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  • Originally posted by Tom24 View Post
    OK before I comment any further in this thread, this isn't going to devolve into one of these tired " the Coast Guard isn't military thread" is it?? Seriously, you do realize that the U.S. Coast Guard is one of the 5 Armed Forces of the United States don't you? Despite the fact that Coast Guard cutters have dual maritime law enforcement capability that our cutters are surface combatants don't you, and that during time of war we act as ocean going escorts, amphibious, and littoral warfare operations, armed boarding, search and seizures in international waters and in war zones? These aren't new missions, these are all legacy Coast Guard missions performed since the creation of the Coast Guard as a military service, performed in WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Desert Storm and our current wars. Our cutters deploy to war zones because the U.S. Navy asks for them because of their dual LE authority. Since the beginning of Iraqi Freedom we've had 6 110' (Island class) cutters permanently forward deployed to the Persian Gulf, they are still there and we're very involved in the initial invasion of Iraq. USCGC Monomoy captured the first Iraqi maritime prisoners of war during the initial invasion operating upriver. If our cutters are going to deploy to war zones to conduct patrols they need to be armed should they not? The NSC's can act as flagships in amphibious operations if needed just like the 378's did and the 327's before them during WWII. Even our 225' black hulled bouy tenders take part in naval exercises. The OPC's that will replace our 270' and 210's will be close to the same size as the LCS and armed similarly to the NSC. We deploy to war zones because of our dual LE capability and expertize in armed boardings. Even Navy ships engaged in LE missions need Coasties embarked. We have participated in every armed conflict in U.S. history, that's why our cutters are equipped with these capabilities. Combat is not the primary mission of the Coast Guard, maritime law enforcement and SAR is our bread and butter, but support of military and combat operations is one of our mission sets. There are even Coast Guard members deployed in land locked Afghanistan. The US. Navy can't be everywhere, and I don't think DDG's should be doing those missions. I've tried to answer your questions as best as I can and you just aren't getting it for some reason, so I'm going to bow out of this thread. Carry on and have a nice day.
    No worries on my end vis-a-vis the Coast Guard mission. I wear the Coast Guard Special Operations Ribbon for a reason. In fact, almost my entire XO/CO ride was in support of the Coast Guard/DEA mission in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean. Sometimes we had LEO dets on board, sometimes we didn't. When we didn't, it's because we were serving as a sort of radar picket ship to spot and track low fliers from Colombia, etc. to the US. We did the battle hand off to the Coast Guard once when the contact was about to go feet dry, and they did the rest. I kind of liked doing the LEO job. Beats the hell out of being someone's "orange force" in a never ending series of exercises, and could occasionally get "exciting."

    Comment


    • Hijacked ......

      Tom,

      The best of threads on Naval warfare gets hijacked once in a while.
      But just like the famous 47 footers, they roll over in heavy swells and right themselves....
      It stirs the blood and keeps the interest, plus we usually learn something.! ;)

      You mention Grand Haven... well then you being a Coastie know about another famous underarmed Cutter? [first four photos]

      And you may of been fortunate to have missed out on the famed USCG crew @ South Haven, to used this type of rescue boat which was recently restored [last picture]!: on the east side of Lake Michigan when the winter winds come early ...... eek:
      Attached Files
      Last edited by blidgepump; 22 Jan 15,, 20:01.

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      • As a matter of fact I've been aboard the McClane several times. It's actually a bit north of Grand Haven in Muskegon. The USS Silversides is moored there as well, and the NOAA vessel Laurentian. I had the pleasure of visiting the the McClane on a bitterly cold winter morning when they were running up the diesels on the Silversides, that was cool. I didn't know that they were in running condition. The McClane is in great shape.
        Attached Files

        Comment


        • Originally posted by Tom24 View Post
          As a matter of fact I've been aboard the McClane several times. It's actually a bit north of Grand Haven in Muskegon. The USS Silversides is moored there as well, and the NOAA vessel Laurentian. I had the pleasure of visiting the the McClane on a bitterly cold winter morning when they were running up the diesels on the Silversides, that was cool. I didn't know that they were in running condition. The McClane is in great shape. [ATTACH]38992[/ATTACH][ATTACH]38993[/ATTACH][ATTACH]38994[/ATTACH][ATTACH]38995[/ATTACH]

          https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5oa3...FfXZP&index=51


          Then you will want to be sure to watch this action packed B & W TV series I have been working my way through on a cold winter evening.
          Our resident O-6 was kind enough to provide the link and this episode is about the Silversides..... enjoy. ;)

