Littoral Combat Ships

[SteveDaPirate]

Watch The Navy's Littoral Combat Ship Get Hammered By Heavy Seas

This video makes me feel for the poor guys riding around in Destroyer Escorts back in the day. I'm also curious to see how the fancy hull shape of the DDG-1000 performs in heavy seas as pictured.

[dan m]

This video makes me feel for the poor guys riding around in Destroyer Escorts back in the day. I'm also curious to see how the fancy hull shape of the DDG-1000 performs in heavy seas as pictured.

Damn that doesn't look like a fun ride. I agree and I can't wait to see how the DDG-1000 performs at sea with that pre-dreadnought esqe hull too. I also can't wait to see what it looks like inside and how the weapons will perform.

[TopHatter]

Norman Friedman penned a stout defense of the LCS back in December 2013

USS Little Rock, From Light to Guided Missile Cruiser: Lessons For The Littoral Combat Ship
By NORMAN FRIEDMAN
December 23, 2013

The Littoral Combat Ship has come under light fire from Congress because they worry especially about findings by operational testers that the ships cannot survive a firefight. Norman Friedman, a consultant at Gryphon Technologies with more than 30 military books to his name, argues in the following piece that critics need to consider that “change is at the core” of the LCS design, marking a welcome change in naval design. He believes LCS marks “the most fundamental change in warship design” in decades. Friedman compares the just-launched LCS ship USS Little Rock with the history of its predecessor, a light cruiser built near the end of World War II, mothballed a few years later and later rebuilt as a guided missile cruiser at considerable cost. Before critics dismiss Friedman’s argument, bear in mind that his book, “The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War,” won the Royal United Services Institute’s Westminster Prize in 2001. The man knows his history, as well as the capabilities of the US Navy. Read on. The Editor.

Warships are built to last a long time, so when they are laid down they are in essence bets on the future. But legendary baseball great and sometime philosopher Yogi Berra had it right, “It’s tough making predictions… especially about the future!” The increasing cost of modern warships makes it even more important that these platforms are capable of changing as threats evolve or new breakthroughs in warfare emerge.

Lost in all the discussions and debate swirling around the design, engineering, construction, and introduction of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is the most fundamental change in warship design since the introduction of the Vertical Launching System or the AEGIS Weapon System decades ago, and that is the concept of modularity. One of the most important characteristics of the LCS program is its inherent modularity and how that will facilitate affordable and timely modernization of the LCS ships throughout its expected 30-year service life. As is often the case in these technical debates, a look at history is helpful in understanding and placing modularity into a 21st-Century context.

The history of the World War II-era light cruiser the USS Little Rock (CL-92) showed how right Yogi was; her life was full of operational and technical surprises. She was laid down in 1943 as one of a large number of light cruisers that were just showing how effective they could be in combat versus Japanese cruisers in murderous night gun battles in the Solomon Islands. By the time she was completed in June 1945, her mission had changed, and the same cruisers were now wanted primarily to protect aircraft carriers, the fleet’s main striking arm. The war ended, however, before Little Rock could see actual combat, and the world’s geo-strategic situation soon changed dramatically.

Amid the postwar political disorder, it mattered a great deal that the United States could deploy powerful cruisers. Little Rock spent the early postwar years patrolling the Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas – regions where the new Cold War was brewing. By 1949, however, money for defense was short and many cruisers like Little Rock had to be laid up. In 1943, very few observers could have imagined a nuclear world in which the U.S. Navy’s main priorities would be strike carriers and anti-submarine warfare, while general-purpose gunships like cruisers would no longer be essential.

The real surprise, however was that Little Rock was still valuable – because she was large enough to adapt to undertake new missions and to accommodate new technology. The new jets of the 1950s out-classed the shipboard anti-aircraft guns that had been so useful against kamikaze attacks in 1945, so the Navy led in the development of the first generation of ship-to-air guided missiles. It took a big ship to accommodate these new weapons, and in its inventory of war-built cruisers the Navy had exactly the right ships for this new mission.

