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The Big 19th: China's 2017 19th National Party Congress

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  • #16
    Essential background.

    Deng Xiaoping was purged in 1966, and along with him went Hu Yaobang. Deng was rehabilitated in 1973, and back came Hu. Deng was again purged in 1976, as was Hu, and re-rehabilitated in 1977 along with his buddy.

    Deng put Hu in charge of the CCP Central Committee Organization Department – hugely powerful position where he was able to remove and replace cadres. Some 3 million Cultural Revolution victims were exonerated by Hu (he was very popular). Then, Deng made him General Secretary of the party, the top title. He relaxed the party’s grip, making him even more popular with the masses but a bit of a pain to the old guard.

    In 1987 the elders dismissed Hu and replaced him with Zhao Ziyang. In 1989, the Tiananmen Massacre was triggered by Hu Yaobang’s death. Zhao was purged.

    Jiang Zemin, party secretary in Shanghai, was hand-picked by Deng as an emergency replacement for Zhao. He had only the very weakest power base, and depended on Deng’s power to get anything done.

    CCP Military Affairs Commission (MAC) secretary general Yang Shangkun, an old buddy of Deng Xiaoping’s, thought that he himself should be the next in line (Deng made him PRC State President, instead). So, he worked behind the scenes to curtail Jiang’s powers.

    As MAC secretary general (Deng kept the chair for himself), Yang was in a position to initiate military exercises and missile tests. He may even have cleared it with Deng, but it wasn’t on Jiang’s agenda. Yang appears to have thought that a show of force would convince Taiwan voters to pick a more conciliatory president, but they gave him a large middle finger, and chose Chen Shui-bian. Chen was widely seen as an independence advocate, so the hard-line approach failed.

    In the mid-1990s, Jiang wasn’t strong enough to stand on his own against the so-called Eight Immortals (old guard, mostly conservatives). He would never have been made party boss on his own. He only got the job because Deng’s hand-picked back-up successor, Zhao, had to be dismissed for taking a soft line on Tiananmen.

    When Jiang Zemin's two terms (10 years) were up, Hu Jintao -- also hand-picked by the now-dead Deng -- was next in line. Jiang didn't have anything to say about this, but he did pack the party and military leadership with his allies. Hu never had a chance to be his own man.

    - - - - - -

    Xi Jinping is an entirely different type of player. He had his own power base, multiple ones, in fact. He worked on military matters in 1979-82 (Sino-Vietnam war era), then went down to the countryside to get some hands-on experience. He finally went to college (Tsinghua, or Qinghua, another elite powerbase) part-time, then became governor of Fujian Province opposite Taiwan. Next, Zhejiang Province (next to Shanghai), back to school (party school) and on up.

    So, as the son of a former Vice Premier (Xi Zhongxun) he has the Princeling support; as a guy who worked on military issues during war, he has some military support and as an East Coast provincial cadre, he has some backing from those seeking rapid growth and liberalization.

    When Jiang Zemin became party boss/president, Deng kept the MAC chair for five years.

    When Hu Jintao became party boss/president, Jiang kept the MAC chair for five years.

    When Xi Jinping became party boss/president, he also took the MAC chair from day one. Now, they call him the “core” of the leadership, a term Deng only used to describe Mao and no one used it to describe Deng while he was alive.

    His anti-corruption campaign, he knocked off some of the most powerful military leaders of the post-Deng era. He took down Zhou Yongkang, the politburo standing committee member in charge of security (he commanded a larger force, on paper, than the PLA) and a close ally of Jiang Zemin. He took down General Xu Caihou, politburo member, MAC vice-chair, head of anti-corruption in the PLA and a member of the Central Committee Secretariat. He took down Guo Boxiong, politburo and MAC vice chair and over 30 other generals.

    He also took down Bo Xilai, son of an Immortal (Bo Yibo) and a clear (rival) candidate for the politburo standing committee. He took down Hu Jintao’s former secretary, Ling Jihua. He took down former Premier Wen Jiabao’s protégé, Sun Zhengcai.

