Bring Back The Iowa Class Discussion And Debate

[Gun Grape]

(M21 Sniper)

Guess what. That's well within the engagement envelope of the S-300 and S-400 SAM systems.

......

That's in the engagement envelope of the Vietnam era SA-2, let alone modern systems.

(Gun Grape)

And your BB has to get within range of every threat aircraft with bombs, AShM and diesel subs known to man. All without the ability to protect herself. The planes at least have countermeasures.

(M21 Sniper)
GPS is a wonderful thing. Exactly why we should incorporate it into the DARPA 13" and 11" sabot shells as tested in the 1980s.

(Gun Grape)

Not tested in the 80s they never got off the drawing board. Its been said one was fired after the program was stopped. Show me the 40 + mile range at Indian head and I’ll believe it. Or who paid for an unauthorized test firing? Any idea of the accuracy? The point being JDAM, JSOW and TacTom are already in inventory. No need for research and designing fuses and control surfaces.

(M21 Sniper)
There are competing theories as to what happened, but the gunners mates manning the turrets were quite well trained, and manning levels have nothing to do with the explosion theories espoused by anyone.

(Gun Grape)

Need to read the GAO report GAO/T-NSIAD-90-46

“We found that, as a result of the Navy’s assignment process, the
Iowa and the battleships were assigned a disproportionably low
percentage of enlisted supervisory personnel, including gunners
mates and fire controlmen, when compared to a selected sample of
other ships. Also, we corroborated the Iowa’s former Commanding
Officer’s perception that the quality of manning on the battleships
was lower than that for naval ships on average.”


(M21 Sniper)
The 2700lb Mk8 AP round is a sub MOA projectile, and achieves significantly better point accuracy, as demonstrated during actual combat operations off the coast of Beirut in the 1980s.

(Gun Grape)

She shot like Crap. Went there, saw that, got the CAR. If you were around at the time, many bad things were said about her lack of effectivness. MAybe why arty was called on to take out the power plant.

(M21 Sniper)

Since when is comparing unguided projectiles with guided munitions fair? Apples to Oranges lad, apples to oranges.

(Gun Grape)

Why? We use JSOW/JDAM/TacTom for fire support now. Its part of the triad. So I am comparing apples to apples. Current weapons that are used and weapons the BBs would use if brought out of retirement with service 16"/50 rounds.



(M21 Sniper)
That's because the lethal radius of the 16" HHC-VT projectile is so massive. The DCZ is entirely dependent on the projectiles fuzing- as you full well know. The DCZ is 750 meters for QT fuzed 16" HC shells.

Of course, i've already told you that in three separate threads now.

(Gun Grape)

And what Fire support handbook are you using? Or Ft Sill reference?
Please post. I'm still using my class material from the NGF Spotter course in 1992. A 1990s version of the fire support handbook


(M21 Sniper)
" Not anymore they're not. Do you think i make this shiit up or something? All mission related electronics were removed/are being removed from the S-3, and regardless, it's slated for retirement.

(Gun Grape)

They are used in the anti surface warfare role. All ASW electronics were removed with the A models. But as you said they will soon be gone. Most of the Sea control squadrons (VS)were disbanded last year. I think there are only about 4 left


(M21 sniper)
The B-52 Harpoon capability was removed in the 1990s. I've told you THAT three times now too.

(Gun Grape)

And you have been wrong 3 times. Capability was removed from the Gs when they retired in the 94. The H model now carries them.


"And how many Burkes and Ticos do we already have that, without mods already have DPICM and AEGIS. Not a reason to bring back BBs."

There is no 5" submunition round in service in the USN.

(Gun Grape)
No but there is submunition rounds with Tomahawk. Part of that fires triad.


(M21 Sniper)
Yeah, but you got it all figured out, right Marine? You know what all the experts at USNFSA who have commited years of their life wrt the BBs don't....

(Gun Grape)

I do have a problem with them lying, as shown by RICKUSN. Of them using HARP data as if it was just a regular 16” gun and could transition to firable results. Statements such as SCRAMJETS fired from Bulls guns and other BS like that.


(M21 Sniper)
Sorry skippy, the 13" rounds were developed and test fired. The 11" rounds were the ones that never made it off paper..

(Gun Grape)
So whats its designation? It would have been type classified with at least an
The Mk-148 was never a full size prototype. Please list a source other that USNFSA.
The 148 and 149 were under development not test fired and ready for action.

[Gun Grape]

What is it we need the Marines for again? :)

We have the cool uniforms.


Lighten up.

[Bill]

"And they are not within the range of the 5/38s. So once again the 85% of tgts in range and engagable with a BB is a BS statement."

Nope. Since you seem to want to get technical, my initial comment was absolutely correct, since by any standards of measurement, 85% of the DPRK targets are in RANGE of the Iowas main guns.

"But 100% are in range of Ticos and Burkes"

Ticos and Burkes don't come that close to the shore, and they damned sure won't come that close to the coast of the DPRK, which is liberally interlaced with shore-based AShM and artillery batteries. A Tico or Burke that tried to operate within visual sight of the coast of the DPRK would get raped.

