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  • It would appear the USS Freedom may be rough ride in big seas. Navy News Service - Eye on the Fleet

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    • Originally posted by surfgun View Post
      It would appear the USS Freedom may be rough ride in big seas. Navy News Service - Eye on the Fleet
      She is planing at an interesting angle, isn't she? All the more reason to go with the other hullform, the LCS-2 Independence (in case you can't tell, I REALLY like the Indy!).
      "There is never enough time to do or say all the things that we would wish. The thing is to try to do as much as you can in the time that you have. Remember Scrooge, time is short, and suddenly, you're not there any more." -Ghost of Christmas Present, Scrooge

      Comment


      • GAO Report on Littoral Combat Ship - August 2010

        U.S. GAO - Defense Acquisitions: Navy's Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities

        The one damning paragraph out of the GAO report reads:

        "Until mission package performance is proven, the Navy risks investing in a fleet of ships that does not deliver its promised capability. As the Navy stated, the underlying strength of the LCS lies in its innovative design - interchangeable mission equipment that allows the ship to used for different missions. Fundamental to this approach is the capability to rapidly install interchangeable mission packages into the seaframe. Absent that significant capability within its mission packages, seaframe functionality is largely constrained to self-defense as opposed to mission-related tasks." (Page 25 GAO-10-523 Littoral Combat Ship)"

        Coupled with the analysis that the report has on Mission Package delivery - none of them are complete and MP development is now projected out through 2017, it confirms that LCS will not be able meet the combat requirements of the Fleet for a significant period of time.

        So what to do now?

        Comment


        • Would it be possible to forget the mission packages for the time being, and simply fit half of the hulls as surface-to-air frigates, and the other half as anti-submarine frigates, at least until the mission packages are ready? I know they're supposed to be all-purpose littoral ships, but doesn't seem to be working out. At present they can't d much of anything, except perhaps chase drug runners and pirates, and they can't even chase the new submersible drug running boats.

          Comment


          • We already have too many AAW destroyers. What we need are small combatants capable of independent command, yet survivable enough away from the coverage of a big-deck carrier and the attendant Strike Aviation. That is NOT the LCS no matter what we retrofit into the class. Make LCS a dedicated minesweeper I say. In it's current configuration, it has more defenses and is efficient, speedy and habitable compared to the Avenger MCMs.

            Comment


            • Here is a shot of the mighty 57mm at work (note the size of the spent shells on deck) during RIMPAC 2010.
              Navy News Service - Eye on the Fleet

              This was the target LPH-11 New Orleans. However, I don't think it was USS Freedom that dealt the death blow.http://www.navy.mil/management/photo...-XXXXX-018.jpg
              Last edited by surfgun; 08 Oct 10,, 23:30.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by AK Fan View Post
                Two prototypes of LCS - Freedom and Independence classes - are now under production in the USA. Do they mean to continue with manufacturing both types in parallel or decision in favour of one of them will be taken some day?
                There are other possibilities in the mix.


                What follows is Appendix G of the CRS report at the link:
                http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33741_20100908.pdf

                Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:
                Background, Issues, and Options for Congress
                Ronald O'Rourke
                Specialist in Naval Affairs
                September 8, 2010

                Appendix G. Potential for Common Hulls

                Some observers, including some Members of Congress, have expressed interest in the idea of
                using common hulls for Coast Guard cutters and smaller Navy combatants, so as to improve
                economies of scale in the construction of these ships and thereby reduce their procurement costs.

                In earlier years, this interest focused on using a common hull for the LCS and the Offshore Patrol
                Cutter (OPC), a cutter displacing roughly 3,000 tons that is to be procured under the Coast
                Guard’s Deepwater acquisition program.59 More recently, this interest has focused on using a
                common hull for the LCS and the National Security Cutter (NSC), a cutter displacing about 4,300
                tons that is also being acquired under the Deepwater program. This appendix presents information
                regarding the idea of using common hulls for Coast Guard cutters and smaller Navy combatants.

                July 2009 CBO Report

                A July 2009 CBO report examines options for the Navy and Coast Guard to use common hulls for
                some of their ships. The report states that:

                some members of Congress and independent analysts have questioned whether the Navy and
                the Coast Guard need to purchase four different types of small combatants and whether—in
                spite of the services’ well-documented reservations about using similar hull designs—the
                same type of hull could be employed for certain missions. To explore that possibility, the
                Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined three alternatives to the Navy’s and the Coast
                Guard’s current plans for acquiring littoral combat ships and deepwater cutters.