          Comment


          • By: Steven Wills
            Published: January 22, 2015 7:00 AM • Updated: January 22, 2015 5:36 PM


            Less than a month after U.S. Navy leaders announced modified versions of both variants of the Littoral Combat Ship would be the Navy’s pick for its for a more lethal and survivable small surface combatant, one of the chief LCS critics said the upgrades would do little to improve the survivability of the class.

            Chief Pentagon weapon tester Michael Gilmore still remains fundamentally dissatisfied with the survivability of the Navy’s littoral combatant ship (LCS) and its upgraded follow-on, the small surface combatant (SSC).

            “Notwithstanding reductions to its susceptibility” compared with the design of the first 32 ships, he told Bloomberg on Jan. 8.
            “The minor modifications to the LCS will not yield a ship that is significantly more survivable.”

            It remains to be seen, however, how the Navy can improve the other legs of the “survivability triangle” of a hull displacing 3,000 tons and is less than 425 feet in length.

            Small ships have been historically unsurvivable. Modern small warships are not in any way the equivalent of the World War II predecessors. Every warship is a compromise in armament, endurance, speed and survivability. This is especially true of the LCS, as its modular operational profile demands absolute adherence to weight limitations.

            Small warships are historically unsurvivable in combat. They have a shorter floodable length, reduced reserve buoyancy and more likely to be affected by fire and smoke damage than larger combatants. In both World Wars, losses in ships below 3000 tons in displacement far exceeded those of larger vessels.

            In World War II, for example, the U.S. lost a total of 71 destroyers and 11 destroyer escorts — all under 3400 tons displacement and less than 400 feet in length.

            By comparison, only 23 larger ships were lost. Part of that figure is undoubtedly due to their operational employment, but in simple terms of engineering and physics, larger ships are inherently more survivable than their smaller counterparts.

            There are stories of small combatants, such as the famous Fletcher class destroyer, surviving severe damage and yet remaining capable of inflicting damage on opponents.

            This history perhaps influences the opinions of those who believe small warships can somehow be made more survivable than the LCS or the SSC.

            Today’s weapon systems such as the 57mm gun on the LCS and SSC are much more fragile than the 5’38 caliber guns found on most U.S. Navy small combatants in World War II.

            Gun mounts became lighter and unarmored in the Cold War as the expansion of radars and mast-mounted communications equipment, among many improvements, forced warship designers to adopt lighter equipment to maintain ship stability.

            Current gun mounts are no longer manned to allow for a backup capability in the event of damage to centralized fire control capabilities. Many commercial off the shelf (COTS) components currently in use aboard Navy warships are much more fragile and more difficult to repair under battle conditions.
            The crew size of a modern small combatant is also significantly smaller than its WWII cousins.

            A Flight 0 LCS has a base crew of 90, with the capability to accommodate more personnel for mission modules. SSC would presumably have a similar complement. The Fletcher class destroyer had a crew of 273 and later wartime destroyers had over 300 men assigned. Crew sizes in present warships are likely to decrease in the wake of greater automation and a desire to reduce personnel costs.

            These additional crewmen allowed for manual weapons operation and damage control vital to the survivability of the ship. In short, comparisons with past small combatants are not an effective means to measure the survivability of the LCS or SSC.
            The present Navy concept of warship survivability is described in OPNAV Instruction 9070.1A as a combination of susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability.

            Gilmore noted that the SSC represents an improvement of LCS in susceptibility to attack. By Navy definition, this means “A measure of the capability of the ship, mission critical systems, and crew to avoid and or defeat an attack and is a function of operational tactics, signature reduction, countermeasures, and self-defense system effectiveness.”

            The SSC has an increased fit of installed weapon systems that allow the ship to defeat attack. Improvements to the other legs of the survivability triangle are more difficult.