"And your BB has to get within range of every threat aircraft with bombs, AShM and diesel subs known to man. All without the ability to protect herself. The planes at least have countermeasures."

An Iowa is utterly immune to land based artillery fires. It is practically immune to anti-ship missiles(assuming it's AAW screen or own multilayed defenses lets missiles through). The only real threat to it would be subs, and i never once proposed operating it as a stand alone asset. Any ship operating within visual range of the beach is susceptible to SSK attacks because land based observers can direct prowling SSKs onto the target. So an Iowa would face no greater risk from subs than any other ship would, and because of it's TDS and great speed it is far better equipped to deal with a torpedo hit than any other ship in USN service, now...or ever.

" Need to read the GAO report GAO/T-NSIAD-90-46"

A report which contradicts the USNs own findings, and the JAGs findings. Like i said, many competing theories.

"She shot like Crap. Went there, saw that, got the CAR. If you were around at the time, many bad things were said about her lack of effectivness. MAybe why arty was called on to take out the power plant."

If you were there then you no doubt are aware that the Iowa operated without any spotter with direct eyes on the target. Given your background, i'm sure you know what that does for accuracy. Since then, a compliment of 5 UAVs were fitted to the Iowas as a result of the Beirut experience, and that fully corrected the problem. And regardless, the New Jersey destroyed a Syrian command bunker 10 stories underground that numerous A-6 sorties had failed to take out. We lost a couple aircraft on those failed sorties as well. The Jersey took out that complex with under a dozen 16" Mk8 AP projectiles.

"Why? We use JSOW/JDAM/TacTom for fire support now. Its part of the triad. So I am comparing apples to apples. Current weapons that are used and weapons the BBs would use if brought out of retirement with service 16"/50 rounds."

We do not use TACTOMs for direct fire support now, that's not what they're made for, nor are they suitable for the role(regardless of what the USN sales team says). They are also far too expensive, far too capable for deep HVA strike, and in too limited a supply for the role.
JSOW is not NGFS, and as such, it is inherently uncapable of fulfilling the USMCs own stated NGFS requirements.

"And what Fire support handbook are you using? Or Ft Sill reference?
Please post. I'm still using my class material from the NGF Spotter course in 1992. A 1990s version of the fire support handbook"

I gave you the listed lethal zone and DCZ as it appears on the USNFSA site for the various fuzings of the Mk13 projectile. If you have a manual that states the actual DCZs for all Mk13 HC projectiles regardless of fuzing as the same figure, i'd be grateful if you gave me the title of the manual, and the page number so i can have it verified. The 2000 meter DCZ with 16" QT and Delay fuzed projectiles is completely beyond reason when viewed against the footprint of the Mk13 16" gun system(which as you stated was 750 meters at the Mk7 16"/50s extreme range) and the lethal zone of QT and especialy delayed fuze projectiles. The VT fuzed projectile does have a 2000 meter DCZ. The others are 750. I've been told that many times by many people familiar with the gunnery system of the Iowas, including an Anglican Marine Sgt(later turned USAF fighter pilot) that posts at my site.

"And you have been wrong 3 times. Capability was removed from the Gs when they retired in the 94. The H model now carries them."

That's not the 'scoop' i got. We had a big debate about this on two separate threads. A USAF B-52 pilot at another board settled the debate for us when he told us that the capability was withdrawn. Maybe he was wrong, but i doubt it. Regardless, the B-52 is not a USN surface asset, and what you're arguing about was my original statement that the SM-2 is the USN's primary surface launched ASuW weapon. It is, regardless of what USAF platforms do or don't carry Harpoon.
I believe i read that the USAF harpoons were also transferred back to the USN.
There's a long thread about it on the EZBoard "History Politics And Current Affairs" website. It's in there somewhere: .http://p074.ezboard.com/fhistorypoli...fairs68862frm9

" No but there is submunition rounds with Tomahawk. Part of that fires triad."|

Tomahawk TACTOM is a theater level weapon, it won't be used as a direct support weapon, nor is it suited to the role in any case. It's simply too slow and too expensive, and carried in too few numbers. Block III and older TLAMS are completely incapable of even attempting direct support fires.

"I do have a problem with them lying, as shown by RICKUSN. Of them using HARP data as if it was just a regular 16” gun and could transition to firable results. Statements such as SCRAMJETS fired from Bulls guns and other BS like that."

All groups use disinformation, misdirection, and yes, even outright lies to advance their cause. Even your beloved Marine Corps bro.(more on this in a subsequent post below)

" So whats its designation? It would have been type classified with at least an
The Mk-148 was never a full size prototype. Please list a source other that USNFSA.
The 148 and 149 were under development not test fired and ready for action."

From a Nov. 2004 GAO report:

"• Desired/Objective range to target could be achieved with previously tested but not fielded advanced (16") projectiles"

There you have it, in black and white, in an official US Government document.
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0539r.pdf

[Bill]

"Lighten up."

I'm breaking your stones Marine. You should expect that from an ex- nasty-assed leg Army grunt. :)

[Bill]

OK, i did some more research on the B-52H harpoon capability.