                • Option 1 explores the feasibility of having the Coast Guard buy a variant of the Navy’s
                LCS—specifically, the semiplaning monohull—to use as its offshore patrol cutter.

                • Option 2 examines the effects of reducing the number of LCSs the Navy would buy and
                substituting instead a naval version of the Coast Guard’s national security cutter. (The
                rationale for this option is that, according to some analysts, the NSC’s longer mission
                range and higher endurance might make it better suited than the LCS to act as a “patrol
                frigate,” which would allow the Navy to carry out certain activities—maritime security,
                engagement, and humanitarian operations—outlined in the sea services’ new maritime
                strategy.)

                • Option 3 examines the advantages and disadvantages of having the Coast Guard buy
                more national security cutters rather than incur the costs of designing and building a
                new ship to perform the missions of an offshore patrol cutter.

                According to CBO’s estimates, all three alternatives and the services’ plans would have
                similar costs, regardless of whether they are calculated in terms of acquisition costs or total
                life-cycle costs (see Table 1).6 CBO’s analysis also indicates that the three alternative plans
                would not necessarily be more cost-effective or provide more capability than the services’
                existing plans. Specifically, even if the options addressed individual problems that the Navy
                and Coast Guard might confront with their small combatants, it would be at the cost of
                creating new challenges. For instance, Option 1—which calls for using the LCS monohull
                for the Coast Guard’s OPC—would provide less capability for the Coast Guard from that
                service’s perspective and at a potentially higher cost. Option 2 could provide the Navy with
                capability that, in some respects, would be superior for executing the peacetime elements of
                its maritime strategy; but that enhanced peacetime capability would sacrifice wartime
                capability and survivability. Option 3 would allow the Coast Guard to replace its aging
                cutters more quickly at a slightly higher cost but without the technical risk that is associated
                with designing and constructing a new class of ships, which the service’s existing plan
                entails. It would, however, provide fewer mission days at sea and require the Coast Guard to
                find new home ports for its much larger force of national security cutters.

                Reported Proposal to Build Variant of NSC for Navy

                In January 2008, it was reported that Northrop Grumman, the builder of the NSC, had submitted
                an unsolicited proposal to the Navy to build a version of the NSC for the Navy as a complement
                to, rather than a replacement for, the LCS.

                January 14, 2008, Press Report

                A press report dated January 14, 2008, stated:

                The U.S. Navy is stumbling to build the ship it wants—the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)—so
                shipbuilder Northrop Grumman is urging the service to turn to a ship it can get sooner and
                cheaper: a patrol frigate version of the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter (NSC).
                “We have listened to what the Navy has said—to be more efficient, be innovative and
                produce affordable and capable ships,” said Phil Teel, president of Northrop’s Ship Systems
                sector. “The patrol frigate is a response to that, and to the Navy’s new National Maritime
                Strategy.”

                Northrop’s analysts have studied remarks and themes oft repeated by senior Navy leaders
                and concluded a de facto requirement exists for a frigate-size ship capable of handling a
                range of low- and mid-intensity missions. Those missions, said Eric Womble, head of Ship
                Systems’ Advanced Capabilities Group, are detailed in the Navy’s new Maritime Strategy
                and include forward presence, deterrence, sea control, maritime security, humanitarian
                assistance and disaster response.

                “You don’t want a high-end Aegis ship to handle those missions,” Womble said, “you want
                something cheaper and smaller.”

                The National Security Cutter (NSC) as configured for the Coast Guard could easily handle
                those roles, Womble said.

                The first NSC, the Bertholf, successfully carried out its initial trials in early December and
                will be commissioned this year by the Coast Guard. Womble said a Navy version would
                avoid the first-of-class issues that have plagued numerous Navy programs, including both
                designs being built for the LCS competition.

                Northrop in late December began briefing select Navy leaders on its unsolicited proposal.
                The company is taking pains to avoid presenting the ship as an LCS alternative, instead
                calling it an LCS “complement,” which is being built under a competition between Lockheed
                Martin and General Dynamics.

