Littoral Combat Ships

[gunnut]

I wasn't thinking of "sending". Frigates & such are patrollers. Sending a Burke just to have a look around, or as light escort, is an overkill. And, again, the USN needs a lot of hulls, can't aford Burkes and such everywhere. As for "hold their own", no one expects a single frigate to win wars. But most modern (ie, last 20 years) EU frigates are pretty well equiped. The average has a 76-127mm gun, ASM/SAM missiles, 1-2 light guns and at least 1 CIWS, doing 25-30 knots, carrying a helicopter. Ie, what the Perrys had.

Karel Doorman-class frigate - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Barbaros-class frigate - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Anzac-class frigate - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Surelly the USN would find use for such ships. 3-4 could cover an area larger than a single Burke. Portuguese MEKO (amongst others) have been patroling everywhere, from the Med to Somalia. And we have to relly entirelly on someone else's support ships...

Well, now we're talking policies and doctrine. Can we, and should we, be at all places around the world at all times? Or do we outsource minor matters to local powers friendly to us? Like you said, other nations have their own forces to patrol their own area of interest. Most naval powers are friendly to us. The Brits and the French usually will take care of stuff around Africa. The Italians hang out in the Roman lake. We have the Aussies and the Kiwis patrolling south Pacific. South America is our backyard and close enough to send just about anything we have on a moment's notice. The only areas of concern are Indian Ocean (Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa) and West Pacific where the local powers are squabbling (China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines).

Perrys were the last of a long line of ocean going escorts. Do we still need them? Is there a purpose for them in the next 30 years? If we have frigates, are they ocean going escorts or minor surface combatants or land attack platform or sub chasers?

Apparently the Navy thinks we don't need ocean going escorts any more, at least not in the immediate future. The Navy believes we need land attack platforms and mini carriers to augment our main carriers and assault carriers. It's a whole new way of thinking. Will it work? Is it worth the cost? I don't know. It sure got us talking though.

[SteveDaPirate]

Well, now we're talking policies and doctrine. Can we, and should we, be at all places around the world at all times? Or do we outsource minor matters to local powers friendly to us? Like you said, other nations have their own forces to patrol their own area of interest. Most naval powers are friendly to us. The Brits and the French usually will take care of stuff around Africa. The Italians hang out in the Roman lake. We have the Aussies and the Kiwis patrolling south Pacific. South America is our backyard and close enough to send just about anything we have on a moment's notice. The only areas of concern are Indian Ocean (Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa) and West Pacific where the local powers are squabbling (China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines).

Perrys were the last of a long line of ocean going escorts. Do we still need them? Is there a purpose for them in the next 30 years? If we have frigates, are they ocean going escorts or minor surface combatants or land attack platform or sub chasers?

Apparently the Navy thinks we don't need ocean going escorts any more, at least not in the immediate future. The Navy believes we need land attack platforms and mini carriers to augment our main carriers and assault carriers. It's a whole new way of thinking. Will it work? Is it worth the cost? I don't know. It sure got us talking though.

This begs the question of which, if any, potential adversaries have the ability to harass allied shipping in the face of an assault/blockade by the USN and local allies. The most obvious candidate is the PLAN, although several factors work against them.

Foremost in my mind is geography. The first island chain is certain to be the focus of major efforts by all parties to seal the opposition out or in respectively. I imagine mines will quickly be deployed en masse by both parties in relevant areas, further restricting the ability of either side to transit the first island chain. With such choke points, I don't give the limited numbers of PLAN surface assets capable of blue water operations much chance of forcing a task force out, particularly since the lack of forward bases for the PLAN means they will have to force their way back in again to repair/refuel/rearm.

This mostly leaves PLAN submarines to attempt to break out of the containment and give the USN the slip if they want to harass shipping. An operating environment where mines and submarines are the major threat to shipping, with relatively little surface opposition seems to be right up the alley of numerous small ships with unusually extensive rotary-wing assets, à la LCS.

Does anyone besides the PLAN present a real challenge to the USN in the foreseeable future? I'm assuming the old Soviet fleet is too far gone at this point to be modernized and brought into service.

[Squirrel]

This begs the question of which, if any, potential adversaries have the ability to harass allied shipping in the face of an assault/blockade by the USN and local allies. The most obvious candidate is the PLAN, although several factors work against them.

Foremost in my mind is geography. The first island chain is certain to be the focus of major efforts by all parties to seal the opposition out or in respectively. I imagine mines will quickly be deployed en masse by both parties in relevant areas, further restricting the ability of either side to transit the first island chain. With such choke points, I don't give the limited numbers of PLAN surface assets capable of blue water operations much chance of forcing a task force out, particularly since the lack of forward bases for the PLAN means they will have to force their way back in again to repair/refuel/rearm.

This mostly leaves PLAN submarines to attempt to break out of the containment and give the USN the slip if they want to harass shipping. An operating environment where mines and submarines are the major threat to shipping, with relatively little surface opposition seems to be right up the alley of numerous small ships with unusually extensive rotary-wing assets, à la LCS.