This is what i found:

When the G's were retired 19 B-52Hs were modified to embark 8 Harpoons each. I could find nothing about the capability being withdrawn from service, so for the sake of argument, we'll assume they weren't...at least for now. ;)

Given the B-52Hs mission readiness rate of 80.5%, that means on average no more than 15 B-52s will be available at any one time for ASuW duties, and those 15 bombers have a global requirement.

What is clear however is that the USNs institutional paranoia has led them to whine about the USAF 'intruding upon long established USN missions', which has prevented the USAF from gaining any support in congress for enhancing it's own ASuW capabilities beyond that of AMRAAM and a few old heavy bombers that are already tasked out the wazoo with myriad other mission requirements.

Of all the services, the USN is by far the most aggravating to study or try to understand.

[Bill]

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0539r.pdf

The above linked report was written by Roscoe G. Bartlett, Chairman, subcommitee of Projection forces, and was prepared on Nov 19th, 2004(less than 7 months ago).

His reccomondation to the GAO?

A comprehensive study into the feasability of reactivation of the two remaining Iowas, and congressional hearings.

Excerpt:

"...Marine Corps supports the strategic purpose of reactivating two battleships in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 and supports the Navy’s modernization efforts to deliver a sufficient NSFS capability that exceeds that of the Iowa class battleships"

Saying the Iowas do not have any political support by those in power is an outright distortion of the truth. The USMC has in the last 7 months publicly stated it supports the reactivation of the remaining two Iowas.

That is pretty damned compelling support.

What the Battleships don't have is any NAVY support.

The USN is in violation of US Law, specifically PL104-106, and there are some in congress that want to smash the navies collective head against the wall over the waste of billions of dollars in developing, and cancelling, and developing, and cancelling, alternative NGFS proposals instead of just reactivating the Iowas to begin with.

I have just found out that there are going to be congressional hearings wrt the lack of NGFS and the possible reactivation of the Iowas in the next few months. The people that are paying the bills are getting increasingly pisssed off at the Navy over this issue.

Why you ask?

ERGM- 5 billion dollars later and counting, is on the verge of cancellation. It's competitors munition is unfunded by the USN.

LASM was cancelled after 100s of millions were invested in it's development.

DD-21 was cancelled after a 1 bn dollar expenditure.

DD-X has now been cut from 28 hulls to 5, and the entire program looks to be in serious trouble of cancellation. So far well over a billion dollars has been spent on that program. Each DD-X is currently projected to cost as much as 3 billion each(and the ship is still a paper design!)

AGS 155mm gun system: Too large to retrofit into Ticos or Burkes, and it is only envisioned by the USN to be embarked on the DD-X. A ship that now appears as if it is going to be spit canned. There goes a couple billion dollars with it...

TACTOM was sold as an NGFS asset when anyone with any sense knows that half million dollar 500kt munitions with a 1500 mile range and embarked in limited numbers by the fleet is NEVER going to be used for direct fire support in all but the most extreme and desperate situations, and that even in such situations it is far from ideal for the role.

CG-X is growing larger and larger with each passing month, and is now so big(on paper) that it's actually more in the battlecruiser displacement range. It will cost so much that i doubt any will ever be built. It is an extremely ambitious program- exactly the kind that repeatedly fails to produce any tangible weapons systems.

We cannot mount amphibious invasions with powerpoint presentations. We can mount them with ships that have proven themselves completely capable of filling the NGFS role in the biggest war the world has ever seen. The Iowas have also proven themselves EXTREMELY capable at naval interdiction fires in Korea, Vietnam, and ODS.

Stay tuned, this fight is not only not over, it's just about to finally warm up for real. :)

BTW, wrt the 'lies' USNFSA told about the inadequacies of the San Francisco berthing site, what was at issue was NOT whether the yard could properly maintain a ship in Cat B, but rather that the site cannot REACTIVATE an Iowa from Cat B. All the people that helped to prepare that GAO report seem to be in agreement that in fact, it cannot. This would include the man that was in charge of overseeing their reactivation in the 80s.

Someones lying, but it's not the USNFSA or the USMC, it's the United States Navy.

USNFSA is a non-profit organization that cares about one thing, and one thing only....the proper support of our amphibious ground forces in the event of amphibious operations, and the USNs surface fleets ability to timely interdict enemy land forces operating in proximity to the enemy coastline with a platform that can go where others dare not tread.

If you want to argue the BBs are not needed you have to argue that the leadership of the USMC doesn't know what it's talking about, that their stated requirements for NGFS fires are completely unfounded, and that airpower alone can fill the almost complete NSFS vacuum that currently exists in the USN, and that artillery systems are no longer required. (an argument which the US Army and USMC have repeatedly rejected out of hand).

[Bill]

"These ships would be equipped with shells developed from the HE-ER Mk 148 program (cancelled after the 1991 decommissioning of the battleships). The Ex-148 was slated to have a range of 91 kilometers using a 13.5-inch (343mm) shell in a sabot. An 11-inch (280mm) version would have had a range of 180 kilometers (equivalent to the 155mm AGS). These shells, at 1,400 pounds/635 kilograms and 694 pounds/315 kilograms respectively, are much larger than the shells from the 127mm and 155mm guns."

http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/002175.html

NOTE: The 11" sabot particularly would have an excellent ballistic coeficient thanks to it's excellent aspect ratio, and such a shell should easily surpass .75 MOA accuracy(which is better than an M-40, M-21, M-24, or M-82/117 sniper rifle). It would also have greatly increased velocity, resulting in less wind effect, and faster time to steel on target.

