Indians are celebrating President Bush's re-election.
BY C. RAJA MOHAN
Sunday, December 19, 2004 12:01 a.m. EST
NEW DELHI--While Europe continues to hold its nose at the decisive triumph of George W. Bush, the Indian establishment is quietly savoring the outcome of the recent elections in America. India and Europe, one might say, have traded places in the global arena. India, once nonaligned, used to be the first to throw stones at Washington on any issue during the Cold War; today, it sees America as a natural ally. Europe, on the other hand, now speaks the language of "nonalignment," and holds that nothing is ever right with U.S. foreign policy.
There is a straightforward explanation for India's enthusiasm for the Bush administration. New Delhi has transacted more political business with Washington in the past four years than in the previous four decades. After nearly half a century of estrangement, India and the U.S. rapidly drew closer during the first Bush term. Whether it is the commitment to the war against terrorism or the exploration of missile defense, Mr. Bush has found a partner in Delhi.
India has no desire to lose the rare momentum in bilateral relations with the U.S. that it enjoys under President Bush. It had good reason to worry about John Kerry. Besides the traditional fear about the protectionist impulses of the Democrats, New Delhi was alarmed by the noises made by Mr. Kerry against off-shoring of American services to India. For the first time since its independence in 1947, India has begun to carve out a niche for itself in the global economy, and Mr. Kerry cast a malign shadow over this development by suggesting punitive actions against U.S. companies outsourcing in India.
But most important for New Delhi is the strategic decision by the Bush administration to view India as an emerging global power and a potential partner in the management of the global order. For earlier administrations, India was merely a part of a political nuisance in South Asia. The perceived nuclear flashpoint in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the broader conflict with Pakistan were the only issues that drew American political attention to India. New Delhi also acknowledges that the Bush administration, despite America's renewed dependence on Pakistan after 9/11, has not dropped the ball on relations with India. There is no going back, it is clear, to the zero-sum game of the Cold War days in the Subcontinent.
There is a deeper philosophy that has united India and the U.S. in the last four years: They both are revisionist powers. Well before Sept. 11, 2001, and more clearly after, the Bush administration saw the need for a new set of rules for managing the emerging threats to international security. The tools and doctrines of the Yalta system had outlived their utility and had to be recast, the Bush administration concluded. India could not agree more.
Despite its significant contributions (under the aegis of the British Empire) to two World Wars, India was left out in the cold by the Yalta arrangements--especially the United Nations. To be accorded its rightful place in the global order, India needs a drastic revision of existing international rules--from those relating to nonproliferation to the management of international peace and security. The Bush administration, pursuing its objectives in the global war on terror, is determined to engineer changes in the spheres that are of greatest import to India. Having missed the boat at Yalta, India can only wish President Bush all success in his endeavor to transform the international order.
Very few countries in the world share the Bush administration's contempt for the U.N. when it comes to maintenance of international security. India is one of them. India went to the Security Council in 1948, to find a way out of its impasse with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir after the messy Partition of the Subcontinent in 1947. Although India has never stopped regretting its decision, its experience at the U.N. has cured New Delhi of all illusions about collective security in the international system.
Much like American conservatives who believe that U.S. national security is too important to be left to consensus politics in Turtle Bay, India underlines the fact that peace and stability in the Subcontinent cannot be left to the mercy of the U.N. Security Council. While Indian diplomats often mouth the virtues of multilateralism, they have little desire to see the pious forces of liberal internationalism, bereft of all strategic content, create a Brussels on the East River. Like the Bush administration, New Delhi does not want to cede national control over decisionmaking on war and peace to unelected bureaucrats in a "supranational" U.N. In democracies, those decisions must lie with elected governments, accountable to their own people.
Given its firm commitment to national sovereignty, India, not surprisingly, also found itself with the Bush administration in the global debate on the International Criminal Court. The examples of Indo-U.S. political convergence during Bush years abound--including counterproliferation strategies, and pre-emption against terrorist groups and states.
Having been the biggest victim of terrorism sponsored against it by a nuclear-armed Pakistan over the last 15 years, India had little difficulty in understanding the imperatives of Mr. Bush after 9/11. And with its 150 million Muslims, India has a big stake in the success of Mr. Bush's project for the modernization and democratization of the Islamic Middle East.
On nonproliferation, India believes that the vacuous legalism of the current nonproliferation regime will lead the world nowhere. Effective nonproliferation requires a new set of rules which India is willing to develop along with the U.S.
But in defining a new world order, Mr. Bush will have to move away from the traditional American emphasis on the Euro-Atlantic world and recognize the power shift to Asia. New Delhi would surely stand with Mr. Bush in the configuration of a new global equilibrium, one that takes into account the return of India to the center stage of global affairs.
