Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Littoral Combat Ships

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • desertswo
    replied
    Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    Sir,

    Follow up question, how capable were they of getting in the first lick, I mean, how capable were their officers? Follow up question, did they know they were a kamakazi force?
    Officers were fine. Enlisted men not so much.


















    o

    Leave a comment:


  • desertswo
    replied
    Originally posted by Monash View Post
    This raises a point I've been curious about for a while i.e damage control in a modern naval engagement. The only experience I can think of that even loosely equates is the Falklands War where the chief (public) lesson - apart from never build warship hulls or superstructures using aluminum alloy was that against frigate size hulls 'one shot' kills were to be expected i.e. the damage caused by modern anti-ship combined with modern ship designs meant 'damage control' was limited to fighting the fires long enough for the crew to abandon ship.

    So take say an AB class destroyer which gets hit by 2 harpoons in a narrow space of time (minutes), damage control is fully manned and operational at the time and both hits are roughly mid-ship, one near the waterline and one in the superstructure. So for we laymen exactly how the hell do you 'damage control 440 kilos of HE going off inside a modern warship?
    Watch and learn.

    Leave a comment:


  • Officer of Engineers
    replied
    Originally posted by desertswo View Post
    My "appreciation" of both was simple . . . they'd better get in the first lick,
    Sir,

    Follow up question, how capable were they of getting in the first lick, I mean, how capable were their officers? Follow up question, did they know they were a kamakazi force?

    Leave a comment:


  • tbm3fan
    replied
    Originally posted by gunnut View Post
    I wonder if current PLAN ships operate under the same "doctrine?"
    I wonder the same thing although I don't think any will be paying a visit during Fleet Week and be open to the public. If they did I would be looking them over.

    Leave a comment:


  • Officer of Engineers
    replied
    From a Land Force Officer at the time of the good Captain, I really didn't know the defficenies of the Navy but I trusted the Navy to do her job. The Good Captain did nothing to disillusioned me although his stories made me extremely scared just how fucking tough his job was.

    Leave a comment:


  • Monash
    replied
    Originally posted by desertswo View Post
    Twist my arm why don't ya? :LOL:

    They couldn't have put out a fire, or shored up a bulkhead if their lives depended on it . . . which, of course they did.

    See for those have no experience with the US Navy, we assume we are going to take battle damage, rather than hope (like one would do in the case of the Soviet ships or the LCS) that we won't. We kind of take John Paul Jones' admonishment, "Don't give up the ship," pretty seriously.
    This raises a point I've been curious about for a while i.e damage control in a modern naval engagement. The only experience I can think of that even loosely equates is the Falklands War where the chief (public) lesson - apart from never build warship hulls or superstructures using aluminum alloy was that against frigate size hulls 'one shot' kills were to be expected i.e. the damage caused by modern anti-ship combined with modern ship designs meant 'damage control' was limited to fighting the fires long enough for the crew to abandon ship.

    So take say an AB class destroyer which gets hit by 2 harpoons in a narrow space of time (minutes), damage control is fully manned and operational at the time and both hits are roughly mid-ship, one near the waterline and one in the superstructure. So for we laymen exactly how the hell do you 'damage control 440 kilos of HE going off inside a modern warship?

    Leave a comment:


  • Officer of Engineers
    replied
    Originally posted by Tankersteve View Post
    I know, tons of newbie/neophyte questions. Thanks for putting up with me.
    Major,

    Not a direct answer but perhaps an anology you can understand. I was Land Force, not Navy but I experienced the same equipment degration and budget shortages and my Chief of Land Staff at the time made the best decision he could under the circumstances.

    LF at the time had LEO C1s but they were so overused that you can poke a pencil through its armour. At the same time, our M113s were also due for replacements. Our deployments at the time was Yugoslavia. Which was more important? Tanks we couldn't deploy or infantry protection for our Peacekeepers?

    Obviously, we chosed our Peacekeepers but being soldiers, we piggy back as much as we could on our new purchases. This being the LAV-105.

    Then 11 September happenned.

    Long story short, the war gave Ottawa the excuse to ditch the LAV-105s and got 2nd hand LEO IIs. But we're Canadians.

    There is no such thing as 2nd hand stuff for the USN.

    Leave a comment:


  • Tankersteve
    replied
    Originally posted by desertswo View Post
    I am both. In fact, for three years I was the Navy's "school master" on all things engineering and damage control related. My staff of 32 officers and CPOs taught every officer assigned to a surface combatant, from brand new Ensigns to senior Captains on their way to their major command rides. Among other facilities in my bag of tricks were fire fighting and DC wet trainers. In all approximately 18 of my 25 years of active duty were spent either being an engineer at sea, a fleet engineering inspector, or an instructor. So with that as my bona fides, my take on these ships is that they are simply not survivable in an environment wherein missiles and/or major caliber guns are in play. Why? Aluminum hull combined with minimal manning. Bad combination all around. If I were king for a day, they'd be gone . . . with the exception of their 40 knot speed.
    And sir, thanks for that response. I am a doubter, myself, not that anyone need care. I have to say that I find it odd that many wrote off my questions/concerns, yet a sailor with serious credentials has his own significant misgivings about this set of concepts/designs/classes.

    A ship operating in the littorals would seem to have a greater risk of facing anti-ship shore batteries. Israel is a good example of facing asymmetric/non-state actor-type threats fielding capabilities that many are surprised to see. This seems to be all the more reason to have increased layers of air defense/point defense capabilities. Am I overthinking the threat here?

    As for the comment about how the LCS compares to the neutered FFGs, I think their (FFG) subsequent role was an example of what that led to. You went from a very well-rounded frigate, to one relegated to showing the flag and counter-narcotic missions. Important stuff, sure, but pretty limited still. Even when the aircraft couldn't fly, the FFGs still had the ability to conduct limited ASW and had a marginally more capable gun than the LCS. If equipped with RAM (as originally conceived) and Phalanx, they had increased point defense capabilities too (over LCS), given similar upgrades in sensor/EW capabilities.

