Congressional Budget Office reports

[DOR]

An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2024 Shipbuilding Plan

The Navy’s shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2024 described three alternative projections of the composition of its fleet over the next 30 years. Under the three alternatives, the fleet would comprise between 319 and 367 battle force ships by 2053.

CBO estimates that total shipbuilding costs would average about $34 billion to $36 billion (in 2023 dollars) over the next 30 years, which is 14 percent to 18 percent more than the Navy estimates. The Navy’s total budget would increase from $245 billion today to more than $300 billion (in 2023 dollars) in 2053.

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59508

[DOR]

CBO Releases an Updated Interactive Tool for Analyzing the Size and Cost of the U.S. Military

CBO has updated and enhanced its interactive force structure tool. The online tool lets users customize the structure of the U.S. military’s forces to see the effects on defense spending, or customize the defense budget to see the effects on the size and structure of the military. It also provides information about the major combat units that make up the armed forces, including their number, size, functions, and average annual costs over the 2024–2028 period.

Today, the Congressional Budget Office updated and enhanced its interactive force structure tool. The online tool lets users customize the structure of the U.S. military’s forces to see the effects on defense spending, or customize the defense budget to see the effects on the size and structure of the military. It also provides information about the major combat units that make up the armed forces, including their number, size, functions, and average annual costs over the 2024–2028 period.

What Is New in the Updated Version?

This new version includes updated costs and personnel numbers that reflect the Department of Defense’s 2024 budget request. In addition, it includes more precision about certain Army and Navy units. The Army’s field artillery brigades and air-defense brigades, which CBO previously included in support personnel and costs for brigade combat teams, are now separate units whose size can be adjusted directly. The Navy’s amphibious assault ships—some of the largest and most costly vessels in the U.S. fleet—have also been broken out separately from other, smaller amphibious ships.

How Can the Interactive Tool Be Useful?

Want to see what effect an increase or decrease of $50 billion a year in the defense budget would have on U.S. forces? Want to know how an increase in the number of ships or special forces would affect defense spending? The tool can help you answer those questions and explore other policy alternatives.
Educators can use the tool to introduce their students to the wide array of U.S. forces and engage in “what if” analysis of possible changes to those forces.
A tutorial page explains how to use the tool, a set of frequently asked questions (FAQs) provides additional detailed information, and several spreadsheets show the data underlying the tool.

Can I See What Is Under the Hood?

The updated tool is based on a cost model for the military that CBO developed for its series of reports titled The U.S. Military’s Force Structure: A Primer. The tool shows the raw cost factors and quantities included in CBO’s model, allowing users to view, use, or alter the model. Users can also export detailed data files if they want to conduct more in-depth analysis than the tool permits. Those data files document all the cost factors and default settings used in the model, as well as technical factors such as phase-in rates, deflators, and CBO’s projections of the U.S. military’s costs over the next decade.


https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59681

[DOR]

The Navy’s Costs to Eliminate Its Deferred Maintenance Backlog and to Renovate and Modernize Its Buildings


November 30, 2023

CBO estimates that eliminating the maintenance backlogs of roughly 20,000 buildings that the Navy uses and maintains in the United States would cost $17 billion. Renovating and modernizing the buildings would cost an additional $32 billion.


https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59381

[DOR]

Atlas of Military Compensation

Since 2000, the total budget for military compensation has been rising steadily, even though the number of military personnel and veterans has been declining. Spending by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has accounted for most of that increase, rising from a small fraction of the total to about 60 percent of military compensation in the President’s 2024 budget request.
In the 2024 budget request, total military compensation is $551 billion. (Of that total, $230 billion is for the Department of Defense and $321 billion is for VA.) That amount represents an increase of 144 percent since 1980 (and 134 percent since 1999) after removing the effects of inflation.

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59475

[Gun Grape]

The effects of a 20+ year never ending war.
And at the same time downsizing the number of VA clinics, then start a program to have the VA pay for treatment by civilian Dr's.