            The Navy defines vulnerability as “A measure of the capability of the ship, mission critical systems, and crew to withstand the initial damage effects”, while still carrying out its mission. As previously described, that’s a tall order for a ship already disadvantaged by its physically small size.
            Improving recoverability is equally difficult. The Navy defines it as “A measure of the capability of the ship and crew, after initial damage effects, whatever the cause, to take emergency action to contain and control damage, prevent loss of a damaged ship, minimize personnel casualties, and restore and sustain primary mission capabilities.” SSC is supposed to have additional armor protection, but given the weight restrictions of the LCS class, it is doubtful this will be anything beyond splinter protection.

            The small crew size will also limit the sort of manual-intensive damage control the U.S. Navy practiced in WW II and the Cold War. Installed, automated damage control systems offer some relief, but if damaged or destroyed in the first attack, they will likely be ineffective. Given all of these factors and their effect on a small ship with a small crew and little spare weight for improvement; it seems impossible that the Navy will ever reach Gilmore’s survivability demands for either the LCS or the SSC.
            Every warship is a compromise of capabilities and limitations on a hull of a given size. The Navy has determined that the LCS and eventually the SSC will fulfill very specific missions on the hull size it selected during initial LCS design.

            Gilmore’s survivability demands on the present LCS hull are respectfully unrealistic. A larger vessel such as the Spanish Navy’s Alvaro de Bazan class F100 frigate or its Norwegian or Australian cousins may be able to support increased survivability, but such a vessel would be inherently more expensive.

            A traditional frigate is also not what the Navy desired when it sought a replacement for the aging mine countermeasures and patrol ships, as well as the retiring Oliver Hazard Perry class whose dated missile capabilities were removed starting in 2003.

            LCS and SSC are simply not as survivable, as the Navy currently defines this term, as larger combatants due to physical constraints, smaller crew size, and fewer installed active and passive defense systems. It is unreasonable to demand that they meet a higher standard on the current hull.
            Opinion: LCS Survivability Questions Linger - USNI News
            Last edited by surfgun; 23 Jan 15,, 01:09.

            Comment


            • Just want to be the devil's advocate here:

              LCS standard crew size: 90
              Fletcher standard crew size: 300+ (war time)

              Let's just say a missile hits an LCS. The ship explodes and sinks, taking all hands. 90 lives lost.

              Let's say the same missile hits a Fletcher. The large crew was able to save the ship using intense manual damage control methods. Basically, throwing bodies at damaged areas to stop things from getting worse. Let's say the ship survived but lost 2/3 of the crew. That's 100 lives lost.

              From body count perspective, LCS is still safer. I know there's a damage to the prestige of the navy with each lost ship. But the human toll might actually be smaller.
              "Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

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              • The human toll may be smaller, but there will be no ship to patch up to return to the fight.

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                • Originally posted by surfgun View Post
                  By: Steven Wills
                  Published: January 22, 2015 7:00 AM • Updated: January 22, 2015 5:36 PM


                  By comparison, only 23 larger ships were lost. Part of that figure is undoubtedly due to their operational employment, but in simple terms of engineering and physics, larger ships are inherently more survivable than their smaller counterparts.
                  And how many "large ships" can any navy aford? And 1 ship can only be in 1 spot; no matter how good it is, you still need to cover multiple spots... which means multiple ships. A half-size, half-decent hull is better than none.

                  But the LCS is an over-expensive, underguned bloat. Which can't even hold it's own.

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                  • The survivability of large ships vs small ships in WW2 also owes somewhat to the fact that the small ships, destroyers and destroyer escorts, were defending the larger ships which were ships involved in projecting power- aircraft carriers, troop landing ships, etc. But there are other factors, not just size, armor and weapons involved in survivability. Do LCS's have fire mains that can be segregated into loops and isolated from damage? Multiple pumps feeding the system? Multiple portable pumps both electric and gas powered? How many fire stations and damage control lockers do they have? Do they have a centralized location to monitor these systems and track damage. Can you reroute power around damaged areas?
                    The LCS also have a lot of wide open spaces because of the concept of mission packages- this doesn't help to control flooding or fire. Damage control/ survivabilty is man power intensive, but also you need something you can isolate, work around and jury-rig to make it survivable. The OHP class for it's short comings was able to do this- put men with knowledge and tools together with something that they could work with.

