It hasn't been possible to discuss this openly since the big orange man endorsed it last spring. But its taken some time for things to shake loose since the usa election and the constantly delayed WHO report. Hoping to finally see that published soon.
This stories begins in 2014 when Obama called a multi year moratorium on certain types of gain of function research (lifted under the trump admin) that was due to a letter signed by many scientists called the cambridge working group.
http://cambridgeworkinggroup.org
Its not easy to shut down a multi billion dollar industry which is important to the welfare of humanity so you can imagine it had an impressive group of scientists support it. The trigger was gain of research on ferrets in the netherlands and the USA that made the H5N1 FLU virus easily transmissible, which possess an immune system similar to humans, if it escaped could spark a flu pandemic. Scientists for Science oppossed the cambridge group and made the value argument. During the moratorium China became an even more important centre for this type of research. but even before the ferret research there has been an argument raging on specific types of gain of function research and its risk reward ratio, splashed across top scientific journals like Nature throughout the years. This has always been a mainstream argument that has divided the community. And the research has been an international collaboration led by scientists in the west and china. Any leak, anywhere, will partly rest with this collective community and the risk reward analysis they have conducted.
You can make the argument that its the correct call even if a pandemic is sparked if the probability analysis was sound. In other words, hindsight bias is unfair, we did the right thing but just got unlucky. As opposed to we didnt estimate the risk correctly. The reward component is a separate analysis and also hotly debated ove the years between scientists. I will follow up here with some more thoughts/posts.
This stories begins in 2014 when Obama called a multi year moratorium on certain types of gain of function research (lifted under the trump admin) that was due to a letter signed by many scientists called the cambridge working group.
Recent incidents involving smallpox, anthrax and bird flu in some of the top US laboratories remind us of the fallibility of even the most secure laboratories, reinforcing the urgent need for a thorough reassessment of biosafety. Such incidents have been accelerating and have been occurring on average over twice a week with regulated pathogens in academic and government labs across the country. An accidental infection with any pathogen is concerning. But accident risks with newly created “potential pandemic pathogens” raise grave new concerns. Laboratory creation of highly transmissible, novel strains of dangerous viruses, especially but not limited to influenza, poses substantially increased risks. An accidental infection in such a setting could trigger outbreaks that would be difficult or impossible to control. Historically, new strains of influenza, once they establish transmission in the human population, have infected a quarter or more of the world’s population within two years.
For any experiment, the expected net benefits should outweigh the risks. Experiments involving the creation of potential pandemic pathogens should be curtailed until there has been a quantitative, objective and credible assessment of the risks, potential benefits, and opportunities for risk mitigation, as well as comparison against safer experimental approaches. A modern version of the Asilomar process, which engaged scientists in proposing rules to manage research on recombinant DNA, could be a starting point to identify the best approaches to achieve the global public health goals of defeating pandemic disease and assuring the highest level of safety. Whenever possible, safer approaches should be pursued in preference to any approach that risks an accidental pandemic.
For any experiment, the expected net benefits should outweigh the risks. Experiments involving the creation of potential pandemic pathogens should be curtailed until there has been a quantitative, objective and credible assessment of the risks, potential benefits, and opportunities for risk mitigation, as well as comparison against safer experimental approaches. A modern version of the Asilomar process, which engaged scientists in proposing rules to manage research on recombinant DNA, could be a starting point to identify the best approaches to achieve the global public health goals of defeating pandemic disease and assuring the highest level of safety. Whenever possible, safer approaches should be pursued in preference to any approach that risks an accidental pandemic.
Its not easy to shut down a multi billion dollar industry which is important to the welfare of humanity so you can imagine it had an impressive group of scientists support it. The trigger was gain of research on ferrets in the netherlands and the USA that made the H5N1 FLU virus easily transmissible, which possess an immune system similar to humans, if it escaped could spark a flu pandemic. Scientists for Science oppossed the cambridge group and made the value argument. During the moratorium China became an even more important centre for this type of research. but even before the ferret research there has been an argument raging on specific types of gain of function research and its risk reward ratio, splashed across top scientific journals like Nature throughout the years. This has always been a mainstream argument that has divided the community. And the research has been an international collaboration led by scientists in the west and china. Any leak, anywhere, will partly rest with this collective community and the risk reward analysis they have conducted.
You can make the argument that its the correct call even if a pandemic is sparked if the probability analysis was sound. In other words, hindsight bias is unfair, we did the right thing but just got unlucky. As opposed to we didnt estimate the risk correctly. The reward component is a separate analysis and also hotly debated ove the years between scientists. I will follow up here with some more thoughts/posts.
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