That is a round that shows tremendous promise while offering very limited engineering risk. A 694lb saboted projectile would also GREATLY reduce the associated DCZ of the Mk7 16" gun system at Mk13 HC ranges, particularly if it was fitted with simple GIF or GAINS guidance(as per the US Army/USN Excalibur 155mm artillery projectile), allowing the full 180km range of the projectile to be used even in DC situations.
GIF/GAINS is proven legacy technology, there is absolutely no factual basis whatsoever to expect that such a munition would face any significant technical or engineering hurdles to field, especially considering that it would require a far less demanding level of miniturization than any of the 155mm guided projectiles already in service around the world.

I can think of about 10 gillion uses for a 694lb precision guided projectile with a range of 180km and a CEP of 40 feet(and a SALH 11" munition would have an even smaller CEP, but would be subject to weather restrictions similar to the Copperhead), ESPECIALLY when combined with a platform that can safely embark 1300+ of those munitions in a triple-layered armored steel citadel as much as 19" thick, featuring global range and a 35kt sprint capability.

One can argue we can't afford that capability(a capability that when all is said and done would cost about the same as 20-25 MV-22 Ospreys), but one cannot possibly say we have no need for such a capability.

At least not with a straight face. ;)

[rickusn]

"...Marine Corps supports the strategic purpose of reactivating two battleships in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 and supports the Navy’s modernization efforts to deliver a sufficient NSFS capability that exceeds that of the Iowa class battleships"

This means they support the status quo of keeping the BB's in CAT B.

The rest of your diatribe comes directly from USNFSA and Im willling to bet dollar to donuts specifically from Ted Yablonsky.

I myself welcome serious hearings on NSFS in particular NGFS.

Unfortunately weve been down this road before and it may be a little too late again this time.

As for your USNSFA explanation of the USS IOWA move its not what they said at the time and is disenguous at best.

Id be interested who in Congress supports them. I havent seen anyone come out publicly yet. And please dont bring up Ted Kennedy.

I'd welcome the BB's back but I dont see it happening.

[Bill]

"This means they support the status quo of keeping the BB's in CAT B."

I don't know how you come to that conclusion when the first line of the USMC statement clearly states, "...Marine Corps supports the strategic purpose of reactivating two battleships in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996"

As far was what comes from Ted Yablonski, i've worked pretty closely with him in the past wrt this issue- so one might more accurately say that many of his diatribes came directly from me. He attempted to recruit me into USNFSA a couple years ago to present the USNFSA case for reactivation in meetings with government agencies and officials(he felt my background would lend me a certain credibility that he lacked), but i declined. Ask him. ;)

"As for your USNSFA explanation of the USS IOWA move its not what they said at the time and is disenguous at best."

I spoke to Ted and asked him what the protest was about, that was the reasoning he gave. He states that all the experts he's spoken to agree that the SF facility is not fit to reactivate an Iowa from Cat B reserve.
I have no reason to not believe him, since, so far as i know, he has never been dishonest with me.
That would include when he told me that a major Defense contractor was going to begin work on guided scramjet projectiles, but could offer no immediate proof. Lo and behold, he produced a P&W document addressed to USNFSA stating that P&W was about to enter into a private venture to develop scramjet powered gun projectiles.

"Id be interested who in Congress supports them. I havent seen anyone come out publicly yet. And please dont bring up Ted Kennedy."

So will i. Hopefully we'll find out when the hearings come to pass. And good ole' Teddy may be persona non grata with us on the right, but there is no doubt the old drunk is still a powerful senior senator. It would be nice to get the old grandstander to work to worthwhile ends....for once.

And seriously, it's VERY hard to find any current info wrt the Battleships from anyone BUT USNFSA, since they have retained all the top battleship experts in their organization(and i mean all the top experts, lol), and the USN itself refuses to do the actual studies neccesary to determine exactly what's involved. That means that by default one is forced to examine the figures for the only side of the case that's being presented- the USNFSA side.

The USN has been completely disingenous wrt the Iowas, their capabilities, their reactivation costs, the state of the current support infrastructure, etc, etc, etc.

[Gun Grape]

(M21 Sniper)
I don't know how you come to that conclusion when the first line of the USMC statement clearly states, "...Marine Corps supports the strategic purpose of reactivating two battleships in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996"

(Gun Grape)

Because thats what the Act of 96 was about. Not bringing them back into service but putting them in Cat B storage.

(M21Sniper)
That would include when he told me that a major Defense contractor was going to begin work on guided scramjet projectiles, but could offer no immediate proof. Lo and behold, he produced a P&W document addressed to USNFSA stating that P&W was about to enter into a private venture to develop scramjet powered gun projectiles.

