RAN's Collins class replacement

[Albany Rifles]

Well, if that ends up being the case I feel as though there's probably some significant readjustment of expectations are far as our existing diesel sub life is concerned.

If there's one thing we just don't do well it's comit to a program without trying to stuff around with the requirements, and then renege politically 9n the importance of an outlined requirement.

Name the government - they all do it. I shudder to think about the RAN chugging around in a 60 year old sub, there's not really any excuse in the last 13 years when it comes to that.

As an Acquisition Logistician I can confirm this disease in not isolated to Australia.

In my 30+ years in this business I cannot tell you the number of times we have had to fight off the capability developers (the requirements people in the US) right up to to final production. And a simple add at a late stage can be ruinously expensive to a program in sustainment for years after deployment. Case in point....when the Army added a With Winch requirement to the HEMTT program at last minute it added costs associated to a) more tools to maintain the winch, b) cost for a new bumper and mounting bracket to handle the stress of the winch, c) training and certification to a truck driver to operate a winch, and d) increased annual servicing cots ($ & time) to test and certify every 6 months the winch cable.

Added tens of millions of dollars to life cycle costs.

[JRT]

OPINION: A nuclear submarine deal that China would actually respect

07 October 2021
by John Ferrari and Bill Greenwalt
(The views expressed by opinion contributors are their own and not the view of The Hill)

Why is it that we as a nation repeatedly sabotage our own plans at the starting block? We never learned from Iraq and Afghanistan that announcing troop surges, withdrawals or artificial deadlines undercuts our objectives by effectively signaling to our enemies that they can just wait us out. The Biden administration seems to be replaying this same game plan with the recent announcement of the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal with Australia and the United Kingdom.

After a wildly successful rollout of the plan to equip the Australian Navy with nuclear-powered submarines, which was both brilliant in design and a bold strategic signaling win, comes the recent statement from Adm. Michael Gilday, the chief of naval operations: "This is a very long-term effort that'll be decades, I think, before a submarine goes in the water." Talk about pulling the rug out from under our own two feet, not to mention our allies.

In effect, we have announced a major power shift in the Pacific but followed the announcement with an assurance to China that it will be decades (note the plural) before the shift takes hold. The message to China is clear: If you are going to cause problems, do it sooner rather than later. One can hear the air rushing out of the balloon the more that the admiral kept talking.

Gilday is correct in one sense: If we follow all our current bureaucratic processes and build a new submarine design, it will take decades. That will signal to China that we are not serious and give them the opportunity to change the strategic calculus long before that time. Instead, what if he had said the first nuclear submarine will be in the hands of the Australian Navy before the end of the Biden administration's first term and a full complement of eight Australian submarines will be in the water a decade earlier than current practices would allow?

So, how could this happen? The first step is to start moving now. In the coming months, the Australians need to be sent to school, or more specifically the Naval Nuclear Power Training Command's Nuclear Power School. Upon graduation, these enlisted personnel should complete their training on board operational U.S. submarines.

After training up a cadre of Aussies, and rather than wishing for a brand-new class of paper submarines, we should loan the Australians one or two of ours operated by skeleton crews. All we have to do is look back toward lend-lease during World War II to see that there is nothing new in this approach. If President Kennedy could commit to putting a man on the moon within one decade, we can certainly figure out how to get a nuclear submarine under the command of an Australian, with a joint U.S.-Australian crew, while this administration is in office.

Still, this would not yet increase the number of nuclear submarines on patrol in Asia. The fastest way to do that would be to extend the life of current Los Angeles class or British Trafalgar class submarines and transfer them to the Australians until new submarines can be built. Here, numbers matter. Not retiring these submarines and adding them to the total mix would immediately alter China's strategic condition in the South China Sea.

Finally, the question of building new capability can be addressed. Under current U.S. acquisition timelines, the first new Australian nuclear submarine, optimistically, would not be delivered until 2038. That is too late to address the changing balance of power. Looming over future AUKUS cooperation is the fragility of the current U.S. submarine industrial base. It is stretched thin as it scales up to construct two Virginia class submarines a year, in addition to eventually building the Ohio class. The fear is that the Aussies will have to wait in line.

Fortunately, this is not the case in the U.K., where the Astute class submarine program is winding down. It makes perfect sense to extend that production line so that the Aussies can buy the next Astute that can be built after the current U.K. order. This potentially could take place as soon as 2028, with a new submarine then delivered every two years to replace temporary lend-lease submarines. Planning under traditional acquisition processes could then commence on a new submarine design for delivery post-2040.