Removed from “mothballs” in 1957, after three years of shipyard work and hundreds of millions of dollars in upgrades, Little Rock was re-commissioned in June 1960, as one of the first guided missile cruisers (CLG/CG-4) in the Fleet. Not only did she carry missiles, she was also large enough to be outfitted as a fleet flagship. Both the missiles and the flagship capacity made her extremely useful in the new Cold War.

Little Rock returned to the Mediterranean as flagship of the Sixth Fleet, the most powerful Navy flotilla in that turbulent arena. As such, she was present when war erupted in the Middle East in 1967. After the Israelis inadvertently attacked the Navy surveillance ship USS Liberty, Little Rock provided medical aid and other emergency assistance to the stricken U.S. warship. As a command ship, she served as the hub of NATO forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. Besides Mediterranean operations, in 1961 Little Rock steamed off Santo Domingo to provide command and control capabilities for U.S. forces trying to stabilize that country after dictator Rafael Trujillo was assassinated. The crises may have changed, but the United States is still vitally interested today in both of those regions in which the original Little Rock once steamed. Little Rock was decommissioned in 1976, after two separate naval lives and providing valuable service to the nation.

In June 2013, the keel of a new USS Little Rock was laid. The latest incarnation is the Navy’s ninth Littoral Combat Ship (LCS-9), and her design reflects the great lesson of her predecessor’s life; ships last, but the world and missions can change quickly. The first Little Rock was never conceived to be re-built with entirely new weapons and electronics for new types of missions; no one could have imagined what those might be in 1943. The ship was worth re-building because she was large enough, fast enough and had a great deal of hull and machinery life still left in her. The second, latest iteration of Little Rock, on the other hand, is a very different proposition already. Change is at the core of her design. LCS-9 is conceived from the keel up to carry weapons and sensors that would be installed by placing standard shipping containers on board and connecting them to a “plug-and-fight” combat system.

Right now, the mission options are what might be expected for the littoral arena: anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, and mine countermeasures. To support those options, the new Little Rock can carry helicopters – manned and unmanned – and she can launch unmanned surface and underwater craft. She is designed to connect not only with craft she may launch, but also with other off-board sensors and systems. Both the unmanned vehicles and the off-board systems will undoubtedly become more and more important over her lifetime. We don’t know exactly what new missions she may be called upon to perform at a future date, but we do know that adapting to changing missions cannot take three years of shipyard work and hundreds of millions of dollars before she is ready to confront those changing operational demands.

As the new Little Rock is designed and built, the Navy remembered the lesson of the past: change is inevitable, and the service must build ships that can change as needed. Accordingly, the new Little Rock will be able to swap in-and-out tailored mission packages quickly – on the order of days if not hours—vice months or years.

The other lesson of the two Little Rocks is that the sea does not change. There is a reason the cruiser Little Rock spent years in the Mediterranean in both of her incarnations, and a reason she also spent time in the Caribbean. The sea is still the main way in which the United States connects with the rest of the world – and in a globalized world, we cannot lose that intimate contact. It is the primary way in which the United States supports its friends and Allies abroad, because only by sea can we move masses of material, including airplanes.

The new Little Rock is a littoral combat ship because more and more of the action at sea is likely to be in the littorals – that strip of land influenced by what happens offshore, and the strip offshore influenced by what happens ashore. That means mine warfare, anti-ship missiles and diesel-electric submarines – operational problems the containerized, modular LCS systems are intended to surmount.

If the modularity concept is so important, why then have the LCS mission modules taken so long to develop and field? The short answer would seem to be that the overall LCS program was uncertain until the decision was ultimately made to pursue the 20-ship contract. Why press ahead on mission packages when the basic hull itself and the need for 45-knot speed were in question?

It would appear that the program is now at the point where the Navy can place increased focus and resources on modular mission packages. If successful, these packages will be available to support matter-of-fact upgrades, as well as respond to unforeseen advances in technology, for Little Rock (LCS -9) and her sister ships. In short, modularity is a terrific idea and – apart from aircraft carriers, which are inherently modular – the LCS is the only modular ship we have. We need to get it right. Modularity is the future.

