing to him, and he may judge that he should hold back until that part of his strategy can have maximal effect—thus improving the changes he will accept some kind of negotiated outcome this round. Thus this option comes in around 40% as well, about equal to the chances of the hybrid approach.

The U.S. and NATO should do all we can to use diplomacy to defuse the situation and avoid giving Putin an easy and obvious win. That means ensuring the west in general and NATO in particular speak with one voice on the level and lethality of economic sanctions that would be applied if Putin crosses another sovereign border in anger. We should also use the next month or two to rush defensive but lethal weapons to Ukraine, which would serve as a further deterrent. Nord Stream 2 represents real leverage at this point, and looking at some sanctions relief could be possible—but not while Russia effectively has a dagger at the throat of Ukraine.

As talks unfold the Biden administration is signaling a willingness to provide some strategic flexibility. This could include reducing the capability of NATO anti-ballistic missile systems in Poland and Romania; discussing balancing troop levels between Russia and the west in NATO nations on Russia’s border; and reducing military exercises on both sides. But there is a great deal of animosity between the sides.

Putin and his generals like maintaining the west off-balance, something they have done to good effect over the past decade. One thing I learned studying their approach to warfare at the SACEUR is how much they like to preserve optionality. Count on the Russian President to threaten the massive attack, see what he can get at the table in January that can go in his pocket, but be back with the hybrid approach as the year goes along. Unfortunately, this is a long-simmering crisis that will come closer and closer to a full boil at different times as the year unfolds.
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LTC(R) Alex Vindman last evening on NPR's All Things Considered on the likelihood of further Russian intervention in Ukraine.

Love him her hate him but he is one of our country's foremost experts on Ukraine, Russia and other countries of the old Warsaw Pact


https://www.npr.org/2022/01/10/1071896624/vindman-discusses-u-s-options-on-russia-ukraine-tensions

Vindman discusses U.S. options on Russia-Ukraine tensions


NPR's Mary Louise Kelly talks to Alexander Vindman, former director for European affairs at the United States National Security Council, about how the U.S. might deter Russia from invading Ukraine.

MARY LOUISE KELLY, HOST:

Is Russia about to invade Ukraine? No one knows for sure including, possibly, Vladimir Putin himself. The U.S. and Russia talked about it for nearly eight hours in Geneva today. And NATO members will meet with Russia on Wednesday. Our next guest has thoughts on how the U.S. might deter Putin and help encourage a prosperous democratic Ukraine to boot. Alexander Vindman is a former Ukraine expert on President Trump's National Security Council.

Colonel Vindman, welcome. Good to speak with you again.

ALEXANDER VINDMAN: Yes, good to speak to you again, too.

KELLY: So, as you know, the U.S. is warning of maximum consequences for Russia if it attacks Ukraine - economic and otherwise. You aren't convinced that is enough to protect Ukraine. Why not?

VINDMAN: Well, maximum consequences in this context is limited to options outside of really the defense and security realm.

KELLY: You mean, if it's sanctions - if that's what they're talking about.

VINDMAN: If it's sanctions. That's exactly right.

KELLY: And you think sanctions won't work why? - because the U.S. has sanctioned Russia for years now, and it has not stopped Russian aggression and militarism toward its neighbor?

VINDMAN: That's right. And also because Russia is actually hardened against sanctions. They've dealt with the world of sanctions - fairly severe sanctions - starting with 2014. And in addition to that, in addition to a hardening against the economic sanctions, in addition to indigenizing technologies and supply chains to Russia, they've also built a massive warchest - $620 billion - that gives them a significant cushion to ride through some of these sanctions. And the last part on the sanctions that should be noted is Russia and China continue to converge. It's far from an alliance, but still there's a high degree of cooperation and interoperability. And the Russians are counting on the Chinese to ease the shock of whatever sanctions the U.S. applies. So I think sanctions by themselves again are not going to be sufficient.

KELLY: OK. So from your perspective, what would work? What's the broader set of policy options you want?

VINDMAN: Frankly, I don't know if there is much that we can do that could work. But I think if things - meaningful things that could have an effect include forced posture changes in Europe. That's boots on the ground in NATO territory. I could definitely see a merit to some U.S. presence in Ukraine, but I think that's unpalatable to this administration. So what I think is - should be palatable is positioning troops in Europe - in Poland, in Romania, in Bulgaria, in the Baltic states - to reassure them that the U.S. will be there and live up to its obligations under NATO Article 5.