    A bit long winded, but the bottom line is that the PLA needs to be reminded who’s in charge and Xi Jinping is that guy.
    Last edited by DOR; 12 Sep 17,, 10:52.
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    • #17
      Very good, but the question about Xi is still outstanding. If Xi took down all these Deng era people to the tune of thirty generals, he presumably replaced them with his people.

      All good then, right

      Party boss. Check
      CMC head. Check
      Core leader. Check

      So why does he still need to remind the PLA who the boss is : )

      Or is it still a work in progress and we can expect the same next year where he will be reminding PLA once again after a few more hard nuts got replaced
      Last edited by Double Edge; 12 Sep 17,, 11:38.


      • #18
        The challenges of instant analysis …

        From The President’s Daily Brief (CIA)

        September 10, 1976
        [In China] “Civilians will be on guard against a possible military coup attempt. We believe an attempted military coup is most unlikely.”

        Well, at least not until October 6 …

        September 18, 1976
        [Regarding China’s future leadership] ”At this stage, however, the military establishment is likely to be concerned with protecting its own institutional interests. To some extent it can make political gains by playing off civilian factions against each other, and for this reason, the PLA may want to leave some ambiguity in its position.

        Or, it might just pull a coup d’etat

        October 11, 1976
        Lower level cadre in Peking have been told that the four leftists (i.e., The Gang of Four) have been arrested for alleged complicity in a coup d’etat – presumably against Hua (Guofeng).”

        Ah, which way was that coup pointed?

        (predicted senior appointments):
        National People’s Congress Chair: Wu De … never got the job.
        Premier: Li Xiannian … never got the job.

        October 14, 1976
        (post-coup arrests) “In addition to high officials in the ministries of education and culture who were closely associated with Chiang Ching (Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing), there have been persistent reports that Politburo member Wang Tung-hsing (Wang Dongxing) has also been arrested.”

        Wang Dongxing, the man who personally arrested the Gang of Four.

        The record of dissension evident in the public media during the month following Mao’s death makes it virtually certain that the leading leftists were somehow intriguing either to retain the shreds of power they still possessed or to turn the tables on their “rightist” enemies with the help of Wang Tung-hsing’s Peking security unit.

        Wang’s Peking security unit, 8341, the ones who carried out the arrests of the Gang of Four.

        October 23, 1976

        One Politburo member, Wang Tung-hsing, initially rumored to have falled [sic] with the leftist quartet, appears not to be in political trouble.

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        • #19
          Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
          Very good, but the question about Xi is still outstanding. If Xi took down all these Deng era people to the tune of thirty generals, he presumably replaced them with his people.

          All good then, right

          Party boss. Check
          CMC head. Check
          Core leader. Check

          So why does he still need to remind the PLA who the boss is : )

          Or is it still a work in progress and we can expect the same next year where he will be reminding PLA once again after a few more hard nuts got replaced
          Sorry, missed this one.

          The generals taken down were appointed by Jiang Zemin and, to a lesser extent, Hu Jintao.
          That the party boss needs to remind the army who's in charge is a standard feature of Chinese politics.
          "Power grows out of the barrel of a gun," and all that.

          The new guy to watch is Zhang Youxia, recently replaced as head of equipment development (previously the General Armaments Department) and most likely to be named MAC Vice Chair next month. Zhang's dad, also a general, was born in the same Shaaxi county as Xi Jinping's dad. Zhang Youxia is one of the very few top generals with actual combat experience (Vietnam, 1979, 1984).

          Wei Fenghe, the just replaced head of the Rocket Forces, is another MAC Vice Chair candidate. His deputy, Li Shangfu, took over Zhang Youxia's equipment job.

          The new rocketman, Zhou Yaning, hails from a long career in the Nanjing Military Region, where Xi Jinping spent a lot of time. The new Ground Forces Commander, Han Weiguo, was in charge of the Central Theater, which absorbed the Nanjing Military Region.
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          • #20
            Chang Li's predictions on the ins and outs of the MAC

            Nice to see he agrees with me re: Zhang Youxia, and a lot more food for thought.