In many ways Yogi Berra was right, predicting the future is tough. But Little Rock LCS-9 and her sisters will have the flexibility to respond to — if not anticipate — unforeseen change and take on new missions that we can only dimly forecast today. Link

[SteveDaPirate]

Interesting article Tophatter.

I'm a fan of the LCS design, as I think that high speed, long range striking power (via generous aviation facilities) and modularity are a much better combination than heavy armor and a large gun in a ship of that size. I like to see an air defense module developed for them however.

I wouldn't be surprised at all if either more LCS ships or a successor designed in a similar vein are ordered after the original 20 are completed and they have a chance to show their stuff.

[surfgun]

Some estimates of the lifespan of an LCS is only 25 years. I would guess it is just dependent on how lightly these ships are used. Perhaps, if they are lightly used they may last as long as thirty years, but I'm not holding my breath.

[Tankersteve]

I am not a naval officer or engineer. However, I am not sure that a lightly armed, lightly built, very role-specific ship is the one I would want to be on. I appreciate the role of modularity. I would offer that the Mk41 VLS (and follow-on systems) are the hallmark of naval modularity. Perhaps in the future, space should be provided for faster sensor and workstation changes (or simply open architecture software workstations in the CiC or whatever squids call it).

But the LCS has very little capability in its own self-defense. It is undermanned to the point that crews report being overstressed just standing regular watches. It has to have made significant tradeoffs (likely in endurance, possibly in seakeeping and even seaworthiness) for the vaunted 40 knot speed. It is overly dependent on its aviation assets which may not be as available during various weather conditions. And it is weight-sensitive, and therefore limited in its own expansion through modularity - this is no pickup truck of a ship. It's more of a sports car with a radar detector that can be traded out for a scanner to monitor police or fire nets.

I'm on this site to learn. I have a few questions that may help me understand/appreciate the LCS design.

1. Are there standing universal principles of ship design (that may have evolved, as our understanding about the superiority of battleships and then aircraft carriers also evolved) or nation-specific ones, such as Italians seemingly always favoring faster ships with their primarily Med focus, or the idea that every (expeditionary) ship of a certain (decent) size/tonnage should have point defense, ASW, ASuW and AA capabilities, with sensors to match?
2. Why the preeminence given to sensors nowadays, which appears to outsiders at the expense of lethal systems to deal with the data produced by those sensors?

Tankersteve

[SteveDaPirate]

While I agree that VLS allows for quite a bit of flexibility, we already have cruisers, destroyers, and submarines that all sport VLS and with much deeper magazines than any ship the size of the LCS could manage.

I think the role of the LCS is really as a fast helicopter/drone carrier. For a smallish ship it has huge aviation facilities that are on par with those found on cruisers that are 4-5x the displacement. Its fast enough to run down nearly anything afloat and has the legs to evade anything it can't take in a straight up fight.

With an AEW helicopter and a couple of gunships it sounds like a great platform for plinking things like the Type 22 missile boat that are becoming quite prolific in the South China Sea. With airborne radar it can send gunships to attack missile boats loaded with AShMs while using its superior speed to avoid being targeted in turn. If a destroyer or cruiser starts getting too close for comfort it can turn on its heels and let them eat wake.

A more traditional Frigate with lower top speeds, armor, a big gun, and some VLS cells, could certainly kill missile boats, but not without taking a pounding in turn. It also runs the risk of being run down by larger surface combatants it can't fight effectively.

[Tankersteve]

SteveDP,

I'll buy that, but it sure isn't what the Navy is articulating about this ship. Also, a Mk32 (ASW) and a 8x pack of ESSM would certainly give this ship a more well-rounded capability. Sure, chasing little guys and the whole 'littoral' mission is cool and trendy, but we all know that the Navy will have to use these ships for everything and anything.

We are still awfully focused on those 2 MH-60s. Maybe things are different in the Navy, but in the Army I have seen really mild weather shut down aviation operations, and this was in a warzone, not training.

