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why would RAN consider getting second hand nukes? it would absolutely screw up the rest of the training and sustainment budget for all the services.
the last thing RAN would do is look at 2nd hand nukes and considering that the USN and NAVSEA had to assist with Astute, the UK ship building industry is not out of the water yet (no pun intended)
UK shipbuilding was that parlous that US Dept Commerce provided a report to State Dept re lessons learnt from the Astute problems.
Obviously you know more about this than I do. What I wanted to do was start a discussion of a remote possibilty. Since the USN and Australian navies have had a close working relationship in the past, I was thinking the leasing or transfer option was viable. It would allow the Australian navy an excellent oppotunity to train on first class equipment, while at the same time, having more of their own country's defense capacity.
Obviously you know more about this than I do. What I wanted to do was start a discussion of a remote possibilty. Since the USN and Australian navies have had a close working relationship in the past, I was thinking the leasing or transfer option was viable. It would allow the Australian navy an excellent oppotunity to train on first class equipment, while at the same time, having more of their own country's defense capacity.
Anythings possible :)
However, when you start boiling it all down it does start to get back to basics and the critical basics are raise, train and sustain costs. In addition I see it as creating a force structure imbalance. ie either all LR conventional SSG's or all nukes.
Personally, I don't see too many advantages for the employment of nukes in the RAN
There are Australians on exchange with USN, and that includes working on nukes... There are ex USN nuke crew on RAN subs
In the broader picture, Aust and PACOM have a very very close relationship, closer than our relationship with most countries, so if the need arose, I don't see any resistance to it - certainly I can't see any coming from the USN side of the house.
the realpolitik issue is that in a major conflict the odds of australia working alone are remote, major conflict will be a coalition event, so spending coin on capability that we can readily partner with, already have close operational familiarity with etc... would be a "effectiveness negative" issue.
Collins was designed to be able to work alongside nukes, apart from the obvious sprint, projection comparisons, their duty cycles, like nukes are ultimately limited by onboard food
It would be nice if Australia did get some nuke boats to help fill a World power vacuum (on our side) if five America Naval bases just happened to go poof, as the Americans will not have that many boats left.
It would be nice if Australia did get some nuke boats to help fill a World power vacuum (on our side) if five America Naval bases just happened to go poof, as the Americans will not have that many boats left.
boats don't stay at home. so he numbers of subs that are going to be port bound at any given time is low. if you want to kill a sub then do it at port, but as soon as it sallies out, then each kilometre away makes it exponentially harder to track, and ultimately, harder to kill. The further out a sub us, then exponentally the more disproportionate the effort red team has to make to find it, track it, kill it. subs are "always" on a warfooting, even if they don't always carry full warshot.
so, the chances of the US losing boats in port is slim to negligible IMO. LR conventionals like Collins, Oyashios etc were designed to go far, and were designed to kill nukes as they were "end of" cold war design philosophies.
I don't subscribe to the philosophy that the USN will face the tough end as they're outnumbered. sure it makes it harder, but training is the key. training has been shown repeatedly to be a tipping point. Both the USN and RN wrote the rule books on modern sub warfare, they're not training deficient by any means.
About 40 percent of US subs are usually in port. With only two sub-tenders in commission those ports are needed to keep the balance of subs deployable.
About 40 percent of US subs are usually in port. With only two sub-tenders in commission those ports are needed to keep the balance of subs deployable.
You're in a low threat environment. as soon as your INT alerts change, so does the number of sub that are available. their status changes with the alert levels.
apart from those in deep maintenance, your others could shift from hrs, to days, to weeks sailing notice. Even if things went pear shaped at short notice, there other intel "tells" happening that change boat status
I guess your right. Australia has the leisure to ignore the global sea lanes and can hang of the Great Barrier Reef in short ranged diesels. Must be nice. Let the US worry about the whole International commerce thing.
I guess your right. Australia has the leisure to ignore the global sea lanes and can hang of the Great Barrier Reef in short ranged diesels. Must be nice. Let the US worry about the whole International commerce thing.
australia doesn't have the leisure to ignore global sea lanes.
98% of australias trade is by sea
australia has 1/9th of the worlds oceans under her territorial jurisdiction. on sheer contiguous coastline only the canadians and russians have larger "length".
again
Collins is a LR deep blue conventional, designed to be able to run on nuke duty cycles. their limit is the same as nukes - ie onboard food, and then remaining weapons
these are not your typical diesel subs, and are definitely not short range. to give an idea, the RAN Oberons used to run out to Vladivostok during the cold war - the Collins were designed to go further. they were also designed to be able to take on and kill nukes.
I'm not sure you understand how close PACOM and RAN work together, but its certainly not with Australia employing an EEZ focused sub force.
however, RAN doesn't need nukes - esp as it would cause a huge force imbalance.
Australia to Vladivostok is not long range by American standards. A German, WWII U-Boat is capable of such a feet. Perhaps, I was not clear, I was speaking of Global sea lanes not those only in direct proximity. Those other than the South Pacific and the Indian Oceans.
Australia to Vladivostok is not long range by American standards. A German, WWII U-Boat is capable of such a feet. Perhaps, I was not clear, I was speaking of Global sea lanes not those only in direct proximity. Those other than the South Pacific and the Indian Oceans.
during the cold war, australian and canadian conventionals operated in all 7 blue water seas.... ie the same operational areas as the nukes.
its no different today.
I'm not sure you're aware of where australian subs do go, but its definitely further than the pacrim, micronesia and the indian ocean
It would just be nice if the Australians were ambitious as the Brazilians, as they are on the verge of joining the SSN club. Perhaps the Brazilian's are just being misguided to join the likes of the British, French, and the Americans. I'm sure those old Canadian and Australian diesels during the Cold War kept the Soviet SSN's really scrambling just like the 688's did.
It would just be nice if the Australians were ambitious as the Brazilians as they are on the verge of joining the SSN club. Perhaps the Brazilian's are just being misguided to join the likes of the British, French, and the Americans. I'm sure those old Canadian and Australian diesels during the Cold War kept the Soviet SSN's really scrambling just like the 688's did.
The issue is about tactical merit and benefit.
One could seriously ask, apart from status, what benefit do nukes play in the Brazilian strategic and tactical map? what is it on their 30 year threat matrix (the typical forward view) that warrants them getting nukes. I'd argue that in Brazils case the motivator is regional status and cachet and that there is minimal benefit or utility against everyone on their threat matrix.
similarly, although nukes provide some tactical benefits and opportunities in specific scenarios, in the cold light of day, bearing in mind our perceived threats, the fact that we provide an important tactical and intelligence footprint in this part of the world, the odds of australia fighting alone in a major theatre event are minimal.
its not always about what you have, it about how you use it to your own strengths. nukes would cause a significant force imbalance at the purple service level.
In the short term I think you are right about the Brazilians.
They may be thinking into the future as the Chinese reach out in say the next twenty years? The Chinese have been attempting to gain influence in Central and South America. How many SSN's will the Chinese have in that twenty year window? will they be operating in the South Atlantic?
The Brazilians would rather go to nuke school before they find the Chinese in their backyard.
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