[Albany Rifles]

The effects of a 20+ year never ending war.
And at the same time downsizing the number of VA clinics, then start a program to have the VA pay for treatment by civilian Dr's.

I'm sure we had the same spikes from 1964-75 because of WW 2 getting older & VN vets flooding the system.

Funny how that works...VA benefit requirements go up as a result of war.

[DOR]

Acquisition Costs of the Navy’s Medium Landing Ship

In fiscal year 2025, the Department of the Navy plans to start construction of the medium landing ship (LSM), a new small amphibious ship. Many facets of the program remain uncertain, such as the number of ships the Navy wants to buy, the design and capabilities of the ship, and the cost of the program.

By CBO’s estimates, an 18-ship LSM program would cost between $6.2 billion and $7.8 billion in 2024 (inflation-adjusted) dollars, or $340 million to $430 million per ship. CBO’s per-ship estimates range from two to roughly three times the Navy’s estimates for the 8 ships it wants to buy between 2025 and 2029.

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60071

[DOR]

Testimony on the Cost of the Coast Guard’s Polar Security Cutter

CBO testifies about the agency’s analysis of the costs of the Coast Guard’s heavy polar icebreaker program, known as the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program, before the House Homeland Security Committee's Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security on May 7, 2024.

CBO finds that in 2024 dollars, the procurement cost of the first PSC would be about $1.9 billion. Subsequent ships would average about $1.6 billion each. Given those costs, the procurement cost of three PSCs would be about $5.1 billion. That amount is 60 percent greater than the Coast Guard’s most recent publicly released estimate for the procurement cost of three heavy icebreakers, which was provided to CBO by the Coast Guard in March 2024.

Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify about the procurement costs of the Coast Guard’s heavy polar icebreaker program, known as the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program. In consultation with Committee staff, I have focused this short statement on providing a summary of the Congressional Budget Office’s report on the PSC program, which Chairman Green and Chairman Gimenez requested. That report is currently being drafted, and we expect to publish it this summer.

CBO’s findings are as follows:

The procurement cost of the first PSC would be about $1.9 billion.
Subsequent ships would average about $1.6 billion each. (All costs in this statement are expressed in 2024 dollars.)
Given those costs, the procurement cost of three PSCs would be about $5.1 billion.
That amount is 60 percent greater than the Coast Guard’s most recent publicly released estimate for the procurement cost of three heavy icebreakers, which was provided to CBO by the Coast Guard in March 2024.

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60168

[Albany Rifles]

Testimony on the Cost of the Coast Guard’s Polar Security Cutter

CBO testifies about the agency’s analysis of the costs of the Coast Guard’s heavy polar icebreaker program, known as the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program, before the House Homeland Security Committee's Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security on May 7, 2024.

CBO finds that in 2024 dollars, the procurement cost of the first PSC would be about $1.9 billion. Subsequent ships would average about $1.6 billion each. Given those costs, the procurement cost of three PSCs would be about $5.1 billion. That amount is 60 percent greater than the Coast Guard’s most recent publicly released estimate for the procurement cost of three heavy icebreakers, which was provided to CBO by the Coast Guard in March 2024.

Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify about the procurement costs of the Coast Guard’s heavy polar icebreaker program, known as the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program. In consultation with Committee staff, I have focused this short statement on providing a summary of the Congressional Budget Office’s report on the PSC program, which Chairman Green and Chairman Gimenez requested. That report is currently being drafted, and we expect to publish it this summer.

CBO’s findings are as follows:

The procurement cost of the first PSC would be about $1.9 billion.
Subsequent ships would average about $1.6 billion each. (All costs in this statement are expressed in 2024 dollars.)
Given those costs, the procurement cost of three PSCs would be about $5.1 billion.
That amount is 60 percent greater than the Coast Guard’s most recent publicly released estimate for the procurement cost of three heavy icebreakers, which was provided to CBO by the Coast Guard in March 2024.

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60168

I wonder why there is such a divergence? Different kinds of contracts?