                Key features of Northrop’s concept are:

                —The ship is based on a proven design already under construction.

                —The NSC’s weapons, sensors and systems already have a high degree of commonality with
                Navy systems, increasing affordability.

                —While the NSC is 15 knots slower than the 45-knot LCS, the cutter can stay at sea up to
                two months, much longer than the LCS.

                The report also stated:

                Northrop is claiming it can deliver the first ship at the end of 2012 at an average cost of less
                than $400 million per ship, exclusive of government-furnished equipment, in fiscal 2007
                dollars. That’s close to the $403 million contract cost of the third NSC, which incorporates
                all current design upgrades.

                A major element of Northrop’s proposal, Womble said, is that the Navy should make no
                changes to the current Block 0 design. “That’s the only way we can deliver the ship at this
                price.”

                The design, however, has plenty of room for upgrades, Womble claimed, and Northrop is
                proposing future upgrades be handled in groups, or blocks, of ships, rather than modifying
                individual ones. Those upgrades could include non-line-of-sight missiles, SeaRAM missile
                launchers and more capabilities to handle unmanned systems. The design even has room for
                an LCS-like reconfigurable mission area under the flight deck, he claimed.

                Northrop admits the ships are deficient in one significant Navy requirement: full
                compatibility with the Naval Vessel Rules (NVR), essentially building codes developed by
                the Naval Sea Systems Command and the American Bureau of Shipping. The belated
                application of the NVR to both LCS designs was a major factor in the cost growth on those
                ships.

                Most of the NSC design already is NVR-compatible, Womble said, but upgrading the entire
                design to NVR standards would involve a fundamental redesign and eliminate the proposal’s
                cost and construction time attributes.

                “We’d need a waiver [from the NVR rules] to make this proposal work,” he said.

                The report also stated:

                Navy Response: ‘No Requirement’

                The official response from the Navy to Northrop’s proposal so far is unenthusiastic.

                “There is currently no requirement for such a combatant,” said Lt. Clay Doss, a Navy
                spokesman at the Pentagon. The Navy’s other surface ship programs, he said, “address
                specific requirements.”

                Doss did note that “the Navy and Coast Guard have considered a common platform for the
                LCS and the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter. However, due to the unique mission
                requirements of each service, a common hull is not a likely course of action.”

                Problems with the LCS have caused some observers to predict the program’s demise, but the
                Navy “is completely committed to the LCS program,” Doss said. “We need 55 Littoral
                Combat Ships sooner rather than later, and we need them now to fulfill critical, urgent warfighting
                gaps.”

                Northrop however, is not alone in proposing the NSC as an LCS alternative. Coast Guard
                Capt. James Howe, writing in the current issue of the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings
                magazine, is urging Navy leaders to consider the NSC.

                “I think the Navy should look at it,” he said Jan. 10. “Northrop is building a naval combatant
                here. It has standard U.S. Navy weapon systems as part of its packages. Its communications
                are interoperable. It can handle underway replenishment. If there’s a possibility it could be a
                cost saver or a good deal for the Navy, it needs to be explored.”

                Howe, who said he was unaware of Northrop’s patrol frigate proposal, agreed the NSC is
                capable of further enhancements. “There’s a lot of space on that ship,” he said.

                ‘Potential Game-changer’

                Northrop likely is facing an uphill battle with its patrol frigate, as the Navy culturally prefers
                to dictate requirements based on its own analysis.

                But the Navy is having trouble defending the affordability of its shipbuilding plan to
                Congress and bringing programs in on budget. One congressional source noted the service
                “can’t admit their plan won’t work.” An unsolicited proposal, the source said, “opens the
                way for someone else to come up with a potential game-changer.”

                Northrop’s plan, the source said, may be an unexpected opportunity.

                “Northrop is listening to the people who have been criticizing the Navy’s shipbuilding plan,”
                the source said. “They’ve gotten a sense that maybe the Navy is looking for a solution, and
                the Navy can’t produce a solution because it might be too embarrassing.”

                One more aspect that could be at work in the Northrop proposal: “I think there’s something
                coy going on here,” the source said. “They may be promoting this as an LCS complement,
                but their idea might be part of a strategic plan to replace the LCS.”