Tankersteve

[Squirrel]

I am not a naval officer or engineer. However, I am not sure that a lightly armed, lightly built, very role-specific ship is the one I would want to be on. I appreciate the role of modularity. I would offer that the Mk41 VLS (and follow-on systems) are the hallmark of naval modularity. Perhaps in the future, space should be provided for faster sensor and workstation changes (or simply open architecture software workstations in the CiC or whatever squids call it).

But the LCS has very little capability in its own self-defense. It is undermanned to the point that crews report being overstressed just standing regular watches. It has to have made significant tradeoffs (likely in endurance, possibly in seakeeping and even seaworthiness) for the vaunted 40 knot speed. It is overly dependent on its aviation assets which may not be as available during various weather conditions. And it is weight-sensitive, and therefore limited in its own expansion through modularity - this is no pickup truck of a ship. It's more of a sports car with a radar detector that can be traded out for a scanner to monitor police or fire nets.

I'm on this site to learn. I have a few questions that may help me understand/appreciate the LCS design.

1. Are there standing universal principles of ship design (that may have evolved, as our understanding about the superiority of battleships and then aircraft carriers also evolved) or nation-specific ones, such as Italians seemingly always favoring faster ships with their primarily Med focus, or the idea that every (expeditionary) ship of a certain (decent) size/tonnage should have point defense, ASW, ASuW and AA capabilities, with sensors to match?
2. Why the preeminence given to sensors nowadays, which appears to outsiders at the expense of lethal systems to deal with the data produced by those sensors?

Tankersteve

You can call us Sailors, that's what we are.

Open architecture is a pipe dream. We need systems that work, that work with existing systems, and systems that other elements are using. If you think that you can just implement a new system in CIC you've obviously never seen how things work. Systems talk to other systems, and then they talk to several other systems. Now, there are redundancies and back ups, but that's because they have built in over time, and tested. Not to mention the security issues involved.

Sailors complain all the damn time about being tired...it's nothing new. Welcome to the Navy.

Carriers are also "overly dependent on their aviation assets" but that seems to work out just fine.

Sensors are absolutely VITAL in regards of fighting the ship. This isn't WWII. The focus is because countries like Iran and China decided to go out and slap a damn missile on just about anything floating on the water. Those missiles can't do them a damn bit of good against a strong EW capability.

The IDC is here to stay.

[Tankersteve]

Sorry, didn't know I had used a less than accepted term.

I understand the issues. The Army is working to reset their mission command systems. Open architecture (or the Common Operating Environment) is a very distant objective, IMO, as no one is able to accept a set of standards. However, I do think it is the way to go. You adapt the hardware and proprietary software to the transport, not the transport and operating system to the separate systems. It's hard, but it is where we need to go. I have seen some bits on the Navy trying it - probably have the same issues Army will have. Plus, new anything (software, apps) isn't cheap.

Being tired - I think this has come from ship captains talking about their ability to satisfy missions vs manning. I could look, but I am sure it is out there that future missions will involve adhoc solutions to add bunk space for additional crew. Doesn't sound like the right way to work, and leaders are saying it.

Carriers also don't work alone. There is plenty of precedence for Perry-class working alone. If they have to be tethered to a Burke or other ships, with capabilities regardless of the weather, well, that is a significant limitation. I imagine that storms near littoral areas will create significant sea states that will impede aviation operations. Yet subs will still be functioning, and this ship will have very little capability to deal with it. Plus, fixed vs rotary wing is a pretty big difference, and landing a helicopter on a carrier vs a small deck on a short, pitching ship is not the same. I don't doubt your knowledge, but that answer was not what I was hoping to get from this site.

The focus on EW seems like a one-trick pony to me. Add a laser designator, ECM-proofed sensor, directional antenna for remote guidance or probably any series of alternatives that an enemy could develop and EW will not be effective. However, I agree that they are important. I just can't imagine being comfortable without some kind of tiered defense plan with Short/Medium range missiles and point defense systems. I guess my issue is why sensors are so overwhelmingly expensive. From what little I have read, hulls are not that expensive, even when built to higher naval requirements of survivability and even stealthy features. Weapon systems are expensive and sensors even more so.

I am not trying to be provocative, but I feel that your answers were almost boilerplate in addressing my questions.