[DOR]

Income of Black Working-Age Veterans

CBO compared economic outcomes from 2017 to 2019 of veterans who are Black, male, and working age (ages 22 to 54) with outcomes of two groups of working-age men: Black nonveterans and White veterans. The agency found that, on average, Black veterans had more earnings, higher rates of marriage and homeownership, and greater educational attainment than Black nonveterans did. But the average earnings of Black veterans and Black nonveterans did not differ among men with similar demographic characteristics (age, marital status, level of education, and region of residence).

Black veterans had less earnings, on average, and lower rates of marriage and homeownership than White veterans did. Among men whose demographic characteristics were similar, Black veterans earned about 20 percent less than White veterans did, on average.

In 2023, about 18 percent of veterans who had served in the military since the start of the first Gulf War were Black. A limited but growing body of research has examined the relationship between military service and economic outcomes of Black veterans, the largest minority group ever to have served. In this report, the Congressional Budget Office describes several economic outcomes of veterans who are Black, male, and working age (ages 22 to 54) and whose service began during or after August 1990. Using data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), CBO compared the outcomes of that group with outcomes of Black nonveterans and White veterans from 2017 to 2019.

CBO found the following:

• Black veterans had more earnings, higher rates of marriage and homeownership, and greater educational attainment than Black nonveterans did.
• The average earnings of Black veterans and Black nonveterans did not differ among men with similar demographic characteristics (age, marital status, level of education, and region of residence).
• Black veterans had less earnings and lower rates of marriage and homeownership than White veterans did. Educational attainment was much the same for the two groups. Among men whose demographic characteristics were similar, Black veterans earned about 20 percent less than White veterans did, on average.
• Black veterans were more likely than White veterans to have disability ratings from VA, and their ratings were higher, on average. (VA disability ratings generally reflect the severity of a veteran’s service-connected conditions and are the basis for disability payments. The higher the rating, the more severe the conditions.) A larger percentage of Black veterans than White veterans received VA disability compensation and health care; but a greater share of White veterans used VA-supported home loans.

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60043

[DOR]

The Cost of the Coast Guard’s Polar Security Cutter
CBO Aug 21, 2024

On April 23, 2019, the Coast Guard awarded a contract to VT Halter Marine to build the first of a class of new heavy polar icebreakers, called the Polar Security Cutter (PSC). The service plans to name the first ship the Polar Sentinel. On December 29, 2021, the Coast Guard exercised an option under that contract to have Halter Marine build the second ship of the class. Halter Marine was subsequently purchased by Bollinger Shipyards in November 2022 and renamed Bollinger Mississippi Shipbuilding.

Construction of the lead ship in the PSC program has been plagued by delays and cost overruns. In February 2024, the Coast Guard notified the Congress that the ship would experience cost growth in excess of 20 percent and a schedule delay in excess of one year. Despite a contract awarded five years ago, full construction of the lead ship has not begun, although the service is aiming to start by the end of calendar year 2024.

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60170

The Deferred Maintenance Backlog for the Military Services’ Buildings
CBO Aug 22, 2024
The Department of Defense (DoD) has thousands of buildings on its bases. Together, the buildings cost several billion dollars each year to maintain, but funding for the task has regularly fallen short of the amounts that the department estimates would keep them all in working order. As a result, DoD faces a backlog of maintenance.

For this report, the Congressional Budget Office analyzed the condition of more than 100,000 buildings that the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy use and maintain on their bases in the United States and its territories. On the basis of data provided by the services, which were current as of September 2020, CBO found the following:

• Total Deferred Maintenance. The four services had about $50 billion in deferred maintenance on their bases; the Army and the Navy accounted for about 70 percent of the backlog.
• Deferred Maintenance Costs per Building and per Square Foot. The Marine Corps and the Navy had higher deferred maintenance costs, on both a per-building and a per–square-foot basis, because their buildings were reported to be in worse condition than the other services’ buildings.
• Buildings With High Replacement Values. The Air Force’s and the Navy’s buildings with the highest replacement costs, or (in DoD’s parlance) replacement values, tended to be in the best condition.
• The Aging of Buildings. The Marine Corps had, on average, newer buildings than the other services had, but the Marine Corps’ buildings appeared to degrade faster as they age.