Mr. Raja Mohan, professor of South Asian studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, is the author of "Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy" (Palgrave MacMillan, 2004).
http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110006049
BY C. RAJA MOHAN
Sunday, December 19, 2004 12:01 a.m. EST
NEW DELHI--While Europe continues to hold its nose at the decisive triumph of George W. Bush, the Indian establishment is quietly savoring the outcome of the recent elections in America. India and Europe, one might say, have traded places in the global arena. India, once nonaligned, used to be the first to throw stones at Washington on any issue during the Cold War; today, it sees America as a natural ally. Europe, on the other hand, now speaks the language of "nonalignment," and holds that nothing is ever right with U.S. foreign policy.
There is a straightforward explanation for India's enthusiasm for the Bush administration. New Delhi has transacted more political business with Washington in the past four years than in the previous four decades. After nearly half a century of estrangement, India and the U.S. rapidly drew closer during the first Bush term. Whether it is the commitment to the war against terrorism or the exploration of missile defense, Mr. Bush has found a partner in Delhi.
India has no desire to lose the rare momentum in bilateral relations with the U.S. that it enjoys under President Bush. It had good reason to worry about John Kerry. Besides the traditional fear about the protectionist impulses of the Democrats, New Delhi was alarmed by the noises made by Mr. Kerry against off-shoring of American services to India. For the first time since its independence in 1947, India has begun to carve out a niche for itself in the global economy, and Mr. Kerry cast a malign shadow over this development by suggesting punitive actions against U.S. companies outsourcing in India.
But most important for New Delhi is the strategic decision by the Bush administration to view India as an emerging global power and a potential partner in the management of the global order. For earlier administrations, India was merely a part of a political nuisance in South Asia. The perceived nuclear flashpoint in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the broader conflict with Pakistan were the only issues that drew American political attention to India. New Delhi also acknowledges that the Bush administration, despite America's renewed dependence on Pakistan after 9/11, has not dropped the ball on relations with India. There is no going back, it is clear, to the zero-sum game of the Cold War days in the Subcontinent.
There is a deeper philosophy that has united India and the U.S. in the last four years: They both are revisionist powers. Well before Sept. 11, 2001, and more clearly after, the Bush administration saw the need for a new set of rules for managing the emerging threats to international security. The tools and doctrines of the Yalta system had outlived their utility and had to be recast, the Bush administration concluded. India could not agree more.
Despite its significant contributions (under the aegis of the British Empire) to two World Wars, India was left out in the cold by the Yalta arrangements--especially the United Nations. To be accorded its rightful place in the global order, India needs a drastic revision of existing international rules--from those relating to nonproliferation to the management of international peace and security. The Bush administration, pursuing its objectives in the global war on terror, is determined to engineer changes in the spheres that are of greatest import to India. Having missed the boat at Yalta, India can only wish President Bush all success in his endeavor to transform the international order.
Very few countries in the world share the Bush administration's contempt for the U.N. when it comes to maintenance of international security. India is one of them. India went to the Security Council in 1948, to find a way out of its impasse with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir after the messy Partition of the Subcontinent in 1947. Although India has never stopped regretting its decision, its experience at the U.N. has cured New Delhi of all illusions about collective security in the international system.
Much like American conservatives who believe that U.S. national security is too important to be left to consensus politics in Turtle Bay, India underlines the fact that peace and stability in the Subcontinent cannot be left to the mercy of the U.N. Security Council. While Indian diplomats often mouth the virtues of multilateralism, they have little desire to see the pious forces of liberal internationalism, bereft of all strategic content, create a Brussels on the East River. Like the Bush administration, New Delhi does not want to cede national control over decisionmaking on war and peace to unelected bureaucrats in a "supranational" U.N. In democracies, those decisions must lie with elected governments, accountable to their own people.
Given its firm commitment to national sovereignty, India, not surprisingly, also found itself with the Bush administration in the global debate on the International Criminal Court. The examples of Indo-U.S. political convergence during Bush years abound--including counterproliferation strategies, and pre-emption against terrorist groups and states.
Having been the biggest victim of terrorism sponsored against it by a nuclear-armed Pakistan over the last 15 years, India had little difficulty in understanding the imperatives of Mr. Bush after 9/11. And with its 150 million Muslims, India has a big stake in the success of Mr. Bush's project for the modernization and democratization of the Islamic Middle East.
On nonproliferation, India believes that the vacuous legalism of the current nonproliferation regime will lead the world nowhere. Effective nonproliferation requires a new set of rules which India is willing to develop along with the U.S.
But in defining a new world order, Mr. Bush will have to move away from the traditional American emphasis on the Euro-Atlantic world and recognize the power shift to Asia. New Delhi would surely stand with Mr. Bush in the configuration of a new global equilibrium, one that takes into account the return of India to the center stage of global affairs.
Mr. Raja Mohan, professor of South Asian studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, is the author of "Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy" (Palgrave MacMillan, 2004).
http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110006049
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