Scorpene submarine secrets leaked

[gf0012-aust]

The fact is that the cold never actually ended and it never will.

its not about it being over - the military temperature of today between russia and western powers is nowhere any near the temperature and tempo of even the early days - let alone the closing stages of the cold war between the soviets and their warpac proxies and NATO

Given the situation of the order, india is not changing sides. Instead, it is diversifying its acquisitions; not just limited to US systems.

never said it was about switching sides or sole US equipment sourcing - as I said 10 years ago, this is about the indians coming to the realisation that their logistics and capability was not being advanced under weighted purchases with the russians. That was made pretty clear to me when I was contracting on sub technology and we had numbers of dealings with the Indian Mil Attache (Navy and then Air Force officers at the time). They made it pretty clear that western tech was more capable, that it had far better logistics impact and that it was timely etc..... They just weren't talking about US tech, they were talking about access to non russian or warpac tech. As soon as 911 happened the doors opened and they took full advantage of it to start changing force structure and development. This rebirth and shift to a diff force structure is now in its 17th year - its not sudden, but its deliberate.

Geopolitical interests of Indias and the US(and its allies) do not converge, rather they diverse and clash. Russian inventory is tried and tested and will remain indias conventional power house.

for the last 17 years they've been converging - and apart from the minutia of execution, minimal "clashes". when indian military officers meet with their non traditional opposites they're often on the same page - thats certainly what I've witnessed first hand

[SteveDaPirate]

Geopolitical interests of Indias and the US(and its allies) do not converge, rather they diverse and clash.

How so? The US wants an Asian counterweight to China and sees that potential in India. Surely India isn't interested in ceeding regional influence to a Chinese hegemony.

I'd think US power in India's neighborhood would be less threatening than Chinese power, since the US is far away and in no position to make any land acquisitions at India's expense.

The general US strategic imperative is to prevent any power from consolidating control of Eurasia in particular, but also holds true in any important region. That generally means opposing the dominant Eurasian power and supporting the underdog of the day. Until India eclipses Russia and China in power, she can count on US support unless she throws in her lot with the strongest Eurasian power.

[anil]

In an ideal world - thats the preferred option

The fact is that the cold never actually ended and it never will.

Given the situation of the order, india is not changing sides. Instead, it is diversifying its acquisitions; not just limited to US systems.

Geopolitical interests of Indias and the US(and its allies) do not converge, rather they diverse and clash. Russian inventory is tried and tested and will remain indias conventional power house.

[gf0012-aust]

Can they?

not in the current climate - there's still a phoney war atmosphere in place, so no sense of urgency. even the USN is in real terms coming late to the game

[Officer of Engineers]

the good thing is that there is a capability deficit - the PLAN ASW capability is just woeful, so the regionals have a slight temporal flux advantage which they should be maximising ASAP

Can they? Even Australia is not NATO's peer, not to any lack of equipment but to a lack of culture. Asia and Australia never had to punch their way through U-Boat pacts, up to and including trading a frigate for a u-boat in order to save 10 freighters.. The frigate means 200 lives. 10 freighters is an entire brigade in Europe.

Move that to the cold war. A frigate is again 200 lives, a USN aircraft carrierr can mean the war.

So, NATO's dedication to ASW is understandable. While most certainly ABCA has rubbed off on Australia, can any of the regional powers understand the same dedication that the British and Canadians share (the US handed off ASW to us which they took on air superiority).

[gf0012-aust]

I'm just getting the feeling that everyone (with the most certain exception of the Australians and maybe the Japanese (but not according to the good Captain Desertswo)), everyone in the region is ignoring the white elephant in the room. Maybe lack of experience but nobody is taking ASW seriously and by seriously, I mean putting together a serious ASW package - frigates, helos, and subs. The Japanese have it on paper but their abilities to deviate from the book, even when obvious, is in serious question.

I struggle to understand the ostrich mentality, the post cold war peace dividend which resulted in most ASW air getting retasked to ISR and defacto Compass and Rivet roles has been known for a long while - and for those who needed a reminder then all they had to do was open their eyes at various RIMPAC.

RAAF and RAN are certainly rebuilding ASW and taking advantage of the new systems synergies etc... but some of the regionals who think that buying subs is enough to cause the PLAN pause are living in the twilight zone

the good thing is that there is a capability deficit - the PLAN ASW capability is just woeful, so the regionals have a slight temporal flux advantage which they should be maximising ASAP

[Officer of Engineers]

I'm just getting the feeling that everyone (with the most certain exception of the Australians and maybe the Japanese (but not according to the good Captain Desertswo)), everyone in the region is ignoring the white elephant in the room. Maybe lack of experience but nobody is taking ASW seriously and by seriously, I mean putting together a serious ASW package - frigates, helos, and subs. The Japanese have it on paper but their abilities to deviate from the book, even when obvious, is in serious question.

[gf0012-aust]

The takeaway message here is that conventional technology should stay local and indigenous.