We are sure that the U.S. Navy can come up with 100 reasons not to do any of this - and some of them, on their face, might seem valid. But now is not the time to shy away from risk. We are in a period of strategic vulnerability with China. They believe they are ascending, and we need to place them on the horns of strategic dilemmas now, not two decades from now.

________________________________

John G. Ferrari, a retired Army major general, is a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a former director of program analysis and evaluation for the Army, and the chief financial officer at QOMPLX.

William C. Greenwalt is a nonresident senior fellow at AEI, a former deputy undersecretary of defense for industrial policy, and a founder of the Silicon Valley Defense Group.

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...

[jlvfr]

I don't understand what's the author's problem, tbh. Does anyone with any knowledge of navy matters really think that those subs will not take years to design, build, test, deliver and deploy? And that's without the political/economical wrangling that will acompany the process...

[Bigfella]

I don't understand what's the author's problem, tbh. Does anyone with any knowledge of navy matters really think that those subs will not take years to design, build, test, deliver and deploy? And that's without the political/economical wrangling that will acompany the process...

One of the endless irritations us folks out here in the provinces have to deal with is important folk talking as if we don't exist. That article is as classic a piece of Amerocentrism as you will find. The whole article is written as if Australia has no role in the decision making process here - that it is up to the US & UK to just give us stuff/build stuff for us and we are just a passive party. Just as irritating is the partisan undertone - that somehow any problematic aspect of a deal that was initiated by Australia and whose terms are being driven by Australia for Australian reasons are somehow the fault of the Biden Administration.

Seriously Americans, get the fuck over yourselves. Australia is the active party in this arrangement. This article barely seems to know we exist. SIGH!

[Chunder]

I don't disagree with premise that it will take decades if the traditional route is followed.

The problem with the traditional route is that one needs their head examined if they don't think politics and adding our own requirements to the design will not occur, delivering something decades late.

True, visionary leadership would be going MOTS and getting Washington to look at the problem from the perspective of a submarine in theatre is a submarine on theatre regardless of who owns it.

Then when you have a couple let them do what they always do - fvck it all up. The whole situation here in Oz seems eerily reminiscent of 1930s. I read an opinion the other day that when it comes down to it, you have an RAN with subs that are due for replacements 3 Destroyers, and a bunch of clapped out frigates. The Hunter class? Yeah - late being 'Australianised'.

You get a tick for going nuclear (fvckoff Turnbull), now downselect ASAP. Which won't be happening until after an election. Kevin, Julia, Kevin, Abbott, Turnbull, Morrison, then probably Albanese) 7 prime ministers to make a decision, and that's being nice. Process should have started under Howard.

That is how pathetic we approach such things, and it's there for everyone to see.

[Albany Rifles]

One of the endless irritations us folks out here in the provinces have to deal with is important folk talking as if we don't exist. That article is as classic a piece of Amerocentrism as you will find. The whole article is written as if Australia has no role in the decision making process here - that it is up to the US & UK to just give us stuff/build stuff for us and we are just a passive party. Just as irritating is the partisan undertone - that somehow any problematic aspect of a deal that was initiated by Australia and whose terms are being driven by Australia for Australian reasons are somehow the fault of the Biden Administration.

Seriously Americans, get the fuck over yourselves. Australia is the active party in this arrangement. This article barely seems to know we exist. SIGH!

Pete, bloviators are going to bloviate.

Peak Neocon we know best for the world speak.

[JRT]

One of the endless irritations us folks out here in the provinces have to deal with is important folk talking as if we don't exist. That article is as classic a piece of Amerocentrism as you will find. The whole article is written as if Australia has no role in the decision making process here - that it is up to the US & UK to just give us stuff/build stuff for us and we are just a passive party. Just as irritating is the partisan undertone - that somehow any problematic aspect of a deal that was initiated by Australia and whose terms are being driven by Australia for Australian reasons are somehow the fault of the Biden Administration.

Seriously Americans, get the fuck over yourselves. Australia is the active party in this arrangement. This article barely seems to know we exist. SIGH!

Not going to defend their words. They seem overly focused on writing to a US domestic audience, while callously offending others. They are trying to sell a revisted WW2 lend-lease arrangement. That seems like a hard sell. Australia is not going to want elderly platforms aged beyond useful life, as the article seems to be suggesting.

Also, USN does not have an existing surplus of SSN, rather has a worsening existing shortage of SSN relative to demand, according to credible sworn testimony of Adm Harry Harris in 2017 before the US House Armed Services Committee (mentioned in the quoted article below).

27 APRIL 2017

US NAVY CAN ONLY MEET HALF OF SUBMARINE REQUIREMENTS IN PACIFIC

The Navy can only meet half of the requirements for attack submarines from U.S. Pacific Command, according to a top military officer.