Tankersteve

[DonBelt]

Bring back the PHM's!

[DonBelt]

SteveDP,

I'll buy that, but it sure isn't what the Navy is articulating about this ship. Also, a Mk32 (ASW) and a 8x pack of ESSM would certainly give this ship a more well-rounded capability. Sure, chasing little guys and the whole 'littoral' mission is cool and trendy, but we all know that the Navy will have to use these ships for everything and anything.

We are still awfully focused on those 2 MH-60s. Maybe things are different in the Navy, but in the Army I have seen really mild weather shut down aviation operations, and this was in a warzone, not training.

Tankersteve

I'm all for the ESSMS on an LCS, it would fit. But the helo's are what make it more capable. The Navy's SH-60/MH-60's are capable of operating in sea-state 6 with the RAST system and have improvements over the Army's MH-60's due to the marine enviroment- stronger engines, reinforced airframe, reinforced landing gear. If you overload the lcs with too many weapons it defeats the purpose of it, which is already pretty damaged by the cost. You want a smaller cheaper but still capable vessel for shallow water operations, but you're paying ship prices. Keep it simple, the current gun or a 76 mm rapid fire mount and a credible air defense. Not long range, but point defense. You get that with SeaRam and ESSMS. Then pair it up with a couple of Mk VI patrol boats. With helos to extend sensor range or attack ships that are too big for the LCS to close with you have a workable group that can operate in coastal waters against pirates, mine layers, other patrol craft or suicide boats. If you want it to stand on it's own as part of a SAG or patrolling open seas like a frigate, you might as well not have it and just get more destroyers or frigate type vessels.

[Gun Grape]

I am not a naval officer or engineer. However, I am not sure that a lightly armed, lightly built, very role-specific ship is the one I would want to be on. I appreciate the role of modularity. I would offer that the Mk41 VLS (and follow-on systems) are the hallmark of naval modularity. Perhaps in the future, space should be provided for faster sensor and workstation changes (or simply open architecture software workstations in the CiC or whatever squids call it).

But the LCS has very little capability in its own self-defense. It is undermanned to the point that crews report being overstressed just standing regular watches. It has to have made significant tradeoffs (likely in endurance, possibly in seakeeping and even seaworthiness) for the vaunted 40 knot speed. It is overly dependent on its aviation assets which may not be as available during various weather conditions. And it is weight-sensitive, and therefore limited in its own expansion through modularity - this is no pickup truck of a ship. It's more of a sports car with a radar detector that can be traded out for a scanner to monitor police or fire nets.

I'm on this site to learn. I have a few questions that may help me understand/appreciate the LCS design.

1. Are there standing universal principles of ship design (that may have evolved, as our understanding about the superiority of battleships and then aircraft carriers also evolved) or nation-specific ones, such as Italians seemingly always favoring faster ships with their primarily Med focus, or the idea that every (expeditionary) ship of a certain (decent) size/tonnage should have point defense, ASW, ASuW and AA capabilities, with sensors to match?
2. Why the preeminence given to sensors nowadays, which appears to outsiders at the expense of lethal systems to deal with the data produced by those sensors?

Tankersteve

Try this link for a good article that addresses some/most of your questions.