In an ideal world - thats the preferred option

however, the reality is that if India is going to meet its future force development aspirations and objectives then she has no option but to exercise foreign acquisitions where local industry cannot either provide the required capability (in time and on budget) and where there is better capability available. there is always a trade-off and its not wise to allow the parochial drum beat drive the debate

eg 10 years ago when I indicated on some of the older (and some now defunct) forums that India was heading towards US platform acquisition I got howled down pretty consistently - but it was self evident that for those who bothered to suspend their parochialism that India was never going to be in a position to build the force needed by the nominal 2030 timelines with local industry - the majority of which was geared to soviet production behaviour and were really in a capability deficit. eg look at the Il-38 and Sea Dragon fiasco etc....

Its about smart acquisition for the good of the nation - where it works like Brahmos, then build and buy local - where it involves better capability and smarter logistics improvements (p8 and c17) then treat it like a commercial acquisition, go in hard against the vendor, play fairly and achieve the capability outcome

I'm no fan of the french primes through various personal experiences, but the french do some very very smart things at the boat (subs) build and tech development level. It makes no sense to throw the baby out with the bath water without doing tight forensics first

[gf0012-aust]

IMO, it was point no 3 - made DCNS unreliable. Besides money and time, the leak has effected untold sister concerns. The takeaway message here is that conventional technology should stay local and indigenous.

5 is (part of) the reason for the breach - unfort like a lot of security breaches its the inside ones which are hard to pick up - esp if your internal doc handling and tech firewalls are not robust

3 is the fallout if DCNS don't manage the end result to IndGovts satisfaction

[anil]

IMO, it was point no 3 - made DCNS unreliable. Besides money and time, the leak has effected untold sister concerns. The takeaway message here is that conventional technology should stay local and indigenous.

[Officer of Engineers]

Colonel Shukla was a zipperhead but at times, his stubbornness doesn't allow him to see the other side. I've gotten into a big argument with him with the ARJUN-T72 debate. He was veryu much anti-ARJUN ... until the Kuwait War proved him wrong.

[gf0012-aust]

^AJAI SHUKLA is an insightful character but extremely arrogant with an omniscient(yes, like the lord) style of writing. Some members here know him.

he's certainly not getting info from people with actual experience dealing with the US on tech transfer issues and management, and he clearly doesn't understand the selection and acquisition process for the Short Barracuda

in fact if he had half a clue or any access to reliable sources he'd know that Pt 5 is the vector that was identified very quickly by DCNS and the french INT services.

AustGovt was horrified to see the press release and has been working in background with IndGovt to reassure. There is some clear parallel vulnerability despite our subs being different at the sheer tech design level

A leak was not in our interest either, moreso as we see India as a partner. The cold war view vis a vis Russian influence died almost 20 years ago.

I say that as someone who has dealt with the IndGovt, and in particular IndNav on sub technology as a contractor.

Some of these bloggers do more damage than good, esp when they are clueless on the topics they infer experience and inside knowledge of

[anil]

^AJAI SHUKLA is an insightful character but extremely arrogant with an omniscient(yes, like the lord) style of writing. Some members here know him.

[gf0012-aust]

that editor needs to have a reality check, some of his claims are just nonsense

[anil]

will have to go back to the shipyard at some point

In the mean time, some of the 'why's?" below:

The first question to ponder is: what is driving the Scorpene leaks? There are seven possible answers, some more probable than others.

First, this could be an attempt to change Australia’s decision, announced in April, to award DCNS a US $38 billion contract to build 12 conventional submarines under its SEA 1000 project. The losing vendors were Japanese (Mitsubishi/Kawasaki combine) and German (ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, or TKMS).

Second, this could be Canberra’s ploy to release secrets harmless to Australia (though not to India) to pressure DCNS into lowering its price.

Third, it could a foreign government stratagem (e.g. China) to scuttle Australia’s SEA 1000 project by portraying DCNS as unreliable.

Fourth, it could be a dissatisfied former customer of DCNS --- e.g. Pakistan, Chile, Brazil and Malaysia, if India could be removed from the list of potential suspects.

Fifth, it could be a disgruntled DCNS employee, or agent who was removed as a result of Europe’s recent emphasis on anti-corruption compliance. If this sounds far-fetched, recall that the killing of 11 DCNS engineers in Karachi by a suicide bomber in 2002 was blamed (by a DCNS-commissioned investigation) on a vengeful agent in Pakistan who was incensed that his commissions were discontinued. Since then, many more agents have been de-hired by European defence companies, presumably including DCNS.

Sixth, Washington could have driven the leak to prevent sensitive American technologies (such as the combat management system, or torpedoes) from being integrated into a French submarine.

Seventh, and last, a rival submarine manufacturer like TKMS could be discrediting DCNS to boost its own prospects in India’s impending Project 75I --- a multi-billion dollar project to build six conventional submarines with air-independent propulsion (AIP), which New Delhi is currently mulling.

ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2016/08/treating-scorpenes-sting.html