Does anyone besides the PLAN present a real challenge to the USN in the foreseeable future? I'm assuming the old Soviet fleet is too far gone at this point to be modernized and brought into service.

Geography works in favor of the PLAN, not the other way around. And I could give a damn about the mines, because we have sweepers, and we can watch their ships like clockwork. What gives me pause is that df-21, because that is AAD all by itself. Also, their number of surface combatant missile shooters is impressive. And their OPTEMPO is relatively high on a consistent basis.

You're right about the subs, because they are getting better with them. And that's all I'm going to say about that.

As far as other challengers, They all have their strong and weak points. Russia has great sub capabilities. India has a solid surface force. Iran is just fucking nuts and put missiles on just about anything they could have. And you can't trust a Pakistani frigate as far as you can throw it.

Bottom line, we worry. We worry about everything.

The navy pays me to be four things: paranoid, predictive, pessimistic, and professional.

This statement above is solely my own and is not endorsed by or reflective of the official USN position on such matters.

[SteveDaPirate]

Geography works in favor of the PLAN, not the other way around. And I could give a damn about the mines, because we have sweepers, and we can watch their ships like clockwork. What gives me pause is that df-21, because that is AAD all by itself. Also, their number of surface combatant missile shooters is impressive. And their OPTEMPO is relatively high on a consistent basis.

It seems like the geography in China's neighborhood represents somewhat of a double edged sword. Most of the first island chain isn't friendly to China, and while the PLAN can fortify behind it easier than if it were open ocean, locking merchant shipping out will quickly cut deeply into China's export driven economy. I would think that if the USN could keep the bulk of the PLAN contained in the China seas, just waiting while the Chinese economy withers could force capitulation without even requiring any sort of fight to the finish. The fact that much of the Communist Party's legitimacy is contingent upon the delivery of continued economic growth would put additional political pressure on China to concede to demands in the face of a blockade.

[Squirrel]

It seems like the geography in China's neighborhood represents somewhat of a double edged sword. Most of the first island chain isn't friendly to China, and while the PLAN can fortify behind it easier than if it were open ocean, locking merchant shipping out will quickly cut deeply into China's export driven economy. I would think that if the USN could keep the bulk of the PLAN contained in the China seas, just waiting while the Chinese economy withers could force capitulation without even requiring any sort of fight to the finish. The fact that much of the Communist Party's legitimacy is contingent upon the delivery of continued economic growth would put additional political pressure on China to concede to demands in the face of a blockade.

I'm trying hard to frame a response that doesn't sound like I am just barking back at you, but I hope you understand that this is of a very personal interest to me. I do appreciate the exchange, thank you. But...

A blockade pretty much negates everything the USN stands for, in this context you might not realize it, but this is awfully close to declaring war. Which then means you have put a Chinese gun to Taiwan's collective head, along with the rest of east Asia. The Asian countries retain modest naval capabilities, nothing that could withstand a surface group of the PLAN. Also, the ridiculous missile proliferation program China has in place all but assures a futile resistance if offered.

Therefore, if you want to take China down, you should be prepared to watch most of Asia go down with it. Not to mention the pain we will feel here when Chinese goods don't make it to market. This is why I don't really ever see this situation unfolding.

I mean, it's pretty much a gamble: "who'll blink first?" Sure, we can keep the ships within the first island chain, but we also can't go past that first island chain...unless of course we are in full-blown conflict. Then we go where we have to.

[SteveDaPirate]

I appreciate your replies, even if it does involve correcting some misconceptions on my part. :) One of the main reasons I like posting here is that guys who actually know what they are talking about will set me straight when I'm headed off in the wrong direction.

I hadn't considered that USN action might tempt the Chinese to make a play for Taiwan and/or South East Asia, although in retrospect it makes sense. While I'd expect Japan's and South Korea's navies to be able to make a good showing for themselves (although I suspect they would integrate with the USN), I can't really think of anyone else in China's immediate neighborhood with enough modern units to put up a serious fight. So I am inclined to agree that a lot of China's other neighbors could get shellacked.

The issue of trade is one I find to be balanced heavily against China in any conflict however. Trade is responsible for a respectable 23% of the US's GDP, while it makes up a whopping 45% of Chinese GDP. Perhaps more importantly, any naval contest between the USN and PLAN would see nearly all of China's trade shut down, as very little of it goes overland. On the other hand, China has no real means to disrupt the US's dealings with other major trading partners in North America or the EU. So while the US would feel a sting from the loss of Chinese trade and some disruption with other nearby nations, it would hardly compare with China losing ~45% of their GDP overnight.

The question of course is how the Chinese would respond in such a scenario. The idea that they would utilize the inevitable spike in nationalism to achieve their territorial goals with respect to Taiwan and their neighbors to the south is admittedly disconcerting.

My apologies to the group for derailing the thread with "what if" scenarios rather than focusing on the LCS.

[kato]

But most modern (ie, last 20 years) EU frigates are pretty well equiped.