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60192

[DOR]

Availability and Use of Aircraft in the Army
September 5, 2024 CBO Report

In analyzing the availability and use of aircraft by the U.S. Army from 2000 to 2023, CBO found that the number of manned aircraft has decreased and availability has increased. Average flying hours per aircraft have fallen since 2011.

In this report, the Congressional Budget Office analyzes patterns in the availability and use of aircraft by the U.S. Army from 2000 to 2023. CBO looks at availability—a measure of the percentage of time aircraft can be flown for training or missions—and flying hours, both in total and per aircraft.

Here are CBO’s findings about the fleet’s size, availability, and use:

• Size. As of 2023, the Army had about 3,900 manned aircraft, most of which were helicopters. The service had an additional 700 large unmanned aerial systems (commonly called drones). Since 2000, the number of manned Army aircraft has generally declined.
• Availability. Unlike the Air Force and the Department of the Navy, the Army experienced an upward trend in the availability of its aircraft from 2000 to 2023. In 2023, the Army’s average availability rate for manned aircraft was 68 percent—that is, those aircraft were in the possession of operational squadrons and capable of being flown for missions for 68 percent of total possible hours. Since 2005, availability of H-60 Black Hawk helicopters (the Army’s largest fleet) has generally been increasing.
• Use. The Army used its helicopters more during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan than at other times over the 2000–2023 period. Total flying hours for manned aircraft peaked in 2008 (at 1.22 million), and average flying hours per aircraft peaked in 2011 (at 302). In 2023, manned aircraft flew for 0.77 million hours, and the average aircraft flew for 198 hours.
• Recent changes. Aircraft availability rates Army-wide increased during the initial months of the coronavirus pandemic, whereas flying hours markedly declined. Both availability and use returned to near-normal levels by early in fiscal year 2021.

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60683

[DOR]

Availability and Use of Rotary-Wing Aircraft in the Department of Defense
CBO, Nov 18, 2024
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60663

In this report, the Congressional Budget Office analyzes patterns in the availability and use of rotary-wing aircraft by three military departments within the Department of Defense (DoD): the Army, the Department of the Navy (DoN, which includes the Marine Corps), and the Air Force. A fleet’s availability rate is the percentage of aircraft that are possessed by operational squadrons (and not receiving maintenance in a depot) and available to be flown.

• Fleet Sizes. As of September 2023, DoD had about 5,400 rotary-wing aircraft. The Army had about 3,700; DoN had about 1,400; and the Air Force had about 300. Almost half of those rotary-wing aircraft were versions of H-60 transport helicopters.
• Availability and Use Among the Services. In recent years, availability rates of the Army’s rotary-wing aircraft have been greater than availability rates of the Air Force’s and DoN’s aircraft. But DoN has flown its rotary-wing aircraft more hours per aircraft than the Air Force or Army has.
• Age, Availability, and Use of Aircraft. DoN replaced much of its rotary-wing fleet in the first half of the 2010s. The average age of the Army’s rotary-wing aircraft (around 16 years) has remained relatively constant since 2000. The Air Force’s rotary-wing aircraft appear to be older, on average, than those operated by the other services. But that is because when the Air Force rebuilds its helicopters, it does not renumber them like the other services do.

DoN’s H-60s show a marked decline in availability rates in the first five years of operation—more so than the other services’ H-60s. Similarly, although the availability and use of aircraft typically diminish with age, the decrease in availability and use of DoN’s V-22 tiltrotor aircraft is nonetheless noteworthy.

[DOR]

An Analysis of the Navy’s 2025 Shipbuilding Plan

The Navy’s shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2025 described the composition of its fleet over the next 30 years. Under that plan, CBO estimates, the fleet would comprise 390 ships in 2054.
CBO estimates that total shipbuilding costs would average about $40 billion per year (in 2024 dollars) over the next 30 years, which is 17 percent more than the Navy estimates. The Navy’s total budget would increase from $255 billion today to about $340 billion (in 2024 dollars) in 2054.

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60732