Scorpene submarine secrets leaked

[SteveDaPirate]

The stunning leak, which runs to 22,400 pages and has been seen by The Australian, details the entire secret combat capability of the six Scorpene-class submarines that French shipbuilder DCNS has designed for the Indian Navy.

A variant of the same French-designed Scorpene is also used by the navies of Malaysia, Chile and, from 2018, Brazil, so news of the Edward Snowden-sized leak — *revealed today — will trigger alarm at the highest level in these countries. Marked “Restricted Scorpene India”, the DCNS documents detail the most sensitive combat capabilities of India’s new $US3 bn ($3.9bn) submarine fleet and would provide an intelligence bonanza if obtained by India’s strategic rivals, such as Pakistan or China...

The secret information from the leaked documents reveal:

• The stealth capabilities of the six new Indian Scorpene submarines
• The frequencies at which the subs gather intelligence
• The levels of noise the subs make at various speeds
• Diving depths, range and endurance
• Magnetic, electromagnetic and infra-red data
• Specifications of the submarine’s torpedo launch system and the combat system
• Speed and conditions needed for using the periscope
• Propeller’s noise specifications
• Radiated noise levels when the submarine surfaces

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/nati...aaa0a4d42db39e
http://www.defensenews.com/articles/...ne-design-leak

[SteveDaPirate]

I wonder if this will "torpedo" Australia's plans for a Collins replacement?

[Cactus]

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-e...?homepage=true

While some of India’s veteran submariners have described the leak as a storm in a teacup, others fear that the credibility of the platform may have been compromised

Submarines are generally shrouded in opacity given the intrinsic nature of the underwater domain they operate in and the traditional secrecy that surrounds them as a platform. This rule of thumb was given a startling turn last week when The Australian newspaper put out certain documents reported to be part of a 22,400-page tome pertaining to the Indian Scorpene submarine currently being built in collaboration with the French company DCNS.

Clearly the matter was serious enough for Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar to be woken up at midnight on Tuesday to be apprised about what could be a very serious security breach, for the Australian news report suggested that all the significant design parameters of the Indian Scorpene were now in the public domain. If this report was indeed accurate, this exigency would compromise the credibility of the Indian submarine and render it a sitting duck even before the first Scorpene is formally inducted into the Indian Navy by the end of this year.

Who leaked the documents?

The initial government response was predictably cautious and defensive, and the Minister referred to the possibility of hacking. It was also suggested that the leak had not occurred from the Indian end, and an investigation would be carried out to establish the veracity of the leaked document and its correspondence to the Indian Scorpene programme.

The French company initially sought to place the onus on India for this breach of data security but backed off after more details emerged. Sources in Paris now concede that it is probably a theft by a former DCNS employee. It is now reported that the person behind this startling and massive leak of submarine documents is an anonymous Australian citizen who will surrender the computer disk containing all 22,400 pages to the government in Canberra.

Types of security breach

Two types of security breach merit review. The first pertains to the contractual obligations that devolve upon DCNS as a company that is the principal supplier, and the degree to which it is responsible for this leak of documents. One version that is currently doing the rounds alludes to a former employee of DCNS, Paris, having obtained the data over the years and covertly taking it to a Southeast Asian location for commercial purposes.

...

The DNA of the submarine is its opacity, and what makes it vulnerable to detection is its distinctive acoustic signature, or the fingerprint of each boat. An adversary spends years trying to acquire this profile by tracking a boat on patrol, a pattern witnessed between the U.S. and Soviet navies during the Cold War decades.

The dynamic part of this spectrum relates to the frequencies related to the sonar (the device used to detect the target) and the propulsion noise at different speeds and depths. Will the Indian Scorpene be compromised if this technical data is released by The Australian?

The dynamic spectrum will be determined only after the final sea trials, and the data leaked may pertain to a broad design bandwidth. This could be tweaked through software changes but what may be a challenge is the propeller-related acoustics. This is the structural part of the acoustic signature and varies from boat to boat. In the event that such basic propulsion/cavitation design data is leaked, advanced digital signal processing could provide many useful clues to an adversary in the tactical domain. Has this happened, thereby making the Kalveri a sitting duck?

...

Commodore (Retd.) C. Uday Bhaskar is Director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi.

Looking to gf0012-aust's take on this.

On the political front, the French seem to be running a rough stretch in India -- first Rafale, now the Scorpene.

[kato]

If this was 30 years ago the newspaper's offices would probably have suffered a spontaneous gas tank combustion in front of the house by now.

The real problem is that the guy was supposedly running around SEA for five years with the data. "Coincidentally" around the same time as Indonesia shortlisting DCNS for a possible Scorpene buy.

[Oracle]

I got this, Scorpene Leak: Safety of Indian Crew Depends on Radiated Noise Frequencies Remaining Secret.
This is probably the leaked document, only 11 pages to read.

Early morning news, Scorpene leak: French defence firm DCNS moves Aussie court for injunction against 'The Australian'

The move by DCNS comes after a former commander of US Pacific fleet Submarine Force warned that the leaks would undermine the confidence in the ability of French companies to protect classified information.

Rear Admiral (Retd) John Padgett, who is also the president of the US Naval Submarine League, has said that aggressive action needed to be taken to probe the leak and that France should share the outcome with Australia.

The secret data included details of the capabilities of SM39 anti-ship missile expected to be used on the Scorpene and classified information about the number of targets the missile was capable of processing.

Explaining the implications of the leak, Admiral Padgett said "It is never good for an opponent to have your playbook."

"As a member of NATO, the French government and French military demonstrate that they enforce effective security controls and have a solid reputation with their allies," he said.

He said the investigation had to determine exactly how the breach occurred and what "aggressive action" would be taken to correct deficient security controls.