                January 17, 2008, Press Report

                A press report dated January 17, 2008, stated:
                Northrop Grumman Corp said on Wednesday [January 16, 2008, that] a proposal to turn its
                418-foot Coast Guard cutter into a new class of Navy frigates is sparking some interest
                among U.S. Navy officials and lawmakers.

                Northrop is offering the Navy a fixed price for the new ship of under $400 million and could
                deliver the first one as early as 2012 to help out with maritime security, humanitarian aid and
                disaster response, among other things, said Eric Womble, vice president of Northrop
                Grumman Ship Systems.

                So far, the officials briefed have found Northrop’s offer “intriguing,” Womble told Reuters
                in an interview. “They like the fact that we’re putting an option on the table. No one has told
                us, ‘Go away, don’t come back, we don’t want to hear this’,” Womble said.

                At the same time, the Navy says it remains committed to another class of smaller, more agile
                ships—the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) being built by Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N:
                Quote, Profile, Research) and General Dynamics Corp (GD.N: Quote, Profile, Research)—
                amid huge cost overruns.

                “There currently is no requirement for a frigate,” Navy spokesman Lt. Clay Doss said. He
                said the Navy and Coast Guard had discussed a common hull during the initial stage of the
                LCS competition, but agreed that was “not a likely course of action due to the unique
                mission capabilities.”

                For now, he said the Navy was proceeding as quickly as it could with the 55-ship LCS
                program as well as design work on a new DDG-1000 destroyer, and a planned cruiser, CGX....

                The report also stated:

                Virginia-based defense consultant Jim McAleese said the fixed-price offer could be good
                news for the Navy, which has typically borne the risk of cost-based shipbuilding contracts.
                “That is a potential catalyst that could have a huge impact on the way the Navy buys smalland
                mid-sized surface combatants,” McAleese said.

                Northrop says its new Coast Guard cutter also experienced some cost growth, but says that
                was mainly due to requirements added after the Sept. 11, 2001, hijacking attacks. The first of
                the new ships is due to be delivered to the Coast Guard in March, followed by one ship
                annually over the next few years.

                Northrop said it could offer the Navy a fixed price on the frigate because design work on the
                ships is already largely completed. Its price excludes government-furnished equipment that
                would still have to be put on board.

                “We’re not advocating an LCS replacement,” said spokesman Randy Belote. “But after
                listening to the Navy leadership and studying the new maritime strategy, we think we can get
                hulls and capabilities into the water at a much faster pace.”

                Womble said Northrop analysts and an outside consultant studied the Navy’s needs and
                concluded the Navy could use another ship that can operate in shallow water, be forward
                deployed, has the range and endurance to operate independently, and can work with U.S.
                allies, if needed.

                The press report also stated:

                The proposed ship can be deployed for 60 days without new supplies, has a range of 12,000
                nautical miles, and can travel at 29 knots, fast enough to keep up with other warships. That
                compares to 20 days and a range of 3,500 miles for LCS.

                Northrop began sharing a PowerPoint presentation about the proposal with Navy officials
                and lawmakers at the end of December, and has already met with several senior officials,
                including Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead.

                It could deliver the first frigate by 2012, if the Navy was able to add $75 million for long
                lead procurement items into the fiscal 2009 budget proposal to be sent to Congress next
                month, Northrop said.

                The frigate is about 75 percent compliant with special requirements that apply only to U.S.
                Navy ships. Northrop said it believed it could qualify for waivers on the remaining 25
                percent because similar waivers were granted in the past.
                .
                .
                .

                Comment


                • I have a solution: since the Coast Guard wants the semi-planing monohull so bad, build the USS Freedom hullform for the Coast Guard, and stick to the USS Independence hullform for the Navy's LCS program; we'll end up making both manufacturers happy by ordering both types of ship.
                  "There is never enough time to do or say all the things that we would wish. The thing is to try to do as much as you can in the time that you have. Remember Scrooge, time is short, and suddenly, you're not there any more." -Ghost of Christmas Present, Scrooge

                  Comment


                  • According to Galrahn at Information Dissemination: "If you would have asked me a month ago if the Navy intended to cancel the LCS, I would have answered you 'unlikely.'