            For example, the MAC traditionally included the Service Heads and the Department Heads. Chang hints at a shift to selected (not all) Theater Commanders and Political Commissars replacing some Department Heads.
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            • #21
              China's next President


              Quite good analysis from a source with which I am unfamiliar. However, his sources are much the usual suspects, and his conclusions are a bit ... final.

              China's Next President: Reading the Tea Leaves of Chinese Politics
              It’s time to push back against the “Xi Forever” narrative and take a deep dive into political maneuvering in China.

              By Andrei Lungu
              September 29, 2017

              Over the past three years, a narrative about Chinese President Xi Jinping’s desire to remain at China’s helm for another five or ten years after 2022 has steadily taken hold. Together with this “Xi Forever” narrative, there has been growing speculation that, in order to break a precedent that requires leaders to retire at 68, Xi will try to keep his ally Wang Qishan on the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) after the 19th Party Congress. These rumors have grown in intensity, developing in tandem with the mistaken narrative about Xi’s power being equal to that of Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping.

              But what is this Xi Forever narrative based on? It’s based on nothing more than rumors and Western press reports quoting anonymous sources. The problem is that it isn’t clear at all how these sources could have learned, years ago, such an intimate piece of information about what Xi wants to do years from now in 2022. Has Xi told every acquaintance that he intends to prolong his rule? Highly doubtful. Reading the press attribution of sources, we encounter “party insiders” who are “close to senior officials” — not Politburo members who might have first-hand information from Xi, but people who happen to know people and have heard something.

              It might be possible that Xi confessed his intentions to some very close allies, but how this information trickled down from PSC or Politburo politicians to lower-level officials or acquaintances who could be used as sources is difficult to imagine. It’s far more probable that those sources are not in possession of first-hand information from Xi or his closest allies, but they’ve simply heard speculation that is pervasive both inside and outside the party. When it comes to what Xi Jinping might intend to do eight years in the future (the sources started talking in 2015) it should be obvious that nobody has any real information. Everything is speculation.

              The articles about Xi’s desire to remain in power also talk about “the signs” of this intent, like how, unlike his predecessors, Xi hasn’t shown his interest in stepping down or grooming a successor. But what successor did Hu Jintao name in 2005? And how did Hu communicate his desire to step down after two terms, only three years into his presidency? Did he organize a press conference?

              Reading the Tea Leaves

              Let’s assume that deep inside, Xi wants to prolong his rule. How would this desire manifest externally?

              Because Xi already inherited two sixth-generation politicians on the Politburo, who were groomed to succeed him, he would try to purge them or sabotage their careers.

              Secondly, he would avoid grooming any other sixth-generation leader who could succeed him.

              Thirdly, he would start breaking the retirement precedents, as often as possible.

              Fourthly, there would be a public campaign to promote such an extended rule and against retirement norms, like there was a campaign to promote the term “core” before Xi officially received the title. Similarly, there would be a campaign to highlight why some politicians, like Wang Qishan, should stay on, regardless of age.

              And lastly, in order to get the party leadership on board with his plan, Xi would probably have to purge some party leaders in order to make it clear it’s his way or the highway.

              This is what one would expect if Xi were interested in a third or fourth term. Now let’s examine these signs.

              The Rise of Chen Min’er

              At first, there seems to be some truth to the rumors. Sun Zhengcai, the party secretary of Chongqing, born in 1963 and thus eligible to be reelected in 2027 (making him a sixth-generation leader who could serve two terms between 2022-2032), was put under investigation for corruption in July 2017. Indeed, it was this sign that prompted the Economist Intelligence Unit, which until now has avoided falling for the Xi Forever speculation, to declare that Xi might grab a third term.

              But there’s a huge catch. Who replaced Sun as party secretary of Chongqing? Out of dozens of potential candidates and out of half a dozen eligible Xi allies, it was Chen Min’er, Xi’s only sixth-generation ally that could have been promoted to such a position (three other Xi allies born in the 1960s are too junior to be directly promoted to Chongqing party chief).