That's because they're built for 3D escort missions, moving away from the previous large-taskforce-integrated concepts. You can see a similar move within the JMSDF during the same timeframe, although there it's with a blue water emphasis and hence closer to a US "escorter" model. Just look at the Murasame and Takanami class destroyers.

Per se, most of Europe already considers the concept outdated, now - and over the next decade - moving towards a high-low mix of larger numbers of more-or-less modular multi-purpose patrol ships with considerable restrictions and symmetric warfare destroyers that focus pricier AAW capability. It's not just the big navies doing that, the medium-sized ones are moving in this direction too.

[desertswo]

I'm trying hard to frame a response that doesn't sound like I am just barking back at you, but I hope you understand that this is of a very personal interest to me. I do appreciate the exchange, thank you. But...

A blockade pretty much negates everything the USN stands for, in this context you might not realize it, but this is awfully close to declaring war. Which then means you have put a Chinese gun to Taiwan's collective head, along with the rest of east Asia. The Asian countries retain modest naval capabilities, nothing that could withstand a surface group of the PLAN. Also, the ridiculous missile proliferation program China has in place all but assures a futile resistance if offered.

Therefore, if you want to take China down, you should be prepared to watch most of Asia go down with it. Not to mention the pain we will feel here when Chinese goods don't make it to market. This is why I don't really ever see this situation unfolding.

I mean, it's pretty much a gamble: "who'll blink first?" Sure, we can keep the ships within the first island chain, but we also can't go past that first island chain...unless of course we are in full-blown conflict. Then we go where we have to.

It is not "awfully close," it is in fact an "act of war," both de facto and de jure. This is why the blockade of Cuba during October of 1962 purposely wasn't called a "blockade." Walked, talked, etc., etc., etc. like one, but by calling it a "quarantine," the specter of an act of war was avoided, even if only in a very transparent kabuki dance. De facto, it was a blockade, de jure it wasn't.

[desertswo]

How much punishment can you really design a corvette or frigate sized platform to take and remain effective? As mentioned previously, the lack of displacement and crew size are a significant problem that isn't going to be easily overcome by construction techniques.

I'm not sure focusing on speed and elusiveness are such a bad decision in that light, even at the cost of armor or structural strength.

I really consider the primary armament of the LCS to be the aviation facilities, that happen to be superior to what you would find on even a Burke or Tico, not the 57mm gun.

The hanger on an Independence can hold a pair of Seahawks, and the flight deck is the largest of any surface combatant in the fleet at 7300 square feet.

I don't know how many AH-1's you could load on to the thing for an assault, but I'd hazard a guess at 5-6. That actually represents a pretty respectable threat that combined with the LCS's speed, can appear quickly in unexpected places.

The fact that helicopters represent the primary offensive punch also allows the LCS to maintain a significant standoff range, which certainly contributes greatly to survivability, even if it doesn't show up in a comparison of how many mines/missiles/bombs a ship can eat and remain afloat.

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Do AH-1s have rotor brakes? It's not an insignificant question as safety of personnel and aircraft are in play.

[Gun Grape]

Do AH-1s have rotor brakes? It's not an insignificant question as safety of personnel and aircraft are in play.

Marine Corps ones do.

[desertswo]

Marine Corps ones do.

I figured they did, but you know a lot of people clamor for more "jointness," and I love joint ops, but there are just some things you cannot do and some Army choppers have no business routinely on a flight deck that small.

[gunnut]

I figured they did, but you know a lot of people clamor for more "jointness," and I love joint ops, but there are just some things you cannot do and some Army choppers have no business routinely on a flight deck that small.

Glucosamine for joint health!!!

[DonBelt]

OH-58's and OH-6's routinely operated from small decks in the Persian Gulf in the late 80's. I was on a Spruance- the USS Stump, and we operated 2 OH-58's. And they crashed too. No serious injuries, but there just isn't that much room on a Spruance flight deck and one landed on the other.

[desertswo]

OH-58's and OH-6's routinely operated from small decks in the Persian Gulf in the late 80's. I was on a Spruance- the USS Stump, and we operated 2 OH-58's. And they crashed too. No serious injuries, but there just isn't that much room on a Spruance flight deck and one landed on the other.

Yeah, the deal with the rotor brakes, or rather, lack of them, is that if you are doing 20 knots or so, guess what those Army rotors without brakes are doing until you can get them secured. It can get kind of dicey at times.

We didn't "operate" the Army birds from our poor excuse for a flight deck. Hell, we didn't operate Navy ones for that matter, but we did control the OH-58s and OH-6s during those interesting night excursions they used to do. Lots of fun back in the day.

[gunnut]

OH-58's and OH-6's routinely operated from small decks in the Persian Gulf in the late 80's. I was on a Spruance- the USS Stump, and we operated 2 OH-58's. And they crashed too. No serious injuries, but there just isn't that much room on a Spruance flight deck and one landed on the other.

Heyyyy....guess what little ship has a very large flight deck?