[gf0012-aust]

it's not a good look for the french

when I was contracting we were paid serious money to map the acoustics of different subs - I am kind of gobsmacked that some of the info released was classified by the French as "RESTRICTED" as in other NATO and 5 Eyes partners that material would have rated higher and been placed on a separate network (which also invites different restrictions on the use of portable devices on that network)

there will be some justified clear concerns for the US re RAN modified Barracudas re IP protection - and if any of this is as true as inferred, then it will be raising "I told you so's" about some of the concerns about a french selection in the first place

If I was the IndGov I would be pretty cranky, especially if some of the IndNav operating procedures have been compromised by release of that material

But, the issue is how true any of the info is before you can really assess the extent of any damage. I would have assumed that the French would be requesting a court order to hand over what info "The Australian" has in its possession - and if I was the IndGov I would certainly be considering the same - even though its been heavily redacted etc...

I would imagine that if the french don't handle this properly, then it will flow on to other French product under consideration by India.

All in all, on the surface of it, its an absolute cluster. An internal walk out, debatable classification, debatable whether state secrets have been held on the wrong level network and then trying to trivialise it as well as inferring that it was an Indian sec leak and not internal is just bad bad bad all around

(the responses in that ToI article are ridiculous as well)

Cross post to DT (article on how the material came to hand)
http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/na...05/#post313806

[Oracle]

The document is from 2011. It's 2016 now, and it's probably going to take another 6 months to a year for the first Scorpene to go for sea-trials.

How much/many changes could the document have been through till say 2014 (?, I'm assuming the documents were freezed somewhere around mid 2014 or later, for construction to begin, after satisfactory negotiations between DCNS, IN and Indian MoD ), for this leak to be negligible, in view of Indian defense procurement traits, for e.g buying jets from France, updated avionics from an Israeli company.

[gf0012-aust]

The document is from 2011. It's 2016 now, and it's probably going to take another 6 months to a year for the first Scorpene to go for sea-trials.

How much/many changes could the document have been through till say 2014 (?, I'm assuming the documents were freezed somewhere around mid 2014 or later, for construction to begin, after satisfactory negotiations between DCNS, IN and Indian MoD ), for this leak to be negligible, in view of Indian defense procurement traits, for e.g buying jets from France, updated avionics from an Israeli company.

the material would have gone through multiple iterations - but the main issue lies around whether DCNS were holding procedural material on their servers. eg IndNav training material, IndNav CONOPs detailing sub operating procedures etc.... ASW avoidance, operational vignettes etc....

[Oracle]

DCNS marked the design document "Restricted", instead of marking it as "Classified". My point is, even if the document is old and got leaked, it would make countries using DCNS' products nervous and would hesitate to do business again with them. I use HDD encryption so that my personal data remains safe incase of a breach. This is very very bad reputation. If it were me, I would never ever deal with that Company again, even if they give me those for free.

And going by the chatter from gf0012-aust's DTalk,...............Holy Shit, leaked in 2013? The Chinese probably have this document by now.

It’s in the mail: how submarine secrets surfaced in Australia

WTF? Are the French that lazy? A defense company having such poor IT security protocols?

[Oracle]

the material would have gone through multiple iterations - but the main issue lies around whether DCNS were holding procedural material on their servers. eg IndNav training material, IndNav CONOPs detailing sub operating procedures etc.... ASW avoidance, operational vignettes etc....

Okay, now why would DCSN have IN training materials on their servers? Does the things you mentioned comes along the build package that DCNS will build the subs, train the crew and also help formulate CONOPs etc(?) since it's a new platform.
I knew about this leak since the time it hit the Indian media. I just didn't post it, thinking it's too early and was also a bit busy.

Here is Deep dive: Why Scorpene data leak does not compromise security of Project-75
What do you think?

[gf0012-aust]

I'm kind of loathe to go into broader explanations in an open forum. I do think that the article has overly dumbed down some issues as part of damage control exercises to alleviate public concerns

however, I think they're drawing a long bow on some of their claims

as a contractor we were paid very good money to map the acoustics of various subs - so to get basic data without having to fire up sensors etc... is a dream catch

The reason why DCNS would have training material is because they have responsibility in developing it in conjunction with IN as part of the delivery contract. Ditto for combat vignettes, CONOPs (from the perspective that they need to convince the IN that they are compliant and addressing contractual issues around delivering a boat that works to the CONOPs as per their submission), ASW issues, comms, accreditation vignettes etc.....

The builder is involved across the range, they just don't build the boat

[Officer of Engineers]

Here is Deep dive: Why Scorpene data leak does not compromise security of Project-75
What do you think?

Vis-a-vi the Pakistanis and the Chinese? India doesn't have to worry. Their ASW sucks.

[gf0012-aust]

I'll make a bold assumption here.

In most modern navies, the submarine force answers directly to Chief of Navy or up the line - they don't answer to any other flag command except Joint Forces Commander or the Chief (of all services) - they like SOF answer only to a discrete command structure and even then, the Flag may not know where they are etc...

So having any information about how that force operates, patterns of behaviour, understanding operational constraints etc is a gold mine for others. Subs cause the most disproportionate dislocation on a grand scale to an enemies forces and tactical disposition of any other weaponised platform. Anything you can garner about their operational behaviour and contraints is gold

incidental information is still valuable no matter how small as when its added to other data that an enemy might hold helps them build a picture - and you want to deny them the ability to form any coherent idea about how you deploy and manage those assets.

[Officer of Engineers]

If that's the case, then the odds are even. The Indians have the exact same information about the Chinese. The best subs in the Chinese inventory are the KILOS or the modified KILO, the noise maker YUAN. And the Indians had those over a two decades.

[gf0012-aust]

the game changer is always training and sea time

good crew in a crap boat is better than crap crew in a good boat