(Gun Grape)
No it said they were formulating a plan to verify the feesability of hypershell. Heard anything since. Granted that was only 2 1/2 yrs ago but you would think they would give an update. Nothing on google

(M21Sniper]"
A report which contradicts the USNs own findings, and the JAGs findings. Like i said, many competing theories.

(gun grape)
From the same report: GAO/T-NSIAD-90-46
"Also, we corroborated the Iowa’s former Commanding
Officer’s perception that the quality of manning on the battleships was lower than that for naval ships on average.”"

"We also identified some specific training issues. However, because training records were destroyed in the explosion, we could not reconcile the conflicting statements from the former Commanding Officer that his personnel were adequately trained on the day of the explosion and the Navy’s accident investigation report that said they were not."

Heres another quote
From GAO T-NSIAD-91-02 the end report a year later

While we did not find evidence of any systemic serviceability or safety problems aboard the battleships, we did find systemic problems with the adequacy of supervisory personnel levels, including gunners mates and fire controlmen, and problems with Navy training for 16-inch gun operations.

Also, the Navy's investigation of the incident found some safety violations aboard the Iowa and a subsequent investigation by the Navy's Inspector General confirmed that improperly approved experimentation of gunpowder and projectile combinations was being conducted on the day of the accident and had also been conducted before.

While the battleships are very capable weapons platforms and have been included in deployment schedules and operational plans, emerging circumstances limit their utility. The battleships were reactivated to alleviate existing force structure shortfalls and to help meet the 600-ship goal using existing platforms.

With their variety of guns and missiles, the battleships provide an imposing array of firepower. The Tomahawk missiles give them a significant capability for attacking land targets and other surface ships. The Harpoon missiles also contribute to the battleships' capability to operate against hostile surface ships.

-- Most likely part quoted on USNFSA--

“The battleships' 16-inch guns are the best source of naval surface fire support for an amphibious assault and are, in fact, the only guns remaining on Navy ships that are larger than 5 inches. Navy officials said that when compared to air support in an amphibious operation the 16-inch guns, within their range limitations, can deliver more firepower under a wider variety of weather conditions. Because of its
imposing size and configuration, the Navy believes a battleship's presence can be a strong deterrent in a third-world scenario.


What they left out: following paragraphs

While the battleships' Tomahawk and Harpoon missile capability is imposing, it is not unique within the Navy. Many Other Navy vessels, submarines as well as surface ships, carry those same weapons. Also, the battleships' contribution to future amphibious warfare may be limited. The 16-inch guns' current maximum range of just over 23 miles impairs the ships' ability to provide effective
naval surface fire support within the context of an "over the horizon" amphibious assault-- one launched from 25 to 50 miles offshore and extending far inland. This range limitation has been noted in Navy documents.

Finally, as the world security environment changes, because ships other than battleships have an excellent strike warfare capability, and because of limits on the battleships' ability to support a large scale amphibious assault; the Navy's need to maintain the battleships is questionable. The planned decommissioning of two battleships, including the Iowa, also raises questions about the usefulness and supportability of the other two ships in the active fleet.

Budget constraints led to the decision to decommission two of the four battleships. The battleships are costly to maintain and difficult to man and, until the ships' unique contributions in the Middle East can be evaluated, mission-related questions concerning their contributions remain.

For these reasons, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to reevaluate the battleships' utility in the light of known constraints and limitations and, unless current Middle East operations convincingly demonstrate their unique utility, direct that the Secretary of the Navy decommission the Missouri and the Wisconsin.




(M21 Sniper)
If you were there then you no doubt are aware that the Iowa operated without any spotter with direct eyes on the target. Given your background, i'm sure you know what that does for accuracy. Since then, a compliment of 5 UAVs were fitted to the Iowas as a result of the Beirut experience, and that fully corrected the problem. And regardless, the New Jersey destroyed a Syrian command bunker 10 stories underground that numerous A-6 sorties had failed to take out. We lost a couple aircraft on those failed sorties as well. The Jersey took out that complex with under a dozen 16" Mk8 AP projectiles.


(Gun Grape)

Over 30 hit the CP out of over 300 fired that day. Bet you got that under a doz number from Stearmans group also. And it wasn't just UAVs and they didn't fix the problem. Same complaints were brought up again after Desert Storm about accuracy. We not only had ground observers but fire finder radar was there also.
Don't know if they were involved in that paticular mission. Still a Lance Corporal, not high enough on the food chain to hear those discussions. Regardless they had their Mk 8 that are suppose to do the job.

But heres a question about those UAVs? If a Fixed wing manned aircraft cannot get within 120nm range to launch JSOW, as you argue, How do you expect a UAV to make it in and be used for TA?



(M21 Sniper)
We do not use TACTOMs for direct fire support now, that's not what they're made for, nor are they suitable for the role. They are also far too expensive and in too limited a supply for the role.
JSOW is not NGFS, and as such, it is inherently uncapable of fulfilling the USMCs own stated NGFS requirements.


(Gun Grape)
They are all part of the Fire Support Triad. And as it stands the Marine Corps says that BB as configured now do not meet the NSFS requirements. You seem to forget that its not just NGF that will be in the show.