KELLY: Although, as you just acknowledged, President Biden has made clear, if anything, he wants to bring American troops home, not send more overseas.

VINDMAN: That's partially true. I think he wants to extract from direct commitments to contingencies to military operations. But that's not necessarily the same as consolidating U.S. military presence in the United States. But one of the cornerstones of U.S. security is our access in basing overseas. That's not the same thing as putting troops into harm's way. That's not the same thing as combat operations. It's a deterrent and a hedge against aggression from other powers.

KELLY: As I said at the beginning, no one knows for sure whether Putin will invade. But based on what you can see now, based on your military expertise, where would you rate the chances - scale of 1 to 10?

VINDMAN: I would say, I'm somewhere at an eight, which is pretty amazing. I - this weekend, as I was thinking about these meetings unfolding, I kind of had the pre-combat patrol, pre-battle jitters of recognizing something really serious was coming.

KELLY: And why? What was it you were looking at that was giving you the jitters?

VINDMAN: Because right now, as far apart as the sides are, Russians have laid out a maximalist position. The U.S. said it's not willing to negotiate on very principled positions - I agree with those positions - on sovereign states determining their own orientation and rolling back the clock on the NATO alliance back to 1997. I don't see - and Russia's main focus here, which is achieving a failed state in Ukraine - how we could overcome these things. There is - the most likely scenario in my mind is a major military offensive in Ukraine. I hope I'm wrong, but that's what I see. The less likely scenario is some sort of diplomatic negotiation with some off ramps, with some face-saving measures, where the Russians can say, well, we are in the midst of negotiations - we might be able to achieve what we want. I find that hard to believe that we'll head in that direction.

KELLY: Did I just hear you say Putin's goal here might be achieving a failed state in Ukraine? Why...

VINDMAN: That's exactly right.

KELLY: why? Why would he want that?

VINDMAN: Well, mainly because he needs a weaker state in Ukraine for two probably - primarily two reasons. The first one is Ukraine as a success makes Russia - the Russian exercise of managed democracy a failed experiment. If Ukraine can transition to a democracy, why can't Russia do the same thing? And two, really there is a deep fear of Ukraine slipping out of Russia's sphere of influence.

KELLY: Alert listeners may recall, Colonel Vindman, that you served on Trump's National Security Council until he fired you after you testified in the impeachment inquiry. I bring it up because among the questions that emerged during impeachment was, what is U.S. policy on Ukraine? Who is running it? Understanding listening to you that you don't agree with every aspect of Biden administration policy on Ukraine, in your view, is it now more coherent? Is it clear what the U.S. policy is?

VINDMAN: It's clear in the way it's been clear over the past 30 years, which is to say that it's still muddled. During the Trump administration, we had a coherent, consistent policy that would look similar to the policy of the Obama administration or the Bush administration in certain ways, except for the chief executive. The president was completely at odds with what we - what the national security community thought was in the best interests of the United States. Now we have kind of a more consistent policy that doesn't really express a broad vision on what Ukraine could mean for U.S. national security. It could mean easing the burden of facing a highly capable, highly adversarial Russia in the long term because where Ukraine goes, I could see Russia following. And that's the part that's really missing from this broader vision on what Ukraine means to U.S. national security. It's a linchpin. There's only probably about a handful of places around the globe that are as meaningful as Ukraine in terms of geopolitics.

KELLY: So...

VINDMAN: So that part is missing.

KELLY: In simplest terms, if I'm hearing you right, your argument would be, yes, the U.S. has a coherent policy on Ukraine now, but it's just not as good a policy as the U.S. could have. Is that where you land?

VINDMAN: That's exactly right. And it's not just from the U.S. side. I think the Ukrainians are only now, after 30 years of independence and trying to come out from underneath the thumb of the Russian Federation, are turning to our understanding the role that they could play in regional security and European security. And that's a healthy thing to see. It just has taken a long time to get here.

KELLY: We've been speaking with retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman.

Colonel Vindman, thank you.

VINDMAN: Thank you, Mary Louise.
 
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