              Let’s be clear: if Xi wanted to serve another term, it made zero sense to replace one of the two groomed sixth-generation leaders with his sixth-generation ally. Xi might have checked box number one, but he clearly broke requirement number two: he groomed Chen Min’er, born in 1960, the oldest possible age to lead the sixth-generation, under current retirement precedent.

              In case this doesn’t look like grooming Chen, but as a simple coincidence, let’s go back a little further. Chen worked under Xi when the latter was party secretary of Zhejiang, helping write Xi’s weekly columns for the provincial party newspaper. Chen became vice governor of Zhejiang in May 2007. He languished in this position for almost five years, finally being named deputy party secretary of Guizhou in January 2012, the year Xi was preparing to take the reins of the party. After the 18th Party Congress that year, Chen became a member of the party’s Central Committee and was named governor of Guizhou.

              Two and a half years later, the anti-corruption campaign targeted Zhou Benshun, the party secretary of Hebei and a Zhou Yongkang ally. Who was picked to replace Zhou? Out of over two dozen eligible politicians, it was the party secretary of Guizhou, who vacated his seat to take over Hebei. Then Chen Min’er was promoted to party secretary of Guizhou.

              In April 2017, Xi was elected a delegate to the 19th Party Congress. Xi was born in Beijing, where he has been living for 10 years. He has family roots in Shaanxi. He served for 17 years in Fujian, where he recently organized the BRICS summit. In 2007 and 2012, he was elected a delegate from Shanghai. Xi had a special connection to Shanghai: he was sent there as party secretary in March 2007, just 7 months before the Party Congress which groomed him as China’s future leader. This promotion was made possible by a corruption investigation against the former party chief of Shanghai, who was also a Politburo member (like Sun Zhengcai).

              So which province will Xi represent at the 19th Party Congress? Of course, it is Guizhou. What is Xi’s only connection to this province? Chen Min’er, who was sent to one of China’s poorest provinces, while one of Xi’s main goals is to eradicate extreme poverty until 2020. Xi had allies in numerous other provinces, yet, he decided to signal his support for Chen, his only ally that is in a position to succeed him in 2022.

              Dusting Off the Old Shanghai Playbook

              Three months after Xi publicly signaled his support for Chen, in July 2017, Sun Zhengcai became the only member of the current Politburo to be targeted by the anti-corruption campaign. Who was sent to replace him? Chen Min’er, who again benefited from a seat left open by the anti-corruption campaign. This is not coincidence, this is design. Careful observers have noted Chen’s bright prospects since 2015. Yet, much of the Western press has been very slow to read the tea leaves. Ever since the beginning of the year, there have been a few reports naming Chen “a dark horse” candidate for the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). But, at first, Chen’s promotion in Chongqing was read as a sign that he was assured of a simple Politburo seat. Today, there seems to be agreement that Chen is probably heading to the PSC, but very few have the temerity to call him China’s next president.

              Let’s go back to 2007. Just seven months before the party congress, Xi was named party secretary of Shanghai. At the congress, he joined the PSC and was then named vice president of China. The rest is history. Today, Chen has been named party secretary of Chongqing (like Shanghai, a direct-controlled municipality), three months before the congress. If this isn’t the 2007 Shanghai playbook, then what is?

              Why wasn’t Chen sent to Shanghai? Because Shanghai wasn’t led by a sixth-generation leader. If there would have been three potential successors (Chen, Sun Zhengcai and Hu Chunhua), Chen would have been the odd-one out: less experience, not even a Politburo member. By taking down Sun and replacing him with Chen, Xi left only two potential successors, simplifying the choice: Hu Chunhua, Hu Jintao’s ally, and Chen.

              Everybody who claims Xi wants to have a third term needs to explain why Chen was repeatedly promoted, especially to Chongqing, when Xi could have promoted any other ally. Also, why hasn’t Xi purged or demoted Hu Chunhua? There are only five provincial party chiefs who have remained in the position they received after the 18th Congress and Hu is one of them. If his lack of promotion seems like a bad omen, remember that there aren’t many places where you can go once you’re party secretary of Guangdong. If Xi wanted Hu out, he could have sent him to Qinghai or Anhui or somewhere else. Not only did Hu remain untouched, but Xi praised him in April (and Hu returned the favor).