                    However, I strongly believe we are on the verge of an announcement that the Littoral Combat Ship is about to get canceled. It started with this news:

                    The Pentagon has again postponed a high-level meeting on the Navy's new Littoral Combat Ship program that was due take place on Oct. 29, a spokeswoman said, citing scheduling issues.

                    Pentagon spokeswoman Cheryl Irwin said no new date had been set for the meeting of the Defense Acquisition Board, which was expected to pave the way for the Navy to award a $5 billion contract for its new class of coastal warships.
                    The only reason the Navy would push the date back for selecting a winner of the LCS competition is if the Littoral Combat Ship is on the chopping block for POM 12. Well, as Bloomberg quotes Admiral Mullen discussing future defense budget cuts, that appears to be exactly what is happening.

                    “We’re going through that process right now,” Mullen said. “Major programs from all the services which aren’t performing well, which can’t get themselves under control in terms of cost and schedule, they’re going to be looking at either being slowed down dramatically or being eliminated...”

                    “If LCS is unable to contain itself in terms of cost and schedule, then I don’t think it has much of a future,” he said.
                    Makes sense to me, LCS is a great idea that has ultimately been executed as poorly as possible."

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Oldmike View Post
                      Makes sense to me, LCS is a great idea that has ultimately been executed as poorly as possible.
                      Who's quote is this? Yours, Galrahn's, or Admiral Mullen's?

                      Comment


                      • The last comment is Galrahn's.

                        Comment


                        • I think the LCS-3 design and concept is good. The problem is with that ridiculous 45 knots speed requirement. That eats up too much space which could otherwise be used for endurance or more load capacity. Maybe the USN can modify the design and start making "frigates" again.
                          "Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

                          Comment


                          • Galrahn and others may be a bit too premature in thinking LCS is dead. It's like a fiction novel vampire - hard to kill even if someone stuck a BF wooden stake in it's chest. We are discounting the possibility of PI (political influence) - recall that SECDEF made it his personal mission to ensure that NOC2010 specifically mentioned LCS as a certain part of future force structure and forcefully commented on that in previous talks such as the Navy League conference.

                            Until it's dead, really dead, cut up, burnt to a crisp, ashes scattered to the four winds and bones buried in the mist, LCS is, sadly, well and still alive.

                            Originally posted by Oldmike View Post
                            According to Galrahn at Information Dissemination: "If you would have asked me a month ago if the Navy intended to cancel the LCS, I would have answered you 'unlikely.'

                            However, I strongly believe we are on the verge of an announcement that the Littoral Combat Ship is about to get canceled. It started with this news:

                            The Pentagon has again postponed a high-level meeting on the Navy's new Littoral Combat Ship program that was due take place on Oct. 29, a spokeswoman said, citing scheduling issues.

                            Pentagon spokeswoman Cheryl Irwin said no new date had been set for the meeting of the Defense Acquisition Board, which was expected to pave the way for the Navy to award a $5 billion contract for its new class of coastal warships.
                            The only reason the Navy would push the date back for selecting a winner of the LCS competition is if the Littoral Combat Ship is on the chopping block for POM 12. Well, as Bloomberg quotes Admiral Mullen discussing future defense budget cuts, that appears to be exactly what is happening.

                            “We’re going through that process right now,” Mullen said. “Major programs from all the services which aren’t performing well, which can’t get themselves under control in terms of cost and schedule, they’re going to be looking at either being slowed down dramatically or being eliminated...”

                            “If LCS is unable to contain itself in terms of cost and schedule, then I don’t think it has much of a future,” he said.
                            Makes sense to me, LCS is a great idea that has ultimately been executed as poorly as possible."

                            Comment


                            • I hope the rest of the Rolls Royce gas turbines are more durable, as LCS-1 USS Freedom blew a turbine last month off the coast of California.
                              http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/0...eedom-092310w/
                              Last edited by surfgun; 20 Oct 10,, 23:46.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by gunnut View Post
                                I think the LCS-3 design and concept is good. The problem is with that ridiculous 45 knots speed requirement. That eats up too much space which could otherwise be used for endurance or more load capacity. Maybe the USN can modify the design and start making "frigates" again.
                                Did I say "LCS-3?" I meant "LCS-2" the trimaran hull of the Independence. I thought it's a pretty cool concept and provides a huge flight deck for the tonnage to operate helos and UAVs from.
                                "Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

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