http://www.informationdissemination....ncepts-of.html

Most Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) critics remain fixated on the ships’ past incarnations and problems going back to its origin in 2003. The “gold standard” in the history of the program in that era is Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work’s Naval War College occasional paper on the subject.[1] Work readily acknowledges the faults associated with the program that nearly brought about its demise in 2007, but also remains convinced that the ship in its two forms (Freedom and Independence variants) represents the ideal small surface combatant for the U.S. Navy moving forward into the mid 21st century. This author agrees and plots potential one possible evolution of the class’ concepts of operation moving forward into the next decade.
LCS began life as a very low capability combatant designed to “mop up” any opposition remnants that survived the withering joint assault of aircraft and missiles from a variety of naval and non-naval sources. Nearly all operations in the early 2000’s were envisioned as repeats of the successful 1991 Desert Shield/Storm where Combined Joint forces would intervene from the sea to secure some failed or rouge state on the Eurasian littoral. That operational geography, however, has radically changed due to the emergence of major regional rivals with large scale economic, military, and technological capabilities. These powers have since deployed battle space denial systems to further those interests. The U.S. again contemplates high end combat on the high seas and every ship in the force architecture from carrier to patrol boat must play a part. Given the overall shortfall in U.S. surface forces, LCS will be employed within existing battle networks in support of this new strategic and operational construct.
It appears now that LCS will soon constitute four separate variants of the same warship type, if frigate (FF) versions of each type are produced. What can the LCS's contribute to present and future battle networks? How do they survive within a continuum of war that includes transition from peace to exercise readiness, to crisis, to open hostilities within an intact enemy maritime surveillance system, and finally to conflict with an enemy maritime surveillance system functioning at nuisance value? How does the Navy keep the dispersed LCS and other ships from being isolated from the network and destroyed piecemeal? These are the real questions LCS advocates and critics alike should be asking in 2015.
The LCS will operate in a spectrum of conflict up to and including open warfare. The LCS squadron of four to six ships can conduct a variety of peacetime engagement operations in its baseline configuration. Its transition from peacetime to war footing, however, will require careful prepositioning of multiple mission modules, ammunition, fuel and other supplies for both LCS types and their frigate variants. Such items will need to be dispersed throughout potential regions of conflict in order to allow the ship to quickly assume its wartime tasks. All four variants will remain dependent on existing battle networks when operating in close proximity with other battle force units or when dispersed in order to make the most of its installed and modular capabilities. Neither the baseline LCS nor its frigate variant is expected to support a robust air and missile defense system. Ship and shore-based aviation assets can provide this, and the installation of AEGIS ashore facilities at key geographic points (if political and diplomatic conditions permit) can provide further defensive and offensive support.

LCS combat missions may include antisubmarine warfare (ASW) escort missions in littoral regions where the U.S. and allies have air superiority and general ASW escort of tactical groups.[2] An LCS squadron may secure key sea lines of communication (SLOCS’s) through important chokepoints in low to medium threat environments. LCS and/or frigate units armed with medium range surface to surface missiles also have the potential to contribute to the Distributed Lethality concept at some stage in a campaign by threatening enemy surface formations. The LCS’ size and rotary wing aviation facilities allow a greater degree of independent operations as opposed to single mission small combatants when battle network connectivity is degraded or lost. Manned helicopter and unmanned rotary wing vehicles can provide surveillance, be network connectivity nodes, and provide limited air strike against weak or damaged enemy units. LCS is not a destroyer or a high-end European frigate and is not a substitute for the more robust offensive and defensive capabilities inherent in those larger ships. It can, however, conduct presence operations, replace larger battle force units in low and medium threat environments, and provide additional offensive and defensive capability in support of conventional naval formations.[3]
Sadly, most LCS critics to date are focused on the problems and issues of the past vice those of the present and future. There is a long list of past issues, and progress to ameliorate them is sometimes slow. The Navy grossly underestimated the sea frames' cost in the early 2000's, but recent purchases are well below the most recent Congressional cost cap of $538 million.[4] The ship took a long time to get into active, deployed service and has not met all of its Key Performance Parameters (KPP’s) as fast as many critics demand. The mission modules are still undergoing testing, and require a complete, additional re-test each time a piece of equipment, however minor, is added. Test and Evaluation assessors cannot seem to accept the fact that ships smaller than 4000 tons and less than 425 feet in length are just not as physically survivable as its larger cousins, if for no other reason than having a shower floodable length and less reserve buoyancy. This situation will not change regardless of how many additional systems or superfluous armor is crammed aboard. The speed requirements from 2001 cut into weight that might otherwise be given to fuel and additional installed systems, but redesign of propulsion plants is expensive, and high operational speeds may allow for rapid sprints toward targets and away from potential threats.[5] The ship relies on non-ship’s force personnel for significant amounts of its maintenance, but even this is not a new and haphazard concept that must be replaced by a “relearning” of the maintenance practices of larger ships as some critics suggest.[6] The patrol gunboats of Vietnam vintage; the patrol hydrofoils (PHM’s) of the Cold War[7] and the Post-Cold War Cyclone class patrol coastal ships were all supported by deployable maintenance teams during periods of their service lives.[8]
Naval force structures change over time, and what worked well in the Cold War or in the last 20+ years of the immediate post-Cold War era is not sufficient in the middle of the 2nd decade of the 21st century. The world in which the LCS was created and where Joint and Combined operations against weak opponents along the Eurasian littoral were the most likely operation has changed. The cruise and ballistic missile threat has increased to the point where medium sized combatants like the retiring Oliver Hazard Perry class and large European frigates cannot mount enough defensive weapons to survive repeated salvos of such weapons. Such big frigates are also too expensive in comparison to the limited combat capability they provide in comparison with larger combatants such as the Arleigh Burke class destroyers. The new surface navy world is one of large, high end combatants capable of offensive and defensive warfare, and small combatants like LCS that provide support to larger units, and conduct operations in low and medium threat environments. The Littoral Combat Ship is being built in significant numbers. Its modular design allows for great flexibility in what payloads it carries to the battle. It is time for LCS critics to let go of problems associated with past concepts of LCS and focus their talents on the ships’ future employment in the networked battle force.