              As things stand now, they are very similar to 2007. Two politicians young enough to lead the next generation of Chinese leaders are provincial party chiefs. One of them has remained in the same position for a few years (Li Keqiang in 2007 and Hu Chunhua today). The other one has recently experienced an important promotion thanks to a corruption investigation (Xi Jinping in 2007 and Chen Min’er today). But instead of talking about Chen and Hu, the entire discussion is centered on Xi’s apparent desire to remain in charge after 2022. Maybe the last three signs could provide some support for this theory? We’ll find out in the second installment of this series.

              Andrei Lungu is president of The Romanian Institute for the Study of the Asia-Pacific (RISAP). This is the first article in a four-part series about China’s political system and the 19th Party Congress.
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              • #22
                China combat veteran, close ally of Xi, to get promotion: sources

                Benjamin Kang Lim, Ben Blanchard

                BEIJING (Reuters) - A close ally of President Xi Jinping is expected to be promoted to vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, four sources said, as Xi cements his control over the armed forces.

                Zhang Youxia, 67, one of just a few senior military officers with combat experience, is tipped to become one of at least two vice chairmen of the commission, the sources, including three with direct ties to the leadership, told Reuters.

                Xi is chairman of the commission, which has overall control of the People’s Liberation Army, as well as the nation’s president and general secretary of the Communist Party of China.

                Zhang would replace Fan Changlong, who is expected to retire during the 19th Communist Party Congress which begins on Wednesday. The other vice chairman, Xu Qiliang, is expected to stay on, the sources said.

                Both Xi and Zhang are from the northwestern province of Shaanxi and both are children of former senior officials who fought together in the civil war in the 1940s.

                China’s Defence Ministry did not respond to a faxed request for comment.

                The party has been studying a proposal to increase the number of vice chairmen on the military commission from two to four and reduce the number of other committee members, currently eight, some of the sources said.

                Xi has shaken up the commission and military since assuming power late in 2012 as he roots out corruption and streamlines the 2 million-strong armed forces, the world’s largest. Some 300,000 troops have been laid off and advanced new equipment such as stealth fighters has been developed.

                While China has not fought a war in decades, it is taking an increasingly assertive line in the disputed East China Sea and South China Sea, as well as over self-ruled Taiwan, which is claimed by China.

                Two outgoing members of the commission are currently under investigation for suspected graft, sources have told Reuters, though the government has yet to confirm this.

                It isn’t the first time the military has faced corruption issues. A previous vice chairman, Guo Boxiong, was jailed for life for graft last year, while another former vice chairman, Xu Caihou, died of cancer in 2015 before he could face trial over alleged corruption.

                Zhang is currently the eighth-ranked member of the 11-man military commission.

                Zhang is also expected to be promoted to the Communist Party’s 25-member Politburo, one of its elite ruling bodies, three of the sources said.

                One source with ties to the leadership said that the fathers of Xi and Zhang – Xi Zhongxun and Zhang Zongxun - had been close.

                The two fathers fought together in the civil war that ended in 1949 with the Communist victory and proclamation of the People’s Republic of China. Both men rose to senior positions in the government and military.

                “The second generation of the two families are also close,” the source added, referring to Xi and Zhang.


                Born in Beijing, Zhang Youxia joined the army in 1968, rising through the ranks and joining the military commission in late 2012.

                He fought against Vietnam in a brief border war in 1979 that China launched in punishment for Vietnam invading Cambodia the previous year and ousting the Beijing-backed Khmer Rouge.

                Zhang was 26 when he was sent to the frontlines to fight the Vietnamese, where he performed well and was quickly promoted, according to state media. He also fought in another border clash with Vietnam in 1984.

                “During the battle, whether attacking or defending, Zhang Youxia performed excellently,” the official China Youth Daily wrote in August in a piece entitled, “These Chinese generals have killed the enemy on the battlefield”.