(M21Sniper)
I gave you the listed lethal zone and DCZ as it appears on the USNFSA site for the various fuzings of the Mk13 projectile. If you have a manual that states the actual DCZs for all Mk13 HC projectiles regardless of fuzing as the same figure, i'd be grateful if you gave me the title of the manual, and the page number so i can verify it personally. The 2000 meter DCZ with 16" QT and Delay fuzed projectiles is completely beyond reason when viewed against the footprint of the Mk13 16" projectile and the lethal zone of QT and especialy delayed fuze projectiles. The VT fuzed projectile does have a 2000 meter DCZ. The others are 750. I've been told that many times by many people familiar with the gunnery system of the Iowas, including an Anglican Marine Sgt(later turned USAF fighter pilot) that posts at my site.


(Gun Grape)

OK, you made me dig through the seabags of useless junk to find a FM-6-30. TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR OBSERVED FIRE.

8-31. 16-INCH NAVAL GUNFIRE MISSIONS

Adjusting fire from the 16-inch guns of a battleship is somewhat different than adjusting that from the 5-inch guns.

a. Characteristics. The 16-inch gun produces a significantly larger dispersion pattern than does the 5-inch. The pattern is about 150 meters (or greater) wide and 500 meters (or greater) long. The pattern depends on the terrain, target range, and number of guns in effect. The observer should expect 2 to 5 minutes between transmitting a correction and shot of the next salvo.

Table 8-2 list DC distances as

HE Quick 1000 meters
HE /CVT or ICM 2000 meters

My notes from coronado say to use 2 thous as a rule of thumb for all 16 in. But I cannot give you a FMFM or other official reference.

FYI 5” NGF has a 750Meter DC distance. Which is also the min distance for any cal of Naval guns. Same reference FM 6-30. Guns are crappy s h o o t e r s. Just like the old M-107 175mm gun that the Army and Marines had. Long dispersion and the habit of skipping rounds. Thats why they went away when we got a decent 8" how.

[Bill]

GG, i'll respond to all this tommorow, i'm flat whooped right now(out in the 93degree heat all day after getting all of 3 hrs sleep last night).

[Bill]

"Because thats what the Act of 96 was about. Not bringing them back into service but putting them in Cat B storage."

The marine corps statement clearly says "Marine corps supports the strategic purpose of REACTIVATING the two remaining Iowa class Battleships".

Note that it does not say 'marine corps supports maintaining for reactivation'(a state they are already in), but Marine corps suppports...'REACTIVATING the remaining two Iowa class battleships.'

IOW, the Marine Corps views the strategic purpose of reactivating two Iowas as sound, and supports that course of action.

This is pretty simple english, and is very clearly lacking in ambiguity as to what the Marine Corps supports. I'm surprised you're arguing this point, it's blatantly obvious what the Marine Corps statement means.

"No it said they were formulating a plan to verify the feesability of hypershell. Heard anything since."

You don't seriously expect them to keep the general public updated via email on what is highly sensitive technological data? You should try to email their PA dep't and see what they tell you. I'm sure they'll be completley forthcoming wrt any progress they've made... ;)

They'll say something to the effect of, "P&W is dedicated to the pursuit of many advanced engine technologies, and scramjet propulsion is among them. Unfortunately because of the sensitive nature of our work in these fields, we are unable to go into any specific program details".

I'm sure the P&W PA people speak excellenet legalese... ;)

"Granted that was only 2 1/2 yrs ago but you would think they would give an update. Nothing on google"

Email them.

As far as the results of the investigation to the explosion in turret two, your own posts just reinforce that no one knows for sure what happened, and that multiple theories have been advanced by informed parties. The USN has it's own official conclusion, but it is by no means beyond debate among people that have knowledge of the incident(the fact that there are still competing theories is proof of this).
Christ, the USN and JAG at first tried to peg it on a murder-suicide, so i don't exactly take everything they say as gospel.

"The battleships' 16-inch guns are the best source of naval surface fire support for an amphibious assault and are, in fact, the only guns remaining on Navy ships that are larger than 5 inches. Navy officials said that when compared to air support in an amphibious operation the 16-inch guns, within their range limitations, can deliver more firepower under a wider variety of weather conditions. Because of its
imposing size and configuration, the Navy believes a battleship's presence can be a strong deterrent in a third-world scenario."

All of that has been borne out by actual combat operations, i don't disagree with any of it. The only thing i would modify is that the "16" guns are the best potential source of NGFS for amphibious forces". I say potential because they are obviously currently inactive, and because i believe that improved shells would be a neccesity to get the Iowas to perform to the rigidly stated USMC surface fire support requirements, informal as they may be. However, the improved legacy rounds i've already discussed would easily totally meet the USMCs own stated requirements(specifically a production shell based on the 11.5" EX-149 with simple GAINS/GIF guidance and RAP).

"While the battleships' Tomahawk and Harpoon missile capability is imposing, it is not unique within the Navy."

At one time it was(the Thawk that is), but not anymore. What is unique within the navy is a vessel clad in triple layered steel plating designed to stop guns of it's own caliber....which is the other unique thing about the Iowas, their 9 Mk7 16"/50 rifles.

"Many Other Navy vessels, submarines as well as surface ships, carry those same weapons."