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by surfgun View Post
                      The human toll may be smaller, but there will be no ship to patch up to return to the fight.
                      True, but when? If a conventional ship had lost 1/3 of her war time crew in one battle, I'm gonna say she's out of the fight for a long time.
                      "Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by jlvfr View Post
                        And how many "large ships" can any navy aford? And 1 ship can only be in 1 spot; no matter how good it is, you still need to cover multiple spots... which means multiple ships. A half-size, half-decent hull is better than none.

                        But the LCS is an over-expensive, underguned bloat. Which can't even hold it's own.
                        Agreed, LCS is over priced, with some questionable capabilities. But should they "hold their own?"

                        I think it was gf0012-aust who said these weapons are only a single cog in a system-event that we call "battle." They each perform a specific function to complete the event. We never send our planes, trains, and automobiles into the fight by themselves. They are always supported by many other units tasked to complete this event.

                        We will never send an LCS into the fight all by herself. We won't send a Burke into a fight all by herself. That's just not how we do things.

                        What weapons should the LCS carry? I don't know. All I know is $700 million for a "high speed assault transport" seems a little steep.
                        "Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

                        Comment


                        • How much punishment can you really design a corvette or frigate sized platform to take and remain effective? As mentioned previously, the lack of displacement and crew size are a significant problem that isn't going to be easily overcome by construction techniques.

                          I'm not sure focusing on speed and elusiveness are such a bad decision in that light, even at the cost of armor or structural strength.

                          I really consider the primary armament of the LCS to be the aviation facilities, that happen to be superior to what you would find on even a Burke or Tico, not the 57mm gun.

                          The hanger on an Independence can hold a pair of Seahawks, and the flight deck is the largest of any surface combatant in the fleet at 7300 square feet.

                          I don't know how many AH-1's you could load on to the thing for an assault, but I'd hazard a guess at 5-6. That actually represents a pretty respectable threat that combined with the LCS's speed, can appear quickly in unexpected places.

                          The fact that helicopters represent the primary offensive punch also allows the LCS to maintain a significant standoff range, which certainly contributes greatly to survivability, even if it doesn't show up in a comparison of how many mines/missiles/bombs a ship can eat and remain afloat.

                          Attached Files
                          Last edited by SteveDaPirate; 23 Jan 15,, 22:07.

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                          • Originally posted by gunnut View Post

                            We will never send an LCS into the fight all by herself. We won't send a Burke into a fight all by herself. That's just not how we do things.
                            I wasn't thinking of "sending". Frigates & such are patrollers. Sending a Burke just to have a look around, or as light escort, is an overkill. And, again, the USN needs a lot of hulls, can't aford Burkes and such everywhere. As for "hold their own", no one expects a single frigate to win wars. But most modern (ie, last 20 years) EU frigates are pretty well equiped. The average has a 76-127mm gun, ASM/SAM missiles, 1-2 light guns and at least 1 CIWS, doing 25-30 knots, carrying a helicopter. Ie, what the Perrys had.

                            Karel Doorman-class frigate - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
                            Barbaros-class frigate - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
                            Anzac-class frigate - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

                            Surelly the USN would find use for such ships. 3-4 could cover an area larger than a single Burke. Portuguese MEKO (amongst others) have been patroling everywhere, from the Med to Somalia. And we have to relly entirelly on someone else's support ships...

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                            • Originally posted by SteveDaPirate View Post

                              The fact that helicopters represent the primary offensive punch also allows the LCS to maintain a significant standoff range
                              Yeah, the brits showed that in the Falklands and in the Gulf-91... but that's for ofensive operations. And it assumes the copters can be launched in time, or they don't break down, or the weather isn't bad. And then there's enemy SAMs...

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by jlvfr View Post
                                Yeah, the brits showed that in the Falklands and in the Gulf-91... but that's for ofensive operations. And it assumes the copters can be launched in time, or they don't break down, or the weather isn't bad. And then there's enemy SAMs...
                                I keep seeing a lot of comparisons that are suggesting the LCS is just a gun armed frigate with a wimpy gun. My argument is that it is really a fast helicopter carrier that has a gun sufficient to defend against the things that can catch it.

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