The attack submarine force is among the weapon platform shortfalls U.S. forces face in the Pacific, according to PACOM chief Adm. Harry Harris.

“Our submarine numbers are low and getting smaller,” Harris said during an April 26 House Armed Services Committee hearing on threats in the Pacific region. “The number of submarines, without going into precise detail here, the Navy can only meet about 50 percent of my stated requirement for attack submarines.”

The shortfall has deepened since last February, when Harris told Senate authorizers the Navy could meet just 62 percent of his attack submarine requirements in the Pacific.

Harris said this week that the problem is projected to worsen, as the attack submarine force is expected to dip from 52 boats today to 42 submarines in the late 2020s. The admiral said he supports the Navy’s recent force structure assessment, which delineates a requirement for 66 attack submarines.

Meanwhile, Harris’ written testimony (link to pdf file) states 230 of the world’s foreign submarines are operating in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, including 160 belonging to China, Russia and North Korea. Harris noted that U.S. attack submarines are vastly superior to any other country’s.

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[zraver]

The part of the article that is right though is get RAN sailors into school and onto boats... be it US or UK. Begin building the institutional memory and cadres you need to really operate a fully RAN nuclear SSN force.

[Albany Rifles]

The part of the article that is right though is get RAN sailors into school and onto boats... be it US or UK. Begin building the institutional memory and cadres you need to really operate a fully RAN nuclear SSN force.

That is where stationing an SSN out of Perth makes a ton of sense. Allow RAN Sailors to hot bunk on the nukes.

[zraver]

That is where stationing an SSN out of Perth makes a ton of sense. Allow RAN Sailors to hot bunk on the nukes.

Allow thier yard workers too? Hot start that end of the situation?

Btw, BF not trying to talk over you. Just thinking out loud on how the YS could best help you join the SSN club.

[Albany Rifles]

Allow thier yard workers too? Hot start that end of the situation?

Btw, BF not trying to talk over you. Just thinking out loud on how the YS could best help you join the SSN club.

Australia is part of Five Eyes. If workers are vetted then sure.

[Bigfella]

Allow thier yard workers too? Hot start that end of the situation?

Btw, BF not trying to talk over you. Just thinking out loud on how the YS could best help you join the SSN club.

No worries Z. I was just venting about the tone of the article. Arrogant fuckwits. On the substance, I'm open to some of the ideas in it.

I'm not sure that a 'loaner' is practical, but we might need it if this entire process takes another 15-20 years.

I'm also open to the subs being built overseas provided it substantially improves the time involved or quality. That said, I don't see it. Spending that much money overseas if we can do it here isn't going to happen, even if that slows down the program. There is a lot of politics in this.

I think your ideas are good - basing subs in Australia & letting our crews (or at least some of them) train up on relevant areas is good. So is the yard workers. I actually suspect both these things will happen in some form. I am guessing there were already yard workers over in France (assuming France let them - I think they really wanted to build 90% there) and will have them in the relevant US or UK yards. I would also assume that we will have small numbers of crew on US or UK boats to form a training cadre.

[Albany Rifles]

No worries Z. I was just venting about the tone of the article. Arrogant fuckwits. On the substance, I'm open to some of the ideas in it.

I'm not sure that a 'loaner' is practical, but we might need it if this entire process takes another 15-20 years.

I'm also open to the subs being built overseas provided it substantially improves the time involved or quality. That said, I don't see it. Spending that much money overseas if we can do it here isn't going to happen, even if that slows down the program. There is a lot of politics in this.

I think your ideas are good - basing subs in Australia & letting our crews (or at least some of them) train up on relevant areas is good. So is the yard workers. I actually suspect both these things will happen in some form. I am guessing there were already yard workers over in France (assuming France let them - I think they really wanted to build 90% there) and will have them in the relevant US or UK yards. I would also assume that we will have small numbers of crew on US or UK boats to form a training cadre.

That's why homebasing a US or UK SSN in Perth makes sense. It will allow a hands on, right seat ride for Aussie bubbleheads to learn with their alliance peers.

[Bigfella]

That's why homebasing a US or UK SSN in Perth makes sense. It will allow a hands on, right seat ride for Aussie bubbleheads to learn with their alliance peers.

US boat seems more likely than a UK one for practical reasons. I'd be happy with that. Ultimately we will be integrating with the USN more than any other navy, so having regular access to a US boat would be ideal.

[Monash]

US boat seems more likely than a UK one for practical reasons. I'd be happy with that. Ultimately we will be integrating with the USN more than any other navy, so having regular access to a US boat would be ideal.

The Block 4 Virginia or even Block 5 Virginia's would give us much more bang for our bucks than the Astute class.