                Another officer recently promoted, Li Zuocheng, who was named chief of the Joint Staff Department of the People’s Liberation Army in August, also fought in the 1979 war.

                Li is also likely to become one of the commission’s vice chairmen, but it was unclear if he will also join the Politburo, the sources said.

                One of the sources, who has ties to the military, said Zhang had a reputation when he was based in northeastern China of walking around his base dressed in civilian clothes, prompting challenges from junior soldiers who didn’t recognize him.

                “He doesn’t put on airs and likes getting down in the dirt with ordinary soldiers, to know what their lives are like, how they are living and what they are eating,” said the source, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.
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                • #23
                  Who's Likely to be Who

                  The pundits are placing their bets and we’ll know who the sub-Xi leaders of China will be very shortly.

                  Here’s my guesses:

                  General Secretary, President, MAC Chair and head of every significant Leading Group: Xi Jinping.
                  Weakest Premier since Hua Guofeng: Li Keqiang
                  NPC Chair and insignificant Vice President: Li Yuanchao
                  CPPCC Chair and youngest leader with no future: Hu Chuanhua
                  (or, possibily Xinjiang hard-ass Secretary Zhang Chunxian)
                  Secretariat Secretary and Party School President: Li Zhanshu, heir apparent No. 1
                  DIC Secretary: Zhao Leji, heir apparent No. 2 (Li and Zhao are pretty much interchangeable here)
                  Executive Vice Premier and PM-in-waiting: Wang Yang or possibily Hu Chunhua
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                  • #24
                    It was all a clever plot ...

                    Liu Shiyu, the chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, accused six party leaders on Thursday of plotting a coup against Xi.

                    Liu is said to have identified the ex-party boss of megacity Chongqing, Sun Zhengcai, as the plot’s leader. Sun was once a front runner for a place in the PSC.
                    Xi “addressed the cases of Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua, Xu Caihou, Guo Boxiong and Sun Zhengcai. They had high positions and great power in the party, but they were hugely corrupt and plotted to usurp the party’s leadership and seize state power,” Liu said.


                    Now, if someone could please explain why the equities regulator is the one to reveal this nefarious plot I'd be mighty obliged...
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                    • #25
                      Another case of just enough insight to think you know what you’re talking about:

                      Xi Jinping has quietly chosen his own successor

                      By Andrei Lungu, Foreign Policy, WP Bloomberg, Oct 21, 2017


                      "Xi has more than half a dozen allies in positions of power throughout China’s provinces - like Li Qiang, the Mongolian Bayanqolu, or Li Xi - any one of whom could have been named as Sun’s successor in Chongqing. But Xi’s choice was striking: He promoted his ally Chen Min’er, who was born in 1960. Why is his year of birth so important? Because, based on the traditional retirement age of 68, Chen Min’er - unlike Xi’s other prominent allies, who are older - will be able to serve out a double term from 2022, when he will be 62. Were he born even just a year earlier, in 1959, this would have been impossible, as he would have been forced to retire in 2027."

                      First, “67 up, 68 down” isn’t set in stone. Indeed, it has been strictly enforced only since 2005, when Jiang Zemin finally retired from the State Military Affairs Commission (MAC). That makes a grand total of two – count ‘em, two – national party congress where everyone over the age of 68 has been compelled to retire: 2017 and 2012.

                      2016 may well be the third time in a row that the 67/68 rule is applied.
                      Chen Min’er may well take over from Xi Jinping in 2022.
                      But, to pretend that either (a) there is no other potential successor; or (b) there is a hard-and-fast rule on retirement displays just enough insight into Chinese elite politics to mislead the less well-informed.
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                      • #26
                        China’s top communist is a capitalist, at heart.

                        Discussion at a small group meeting, between CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping and ordinary party delegates from Guizhou Province:

                        He [Xi] is pleased to hear of a distillery in Panzhou owned by shareholders from more than 1,000 households.

                        "What is your drink called?" Xi asked.
                        "Yanbo," Yu answered.

                        "How much does it cost?" Xi continued.
                        "Our price is reasonable for ordinary people," Yu said.