Yet the USN felt a need to convert four Ohio SSGNs at great expense(1 billion+ per hull) to add another 700 tubes? Tubes that we do not even have the stockpiles to fill?

Well, that's sound logic...errrr.....

"Also, the battleships' contribution to future amphibious warfare may be limited. The 16-inch guns' current maximum range of just over 23 miles impairs the ships' ability to provide effective
naval surface fire support within the context of an "over the horizon" amphibious assault-- one launched from 25 to 50 miles offshore and extending far inland. This range limitation has been noted in Navy documents."

Yes, and the same USN documents have also stated that the Iowa can largely overcome it's limitations (as currently configured) by simply operating closer to shore. This is an option that is viable for the Iowas, but NOT viable for Ticos or DDG51s because of their lack of armored protection. Also, the 5" gun system has 10nm less range than the 16"/50, so as it stands a Tico or Burke would have to get REAL close to shore to provide fires 10 miles inland. 10 miles CLOSER than an Iowa would to shoot to the same distance.

How that's a disadvantadge for the Iowa and a plus for currently in service warship classes is COMPLETLEY beyond reason.

"Finally, as the world security environment changes, because ships other than battleships have an excellent strike warfare capability, and because of limits on the battleships' ability to support a large scale amphibious assault; the Navy's need to maintain the battleships is questionable."

It is questionable. But when those questions are asked one by one, and answered one by one, the idea of reactivating them is EXTREMELY attractive.

"The planned decommissioning of two battleships, including the Iowa, also raises questions about the usefulness and supportability of the other two ships in the active fleet."

That refers to the deactivation of the first two, and to be honest, it raises no additional questions to me. 2 would be twice as easy to reactivate and support than 4 would.

That's just simple friggin' commonsense.

"Budget constraints led to the decision to decommission two of the four battleships."

Yeah, cause we saved a whooping 1.2 million a year by decomming Jersey and Missouri.

Whew....thank god we got that budget relief!?!?!?!

"The battleships are costly to maintain and difficult to man and, until the ships' unique contributions in the Middle East can be evaluated, mission-related questions concerning their contributions remain."

And IMO, and the opinion of many who are familiar with this debate(like RickUSN for instance, lol), those questions have been suitably answered for our tastes.

"For these reasons, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to reevaluate the battleships' utility in the light of known constraints and limitations and, unless current Middle East operations convincingly demonstrate their unique utility, direct that the Secretary of the Navy decommission the Missouri and the Wisconsin."

He did, and the United States congress reversed their decision and passed a LAW that two of them MUST be retained in CATB until the USN can demonstrate it has replaced them with systems that offer equal capability.

The USN has OBVIOUSLY not done that, and is NOWHERE NEAR CLOSE to doing that.

"Over 30 hit the CP out of over 300 fired that day. Bet you got that under a doz number from Stearmans group also. And it wasn't just UAVs and they didn't fix the problem. Same complaints were brought up again after Desert Storm about accuracy. We not only had ground observers but fire finder radar was there also."

No, i got that from a former sailor at military.com that was ON the Jersey during the Beirut campaign.

The official DoD findings after ODS found the Battleships to have been extremely effective platforms as a whole, and that they provided adequate accuracy with their 16" gun systems despite worn barrel liners and obsolete munitions.
I've read the report, so has Rick.

"But heres a question about those UAVs? If a Fixed wing manned aircraft cannot get within 120nm range to launch JSOW, as you argue, How do you expect a UAV to make it in and be used for TA?"

Well for one thing UAVs are much smaller, and have a much lower RCS(especially modern ones, which presumably a modernized IOWA would embark), and UAVs don't have a pilot, and are a lot cheaper. Who gives a shiit if one gets shot down(The USAF has lost dozens of Preadators in Iraq and Afghanistan)...just launch another one. Regardless, GAINS guidance would render the need for UAVs from critical to luxury. With GAINS guidance all you need is a 10 digit grid supplied by any asset(up to and including a satellite or SpecOps operator) and you can get tremendous accuracy with satellite or boots on the ground BDA. The UAVs right now are very important because adjusting rounds are needed. With GAINS guidance, that is no longer the case.(GAINS= GPS Aided Internal Navigation System).

"(Gun Grape)
They are all part of the Fire Support Triad. And as it stands the Marine Corps says that BB as configured now do not meet the NSFS requirements. You seem to forget that its not just NGF that will be in the show."

The marine corps states that the Iowas can meet their requirements if they do not adhere to the same standoff threshold required for other surface combatants. The Iowas are uniquely well suited to operate close to the enemy coastline, and therefore they can meet the USMCs requirements provided the standoff restriction is waived.

Whatever they tell us in the civvie world about what TACTOM is intended to do, it only takes a glance at the weapons specifications to see that direct fire is NOT what it's designed to do. It's low 500kt flight speed, high per unit cost, and limited availability in the fleet will dictate that it will be used for engaging and destroying HVAs, not for shooting a particularly annoying machinegun nest or fortification. TACTOM is a tremendously useful strategic weapon and very expensive($500k per), it is NOT going to be wasted on supporting ground troops, which is fine, because it's too slow for the mission. That's why LASM excelled for direct ground support...it's Mach 3.5 flight speed put rounds on target faster than even orbiting CAS can. The only systems that could react quicker than LASM are mortars, land based artillery, and the units own organic rotary aviation assets(if it has any assigned, not all units do). LASM also had a perfectly sized 165lb blast/frag warhead, but it was ultimately far too expensive for direct support either.