    Is there a serious cut-off for flight operations on Navy vessels? I'm curious on sea-state changes in the littorals versus blue-water and the frequency of limited air operations. Also, is the flight deck on the LCS (either variant) at a lower level, ala the early Burke class, where wave action/effects can directly impact air ops? I know many love the flexibility of those -60s, but are non-flying days assumed to essentially be non-fighting days (i.e., the enemy is equally impacted) or are Navy birds just that much more tolerable of weather conditions?

    I know, tons of newbie/neophyte questions. Thanks for putting up with me.

    Tankersteve

    Leave a comment:


  • gunnut
    replied
    I wonder if current PLAN ships operate under the same "doctrine?"

    Leave a comment:


  • TopHatter
    replied
    Good stuff, thank you Cap'n.

    That jibes exactly with what I've heard about the Soviet Navy from other sources: Pretty ships, impressive looking...and no in way capable of intense combat operations (see also USS Samuel B Roberts)

    Leave a comment:


  • desertswo
    replied
    Originally posted by TopHatter View Post
    Captain, can we impose upon you to favor us with an anecdote or two (or three or four) about those Sov ships?
    Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    Seconded. Please.
    Originally posted by blidgepump View Post
    Sir, a full trio awaits your recitals.....
    Twist my arm why don't ya? :LOL:

    First of all, we never knew what alphabet soup was "asking" us to be, as Jethro Bodine was wont to say, "double ought spies"; but I imagine it was ONI/DIA/JCS J-2, but we were never told and we knew enough not to ask. Second, to provide further cover, we took our spouses, or in my case, because my wife was on a walker with a still problematic artificial hip, and wasn't going to be going up and down any ladders, I borrowed another colleague's wife who was a naval officer in her own right. We were all assigned to the CINCPACFLT Propulsion Examining Board. Our boss, Admiral Larson was aboard as well, but he didn't know any of us (we operated as a detachment based in San Diego, rather than with the staff at Pearl Harbor). Third, the ships are very impressive to look at if one is a casual observer. We were paid not to be casual about anything. Four, one of the reasons they look so good is because they had been freshly painted . . . again, and again, AND AGAIN. Hydraulic rams associated with missile launchers, as well as valve hand wheels were so covered in paint that it was doubtful they would function properly. The same situation existed on rubber door gaskets on water tight/fume tight doors and hatches, which means they would not have seated properly, thus rendering them anything but water and/or fume tight. Fifth, and here is the one that really matters; there were no fire stations, as I would know the term, anywhere on the main deck. Nor was there any bulkhead mounted DC equipment or cans of AFFF as one would see on a US combatant. They couldn't have put out a fire, or shored up a bulkhead if their lives depended on it . . . which, of course they did.

    See for those have no experience with the US Navy, we assume we are going to take battle damage, rather than hope (like one would do in the case of the Soviet ships or the LCS) that we won't. We kind of take John Paul Jones' admonishment, "Don't give up the ship," pretty seriously.

    Leave a comment:


  • kato
    replied
    Originally posted by Gun Grape View Post
    RAM and ESSM requires the ship to paint each individual target until impact.
    RAM does not require painting, and actually doesn't support it. The seeker is passive radar homing with terminal imaging infrared, from Block 1 onwards switched to two homing modes (infrared homing or dual passive radar/infrared homing). In HAS mode RAM is IR homing only.

    For those interested in the fire-and-forget modes of RAM you may want to read this (unclassified) document:
    http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA390349

    Since it does not go into that: HAS is an extension of AIR mode with modified scan pattern and classification tables.

    The downside of RAM's AIR/HAS fire-and-forget mode (in particular in comparison to AGM-114L) is that it does not allow ship-side target discrimination or preferred target selection. A salvo of RAM missiles sent towards a specified vector will destroy any target satisfying its target pattern beginning with the target best matching. Should that target be destroyed by the current lead missile in the salvo in-flight successive missiles will switch to the next-best target.

    Against larger surface targets that emit an active radar signature (such as a navigation radar, which is found on anything 30-feet upwards) the dual RF/IR mode can be used that allows target discrimination.

    Originally posted by Gun Grape View Post
    Hellfire is given a direction and general area and uses its own seeker head to find and engage.
    The USN has procured AGM-114L (Longbow Hellfire) though. AGM-114L does not provide LOAL capacity against non-static targets. For non-static targets the launch system provides a radar image of the specific target which the missile will search after launch and home in on.
    Last edited by kato; 02 Aug 15,, 19:48.

    Leave a comment:


  • blidgepump
    replied
    Command performance ....

    Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    Seconded. Please.
    Sir, a full trio awaits your recitals.....

    Leave a comment:


  • Officer of Engineers
    replied
    Originally posted by TopHatter View Post
    Captain, can we impose upon you to favor us with an anecdote or two (or three or four) about those Sov ships?
    Seconded. Please.

    Leave a comment:


  • TopHatter
    replied
    Originally posted by desertswo View Post
    It was like that day back in 1990 when I and two of my compatriots were "asked" to don mufti attire and pretend to be normal, every day touristas touring the Soviet Udaloy and Sovremennyy-class frigates/destroyers visiting San Diego, and then provide our "appreciation" of them in terms of engineering and damage control. My "appreciation" of both was simple . . . they'd better get in the first lick, because they won't get off a second or third. They will be too busy trying to save a ship that cannot be saved. Ditto these POSs.
    Captain, can we impose upon you to favor us with an anecdote or two (or three or four) about those Sov ships?

    Leave a comment:

Working...
X