                        "What, may I ask, is the price?" Xi said.
                        "It sells for only 99 yuan, [less than US$15]" Yu replied.

                        "That's not cheap! A high price is not the key! It may not be so popular if it gets too expensive," Xi said.
                        "Thank you, general secretary, for your advice which will be sure to take on board," Yu said.

                        "The price should be determined by the market. You cannot reduce it to 30 yuan on the basis of what I just said," Xi said.

                        emphasis added
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                        • #27
                          Two Resolutions

                          Resolution of of the 19th National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

                          [The Party] Holds high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and is guided by Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.

                          = = = = =

                          Resolution of the Discipline Inspection Commission of the etc etc --

                          [The DIC] Holds high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and follows the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era

                          There's a dissertation in examining the difference between those to phrases.
                          Last edited by DOR; 24 Oct 17,, 10:20.
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                          • #28
                            What exactly is Xi Jinping Thought?

                            I thought you'd never ask ...

                            Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era builds on and further enriches Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, and the Scientific Outlook on Development. It represents the latest achievement in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context, and encapsulates the practical experience and collective wisdom of our Party and the people. It is an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and a guide to action for all our members and all the Chinese people as we strive to achieve national rejuvenation. This Thought must be adhered to and steadily developed on a long-term basis.

                            The Congress highlights the 14 points that form the basic policy underpinning our endeavors to uphold and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era. They are: Ensure Party leadership over all work; commit to a people-centered approach; continue to comprehensively deepen reform; adopt a new vision for development; see that the people run the country; ensure every dimension of governance is law-based; uphold core socialist values; ensure and improve living standards through development; ensure harmony between human and nature; pursue a holistic approach to national security; uphold absolute Party leadership over the people's forces; uphold the principle of "one country, two systems" and promote national reunification; promote the building of a community with a shared future for mankind; and exercise full and rigorous governance over the Party. All our members must fully implement the Party's basic theory, line, and policy so as to better steer the development of the Party and people's cause.
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                            • #29
                              In case anyone missed it, the people run the country …

                              “We should improve the system of institutions through which the people run the country and develop socialist democracy. We should uphold the unity of Party leadership, the people running the country, and law-based governance. This requires us to strengthen institutional guarantees to ensure the people run the country, give play to the important role of socialist consultative democracy, and advance law-based governance. We should deepen reform of Party and government institutions and the system of government administration, consolidate and develop the patriotic united front, and consolidate and enhance political stability, unity, and vitality.”


                              Party time!
                              The general requirements for Party building for the new era are: Uphold and strengthen overall Party leadership and ensure that the Party exercises effective self-supervision and practices strict self-governance in every respect; take strengthening the Party's long-term governance capacity and its advanced nature and purity as the main thrust, take enhancing the Party's political building as the overarching principle, take holding dear the Party's ideals, convictions, and purpose as the underpinning, and take harnessing the whole Party's enthusiasm, initiative, and creativity as the focus of efforts; make all-round efforts to see the Party's political building enhanced, its theory strengthened, its organizations consolidated, its conduct improved, and its discipline enforced, with institution building incorporated into every aspect of Party building; step up efforts to combat corruption and continue to improve the efficacy of Party building; and build the Party into a vibrant Marxist governing party that is always at the forefront of the times, enjoys the wholehearted support of the people, has the courage to reform itself, and is able to withstand all tests.

                              Final score:
                              “the Party" . . . . 33 mentions
                              ”the people” . . . 17 mentions
                              Xi Jinping Thought / core . . . 8 mentions
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                              • #30
                                Wang Qishan retires

                                Zhao Leji, director of the Central Committee Organization Department and member of the the 18th Polituburo and its Secretariat, will be the new Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary. Along with the title of the Biggest DIC in China comes a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee.

                                Although the DIC hasn’t formally selected their leader at this writing, Zhao is the only central committee member name to the Central DIC. Zhao is 60 years old, so unless he blots his copybook pretty badly, he is likely to get a full 10 years on top. He who takes over from corruption buster Wang Qishan.
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