"OK, you made me dig through the seabags of useless junk to find a FM-6-30. TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR OBSERVED FIRE."

Excellent. :)

"8-31. 16-INCH NAVAL GUNFIRE MISSIONS

Adjusting fire from the 16-inch guns of a battleship is somewhat different than adjusting that from the 5-inch guns.

a. Characteristics. The 16-inch gun produces a significantly larger dispersion pattern than does the 5-inch. The pattern is about 150 meters (or greater) wide and 500 meters (or greater) long. The pattern depends on the terrain, target range, and number of guns in effect. The observer should expect 2 to 5 minutes between transmitting a correction and shot of the next salvo.

Table 8-2 list DC distances as

HE Quick 1000 meters
HE /CVT or ICM 2000 meters"

Heh, thanks dude. I've wanted those figures for a LONG time. You da man sailor. :)

"My notes from coronado say to use 2 thous as a rule of thumb for all 16 in. But I cannot give you a FMFM or other official reference."

I believe you. Restrictions that contradict the actual manual such as what you're talking about are put in place on a lot of systems, but there is always a TO or revision to that effect. I'm sure it exists somewhere, i guess that's something else i'll add to my 'to find' list.

Appreciate the info you did give greatly. :)

"FYI 5” NGF has a 750Meter DC distance. Which is also the min distance for any cal of Naval guns. Same reference FM 6-30. Guns are crappy s h o o t e r s. Just like the old M-107 175mm gun that the Army and Marines had. Long dispersion and the habit of skipping rounds. Thats why they went away when we got a decent 8" how."

Well as you and i both know, DC is just a 'guideline'. A ground commander can call rounds literally right on top of his position if the situation calls for it. It's happened many times in the past.

Based on the info posted above from the FM, it would seem to me that the minimum range one would want to employ 16" HC QT gunfire in a scenario where you're shooting over your ground forces position would be about 750 meters from friendly troops(this would still give about a 250 meter buffer zone for short rounds, and place the lethal fragmentation radius 150 meters long of a friendly position with QT when rounds do fall short, which is right in line with what the former Anglican Sgt on my site stated. So that all makes sense.

If you're shooting perpendicular to friendly forces, and the rounds will be approaching at close to a 90 degree angle to friendly forces, you can use the deflection dispersion rating of 150 meters + lethal radius, or about 250-300 meters.

Of course for adjusting rounds you'd want to start much farther out to ensure you don't accidentally zap your entire platoon if there is a grid or radio error, lol. But once you got the ranging down you could adjust each round in subsequently closer until the rounds were on target, then call for the FFE. I've called quite a lot of firemissions in my day myself, even though i've never worked with the 16" guns(or for that matter any naval system), the same basic principles apply.

In peacetime training, 2000 meters for all 16" fire is VERY SOUND procedure IMO, but in wartime, i'd call it in as close as i had to. When it comes down to the bottom line, i'd rather be obliterated by my own guns than be overrun by the enemy. Of course, that could just be me...

[sparten]

Just a thought, how well would a 60 years old hull bear up to service? The marine corp feels it the weight of naval gun power to support amphibious landing. A good idea may well be to dust up the old Montana-Class design and build a new. Though I doubt Congress would ever approve it.

[Bill]

I can't even begin to imagine what it would cost to build a new modernized Montana from the keel up nowadays.

If i had to take a WAG- $10 billion a pop.

If we want battleships and all that they can and do offer...it's the Iowas or nothing.

[rickusn]

Posts: 7,368 "Because thats what the Act of 96 was about. Not bringing them back into service but putting them in Cat B storage."

The marine corps statement clearly says "Marine corps supports the strategic purpose of REACTIVATING the two remaining Iowa class Battleships".

Note that it does not say 'marine corps supports maintaining for reactivation'(a state they are already in), but Marine corps suppports...'REACTIVATING the remaining two Iowa class battleships.'

Sorry Sniper but your CLEARLY mistaken.

The USMC does NOT and I repeat does NOT support reactivating the battleships.

Wish they did then it would be a done deal. LOL

Your a smart man.

Why you have allied yourself with USNFSA is mind-boggling.

Prove me wrong ...Im waiting... and have been for years.......

Hell you even know my DAD served on the Wisconsin.

But its high time ya'll bring something to the table.

Havent seen it yet. As much as I would like to.

The Battleships dont fit with the USMC's vision of OMFTS so until the USMC changes THEIR vision it wont happen.

Think this:

OSPREY not compatiple

AAAV not compatiple

Of course NOW the USMC is running scared Oprey and AAAV could be canceled at ay moment.

But nowhere, anyone in the USMC is stating thaty Battleships need to be reactivated NOW.

OTOH the USMC does have power. The USNFSA never has, does not now, and is likely never to.

However you can prove me wrong.

The clock as usual is ticking. LOL