[Gun Grape]

Carriers also don't work alone. There is plenty of precedence for Perry-class working alone. If they have to be tethered to a Burke or other ships, with capabilities regardless of the weather, well, that is a significant limitation.

Tankersteve

What offensive and defensive capabilities did the Perrys have after 2000? (When they removed the SM-1/harpoon capabilities of the Mk-13 launcher)

A 76mm gun, CIWS and 2 ASW torpedo launchers. Less than LCS has today.

[Squirrel]

Sorry, didn't know I had used a less than accepted term.

I understand the issues. The Army is working to reset their mission command systems. Open architecture (or the Common Operating Environment) is a very distant objective, IMO, as no one is able to accept a set of standards. However, I do think it is the way to go. You adapt the hardware and proprietary software to the transport, not the transport and operating system to the separate systems. It's hard, but it is where we need to go. I have seen some bits on the Navy trying it - probably have the same issues Army will have. Plus, new anything (software, apps) isn't cheap.

Being tired - I think this has come from ship captains talking about their ability to satisfy missions vs manning. I could look, but I am sure it is out there that future missions will involve adhoc solutions to add bunk space for additional crew. Doesn't sound like the right way to work, and leaders are saying it.

Carriers also don't work alone. There is plenty of precedence for Perry-class working alone. If they have to be tethered to a Burke or other ships, with capabilities regardless of the weather, well, that is a significant limitation. I imagine that storms near littoral areas will create significant sea states that will impede aviation operations. Yet subs will still be functioning, and this ship will have very little capability to deal with it. Plus, fixed vs rotary wing is a pretty big difference, and landing a helicopter on a carrier vs a small deck on a short, pitching ship is not the same. I don't doubt your knowledge, but that answer was not what I was hoping to get from this site.

The focus on EW seems like a one-trick pony to me. Add a laser designator, ECM-proofed sensor, directional antenna for remote guidance or probably any series of alternatives that an enemy could develop and EW will not be effective. However, I agree that they are important. I just can't imagine being comfortable without some kind of tiered defense plan with Short/Medium range missiles and point defense systems. I guess my issue is why sensors are so overwhelmingly expensive. From what little I have read, hulls are not that expensive, even when built to higher naval requirements of survivability and even stealthy features. Weapon systems are expensive and sensors even more so.

I am not trying to be provocative, but I feel that your answers were almost boilerplate in addressing my questions.

Tankersteve

If you know the issues, why ask the question?

Sailors are always tired. Furthermore, how many days underway can they support? Not even to mention the fact that they have three crews for every two hulls...sounds pretty sweet to me.

Carriers don't work alone, and neither will an LCS. No commander would send out an LCS to conduct combat operations without any sort of support, the CNO said as much. Additionally, the mission of the frigate was escort operation, that is something the LCS could do quite well.

I don't know if you have dealt with much EW, but everything you mentioned already exists, and there are already counter-counter measures.